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Second United Front

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For other uses, see United Front (disambiguation).
Second United Front
第二次國共合作
Leader Chiang Kai-shek
Mao Zedong
Dates of operationDecember 24, 1936 (1936-12-24) – March 7, 1947 (1947-03-07)[1]
Dissolved7 March 1947
Merger of Kuomintang
Chinese Communist Party
Country China
Allegiance Nationalist government
MotivesAnti-Japanese sentiment
HeadquartersChongqing, Yan'an
IdeologyChinese nationalism
Anti-fascism[a]
Anti-imperialism
Political positionBig tent
Part ofUnited Nations
Allies Soviet Union
 United States
 British Empire
and other Allies
OpponentsAxis powers
Battles and warsSecond Sino-Japanese War
Flag Republic of China
Preceded by
First United Front
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A Communist soldier waving the Nationalists' flag of the Republic of China after a victorious battle against the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War

The Second United Front (traditional Chinese: 第二次國共合作; simplified Chinese: 第二次国共合作; pinyin: dì èr cì guógòng hézuò; lit. 'Second Nationalist-Communist Cooperation') was the alliance between the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to resist the Imperial Japanese invasion of China during the Second Sino-Japanese War, which suspended the Chinese Civil War from 1937 to 1945.

Background

[edit]
Main article: Xi'an Incident

In late 1935, Chiang Kai-shek started secret negotiations with the Soviet Union in the hopes of gaining material assistance if war broke out between China and Japan. As a precondition for an agreement, the Soviets wanted Chiang to negotiate a ceasefire with the CCP.[6] Although reluctant to engage with a group he saw as a rebels, Chiang cautiously sought to establish contact with the CCP.[7][8] The CCP Central Committee told them that the CCP was interested in a united anti-Japanese army under a government of national defense.[9] Given the wide gap between the CCP and KMT's conditions, further negotiations did not take place during the first half of 1936.[7]

Meanwhile, the CCP opened up separate negotiations with the Nationalist forces besieging them in northwest China. They managed to sign secret ceasefire agreements with Zhang Xueliang, leader of the Northeastern Army, and Yang Hucheng, leader of the Northwestern Army.[10] These generals were frustrated that Chiang' was prioritizing Civil War over resistance to Japan.[11][12] Yan Xishan, another neighboring warlord, also signed a secret agreement with the Communists, although he was not as closely aligned with them as Zhang or Yang.[13] The members of this northwestern alliance were united by their desire to resist Japan, but they differed over the details of how this could best be accomplished.[10] The Communists supported a plan to use Soviet support to take over Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang and turn northwest China into a base under Zhang's command to resist Japan and oppose Chiang.[14] Zhang, Yang, and Yan were still committed to convincing Chiang to lead the anti-Japanese resistance.[10] As they continued to negotiate, they kept their alliance secret and even staged fake military battles to allay the suspicions of the Nanjing government.[15][10]

Negotiations between Chiang and the CCP began in earnest in late 1936.[16] Chiang continued to try to resolve the civil war militarily; he continued to consider a negotiated settlement with the CCP to be a last resort.[17] He was encouraged by the results of the Ningxia campaign in mid-to-late October. In that campaign, the Second and Fourth Corps of the Red Army marched north to pick up supplies dropped in Mongolia by the Soviet Union, but found themselves trapped on the wrong side of the Yellow River.[18] They were cut to pieces by the Hui cavalry allied with the Nationalists.[19] Chiang began making preparations for a sixth encirclement campaign, and instructed Zhang and Yang to participate.[20] In early November, Chen Lifu presented Pan Hannian with a set of extremely harsh conditions for a deal.[b] Pan balked, calling them "conditions for surrender".[23] In late November, Chiang ordered the Northeastern Army and forces from the central Nationalist Army, Hu Zongnan's Right Route Army, to attack towards the Communist capital at Bao'an. At the resulting Battle of Shanchengbao, the Northeastern Army withheld most of its forces from the attack. This allowed the Red Army to ambush and nearly wipe out Hu's 78th regiment.[24][25] This reversed the diplomatic situation: Chen Lifu moderated his conditions, but the CCP recalled Pan Hannian from Nanjing on December 10.[26][27]

In late 1936, Zhang Xueliang decided that his repeated attempts to persuade Chiang to create a united front with the Communists were not going to be enough. To Zhang, Chiang appeared dead-set on continuing the Civil War even as the threat of Japanese invasion loomed ever larger. Following Yang Hucheng's advice, he decided to resort to drastic measures.[28][29] On 12 December 1936, the disgruntled Zhang and Yang conspired to kidnap Chiang and force him into a truce with the CCP. The incident became known as the Xi'an Incident.[30] Both parties suspended fighting to form a Second United Front to focus their energies and fight the Japanese.[30]

Cooperation during the War of Resistance

[edit]
In July 1937, the Presidium of the Central Military Commission issued an order for the Red Army to reorganize into the National Revolutionary Army and stand by for the anti-Japanese front line.

As a result of the truce between KMT and CCP, the Red Army was reorganized into the New Fourth Army and the 8th Route Army, which were placed under the command of the National Revolutionary Army. The CCP agreed to accept the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and began to receive some financial support from the central government run by KMT. In agreement with KMT Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region and Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region were created. They were controlled by the CCP.

After the commencement of full-scale war between China and Japan, CCP forces fought in alliance with the KMT forces during the Battle of Taiyuan, and the high point of their cooperation came in 1938 during the Battle of Wuhan.

However, the CCP submission to the chain of command of the National Revolutionary Army was in name only. The CCP acted independently and hardly ever engaged the Japanese in conventional battles. The level of actual coordination between the CCP and KMT during the Second Sino-Japanese War was minimal.[31]

Breakdown and aftermath

[edit]

In the midst of the Second United Front, the CCP and the Kuomintang were still vying for territorial advantage in "Free China" (i.e. those areas not occupied by the Japanese or ruled by puppet governments). The uneasy alliance began to break down by late 1938 as a result of CCP efforts to expand their military strength through absorbing Chinese guerrilla forces behind enemy lines. For Chinese militia who refused to switch their allegiance, the CCP would call them "collaborators" and then attack to eliminate their forces. For example, the Red Army led by He Long attacked and wiped out a brigade of Chinese militia led by Zhang Yin-wu in Hebei in June, 1939.[32]

In December 1940, Chiang Kai-shek demanded that the CCP's New Fourth Army evacuate Anhui and Jiangsu Provinces. Despite the intense pressure, the New Fourth Army commanders committed insubordination by marching in an unauthorized direction and also missed the deadline to evacuate. Added to this were the attacks by the CCP on the Kuomintang Forces in Hebei in August 1939 and in Jiangsu in October 1940, so they were ambushed and defeated by Nationalist troops in January 1941.[33][34] This clash, which would be known as the New Fourth Army Incident, weakened but didn't end the CCP position in Central China and effectively ended any substantive co-operation between the Nationalists and the CCP and both sides concentrated on jockeying for position in the inevitable Civil War.[35] It also ended the Second United Front formed earlier to fight the Japanese.[36]

Afterwards, within the Japanese occupied provinces and behind enemy lines the KMT and CCP forces carried on warfare with each other, with the CCP eventually destroying or absorbing the KMT partisan forces or driving them into the puppet forces of the Japanese. The CCP under the leadership of Mao Zedong also began to focus most of their energy on building up their sphere of influence wherever opportunities were presented, mainly through rural mass organizations, administrative, land and tax reform measures favoring poor peasants; while the KMT allocated many divisions of its regular army to carry out military blockade of the CCP areas in an attempt to neutralize the spread of their influence until the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War.[37]

After 1945

[edit]

After the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong attempted to engage in peace talks. This effort failed and by 1946 the KMT and the CCP were engaged in all-out civil war. The CCP were able to obtain seized Japanese Army weapons in the Northeast – with Soviet acquiescence – and took the opportunity to engage the already weakened KMT. In October 1949, Mao established the People's Republic of China, while Chiang retreated to the island of Taiwan.[38]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^ Chiang Kai-shek, who was the leader of Kuomintang, was pointed out by some critics as having a fascist element. Jay Taylor, argue that Chiang's ideology does not espouse the general ideology of fascism despite his growing sympathies with fascist ideas in the 1930s.[2] Chiang repeatedly attacked his enemies such as the Empire of Japan as fascistic and ultra-militaristic; he also declared his opposition to the fascist ideology in the 1940s.[3][4] The Sino-German relationship also rapidly deteriorated as Germany failed to pursue a détente between China and Japan, which led to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. China later declared war on fascist countries, including Germany, Italy, and Japan, as part of the Declarations of war during World War II and Chiang became the most powerful "anti-fascist" leader in Asia.[5]
  2. ^ The terms called for, among other things, reducing the Red Army to 3,000 men and sending all of its senior officers into exile.[21][22]

References

[edit]

Citations

[edit]
  1. ^ "1947年3月7日 第二次国共合作破裂".
  2. ^ Taylor, Jay (2009). The Generalissimo. Harvard University Press. pp. 102–103. ISBN 9780674054714.
  3. ^ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 21 April 2021. Retrieved 19 July 2022.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  4. ^ "Chiang Kai-shek's victory speech in 1945 – YouTube". 2013-06-09. Retrieved 2022-07-19 – via YouTube.
  5. ^ Guido Samarani, ed. (2005). Shaping the Future of Asia: Chiang Kai-shek, Nehru and China-India Relations During the Second World War Period. Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies, Lund University.
  6. ^ Yang 2020, p. 62.
  7. ^ a b Yang 2020, p. 63.
  8. ^ Itoh 2016, pp. 124–125.
  9. ^ Pantsov 2023, pp. 230–231.
  10. ^ a b c d van de Ven 2003, p. 179.
  11. ^ Coble 1991, pp. 224–225.
  12. ^ Itoh 2016, p. 108.
  13. ^ Gillin 1967, p. 232.
  14. ^ Yang 2020, p. 64.
  15. ^ Barnouin & Yu 2006, p. 65.
  16. ^ Sheng 1992, p. 158.
  17. ^ Chen 2024, pp. 161–162.
  18. ^ Yang 2020, p. 65.
  19. ^ Watt 2014, pp. 111–112.
  20. ^ Itoh 2016, pp. 129–130.
  21. ^ Peng 2023, p. 476.
  22. ^ Sheng 1992, p. 163.
  23. ^ Chen 2024, p. 161.
  24. ^ Dillon 2020, p. 102.
  25. ^ Yang 1990, p. 223.
  26. ^ Dillon 2020, pp. 101–102.
  27. ^ Peng 2023, pp. 476–477.
  28. ^ Pantsov 2023, pp. 241–242.
  29. ^ Pantsov 2012, p. 302.
  30. ^ a b Ye, Zhaoyan Ye, Berry, Michael. (2003). Nanjing 1937: A Love Story. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-12754-5.
  31. ^ Buss, Claude Albert. (1972). Stanford Alumni Association. The People's Republic of China and Richard Nixon. United States.
  32. ^ Ray Huang, 從大歷史的角度讀蔣介石日記 (Reading Chiang Kai-shek's Diary from a Macro History Perspective) China Times Publishing Company, 1994-1-31 ISBN 957-13-0962-1, p.259
  33. ^ Benton, Gregor (1986). "The South Anhui Incident". The Journal of Asian Studies. 45 (4): 681–720. doi:10.2307/2056083. ISSN 0021-9118. JSTOR 2056083. S2CID 163141212.
  34. ^ "政治垃圾張蔭梧曾欲為國民黨奪回北平_历史-多維新聞網". culture.dwnews.com. Retrieved 2019-10-30.
  35. ^ Schoppa, R. Keith. (2000). The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-11276-9.
  36. ^ Schoppa, R. Keith. (2000). The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-11276-9. p. 160
  37. ^ "Crisis". Time. 13 November 1944. Archived from the original on November 20, 2007.
  38. ^ "The Chinese Revolution of 1949". 2007-07-13.

Sources

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  • Resistance and Revolution in China
  • Barnouin, Barbara; Yu, Changgen (2006). Zhou Enlai: A Political Life. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Retrieved 28 January 2023.
  • Chen, Jian (2024). Zhou Enlai: A Life. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press.
  • Coble, Parks M. (1991). Facing Japan: Chinese politics and Japanese imperialism; 1931 - 1937. Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard Univ. ISBN 9780674290112.
  • Dillon, Michael (2020). Zhou Enlai: The Enigma Behind Chairman Mao. New York: I.B. Tauris.
  • Gillin, Donald (1967). Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Itoh, Mayumi (3 October 2016). The Making of China's War with Japan: Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang. Springer. ISBN 978-981-10-0494-0.
  • Pantsov, Alexander V (2012). Mao: The Real Story. Translated by Levine, Stephen I. New York: Simon and Schuster.
  • Pantsov, Alexander V (2023). Victorious in Defeat: The Life and Times of Chiang Kai-shek, 1887–1975. Translated by Levine, Stephen I. New Haven: Yale University Press.
  • Peng, Lü (2023). A History of China in the 20th Century. Translated by Doar, Bruce (1st ed.). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-981-99-0733-5.
  • Sheng, Michael (1992). "Mao, Stalin, and the Formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front: 1935-1937". The China Quarterly. 129 (129): 149–170. doi:10.1017/S0305741000041266.
  • van de Ven, Hans (2003). War and Nationalism. New York: Routledge.
  • Yang, Benjamin (1990). From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
  • Yang, Kuisong (2020). "Sino-Soviet Diplomacy Under the Threat of War". In Shen, Zhihua (ed.). A Short History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917–1991. Translated by Xia, Yafeng. Singapore: Palmgrave Macmillan and Social Sciences Academic Press.
  • Watt, John R. (2014). Dudbridge, Glen; Pieke, Frank (eds.). Saving Lives in Wartime China. Leiden: Brill.
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