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Online papers on consciousness, part 2: Other Philosophy
of Mind
Compiled by David Chalmers
Part 2 of Online papers on consciousness
TABLE OF CONTENTS [1071 papers]
Language and Thought
Murat Aydede, The language of thought hypothesis (see also here )
Jose Luis Bermudez, Language and thinking about thoughts
Jose Luis Bermudez, The limits of thinking without words
Darragh Byrne, Three notions of tacit knowledge
Elisabeth Camp, Metaphor in the mind
Peter Carruthers, Thinking in language?: Evolution and a modularist possibility
Peter Carruthers, The cognitive functions of language (and reply to commentators )
Peter Carruthers, Distinctively human thinking
David Chalmers, Is there synonymy in Ockham's mental language
Andrew Chrucky, Sellars on language and thought
Andy Clark, Magic words: How language augments human computation
David Cole, Pinker on the thinker: Against mentalese monopoly
David Cole, Hearing yourself think: Natural language, inner speech, and thought
Robert Cummins, Systematicity
Robert Cummins, James Blackmon, David Byrd, Pierre Poirier, Martin Roth, Georg Schwarz, Systematicity and the cognition of structured domains
Martin Davies, Architecturalism and the language of thought
Martin Davies, Aunty's argument and armchair knowledge
Martin Davies, In the armchair, down and out (and lectures two and three )
Martin Davies, Tacit knowledge and semantic theory: Can a five percent difference matter?
Daniel Dennett, Verbal language as a communicative system
Daniel Dennett, The role of language in intelligence
Daniel Dennett, Making tools for thinking
Daniel Dennett, Reflections on language and mind
Michael Devitt, Linguistics is not psychology
Richard DeWitt, Vagueness, semantics, and the language of thought
Jerry Fodor, Review of Bermudez's Thinking without Words
Christopher Gauker, Language and thought
Lila Gleitman & Anna Papafragou, Language and thought
Steven Gross, Can one sincerely say what one doesn't believe?
Larry Hauser and Barbara Abbott, Natural language and thought
Henry Jackman, Expression, thought, and language
Frank Jackson, Locke-ing onto content
Larry Kaye, The language of thought
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, Number and natural language
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, Regress arguments against the language of thought
Kirk Ludwig, Direct reference in thought and speech
Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich, Semantics, cross-cultural style
Ruth Millikan, The language-thought partnership: A bird's eye view
Ruth Millikan, Essential indeterminacies between semantics and pragmatics
Phillip Robbins, What domain integration could not be
Daniel Rothschild & Stephan Leuenberger, Descriptivism and the philosophy of mind
Eric Schwitzgebel, Difficulties in Davidson's arguments against belief without language
Brent Silby, Revealing the language of thought
Aaron Sloman, The primacy of non-communicative language
Jeff Speaks, Is mental content prior to linguistic meaning?: Stalnaker on intentionality
Jeff Speaks, Three Views of Language and the Mind
Dan Sperber, Understanding verbal understanding
Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson, The mapping between the mental and the public lexicon
Tony Stone & Martin Davies, Chomsky among the philosophers
Propositional Attitudes
Kent Bach, A puzzle about belief reports
Kent Bach, Do belief reports report beliefs?
George Bealer, Propositions
Joao Branquinho, The problem of cognitive dynamics
David Braun, Russellianism and psychological generalizations (and explanation and prediction )
David Braun, Understanding belief reports
David Braun, Cognitive significance, attitude ascriptions, and ways of believing propositions
Curtis Brown, Direct and indirect belief
Curtis Brown, What is a belief state?
Cheryl Chen, Why
perception matters: The case of the global clairvoyant
Austen Clark, Beliefs and desires incorporated
Martin Davies, Explicit and implicit knowledge: Philosophical aspects
Martin Davies and Max Coltheart, Pathologies of belief
Daniel Dennett, Do animals have beliefs?
Pascal Engel, Believing, accepting, and holding true
Pascal Engel, Free believers?
Eric Funkhouser, Willing belief and the norm of truth
Christopher Gauker, Attitudes without psychology
Christopher Gauker, The belief-desire law
Heimir Geirsson, True belief reports and the sharing of beliefs
Delia Graff, Desires, scope, and tense
Mitchell Green, Attitude ascription's affinity to measurement
Mitchell Green, Moore's many paradoxes
P.M.S. Hacker, On the ontology of belief
Pamela Hieronymi, Controlling attitudes
Terry Horgan & David Henderson, What does it take to be a true believer? Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialism
Henry Jackman, Truth, rationality, and humanity
Pierre Jacob, Belief attribution and rationality: A dilemma for Jerry Fodor
Pierre Jacob, Frege's puzzle and belief ascriptions
Kit Fine, Kripke's puzzle about belief
Jesper Kallestrup, Paradoxes about belief
Joe Lau, Possible worlds semantics for belief sentences
Peter Ludlow, Logical form and the hidden-indexical theory: A reply to Schiffer (and further reply )
Michael McKinsey, The grammar of belief
Michael McKinsey, The semantics of belief ascriptions
Marc Moffett, Knowing facts and believing propositions: A solution to the problem of doxastic shift
Daniel Nolan, Selfless desires
Lucy O'Brien, Imagination and the motivational role of belief
Carole Penco, Keeping track of individuals: Brandom's analysis of Kripke's puzzle and the content of belief
John Perry, Circumstantial attitudes and benevolent cognition
John Perry, Rip Van Winkle and other characters
Francois Recanati, Can we believe what we do not understand
Francois Recanati, Opacity and the attitudes
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord & Michael Smith, Desires and beliefs of one's own
Stephen Schiffer, A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reports (plus replies by Braun and Salmon )
Stephen Schiffer, Propositional content
Eric Schwitzgebel, Belief
Eric Schwitzgebel, In-between believing
Eric Schwitzgebel, A phenomenal, dispositional account of belief
Eric Schwitzgebel, Acting contrary to our (professed) beliefs
Jeff Speaks, Explaining the disquotational principle
Cara Spencer, Is there a problem of the essential indexical?
Dan Sperber, Intuitive and reflective beliefs
Roger Sperry, The cognitive role of belief: Implications of the new mentalism
Robert Stainton, Robust belief states and the right/wrong dichotomy
Kenneth Taylor, Singular beliefs and their ascriptions
Causal Theories of Content
Fred Adams, Fodor's asymetrical causal dependency theory of meaning
Jason Bridges, Does informational semantics commit Euthyphro's fallacy
Jonathan Cohen, An objective counterfactual theory of information
Jonathan Cohen, Information and content
David Cole, Natural language and natural meaning
Robert Cummins, The LOT of the causal theory of mental content
Robert Cummins, James Blackmon, David Byrd, Alexa Lee, Martin Roth, Representation and unexploited content
Robert Cummins & Pierre Poirier, Representation and indication
Crawford Elder, What sensory signals are about
Crawford Elder, What vs. how in naturally selected representation
Erik Myin, Some problems for Fodor's theory of content
Robert Rupert, Coining terms in the language of thought: Innateness, emergence, and the lot of Cummins's argument against the causal theory of mental content
Robert Rupert, Dispositions indisposed: Semantic atomism and Fodor's theory of content
Robert Rupert, On the relationship between naturalistic semantics and individuation criteria for terms in a language of thought
Robert Rupert, The best test theory of extension
Paul Skokowski, Information, belief, and causal role
Teleological Theories of Content
Louise Antony, Equal rights for swampersons
Jason Bridges, Teleofunctionalism and psychological explanation
Daniel Dennett, Evolution, error, and intentionality
Peter Godfrey-Smith, Mental representation, naturalism, and teleosemantics
Pierre Jacob, Can selection explain content?
Brendan Lalor, Swampman, etiology, and content
Angus Menuge, A critique of Dennett's evolutionary account of intentionality
Ruth Millikan, Theories of mental content
Ruth Millikan, Naturalizing intentionality
Ruth Millikan, On swampkinds
Ruth Millikan, Reading Mother Nature's mind
Ruth Millikan, What has natural information have to do with intentional representation?
Karen Neander, Teleological theories of mental content
Paul Pietroski, Intentionality and teleological error
Mark Rowlands, Teleosemantics
Robert Rupert, Mental representation and Millikan's theory of intentional content
Theories of Content (Misc)
Ned Block, Conceptual role semantics
Alex Byrne, Interpretivism
Adrian Cussins, Content, embodiment, and objectivity
Daniel Dennett, Intentional systems
Daniel Dennett, Intentionality
Daniel Dennett, The interpretation of texts, people, and other artifacts
Chris Eliasmith, How neurons mean: A neurocomputational theory of representational content
Hartry Field, Deflationist views of meaning and content (and postscript )
Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore, Why meaning (probably) isn't conceptual role
Peter Godfrey-Smith, On folk psychology and mental representation
Mark Greenberg, A new map of theories of mental content
Gilbert Harman & Mark Greenberg, Conceptual role semantics
Gilbert Harman, (Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics
Steven Horst, Goldilocks searches for a conceptual semantics
Henry Jackman, Conventionalism, objectivity, and constitution
Mark Kalderon, Reasoning and representing
Barry Loewer, A guide to naturalizing semantics
Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie, Notes towards a structuralist theory of mental representation
Colin McGinn, Intentionality and
intentional objects
Dan Ryder, On thinking of kinds: A neuroscientific perspective
Dan Ryder, Neurosemantics: A theory
Dan Ryder, SINBAD neurosemantics: A theory of mental representation
Dan Ryder, The brain as a model-making machine
Kenneth Taylor, Toward a naturalistic theory of rational intentionality
Nigel Thomas, A non-symbolic theory of conscious content: Imagery and activity
Internalism and Externalism
Michael Antony, Social relations and the individuation of thought
Jason Bridges, Davidson's transcendental externalism
David Buller, Individualism and evolutionary psychology (or: In defense of 'narrow' functions)
John Campbell, Is sense transparent?
Andrew Carpenter, Davidson's externalism and the unintelligibility of massive error
Martin Davies, Externalist dependence thesis
Michael Devitt, Meanings just ain't in the head
Katalin Farkas, Does Twin Earth rest on a mistake?
Katalin Farkas, What is externalism?
Justin Fisher, Why nothing mental is just in the head
Bryan Frances, Externalism, physicalism, statues, and hunks
Bryan Frances, Twin Earth thought experiments
John Hawthorne, Why Humeans are out of their minds
Henry Jackman, Individualism and interpretation
Henry Jackman, Semantic norms and temporal externalism
Henry Jackman, Temporal externalism and our ordinary linguistic practices
Henry Jackman, We live forwards but understand backwards: Linguistic practices and future behavior
Pierre Jacob, Can mental content explain behavior?
Brendan Lalor, It is what you think: Intentional potency & anti-individualism
Joe Lau, Externalism about mental content
Peter Ludlow, Externalism, logical form, and linguistic intentions
Kirk Ludwig, Externalism, naturalism, and method
Kirk Ludwig, The myth of social content
Helge Malmgren, The "internal/external" metaphor in the philosophy of mind
Ron McClamrock, Methodological individualism considered as a constitutive principle of scientific inquiry
Michael McKinsey, Curing folk psychology of 'arthritis'
Michael McKinsey, Individuating beliefs
Ruth Millikan, Existence proof for a viable externalism
Ruth Millikan, On cognitive luck: Externalism in an evolutionary frame
Karen Neander, The narrow and the normative
Anthony Newman, The good, the bad, and the irrational: Three views about mental content
Anthony Newman, Two grades of internalism (pass and fail)
Derk Pereboom, Conceptual structure and the individuation of content
John Perry, Broadening the mind
David Pitt, Nativism and the theory of content
Laura Schroeter, Why be an anti-individualist?
Alberto Voltolini, Internalism and externalism
Alberto Voltolini, The metaphysics of internalism and externalism
Robert Wilson, Meaning making and the mind of the externalism
Robert Wilson, Recent work on indivualism in the social, behavioural, and biological sciences
Wayne Wright, Individualism, behavior, and Marr's theory of vision
Externalism and Self-Knowledge
Paul Boghossian, What the externalist can know a priori
Bill Brewer, Externalism and a priori knowledge of empirical facts
Bill Brewer, Self-knowledge and externalism
Jessica Brown, The incompatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access
Darragh Byrne, The appearance-transparency of sense
Martin Davies, Externalism and armchair knowledge
Martin Davies, Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant
Martin Davies, Externalism, self-knowledge, and transmission of warrant
Martin Davies, The problem of armchair knowledge
Jordi Fernandez, Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensions
Brie Gertler, Externalism and
privileged access: A new approach
John Gibbons, Externalism and knowledge of the attitudes
John Gibbons, Externalism and knowledge of content
Jussi Haukioja, Privileged self-knowledge and externalism: A contextualist approach
Henry Jackman, Deference and self-knowledge
Pierre Jacob, Is self-knowledge compatible with externalism?
William Larkin, Burge on our privileged access to the external world
William Larkin, Content skepticism
Willian Larkin, The non-apriority of concept width
William Larkin, Twin Earth, Dry Earth, and knowing the width of water
Peter Ludlow, Externalism, self-knowledge, and the prevalence of slow switching
Peter Ludlow, Social externalism, self-knowledge, and memory
Peter Ludlow, Social externalism and memory: A problem
Peter Ludlow, On the relevance of slow switching
Peter Ludlow, First-person authority and memory
Cynthia MacDonald, Externalism and authoritative self-knowledge
Luca Malatesti, Externalism and the knowledge of mental states
Michael McKinsey, Externalism and privileged access are inconsistent
Michael McKinsey, Forms of externalism and privileged access
Michael McKinsey, The semantic basis of externalism
Michael McKinsey, Transmission of warrant and closure of apriority
Brian McLaughlin and Michael Tye, Is content-externalism compatible with privileged access?
Paul Noordhof, Outsmarting the McKinsey-Brown argument (and reply to Brueckner )
Sarah Sawyer, An externalist account of introspective knowledge
Sarah Sawyer, Privileged access to the world
Michael Tye, Externalism and memory
Stephen Yablo, Self-knowledge and semantic luck
Narrow Content
Louise Antony, What are you thinking? Character and content in the language of thought
Kent Bach, Content: Wide vs. narrow
Curtis Brown, Belief states and narrow content
David Buller, "Narrow"-mindedness breeds inaction
Alex Byrne, Chalmers on epistemic content
Alex Byrne and James Pryor, Bad intensions
David Chalmers, The components of content
Nick Georgalis, First-person
intentionality
Ulrike Haas-Spohn, Anti-individualism and cognitive semantics
Frank Jackson, Narrow content and representation -- or Twin Earth revisited
Frank Jackson, Why we need A-intensions
Uriah Kriegel, The primacy of narrow content
Joe Lau, Three motivations for narrow content
Kirk Ludwig, Duplicating thoughts
Kirk Ludwig, Singular thought and the Cartesian theory of mind
James Pryor, Varieties of two-dimensionalism
Stephen Schiffer, Mental content and epistemic two-dimensional semantics
Laura Schroeter, The rationalist foundations of Chalmers’ 2-D semantics
The Extended Mind
Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, Andy Clark on intrinsic content and extended cognition
Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa, Defending non-derived content
Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, Defending the bounds of cognition
Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, Why the mind is still in the head
Ken Aizawa, Clark's conditions on extended cognition are too strong
Andy Clark, Memento’s revenge: The extended mind, extended
Andy Clark & David Chalmers, The extended mind
Joseph Fulda, "The extended mind"--extended
Brie Gertler, The narrow mind
Susan Hurley, Active perception and vehicle externalism
Susan Hurley, Vehicles, contents, conceptual structure, and externalism
Robert Rupert, Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition
Robert Rupert, Representation in extended cognitive systems: Does the scaffolding of language extend the mind?
Kim Sterelny, Externalism, epistemic artefacts and the extended mind
Daniel Weiskopf, Patrolling the mind's boundaries
Robert Wilson, Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis
Concepts
Murat Aydede, Fodor on concepts and Frege puzzles
Kent Bach, Review of Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
Jose Luis Bermudez, Naturalism and conceptual norms
Jose Luis Bermudez, Nonconceptual mental content
Robert Brandom, Overcoming a
duality of concepts and causes: A unifying thread in Empiricism and
the Philosophy of Mind
Harold Brown, Sellars, concepts, and conceptual change
Harold Brown, Conceptual comparison and conceptual innovation
Susan Carey, The Origin of Concepts , chapter 1chapter 2 and chapter 3 )
Andy Clark and Jesse Prinz, Putting concepts to work: Some thoughts for the twenty-first century
David DeMoss, Hunting fat gnu: How to identify a proxytype
Jerry Fodor, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
Jerry Fodor, There are no recognitional concepts, not even RED (and part 2 )
Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore, The red herring and the pet fish: Why concepts still can't be prototypes
Christopher Gauker, On the evidence for prelinguistic concepts
Ulrike Haas-Spohn & Wolfgang Spohn, Concepts are beliefs about essences
Larry Hauser, Doing without mentalese
Pierre Jacob, Can semantic properties be noncausal? (comment on Fodor)
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, Concepts and conceptual analysis
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, Radical concept nativism
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, Concepts
Edouard Machery, Concept empiricism: A methodological critique
Edouard Machery, ,
One hundred years of psychology of concepts: Theoretical notions and
their operationalization
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, Should we trust our intuitions? Deflationary accounts of the analytic data
Ruth Millikan, A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: More mama, more milk, and more mouse (and response to critics)
Ruth Millikan, How we make our ideas clear: Empiricist epistemology for empirical concepts
Ruth Millikan, A more plausible kind of "recognitional concept"
Ruth Millikan, On Clear and Confused Ideas , chapter 1chapter 2 , chapter 3 , and chapter 6 )
Christopher Peacocke, Interrelations: Concepts, knowledge, reference, and structure
Christopher Peacocke, Rationale and maxims in the study of concepts
Jesse Prinz, The return of concept empiricism
Francois Recanati, The Fodorian fallacy
Dan Ryder, Empiricism regained (comments on Prinz's Furnishing the Mind )
Dan Ryder, Concept acquisition: How to get something from nothing
Stephen Schiffer, Meanings and concepts
Laura Schroeter, The limits of conceptual analysis
Eric Schwitzgebel, On containers and content, with a cautionary note to philosophers of mind
Gabriel Segal, Reference, causal powers, externalist intuitions, and unicorns
Stephen Stich, Jackson's empirical assumptions
Michael Strevens, The myth of the final criterion
Neil Tennant, The emperor's new concepts
Paul Thagard, Coherent and creative conceptual combinations
Gerald Vision, Flash! Fodor splits the atom
Daniel Weiskopf & William Bechtel, Remarks on Fodor on having concepts
Daniel Weiskopf, The plurality of concepts
Edward Zalta, Fregean senses, modes of presentation, and concepts
Edward Zalta, A (Leibnizian) theory of concepts
Holism and Normativity
Ned Block, An argument for holism
Ned Block, Mental and semantic holism
Pascal Engel, The norms of thought: Are they social?
Pascal Engel, Wherein lies the normative dimension in mental content?
Jakob Hohwy, A reductio of Kripke-Wittgenstein's objections to dispositionalism about meaning
Jakob Hohwy, Semantic primitivism and normativity
Susan Hurley, Wittgenstein on practice and the myth of the giving
Henry Jackman, Holism, relevance, and thought content
Henry Jackman, Moderate holism and the instability thesis
Henry Jackman, Holism, context, and content
Eric Lormand, How to be a meaning holist (and appendix )
Eric Lormand, How to be a meaning atomist
Kirk Ludwig, Is content holism incoherent?
Nick Zangwill, The normativity of the mental
Mental Content, (Misc.)
Jose Luis Bermudez, Peacocke's argument against the autonomy of nonconceptual content
Jose Luis Bermudez, Syntax, semantics, and levels of explanation
Alex Byrne, Intentionality
Tim Crane, Brentano's concept of intentional inexistence
Tim Crane, Intentionality as the mark of the mental
Adrian Cussins, Subjectivity, objectivity, and theories of reference in Evans' theory of thought
Daniel Dennett, Things about things
Michael Devitt, Why Fodor can't have it both ways
Michael Devitt, Transcendentalism about content
Michael Devitt and Georges Rey, Transcending transcendentalism
Hartry Field, Remarks on content and its role in explanation
Jerry Fodor, Hume's program (and ours)
Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepoe, All at sea in semantic space: Churchland on meaning similarity
Peter Godfrey-Smith, Model-based science and the representational theory of mind
Rick Grush, Skill and spatial content
Ulrike Haas-Spohn, Hidden indexicality and subjective meaning
P.M.S. Hacker, An orrery of intentionality
David Hilbert, Content, intention, and explanation
Steven Horst, Notions of 'representation' in philosophy and empirical research
Steven Horst, Symbols and computation: A critique of the computational theory of mind
Henry Jackman, James' pragmatic account of intentionality and truth
Pierre Jacob, Intentionality
Anne Jacobson, The uninviting room: Representations without contents
Sean Kelly, Grasping at straws: Motor intentionality and the cognitive science of skillful action
Ruth Millikan, The myth of mental indexicals
Ruth Millikan, Pushmi-pullyu representations
John Perry, Intentionality and its puzzles
John Perry and David Israel, Fodor and psychological explanation
James Pryor, An epistemic theory of acquaintance (and commentary by Susanna Siegel )
Matthias Scheutz, The ontological status of representations
Stephen Schiffer, A paradox of meaning
Stephen Schiffer, An introduction to content and its role in explanation
John Searle, Explaining
cognition
Gabriel Segal, Intentionality
Paul Skokowski, Structural content: A naturalistic approach to implicit belief
Aaron Sloman, Toward a general theory of representations
Robert Stalnaker, What might nonconceptual content be?
Daniel Stoljar, Nominalism and intentionality
Andrew Ward, The compatibility of psychological naturalism and representationalism
Reduction
Louise Antony, Who's afraid of disjunctive properties?
William Bechtel, The compatibility of complex systems and reduction: A case analysis of memory research
William Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale, Multiple realizability revisited
John Bickle, Concepts of intertheoretic reduction in contemporary philosophy of mind
Ned Block, Anti-reductionism slaps back
Joao Fonseca, On Bickle's failure to give a formal account of the location in the new-wave reductionist spectrum
Eric Funkhouser, A liberal conception of multiple realizability
William Hasker, How not to be a reductivist
John Heil, Multiply realized properties
Pierre Jacob, Some problems for reductive physicalism
Brian Keeley, Shocking lessons from electric fish: The theory and practice of multiple realization
Paul Mainwood, How is non-reductive physicalism possible
Ron McClamrock, Emergence unscathed: Kim on multiple realizability and causal types
Ruth Millikan, Historical kinds and the special sciences
Derk Pereboom, Robust nonreductive materialism
Derk Pereboom and Hilary Kornblith, The metaphysics of irreducibility
Thomas Polger, Realization and the metaphysics of mind
Thomas Polger, Neural machinery and realization
John Post, Breakwater: The new wave, supervenience and individualism
Alex Rosenberg, How to reconcile physicalism and antireductionism about biology
Lawrence Shapiro, Multiple realizations
Lawrence Shapiro, The metaphysics of multiple realizability: It's like apples and oranges
Lawrence Shapiro, Neural plasticity and multiple realizability
Robert Wilson and Carl Craver, Realization
Francis Zucker, Three counter strategies to reductionism in science
Emergence
Nils Baas & Claus Emmeche, On emergence and explanation
Mark Bedau, Weak emergence
Mark Bickhard & Donald Campbell, Emergence
Mark Bickhard, The dynamic emergence of representation
Richard Campbell & Mark Bickhard, Physicalism, emergence, and downward causation
Tim Crane, The significance of emergence
Claus Emmeche, Simo Koppe, Frederick Stjernfelt, Explaining emergence: Toward an ontology of levels
Claus Emmeche, Simo Koppe, Frederick Stjernfelt, Levels, emergence, and three versions of downward causation
Michael Huemer, The philosophical complaint against emergence
Paul Meehl & Wilfrid Sellars, The concept of emergence
Timothy O'Connor, Emergent properties
Timothy O'Connor, Groundwork for an emergentist account of the mental
Timothy O’Connor & Jon Jacobs, Emergent individuals
Timothy O’Connor & Hong Yu Wong, The metaphysics of emergence
Timothy O'Connor and Hong Yu Wong, Emergent properties
Stephen Pepper, Emergence
William Seager, Emergence and efficacy
William Seager, Emergence and supervenience
Warren Shrader, John Stuart Mill and the development of British emergentism
Michael Silberstein & John McGeever, The search for ontological emergence
Roger Sperry, In defense of mentalism and emergent interaction
Functionalism and Behaviorism
Murat Aydede, Syntax, content, and functionalism: What is wrong with the syntactic theory of mind
Ned Block, What is functionalism?
Alex Byrne, Behaviourism
Paul Churchland, Functionalism at forty
Daniel Dennett, Reintroducing The Concept of Mind (plus letter from Ryle )
Brie Gertler, Functionalism's methodological predicament
George Graham, Behaviorism
Colin Klein, Aristotle on functionalism
Robert Koons, Functionalism without physicalism: Outline of an emergentist program
Kirk Ludwig, Functionalism, causation and causal relevance
Pete Mandik, Fine-grained supervenience, cognitive neuroscience, and the future of functionalism
Marc Moffett, Against a posteriori functionalism
Thomas Polger, Against the argument from functional explanation
Thomas Polger, Escaping the epiphenomenal trap
Alexander Pruss, Functionalism and the number of minds
Hilary Putnam, The nature of mental states
Robert Rupert, Functionalism, mental causation, and the problem of metaphysically necessary effects
Matthias Scheutz, Ethology and functionalism: Behavioral descriptions as the link between physical and functional descriptions
Rowland Stout, What you know when you know how someone behaves
Julia Tanney, Rethinking Ryle
Identity theories (including anomalous monism)
Michael Antony, Davidson's argument for monism
Bill Brewer, Levels of explanation and the individuation of events: A difficulty for the token identity theory
Neil Campbell, Anomalous monism
Ted Honderich, Donald Davidson's anomalous monism and the champion of mauve
Ted Honderich, Functionalism, identity theories, the union theory
Dan Hutto, Davidson's identity crisis
Henry Jackman, Belief, rationality, and psychophysical laws
William Lycan, A particularly compelling refutation of eliminative materialism
U.T. Place, Identity theories
David Rosenthal, The identity theory
J.J.C. Smart, The identity theory of mind
Tim van Gelder, Monism, dualism, pluralism
Steven Yalowitz, Anomalous monism
Physicalism
Janice Dowell, The physical: Empirical, not metaphysical
Andrew Chrucky, Critique of Wilfrid Sellars' materialism
Crawford Elder, Physicalism and the fallacy of composition
Jennifer Hornsby, Physicalism, conceptual analysis, and acts of faith
Barbara Montero, What is the physical?
Barbara Montero, Physicalism
Barbara Montero, Physicalism in an infinitely decomposable world
Barbara Montero, The body problem
Barbara Montero, Post-physicalism
Barbara Montero, What does the conservation of energy have to do with physicalism?
Barbara Montero, A defense of the via negativa argument for physicalism
Barbara Montero, Varieties of causal closure
Christian Nimtz & Michael Schuette, On physicalism, physical properties, and panpsychism
David Papineau, The rise of physicalism
Howard Robinson, Materialism in the philosophy of mind
Warren Shrader, Does physicalism require a supervenience thesis?
Elliott Sober, Physicalism from a probabilistic point of view
Daniel Stoljar, Physicalism
Jessica Wilson, How superduper does a physicalist supervenience need to be?
Jessica Wilson, Nonreductive physicalism and degrees of freedom
Jessica Wilson, Supervenience-based formulations of physicalism
Dualism
John Beloff, What are minds for?
John Beloff, The mind-brain problem
John Beloff, Parapsychology and radical dualism
Jose Luis Bermudez, Locke, property dualism and metaphysical dualism
Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy
Karl Popper, Language and the body-mind problem: A restatement of interactionism
Karl Popper, A note on the body-mind problem
Titus Rivas & Hein van Dongen, Exit epiphenomenalism: The demolition of a refuge
William Robinson, Epiphenomenalism
Howard Robinson, Dualism
Wilfrid Sellars, A note on Popper's argument for dualism
Mental Causation
Karen Bennett, Why the exclusion problem seems intractable, and how, just maybe, to tract it
Karen Bennett, Exclusion again
Henk bij de Weg, Dretske and the causality of reasons
Ned Block, Do causal powers drain away?
Bill Brewer, Mental causation: Compulsion by reason
John Campbell, An interventionist approach to causation in psychology
Tim Crane, The mental causation debate
Carl Craver and William Bechtel, Explaining top-down causation (away)
Crawford Elder, Mental causation vs. physical causation: No contest
Eric Funkhouser, Three varieties of causal overdetermination
John Gibbons, Mental causation without downward causation
Jakob Hohwy, The experience of mental causation
Terry Horgan, Causal compatibilism and the exclusion problem
Jesper Kallestrup, The causal exclusion argument
Kirk Ludwig, Causal relevance and thought content
Kirk Ludwig, Dretske on explaining behavior
Eric Marcus, Mental causation in a phyical world
Eric Marcus, Mental causation: Unnaturalized but not unnatural
Peter Menzies, Mental causation for event dualists
Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald, Beyond program explanation
Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald, How to be psychologically relevant?
Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald, The metaphysics of mental causation
Peter Menzies, The causal efficacy of mental states
Paul Raymont, Are mental properties causally relevant? (plus reply to Sullivan )
Paul Raymont, Kim on overdetermination, exclusion, and nonreductive physicalism
William Seager, Generalized epiphenomenalism
Gabriel Segal, Content and causation
Micah Sparacio, Mental realism: Rejecting the causal closure thesis and expanding our physical ontology
Roger Sperry, Mental phenomena as causal determinants in brain function
Julia Tanney, Why reasons may not be causes
Sven Walter, Program explanations and the causal relevance of mental properties
Stephen Yablo, Causal relevance
Stephen Yablo, Seven habits of highly effective thinkers
Metaphysics of Mind
James Barham, Thoughts on thinking matter
Karen Bennett, Global supervenience and dependence
Jose Luis Bermudez, Personal and subpersonal: A difference without a distinction
Mark Bickhard, Mind as process
Robert Bishop, The hidden premise in the causal argument for physicalism
Daniel Dennett, Real patterns
Daniel Dennett, Two black boxes: A fable
Daniel Dennett, The case for rorts
Brie Gertler, Metaphysics of mind
John Heil & David Robb, Mental properties
John Heil, Metaphysics of mind
Steven Horst, Mind and the World of Nature
William Lycan, Serious metaphysics: Frank Jackson's defense of conceptual analysis
Eric Marcus, Defending naive realism about mental properties
Eric Marcus, Events, sortals, and the mind-body problem
Eric Marcus, Why there are no token states
Ruth Millikan, What is behavior?
Jeanne Peijnenburg, Are there mental entities? Some lessons from Hans Reichenbach
Randall Dipert, Two unjustly neglected aspects of C.S. Peirce's philosophy of mind
Huw Price, Psychology in perspective
William Seager, Real patterns and surface metaphysics
Roger Sperry, The riddle of consciousness and the changing scientific worldview
Roger Sperry, A mentalist view of consciousness
Roger Sperry, Mind-brain interaction: Mentalism, yes; dualism, no
Roger Sperry, An objective approach to subjective experience: Further explanation of a hypothesis
Roger Sperry, Turnabout on consciousness: A mentalist view
Stephen Stich, Deconstructing the mind
Stephen Stich and Stephen Laurence, Intentionality and naturalism
Tim van Gelder, Beyond the mind-body problem
Tim van Gelder, The distinction between mind and cognition
Megan Wallace, Mental fictionalism
The Self and Personal Identity
Torin Alter & Stuart Rachels, Epistemicism and the combined-spectrum argument
Richard Baron, The self is unreal
Lynne Rudder Baker, Precis of Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (amd discussion
John Barresi, On becoming a person
Tim Bayne, Moral status and the treatment of dissociative identity disorder
Tim Bayne, The inclusion model of the Incarnation: Problems and prospects (plus reply to Sturch )
Jose Luis Bermudez, Aspects of the self: John Campbell's Past, Space, and Self
Henk bij de Weg, Can a person break a world record
Stephen Braude, Multiple personality and moral responsibility (and replies )
John Campbell, What is it to know what 'I' refers to?
Andy Clark, I am John's brain
Stephen Clark, Minds, memes, and multiples (and replies )
Tom Clark, Death, nothingness, and subjectivity (and replies )
Arthur Deikman, 'I' = Awareness
Daniel Dennett, The self as a center of narrative gravity
Daniel Dennett, The origins of selves
Daniel Dennett, Where am I?
Daniel Dennett, In Darwin's wake, where am I?
Matti Eklund, Personal identity, concerns, and indeterminacy
Shaun Gallagher, Philosophical conceptions of the self
Tamar Gendler, Exceptional persons: On the limits of imaginary cases
Tamar Gendler, Personal identity and thought-experiments
Tamar Gendler, Critical notice of Rovane's The Bounds of Agency
Grant Gillett, A discursive account of multiple personality disorder (and Stephen Braude's reply )
Dan Hutto, Composing our "selves": Aristotelian and fictional personhood
Dan Hutto, The story of the self
Nicholas Humphrey & Daniel Dennett, Speaking for our selves
Ralph Kennedy and George Graham, Extreme self-denial
Amy Kind, The metaphysics of personal identity and our special concern for the future
William Larkin, Persons, animals, and bodies
Chris Lindsay, Subjects as objects: Living in a material world
John Locke, Of identity and diversity
E.J. Lowe, Self, agency, and mental causation
Neil McKinnon & John Bigelow, Parfit, causation, and survival
Max More, The diachronic self
John Perry, The self
Roland Puccetti, Dennett on the split brain (and replies )
David Rosenthal, Emotions and the self
David Rosenthal, Persons, minds, and consciousness
David Sanford, Where was I?
William Seager, The constructed and the secret self
Ted Sider, Criteria of personal identity and the limits of conceptual analysis
Roger Sperry, Consciousness, personal identity and the divided brain
Galen Strawson, The self
Joe Strout, Mind uploading
Peter Suber, Self-determination and selfhood in recent legal cases
Peter Unger, The survival of the sentient
Peter Unger, The mental problems of the many
David Velleman, Self to self
David Velleman, So it goes
Robert Wilson, Persons, social agency, and constitution
Free Will
Torin Alter & Russell Daw, Free acts and robot cats (and reply to Heller )
Tim Bayne and Neil Levy, The feeling of doing: Deconstructing the phenomenology of agency
Tim Bayne, Phenomenology and the feeling of doing: Wegner on the conscious will
Tim Bayne, Putting the experience of acting in its place
Joseph Keim Campbell, Compatibilist alternatives
Mario De Caro, Is freedom really a mystery?
Daniel Dennett, Symposium on Freedom Evolves : comments by John Fischer , Al Mele , Timothy O'Connor , Manuel Vargas , and Dennett's reply
John Dupré, The solution to the problem of the freedom of the will
Bruce Edmonds, Implementing free will
Peter Ells, Naturalistic, libertarian free will
John Martin Fischer, Free will and moral responsibility
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza, Morally responsible people without freedom
Harry Frankfurt, Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility
John Fulda, Partially
resolving the tension between omniscience and free will: A mathematical argument
Patricia Greenspan, Free will and genetic determinism: Locating the problem(s)
Patricia Greenspan, Genes, electrotransmitters, and free will
Thomas Hobbes, Causation, determinism, and their compatibility with freedom
Ted Honderich, Free will, determinism, and moral responsibility: The whole thing in brief
Ted Honderich, Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and the smart aleck
Ted Honderich, Determinism as true, compatibilism and incompatibilism as both false, and the real problem
Ted Honderich, Mind the guff
Ted Honderich, After compatibilism and incompatibilism
Ted Honderich, Determinism's consequences -- the mistakes of compatibilism and incompatibilism, and what is to be done now
Terry Horgan & John Tienson, The phenomenology of embodied agency
David Hume, The obviousness of the truth of determinism
David Hume, Our freedom reconciled with determinism
Michael Huemer, A proof of free will
Michael Huemer, The objectivist theory of free will
Robert Kane, Reflections on free will, determinism, and indeterminism
Immanuel Kant, For determinism and indeterminism
Tomis Kapitan, Modal principles in the metaphysics of free will
Tomis Kapitan, Autonomy and manipulated freedom
Tomis Kapitan, Agency and omniscience
Tomis Kapitan, Deliberation and the presumption of open alternatives
Arthur Koestler, Charles Hartshorne, & Bernhard Rensch, Free will in a hierarchic context
Jeremy Koons, Is hard determinism a form of compatibilism?
William Lycan, Free will and the
burden of proof
Tibor Machan, A brief defense of free will
Matteo Mameli, On Dennett and the natural sciences of free will
Ned Markosian, A compatibilist version of the theory of agent causation
Al Mele, Free will and luck
Thomas Nagel, Fredom and the view from nowhere
Eddy Nahmias, Close calls and the confident agent: Free will, deliberation, and alternative possibilities
Eddy Nahmias, The phenomenology of free will
Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, & Jason Turner, Is incompatibilism intuitive?
Shaun Nichols, The folk psychology of free will: Fits and starts
Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe, Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions
Timothy O'Connor, Agent causation
Timothy O'Connor, Causality, mind, and free will
Timothy O'Connor, Dualist and agent-causal theories
Timothy O'Connor, Why agent causation?
Timothy O'Connor, Alternative possibilities and responsibility
Timothy O'Connor, Indeterminism and free agency: Three recent views
Timothy O'Connor, Free will
Robert Pendleton, Time and free will
Derk Pereboom, Determinism al dente
Derk Pereboom, Is our concept of agent-causation coherent?
Derk Pereboom, Meaning in life without free will
Derk Pereboom, Source incompatibilism and alternative possibilities
John Perry, Is there hope for compatibilism?
Paul Russell, Compatibilist fatalism
Paul Russell, Pessimists, Pollyannas, and the new compatibilism
Aaron Sloman, How to dispose of the free will issue
Saul Smilansky, Free will: Two radical proposals
Roger Sperry, Changing concepts of consciousness and free will
Roger Sperry, Consciousness, free will and personal identity
Ulrich Steinvorth, A third concept of freedom of the will
Peter Strawson, Freedom and resentment
Christopher Taylor & Daniel Dennett, Who's afraid of determinism? Rethinking causes and possibilities
Peter Unger, Free will and scientiphicalism
Peter van Inwagen, The mystery of metaphysical freedom
J. David Velleman, Freedom (from Practical Reflection
Peter Westen, Getting the fly out of the bottle: The false problem of free will and determinism
Jing Zhu, Is conscious will an illusion?
Philosophy of Mind (Misc.)
Colin Allen, Philosophy of cognitive ethology
Anthony Atkinson, Persons, systems, and subsystems
David Braddon-Mitchell, Folk theories of the third kind
Andrew Carpenter, Kant's philosophy of mind
David Chalmers, The Matrix as metaphysics
Andy Clark, The twisted matrix: Dream, simulation or hybrid?
Martin Davies, Persons and their underpinnings
Daniel Dennett, Back from the drawing board (reply to critics)
Daniel Dennett, Get real (reply to critics)
Daniel Dennett, Memes and the exploitation of imagination
Daniel Dennett, Granny's campaign for safe science
Daniel Dennett, Memes: Myths, misunderstandings, and misgivings
Rick Grush, Manifolds, co-ordinations, imagination, objectivity
Susan Hurley, Making sense of animals
Susan Hurley, Perception and action: Alternative views
Sean Kelly & Joshua Knobe, Can one act for a reason without acting intentionally?
Joshua Knobe & Gabriel Mendlow, The good, the bad and the blameworthy: Understanding the role of evaluative reasoning in folk psychology
Colin McGinn, The problem of philosophy
Alva Noe, Anti-intellectualism
Philip Pettit, Groups with minds of their own
Teed Rockwell, Eliminative materialism
Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the philosophy of mind
Galen Strawson, 'Mental'
Crispin Wright, What could anti-realism about ordinary psychology possibly be?
The Turing Test
Ned Block, Psychologism and behaviorism
Selmer Bringsjord, Animals, zombanimals, and the total Turing test: The essence of artificial intelligence
Selmer Bringsjord, Paul Bello, & David Ferrucci, Creativity, the Turing test, and the (better) Lovelace test
Bruce Edmonds, The constructability of artificial intelligence (as defined by the Turing test)
Robert French, Subcognition and the limits of the Turing test
Robert French, Refocusing the debate on the Turing Test: A reply to Jacquette
Stevan Harnad, The Turing test is not a trick
Stevan Harnad, Minds, machines, and Turing: The indistinguishability of indistinguishables
Stevan Harnad, Other bodies, other minds (and Larry Hauser's reply )
William Rapaport, How to pass a Turing test: Syntactic semantics, natural-language understanding, and first-person cognition
James Sennett, The ice man cometh: Lt. Commander Data and the Turing test
Stuart Shieber, Lessons from a restricted Turing test (and Hugh Loebner's reply )
Alan Turing, Computing machinery and intelligence
Peter Turney, Answering subcognitive Turing Test questions: A reply to French
Stuart Watt, Naive psychology and the inverted Turing test (and comments )
Blay Whitby, Why the Turing test is AI's biggest blind alley
The Chinese room
Selmer Bringsjord, Real robots and the missing thought-experiment in the Chinese-room dialectic
Steven Brown, Peirce and formalization of thought: The Chinese room argument
David Cole, The Chinese room argument
Jack Copeland, The curious case of the Chinese gym
Stevan Harnad, Minds, machines, and Searle
Stevan Harnad, What's wrong and right about Searle's Chinese room argument?
David Harrison, Connectionism hits the Chinese gym
Larry Hauser, The Chinese room argument
Larry Hauser, Searle's Chinese Box: The Chinese Room Argument and Artificial Intelligence
Larry Hauser, Searle's Chinese box: Debunking the Chinese room argument
Larry Hauser, Nixin' goes to China
Pat Hayes/Stevan Harnad/Don Perlis/Ned Block, Virtual symposium on virtual mind
Diane Law, Searle, subsymbolic functionalism, and synthetic intelligence
William Rapaport, Understanding understanding: Syntactic semantics and computational cognition
John Searle, Minds, brains, and programs
John Searle, Is the brain a digital computer?
Mark Sprevak, Algorithms and the chinese room
Gödel's theorem and AI
Paul Benacerraf, God, the Devil, and Godel
Damjan Bojadziev, Gödel's theorem for minds and computers
Selmer Bringsjord, A refutation of Penrose's new Gödelian case against the computational conception of mind
David Chalmers, Minds, machines, and mathematics
David Coder, Godel's theorem and mechanism (and Lucas's reply )
Jack Copeland, Turing's O-machines, Searle, Penrose, and the brain
Daniel Dennett, Review of The Emperor's New Mind
Solomon Feferman, Penrose's Gödelian argument
I.J. Good, Human and machine logic (and Lucas's reply )
Rick Grush & Patricia Churchland, Gaps in Penrose's toilings
Anthony Hutton, This Godel is killing me (and Lucas's reply )
Geoffrey Laforte, Pat Hayes, & Ken Ford, Why Godel's theorem cannot refute computationalism: A reply to Penrose
David Lewis, Lucas against mechanism (and Lucas's reply )
J. R. Lucas, Minds, machines, and Gödel
J. R. Lucas, Satan stultified: A rejoinder to Paul Benacerraf
J. R. Lucas, The Gödelian argument: Turn over the page
J. R. Lucas, The implications of Gödel's theorem
Tim Maudlin, Between the motion and the act...
Daryl McCullough, Can humans escape Gödel?
Drew McDermott, [STAR] Penrose is wrong
Roger Penrose, Beyond the doubting of a shadow (reply to commentaries on Shadows of the Mind )
Hilary Putnam, Review of Shadows of the Mind
William Seager, Yesterday's algorithm: Penrose and the Godel argument
Aaron Sloman, The emperor's real mind
Philosophy of Connectionism
Murat Aydede, Language of thought: The connectionist contribution
Murat Aydede, Connectionism and the language of thought
William Bechtel, What should a connectionist philosophy of science look like?
William Bechtel, Natural deduction in connectionist systems
István Berkeley, What the #$*%! is a subsymbol?
István Berkeley, Some myths of connectionism
István Berkeley, A revisionist history of connectionism
James Blackmon, David Byrd, Robert Cummins, Pierre Poirier, Martin Roth, Atomistic learning in non-modular systems
David Chalmers, Syntactic transformations on distributed representations
David Chalmers, Connectionism and compositionality: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn were wrong
David Chalmers, The evolution of learning: An experiment in genetic connectionism
Andy Clark & Chris Eliasmith, Philosophical issues in brain theory and connectionism
Jack Copeland, On Alan Turing's anticipation of connectionism
Martin Davies, Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought
Martin Davies, Connectionism, modularity, and tacit knowledge
Daniel Dennett, Mother nature vs the walking encyclopedia
Chris Eliasmith, Structure without symbols: Providing a distributed account of high-level cognition
Malcolm Forster, Connectionism and the fate of folk psychology: A reply to Ramsey, Stich and Garon
Eric Lormand, Classical and connectionist models
Eric Lormand, Connectionist languages of thought
Eric Lormand, Connectionist content
L. Niklasson & T. van Gelder, Can connectionist models exhibit non-classical structure sensitivity?
Gerard O'Brien, Is connectionism common sense?
Gerard O'Brien, The role of implementation in connectionist explanation
Gerard O'Brien, Connectionism, analogicity and mental content.
Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie, Radical connectionism: Thinking with (not in) language
Paul Skokowski, Belief in networks
Tim van Gelder & L. Niklasson, On being systematically connectionist
Tim van Gelder, Connectionism and the mind-body problem: Exposing the distinction between mind and cognition
Tim van Gelder, Why distributed representation is inherently non-symbolic
Jonathan Waskan, A critique of connectionist semantics
Jonathan Waskan & William Bechtel, Directions in connectionist research: Tractable computations without syntactically structured representations
Computationalism
Mark Bickhard, The biological foundations of cognitive science
Ned Block, The mind as the software of the brain
Selmer Bringsjord, Cognition is not computation: The argument from irreversibility
Selmer Bringsjord, The modal argument for hypercomputing minds
Curtis Brown, Implementation and indeterminacy
David Buller, Confirmation and the computational paradigm (or: Why do you think they call it artifical intelligence?)
David Chalmers, A computational foundation for the study of cognition
David Chalmers, Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton?
Christopher Cherniak, Undebuggability and cognitive science
Austen Clark, Seeing and summing: Implications of computational theories of vision
Jack Copeland, Super Turing-machines
Jack Copeland, Beyond the universal Turing machine
Jack Copeland, The broad conception of computation
Jack Copeland, Turing, Wittgenstein, and the science of the mind
Jack Copeland, What is computation?
Eric Dietrich, Cognitive science and the mechanistic forces of darkness
Hubert Dreyfus, From Socrates to expert systems: The limits and dangers of calculative rationality
Chris Eliasmith, Is the brain analog or digital?: The solution and its consequences for cognitive science
Chris Eliasmith, The myth of the Turing machine: The failings of functionalism and related theses
Jordi Fernandez, Explanation by computer simulation in cognitive science
Christopher Green, Is AI the right method for cognitive science? (and commentaries )
Stevan Harnad, The symbol grounding problem
Stevan Harnad, Computation is just interpretable symbol manipulation; Cognition isn't
Steven Horst, Symbols and computation: A critique of the computational theory of mind
Steven Horst, The computational theory of mind
Colin Klein, Maudlin on computation
William Rapaport, How minds can be computational systems
Matthias Scheutz, Computational vs. causal complexity
Matthias Scheutz, Computationalism: The next generation
Matthias Scheutz, Implementation: Computationalism's weak spot
Matthias Scheutz, New computationalism
Matthias Scheutz and Markus Peschl, Some thoughts on computation and simulation in cognitive science
Matthias Scheutz, The cognitive computational story
Matthias Scheutz, When physical systems realize functions
Aaron Sloman, What are virtual machines? Are they real?
Aaron Sloman, Architecture-based conceptions of mind
Aaron Sloman, What sort of architecture is required for a human-like agent?
Tim van Gelder, Computers and computation in cognitive science
Robert Wilson, What computers (still, still) can't do: Jerry Fodor on computation and modularity
Philosophy of AI, Misc
John Beloff, Minds or machines
Nick Bostrom, How long before superintelligence?
Nick Bostrom, The transhumanist FAQ
Selmer Bringsjord, Precis of What Robots Can and Can't Be (and (commentaries )
Andy Clark, Artificial intelligence and the many faces of reason
Andy Clark, Global abductive inference and authoritative sources, or, how search engines can save cognitive science
Daniel Dennett, Can machines think?
Daniel Dennett, Cog as a thought experiment
Daniel Dennett, Did HAL committ murder?
Eric Drexler, Thinking machines
Matthew Elton, Robots and rights: The ethical demands of artificial agents
Rick Grush, Towards a cognitive robotics
Larry Hauser, Why isn't my pocket calculator a thinking thing?
Brian Keeley, Against the global replacement: On the application of the philosophy of artificial intelligence to artificial life
Jaron Lanier, Agents of alienation
Jaron Lanier, Mindless thought experiments (a critique of machine intelligence)
Eric Lormand, The frame problem
Eric Lormand, The holorobophobe's dilemma
John McCarthy, Ascribing mental qualities to machines
John McCarthy, What is artificial intelligence?
John McCarthy & Patrick Hayes, Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence
Drew McDermott, How intelligent is Deep Blue?
Marvin Minsky, Why people think computers can't
Aaron Sloman, The Computer Revolution in Philosophy
Aaron Sloman, The irrelevance of Turing machines to AI
Paul Skokowski, Can computers carry content inexplicitly
Stanford Humanities Review, Constructions of the mind: Artificial intelligence and the humanities
Tim van Gelder, Into the Deep Blue yonder
Vernor Vinge, The technological singularity
Mitchell Waldrop, Can computers think?
Eliezer Yudkowsky, Creating friendly AI
Eliezer Yudkowsky, General intelligence and seed AI
Eliezer Yudkowsky, Staring into the singularity
Philosophy of Neuroscience
William Bechtel, Aligning multiple research techniques in cognitive neuroscience: Why is it important?
William Bechtel, Decomposing the brain: A long term pursuit
William Bechtel & Robert N. McCauley, Heuristic identity theory (or back to the future): The mind-body problem against the background of research strategies in cognitive neuroscience
William Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale, Integrating neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology through a teleological conception of function
William Bechtel and Robert Stufflebeam, PET: Exploring the myth and the method
John Bickle & Pete Mandik, The philosophy of neuroscience
Christopher Cherniak, The bounded brain: Toward quantitative neuroanatomy
Christopher Cherniak, Philosophy and computational neuroanatomy
Christopher Cherniak, Neural component placement
Max Coltheart and Martin Davies, Inference and explanation in cognitive neuropsychology
Carl Craver, Discovering mechanisms in neurobiology: The case of spatial memory
Carl Craver, Dissociable realization and kind splitting
Carl Craver, Functions and mechanisms in contemporary neuroscience
Carl Craver, Interlevel experiments and multilevel mechanisms in the neuroscience of memory
Carl Craver, The making of a memory mechanism
Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon, and Nora Breen, Monothematic delusions: Toward a two-factor account
Martin Davies, Anne Aimola Davies, and Max Coltheart, Anosognosia and the two-factor theory of delusions
Chris Eliasmith, Computational neuroscience
Ian Gold & Jakob Hohwy, Rationality and schizophrenic delusion
Ian Gold & Daniel Stoljar, A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience (and commentary by Byrne and Hilbert , John Sutton )
Rick Grush, In defense of some 'Cartesian' assumptions concerning the brain and its operation
Rick Grush, The semantic challenge to cognitive neuroscience
Rick Grush & Patricia Churchland, Computation and the brain
Jakob Hohwy, Top-down and bottom-up in delusion formation
Jakob Hohwy & Raben Rosenberg, Unusual experiences, reality testing, and delusions of alien control
Brian Keeley, Fixing content and function in neurobiological systems: The neuroethology of electroreception
Brian Keeley, Neuroethology and the philosophy of cognitive science
Brian Keeley, Shocking lessons from electric fish: The theory and practice of multiple realization
Dan Lloyd, Terra Cognita: From functional neuroimaging to the map of the mind
Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, & Carl Craver, Thinking about mechanisms
Adina Roskies, Neuroethics for the new millenium
Adina Roskies, The binding problem
Dan Ryder & Oleg Favorov, The new associationism: A neural explanation of the predictive powers of th cerebral cortex
Tony Stone and Martin Davies, Cognitive neuropsychology and the philosophy of mind
Paul Thagard, How molecules matter to mental computation
Dynamics and Embodiment
William Bechtel, Dynamics and decomposition: Are they compatible?
William Bechtel, Representations and cognitive explanations: Assessing the dynamicist challenge in cognitive science
Mark Bickhard, How does the environment affect the person?
Mark Bickhard, Interactivism: A manifesto
William Clancey, How situated cognition is different from situated robotics
Andy Clark, Forces, fields, and the role of knowledge in action
Andy Clark, Beyond the flesh: Some lessons from a mole cricket
Andy Clark and Pete Mandik, Selective representing and world-making
Andy Clark, Author's reply to symposium on Natural-Born Cyborgs
Andy Clark, Minds, brains and tools
Chris Eliasmith, Computation and dynamic models of the mind
Chris Eliasmith, The third contender: A critical examination of the dynamicist theory of cognition
Chris Eliasmith, Moving beyond metaphors: Understanding the mind for what it is
Chris Eliasmith, Attractive and in-discrete: A critique of two putative virtues of the dynamicist theory of mind
Peter Godfrey-Smith, Environmental complexity and the evolution of cognition
Peter Godfrey-Smith, Untangling the evolution of mental representation
Jesse Prinz, Emotions embodied
Tim van Gelder, The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science (and responseto commentators )
Tim van Gelder, Defending the dynamic hypothesis
Tim van Gelder, Revisiting the dynamic hypothesis
Daniel Weiskopf, The place of time in cognition
Robert Wilson and Andy Clark, How to situate cognition: Letting nature take its course
Theory of Mind
Angela Arkway, The simulation theory and explanations that "make sense of behavior"
Angela Arkway, Folk psychological explanation, and causal laws
Allison Barnes & Paul Thagard, Empathy and analogy
Jose Luis Bermudez, The domain of folk psychology
Henk bij de Weg, The commonsense conception and its relation to scientific theory
John Campbell, Schizophrenia, the space of reasons, and thinking as a motor process
John Campbell, Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion
Peter Carruthers, Autism as mindblindness: an elaboration and partial defence
Peter Carruthers, Simulation and self-knowledge: A defence of theory-theory
Peter Carruthers, Pretend play
Joe Cruz, Mindreading: Mental state ascription and cognitive architecture
Joe Cruz, Simulation and the psychology of sociopathy
Martin Davies, The mental simulation debate
Martin Davies and Tony Stone, Folk psychology and mental simulation
Martin Davies and Tony Stone, Mental simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of collapse
Martin Davies and Tony Stone, Psychological understanding and social skills
Martin Davies and Tony Stone, Simulation theory
Justin Fisher, Does simulation theory really involve simulation?
Shaun Gallagher, The practice of mind: Theory, simulation, or primary interaction?
Tamar Gendler, On the relation between pretense and belief
Peter Godfrey-Smith, Folk psychology as a model
Alvin Goldman, The psychology of folk psychology
Alvin Goldman, Folk psychology and mental concepts
Robert Gordon, Sellars's Ryleans revisited
Robert Gordon & John Barker, Autism and the "theory of mind" debate
Robert Gordon, Developing commonsense psychology: Experimental data and philosophical data
Robert Gordon, Reason explanations and counterfactuals
Robert Gordon & Joe Cruz, Simulation theory
Robert Gordon, Representing minds
David Henderson & Terry Horgan, Simulation and epistemic competence
Frank Jackson, All that can be at issue in the theory-theory/simulation debate
Robyn Langdon, Martin Davies, and Max Coltheart, Understanding minds and understanding communicated meanings in schizophrenia
Matteo Mameli, Mindreading, mindshaping, and evolution
Shaun Nichols, Folk psychology
Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich, & Alan Leslie, Choice effects and the ineffectiveness of simulation
Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich, Alan Leslie & David Klein, Varieties of off-line simulation
Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich, Rethinking co-cognition
Gerard O'Brien, A conflation of folk psychologies
Gloria Origgi, Theories of theories of mind
Anna Papafragou, Mindreading and verbal communication
Eric Schwitzgebel, A difficulty for simulation theory due to the close connection of pretense and action in early childhood
Eric Schwitzgebel, Children's theories and the drive to explain
Eric Schwitzgebel, Gradual belief change in children
Eric Schwitzgebel, Words about young minds: The concepts of theory, representation, and belief in philosophy and developmental psychology
Eric Schwitzgebel, Representation and desire: A philosophical error with consequences for theory-of-mind research
Kim Sterelny, The triumph of a reasonable man: Stich, mindreading, and nativism
Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols, Folk psychology: Simulation or tacit theory?
Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols, Second thoughts on simulation
Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols, Theory theory to the max
Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols, Cognitive penetrability, rationality, and restricted simulation
Tony Stone and Martin Davies, The mental simulation debate: A progress report
Thomas Suddendorf & Claire Fletcher-Flinn, Theory of mind and the origins of divergent thinking
Julia Tanney, Ordinary language and commonsense psychology
Nigel Thomas, Attitude and image, or, What will simulation theory let us eliminate?
Daniel Weiskopf, Mental mirroring as the origin of attributions
Evolution and Innateness
Andre Ariew, Innateness and canalization
William Bechtel, What knowledge must be in the head in order to acquire language
David Buller, DeFreuding evolutionary psychology: Adapation and human motivation
David Buller, Evolutionary psychology
David Buller, Evolutionary psychology: The emperor's new paradigm
Peter Carruthers, Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection?
John Collins, Cowie on the poverty of the stimulus
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, Evolutionary psychology: A primer
Stephen Crain & Paul Pietroski, Nature, nurture, and universal grammar
Stephen Crain & Paul Pietroski, Why language acquisition is a snap
Denise Cummins, Robert Cummins, and Pierre Poirier, Cognitive evolutionary psychology without representational nativism
Simon Fitzpatrick, Nativism, empiricism and Ockham’s razor
Jerry Fodor, Doing without What's Within (and Fiona Cowie's response ; see also these )
Malcolm Forster & Larry Shapiro, Prediction and accommodation in evolutionary psychology
Mark Greenberg, Goals versus memes: Explanation in the theory of cultural evolution
Paul Griffiths, Evo-devo meets the mind: Toward a developmental evolutionary psychology
Marc Krellenstein, What have we learned from evolutionary psychology?
Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis, The poverty of stimulus argument
Ronald Mallon & Stephen Stich, The odd couple: The compatibility of social construction and evolutionary psychology
Paul Pietroski & Stephen Crain, Innate ideas
Jesse Prinz, Against moral nativism
Geoffrey Pullum, Empirical assessment of stimulus poverty arguments (and reply by Legate and Yang )
Geoffrey Pullum, Learnability, hyperlearning, and the poverty of the stimulus
Robert Richards, Darwin's metaphysics of mind
Robert Rupert, Nativism and empiricism
Gabriel Segal, Poverty of stimulus arguments concerning language and folk psychology
Kim Sterelny, The evolution and evolvability of culture
Modularity
David Buller, Evolutionary psychology, meet developmental neurobiology: Against promiscuous modularity
Peter Carruthers, Simple heuristics meet massive modularity
Peter Carruthers, The case for massively modular models of mind
Peter Carruthers, On Fodor's problem
Peter Carruthers, Practical reasoning in a modular mind
Peter Carruthers, Moderately massive modularity
Jesse Prinz, Is the mind really modular?
Dan Sperber, In defense of massive modularity
Dan Sperber, Modularity and relevance: How can a massively modular mind be flexible and context-sensitive
Kim Sterelny, Language, modularity, and evolution
Philosophy of Cognitive Science (Misc)
Tim Bayne and Elizabeth Pacherie, Bottom-up or top-down: Campbell's rationalist account of monothematic delusions (and reply to commentators )
Mark Bickhard, Psychopathology
Mark Bickhard, An integration of motivation and cognition
Mark Bickhard, Mind as process
Mark Bickhard, The biological foundations of cognitive science
Peter Carruthers, Human creativity
Peter Carruthers, The roots of scientific reasoning
Robert Cummins, Functional analysis
Robert Cummins, "How does it work" versus "What are the laws?": Two conceptions of psychological explanation
Martin Davies, An approach to the philosophy of cognitive science
Martin Davies, Interaction without reduction: The relationship between personal and subpersonal levels of description
Ronald de Sousa, Rational animals: What the bravest lion won't risk
Philip Gerrans, Delusions as performance failures
Philip Gerrans, Refining the explanation of Cotard's delusion
Philip Gerrans, The norms of cognitive development
Alison Gopnik & Eric Schwitzgebel, Whose concepts are they, anyway? The role of philosophical intuition in empirical psychology
Rick Grush, Emulation and cognition
Rick Grush, The emulation theory of representation: Motor control, imagery, and perception
Rick Grush, The philosophy of cognitive science
Rick Grush, The architecture of representation
Rick Grush, Blending in language, conceptual structure, and the cerebral cortex
Stephen Laurence, Is linguistics a branch of psychology?
Ron McClamrock, Functional analysis and etiology
Ron McClamrock, Marr's three levels: A re-evaluation
Ron McClamrock, Holism without tears: Local and global effects in cognitive processes
Ruth Millikan, In defense of public language
Matthias Scheutz and Markus Peschl, Explicating the epistemological role of simulation in the development of theories of cognition
Roger Sperry, The impact and promise of the cognitive revolution
Kim Sterelny, Folk logic and animal rationality
Kim Sterelny, Cognitive load and human decision
John Sutton, Memory
John Sutton, Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism
John Sutton, Representation, reduction, and interdisciplinarity in the sciences of memory
John Sutton, Cognitive conceptions of language and the development of autobiographical memory
John Sutton, Porous memory and the cognitive life of things
Jonathan Waskan, Intrinsic cognitive models
Daniel Weiskopf, On Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way
Robert Wilson, Philosophy of psychology
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