Factors of underdevelopment in Afghanistan, 1919-2000

Chapter One I. Introduction In the late 19th century, Afghanistan experienced some development initiatives; however, the 20th century witnessed the most serious attempts at development in the country. In spite of these efforts, the country remains underdeveloped. Certainly, Afghanistan was much more developed in the 1970s than it was at the turn of the 20th century. However, internal and external factors limited the prospects of development and the result of these efforts has been disappointing. The country is still very far behind vis-à-vis the developed and even the underdeveloped world (Brant, 1974:92). 1.1 Statement of the Problem/ Hypotheses Different regimes have tried different approaches to produce development in Afghanistan. Approaches have ranged from pro-Soviet to pro-Western. In this dissertation, I intend to examine the approaches tried in Afghanistan from the year 1919 to the present in order to identify their results. Two particular questions guide my research. Question 1) Has the failure of development efforts resulted from the imposition of approaches that ignored the specific conditions and aspirations of the people of Afghanistan? Question 2) Has the failure of development efforts been the result of endogenous, or exogenous factors, or both? Two preliminary hypotheses will guide my search for responses. Hypothesis 1) approaches to development have been superimposed on Afghan society without integrating its own conditions, realities and aspirations. Hypothesis 2) they (approaches), in-fact, represented interests that were quite foreign to Afghanistan, in that they were related to the struggle of foreign powers to manipulate and control Afghanistan for their own interests. This dissertation is not an exercise in history but rather a socioeconomic development study of Afghanistan from the 1919 to 2000. The historical changes from 1919 to the present are used to unravel the socioeconomic complexities of Afghanistan. It is not an exhaustive study of all the archival sources related to developmental efforts in the country, but rather it is the study of the core elements, which characterize the developmental experience of Afghanistan. This research will help with the identification of elements that need to be integrated into any current and future development approaches to fit the conditions and local reality and to gain the cooperation of people in Afghanistan. 1.2 Significance of the Study Several reasons explain the significance of this study and my selection of the years 1919 to the present as the subject of my research. The year 1919 marks the first serious formal development effort in Afghanistan.1 The second large-scale development occurred in the 1950s-60s. The period from 1919 to the present witnessed a wide array of developmental approaches that ranges from pro-Western to Soviet models. Since the development approaches from 1919 onward had social, 1 Afghanistan did not engage in serious development efforts before 1919 due to the British intervention, and the isolation Britain imposed on Afghanistan. In the late 19th century, Afghanistan served as a buffer zone between Czarist Russia and British India; consequently, Afghanistan was isolated from the rest of the world. This was due to the agreement of an Afghan King with Britain to have Afghanistan’s foreign affairs handled by Britain due to the danger of a potential Russian advance toward India. The British extended protection against any Russian advance in return for Afghanistan not having any diplomatic relations with Russia or any other country. In 1919, Prince Amanullah Khan fought for, and won Afghan foreign affairs from Britain and defeated British in the Third Anglo-Afghan War. After 1919, a systematic development, economic and political consequences, it is essential to study these periods in order to identify factors that hindered as well as facilitated development in the country. In addition, the analysis of these periods will contribute to identify the reasons why development has been unsuccessful. It may suggest development approaches that avoid the shortcomings of those tried so far. Furthermore, the findings of this research will contribute to future developmental policies in Afghanistan. Since the physical and economic infrastructure of Afghanistan has been largely destroyed by the war, the reconstruction of the economic as well as the physical infrastructures would require sound policy formulations. Moreover, this research hopefully will constitute a useful theoretical source for future socioeconomic policies. Thus far, approaches used have been produced in societies whose social-historical realities differ from those of Afghanistan. Findings from this research may point to indigenous factors that need to be included in future development attempts. touching all levels of society, was undertaken using domestic resources and the expertise of different European countries. II. Literature Review I will examine two categories of literature: 1) the literature on Afghanistan’s development; and 2) the literature on social change and development. The literature on Afghanistan is very limited. With few exceptions, works are limited to chronological accounts of political developments. However, they include development efforts pursued during different periods. This analysis will pay particular attention to them. Authors have studied Afghanistan from different angles. Some have analyzed the modern State in political terms (Ahmad, 1990), others in socioeconomic terms (Gregorian, 1969; Kamrany, 1969). Yet, others have looked at it in the context of the international system of states (Rubin, 1995). Most of the literature agrees on several points including the strategic location of Afghanistan and the tribal structure of Afghan society. Some of the authors make implicit references to individual leaders through their treatment of various historical periods (Rubin, 1995; Kamrany, 1969; Pollouda, 1971; Ahmad, 1990; Gregorian, 1969; & Ghubar, 1969). While providing information on the specifics of development efforts, this review will help determine the shortcomings of the approaches used. The second category of literature consists of two sections. The first section is an overview of the theories of social change. Since it is impossible to review all the theories of social change here, I will review those theories that have informed the development approaches applied in Afghanistan. The second section will focus specifically on the three development models of modernization, dependency and Stalinism either because they were tried in the country or because they are especially relevant to Afghanistan. The review of literature on social change will help identify the shortcomings of theories guiding development in Afghanistan vis-à-vis the reality of this society. Second, the knowledge of social change will serve as the skeleton or framework for my analysis. 2.1 Literature on Afghanistan The literature on the history of Afghanistan is largely limited to the survey of facts through narratives that pay limited attention to the interpretation of events. A healthy exception is the late Ghulam Mohammed Ghubar, who is best known for his reliable accounts of Afghan history. He articulated the history of Afghanistan in his book “Afghanistan Dar Masir-e Tarikh” (written in Persian), or “Afghanistan in the trend of history” (Ghubar, 1969). As an activist for constitutional monarchy, his presence in the early development in the 20th century makes him a valuable source of analysis and facts. However, his book covers only the history up to the period of King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929). Ghubar’s narrative and analysis of the developmental attempts of King Amanullah and his coverage of the ISI (Import Substitution Industrialization) approach provided rich insights for this research. He articulates the details of the economic reforms that increased the government’s budget by more than two times the previous amount. Ghubar presents the particulars of the different taxes imposed on the different sectors of society, namely taxes on land and cattle. In addition, his coverage of social reforms and subsequent reactions provides insurmountable details for the analysis of Amanullah Khan’s development shortcomings. Ghubar speculates on the perspectives of different authors who believe that the failure of Amanullah Khan’s reforms was the result of feudal and religious opposition and foreign intervention. He maintains that the incompetence of governments employees in conveying the reforms to the population paved the way for outsiders to take advantage of the anti-government sentiment and to build on it (Ghubar, 1969: 789-791). However, Ghubar does not take into account the fact that government officials were also Afghans and Muslims, who were offended by the radical social reforms. These government officials were from similar backgrounds in terms of tribal links and shared the same views. In his treatment of Amanullah’s period, Ghubar exhibits some degree of hostility toward conservatives and treats the “intellectuals” with favorable insight. Other sources discuss the imperial competition between Russians and British in the 19th century and the consequences of their rivalry for the development of the Afghan State in the 20th century (Ahmad, 1990; Adamec, 1974; Fraser-Tytler, 1967). The author that does the most compelling job here is N. D. Ahmad. His book The Survival of Afghanistan articulates the trend of development of the modern Afghan State from its official inception in 1747 to 1979 (Ahmad, 1990). The author discusses the external and internal factors affecting the survival of the Afghan State. Ahmad’s insightful analysis of the development of the Afghan Nation-State is inspiring. Ahmad was a colonel of the Army Educational Corps. While he was stationed in the Northwest Frontier of Pakistan (NWFP), he had access to unique sources and documents of the Frontier Officer Corps. Through them, he obtained some meticulous details of the events taking place in different historical periods, especially in the early 20th century. Ahmad puts a lot of emphasis on the reign of Amanullah Khan. This is primarily due to his objective to prove that Amanullah Khan’s modernization attempts were indeed needed in light of the imperial powers’ intentions to hinder the progress of Afghanistan and other Muslim countries as well. The following quote from his book illustrates this: “There is a fairly strong consensus that Amanullah invited ruin to his reign by introducing his modernization programme much before its proper time. I do not find myself in agreement with this view and believe that as the great imperial powers are bent upon keeping the Islamic world away from progress, Amanullah rightly subscribed to the motto: now or never. No doubt, Amanullah is not known to have said anything to this effect, I have, however, ventured to prove in this work that he really meant it” (Ahmad, 1990:116). Ahmad has approached the development of the Afghan nation-state in the context of the struggle of imperial powers, Russia and Britain, and the Afghans’ passion for freedom. Ahmad (1990) reiterates the determination of the common Afghan man and his passion for freedom, as the prime factor for the survival of Afghanistan. Afghans have been living in a tribal mode of organization, each tribe being independent; however, upon the intrusion of any non-Afghan force in their enclaves, they would unite to force the intruders out of their area. Another author, Donald N. Wilber, has a similar perspective on the passion of the Afghan people and their steadfastness in keeping their sovereignty. He articulates the aforementioned point in his book, Afghanistan: its People, its Society, its Culture: “The most striking qualities of the Afghan people are their toughness, their poverty, their self-respect, their religious devotion, their conservatism, and their frugality. As a nation, they have intense love of freedom. As individuals they resent external control and restraint, yet have learned to accept an extraordinary amount of both from their rulers. To visitors who come in a friendly and openminded spirit, they show a remarkable hospitality. Yet their tribal background and war-scarred past have made them suspicious of ferangi [referring to the Englishman not the foreigner], or foreigner, and wary of his wiles and intentions. This same background can make them dangerous enemies of those, who try to bully or deceive them” (Wilber, 1962:4). The limitations of Ahmad’s work stem from his stress on the reign and personality of King Amanullah Khan. In his treatment of events in the 20th century, Mr. Ahmad devoted more space to the period 1919-1929. However, other significant periods in Afghan history such as the period of Prime Minister Daud Khan (19531963), are as important. Moreover, this weakness also serves as a strength, because he has stressed this period to illustrate a general point that not only pertains to Afghanistan but the entire Muslim world --- the exploitation of the Muslim world by powers trying to impede them from progress. This point is better illustrated by the following quote from his book: “As an objective writer, reader and viewer of politico- socio- religious phenomena prevailing in the Muslim world of today, I want to lay stress on the fact that the Muslims will not get any respite from the hostile powers in their efforts to catch up with the requirements of modern age – a must for honorable existence. Amanullah’s studied haste is the answer to this problem” (Ahmad, 1990:116). The last sentence of this quote points to the urgency of development in Afghanistan as well as other Muslim countries. Although Ahmad points out the various endogenous and exogenous factors that hindered development in Afghanistan, he does not fully appreciate the factors that hindered Amanullah’s modernization attempt. Furthermore, he does not give a clear direction as to what Afghanistan should do in order to escape the trap of underdevelopment. That is, Ahmad does not give a vision and a policy alternative other than some hopes for the future of Afghanistan as well as other Muslim countries. Similar claims regarding the rivalry of the great powers in respect to the survival of Afghanistan have been made by Rosanne Klass (1987) in her edited book, Afghanistan: the Great Game Revisited (Klass, 1989). Other authors (Noorzoy, Siddieq; Poullada, Leon; Krakowski, Elie; Shroder, John & Assifi, Abdul Tawab), in the same book, covered topics related to the geopolitics and economics of Afghanistan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although, these authors appreciate the complexity of Afghan history and factors such as strategic location and tribal structure of the country, that molded Afghanistan’s underdevelopment, they do not propose any solution. Unlike the above-mentioned authors’ focus, the emphasis of the dissertation is on the underdevelopment of Afghanistan, especially those factors that may have perpetuated socioeconomic underdevelopment. These authors cover issues of rivalry of the super powers---Russia and Britain in the 19th century or USSR and USA in the 20th century, in the development of the Afghan Nation-State. This dissertation uses information from these books as data in the analysis of the developmental approaches used in each period; however, it adds to them the discussion of endogenous and exogenous factors, and the identification of factors unique to Afghanistan that may have rendered such approaches inappropriate. Moreover, this dissertation proposes a development approach that will contribute hopefully to prosperity in Afghanistan. Leon Poullada’s book, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929 is a significant source of reference also for the period 1919-1929 (Poullada, 1973). His book is a study of political development in Afghanistan. It helps understand the dynamics of this period, that is, modernization reforms, reaction to the reforms, and consequent rebellions. Comparing his claims to authors such as Ahmad (1990) helps identify certain shortcomings. In his study, Poullada attempts to dispel “some of the mythology” about Amanullah Khan’s failure. According to him, Amanullah Khan’s failure was not due to what he calls, the two popular myths that 1) rebellion against Amanullah Khan was widely supported due to his radical social and religious reforms, and 2) the rebellion was instigated by the British. I disagree with Poullada, because there are ample evidences that refute his claims. However, his detailed analysis of the various reforms was very helpful and provided significant data, for this analysis. Poullada analyzes the period 1919-1929 and, like the authors above, acknowledges that Afghanistan remained underdeveloped but he does not give any advice as to what could be done to bring development to Afghanistan. The socioeconomic development of Afghanistan is surveyed also in Vartan Gregorian’s book, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reforms and Modernization, 1880-1946 (Gregorian, 1969). This is a modern history that emphasizes the socioeconomic development and the policies that were instrumental for such development. Gregorian does a superb job in documenting the socioeconomic development in Afghanistan, because he is very thorough in his treatment of the periods he covers. Since his work covers the years 1880-1946, he, therefore, provides substantial information on the two periods of 1919-1929 and 1930-1946. He offers a detailed account of the socioeconomic development of Afghanistan. Gregorian points to two historical factors that are crucial for understanding the direction of development between 1880- 1946, 1) Afghanistan’s struggle and subsequent attitudes toward Britain and Russia; 2) the Afghan dynasty’s dependence on the support of tribes to maintain the integrity and independence of Afghanistan. He alleges that these two factors were the determinants of socioeconomic development in Afghanistan. The Afghan struggle and subsequent attitudes toward Britain and Russia stemmed from the lack of trust in either Russia or Britain. Thus, Afghanistan looked for alternative sources of assistance such as Germany and later the United States. As to the second factor, the Afghan Royal House saw its survival in its positive relationship with tribes. Thus, on the one hand, in economic terms, taxing city dwellers provided a large part of the government’s revenue. On the other hand, development was confined to the cities, because tribes did not like to see their semiautonomy disrupted by the government’s infrastructural projects. Urban merchants were heavily taxed to obtain adequate financial resources for the various modernization schemes, but could not accumulate enough financial resources to pursue serious economic development. Gregorian, (1969:6), accurately, argues that the reliance of Afghan rulers upon tribal military might make them advance a policy that sustained the tribal-feudal structure of the Kingdom. As Gregorian puts it: “…the reforms were confined to the urban centers, which were intended to serve as models and as sources of power, wealth, and prestige. Consequently, the agricultural system of the kingdom remained virtually untouched, and reform and modernization came to be regarded as [a] strictly urban process” (Gregorian, 1969:398). The ramifications of the confinement of modernization to the urban centers will be discussed in later chapters. Meanwhile, certain shortcomings weaken Gregorian’s work. Although, he refers to the tribal and religious sectors as factors determining the extent of modernization, neither does he discuss the dynamics and intricacies of the value systems (Islam and Pashtunwali), nor does he attempt to discuss the individual leaders’ impact upon the development of Afghanistan. Furthermore, he did not offer any suggestion on what Afghanistan ought to embark on in order to bring about progress. His work significantly contributes to the three historical chapters of this dissertation namely 1919-1929, 1929-1933, and 1933-1946. I advance his work through the incorporation of two additional factors, value systems and individual leaders. From the perspective of political development, the author who does perhaps the best job in analyzing the situation of Afghanistan is Barnett Rubin in his book, The fragmentation of Afghanistan (1995). He approaches Afghanistan in the context of nation-state and its position within the international system of nation-states. His study covers the factional fighting among Afghan resistance fighters after the collapse of the Marxist regime in 1992. He refers to the political development in Afghanistan that benefited from the onset of Cold War competition between USSR and USA, and that molded Afghanistan as a rentier state---reliant on foreign aid to keep the masses dependent on the state. He attempts to explain the post-1992 ethnic conflict between the various Mujahideen factions along ethno-linguistic lines. He explains this anarchy in terms of failure of Afghanistan as a rentier-state, that is, the state relied on foreign aid to maintain stability and, once the foreign aid ceased, factional fighting ensued. His analysis adds the perspective of political development. His work furnished data for the discussion in this dissertation of the 1973-1978 period. Furthermore, his discussion of Afghanistan within the dynamics of the international system of states brings up the significance of the strategic location of the country that attracted Soviet and American aid in the 1950s-60s. He analyzes President Daud Khan’s attempts to draw himself away from the Soviet Union (in the late 1970s prior to the Marxist coup) and treats the extensive development aid that regional actors such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries offered to Afghanistan. Rubin brings up an important point that was shared not only by Afghanistan but also other Middle Eastern countries --- the correlation between the government’s spending and the increase in public employment: “The ostensible aim of education [in Afghanistan] was to train the youth for state-guided modernization, but the state failed to provide acceptable career paths or survival strategies for many graduates. Once a student was out of school, whether through graduation or dropping out, virtually the only source of employment was the government bureaucracy. The investment in a centralized state infrastructure had not led to any increase in private employment. As in other Third World countries, the government increased public employment partly in order to employ graduates: the number of state employees tripled in the late 1960s, even as the foreign aid financing the projects, where they were supposed to work was declining” (Rubin, 1995:77). Another related point made by Rubin envisages the social conflict resulting from the modernization attempts of the 1960s. He points to the educational process as a cultural source of conflict between fathers and sons. He mentions: “… But education estranged fathers from sons; a 1967 survey of graduates of Kabul University showed that 62 percent had fathers with minimal or no formal education, and the emotional and social distance between the generations was widening” (Rubin, 1995:76). This quote refers to the alienation brought about by the various Marxist and westernized ideas the students absorbed --- hence the motto: “do not send your children to schools because they become infidels”. Consequently, the alienation of the majority of the population from the educated minority created long-term problems. The relevance of Rubin’s point to this work stems from the postulate that the modernization efforts violated the societal values and pictured modernization in the eyes of the Afghans as a cultural transformation of their country. Such perspectives were intensified especially when male and female students exhibited foreign, untraditional ideas and practices. The ramification of this sort of alienation is unique to Afghanistan as is manifested by the Taliban movement, because the Taliban embodies the wishes of the silent majority of the country, that is, the traditional sector of society. Although the emergence of the Taliban was, in part, a reaction to modernization, however, the media in the United States has grossly exaggerated some of the initial practices and restrictions placed on women. I will discuss this factor fully in chapter fourteen. Since events such as the adoption of secular values contradicted Islam and Pashtunwali2, the traditional sector, Ulema (clerics) and rural population, has always been suspicious of the modernized sector of society. Therefore, Taliban emerged as a reaction to the civil war following the collapse of the Marxist regime in 1992, took over the government, and embarked on the implementation of ultra-traditionalist and Islamic codes of behavior. The reaction was not only to the civil war, but also to those Mujahideen3 groups, product of the 1960s constitutional “freedoms” because some of their leaders opposed mullahs4 on grounds that they supported the status quo. That in 2 Pashtunwali is the Pashtun code of honor. “ The code of honor though wholly un-written has its sanction, like the constitution of Great Britain, in conventions and traditions which govern and regulate the entire social life of a Pashtun and serve as the chief instrument for maintaining law and order in the tribal territory” (Ahmad, 1990:85). The salient maxims of Pashtunwali are: Badal- revenge by retaliation; Tigathe truce between two warring parties; Nanawatae- when a party accompanied by a deputation enters the house of someone that he offended and asks for forgiveness. Panah- refuge; Melmastia—being a genial host; Mehrma-palineh—hospitality; Tureh—“sword” bravery; Meranah—Manhood or chivalry; Isteqamat—persistence; Sabat—steadfastness; Imandari—righteousness; ghayrat— courage, defense of homeland and honor; Namus—defense of the honor of women; Musawat—equality between the high and the low, i.e. tribal khans are equal to common man. (Ahmad, 1990:88-89; Dupree, 1972:126-7) 3 Mujahideen or holy warrior was referred to Afghan resistant fighters because they were fighting a holy war against a non-Muslim enemy. 4 A “mullah” (Persian mulla, from literary Perso-Arabic mawla ‘master’) refers to a literate person in a largely illiterate community, more especially to one who can read the Holy Koran and devotional literature. part, explains Taliban’s opposition to some of the Mujahideen leaders. Although Taliban received the assistance of the United States initially, that however, does not make them prone to support the adoption of Western cultural symbols. Rubin discusses the evolution of the modern system of nation-states and maintains that control of the population by the state necessitated that “laws, state decisions, and ideologies be disseminated and legitimated more widely.” Although, I agree with his general argument, he refers to the European experience of the nationstate formation. The formation of the Afghan Nation-State is unique to its own historical experiences. Contrary to Rubin, the basic ideology/laws and legitimizing factors existed before the formation of the Afghan State. The code of Pashtunwali, of the Pashtuns, satisfied the factors (basic ideology/laws and legitimizing factors), that Rubin points to as being essential for the formation of nation-states. It is appropriate to mention that, though, Pashtuns are one of the many ethnic groups in Afghanistan; nonetheless, they constitute 60-65% of the Afghan population, and the only ethnic group that is organized by tribes. That is why, one could trace the role of Pashtunwali code and the Pashtun tribes played in the early years of the Pashtun or Afghan tribes. 5 Whenever the enemy intruded their enclaves, the rivalry that existed between tribes6 or He is typically one of the lower echelons of the ‘ulama or Islamic scholars’, who might lead public prayers and officiate at other rites, such as a funeral; draft and witness a marriage contract; or teach elementary school. 5 It is appropriate to mention that the non-Pashtun groups, Hazara (of Mongolorigin), and Tajik (Persian speaking) minority group, started to play active roles on large scale during and after the reign of Amanullah Khan. Moreover, Afghan throne was in the hands of Pashtuns from the inception of the nation-state except during the nine-month period when a Tajik bandit Bacha-e-Saqau, occupied the throne after Amanullah’s abdication. Some of them especially Tajiks adopted some aspects of Pashtunwali. 6 All of the Pashtun tribes speak Pashto. The only difference is regional dialect, i.e. the tribes in the south have a different dialect than those in eastern and western Afghanistan. within tribes would be set aside under the provisions of Jerga7 (the tribal council) and the defense of common interest and integrity would take precedence over their differences. An example of this could be seen during the British intervention in Afghanistan. When the Sadozai dynasty (the Pashtun tribe whose chief, Ahmad Shah Baba, founded Afghanistan in 1747) collapsed a struggle for power ensued between the Sadozai princes and the governors of various provinces from the Mohammadzai tribe (another Pashtun tribe). This struggle lasted from 1809 to 1826 bringing about 17 years of interregnum with no official authority. While there was no government for these 17 years, Afghanistan did not cease to be a nation-state. When the British invaded Afghanistan, the animosity ceased between tribes who formed a united front against the British, and annihilated their forces in the winter of 1842 at Jeg-dalek (an area near Kabul). This clearly establishes the significance of common bond of a nation and validates the notion of a nation that does not need to be bound by a central authority to be called nation-state. Rubin claims that tribe and state are two opposing modes of thought that constitute a single system. This formulation may hold in other regions of the world, however, it does not hold in the case of Afghanistan because the relationship between tribe and state are the two complementary components (not opposing) of a single system. The reason why I call this relationship complementary is due to the tribes’ active roles in the State’s affairs from its inception, even-though, occasional conflicts occurred between tribes and the State. Furthermore, until 1978, the royal house from the same Pashtun tribe occupied the Afghan throne; these rulers enjoyed the support of 7 Jerga or council means “(literally “circle” denoting the equality of participants. Jerga includes all adult males and rules by consensus. Jerga can be convened at any level of tribal organization, from the smallest their as well as other Afghan tribes. The occasional conflict between the tribes and the state derived from state’s policies aimed at curtailing tribal semi-autonomy and subjecting them to the rules of the nation-state. This, in part, was a violation of the principles upon which the relationship between the tribes and the state was based. This complementary relationship between the state and the tribes stemmed from the historical formation of the Afghan Nation-State, which, at its inception, was a tribal confederacy whose strength derived from tribal consensus. However, such tribal-state relationship was weakened in the 1950s when the Afghan government formed a modern mechanized army, which was used to suppress any tribal revolt. Furthermore, it should become clear below that tribal influence was not the only factor. Other factors include Pashtunwali, Islam, the strategic location of Afghanistan, and individual leaders. It is worth mentioning that due to the coexistence of Tajiks with Pashtuns, they (Tajiks) also share elements of Pashtunwali. Moreover, the tribal consensus, at the formation of the nation-state, was based on the value systems of Afghan society, namely Islam and Pashtunwali. Since Pashtun tribes were the ones that formed the Afghan State, therefore, it reflects their values, Pashtunwali. In fact, the role of these values can be established when one reviews the official formation of the Afghan Nation-State in 1747, when Ahmad Shah Abdali assembled the Pashtun tribal leaders in a Jerga (tribal council) to form the NationState. Despite counter claims by different Pashtun tribal leaders to the throne, a Darwaish (a mystical religious figure) proclaimed Ahmad Shah Abdali as the head of the Afghan State. The other tribal leaders did not challenge his proclamation because the Darwaish was a religious figure. Hence, tribal discussion via Jerga (tribal council) lineage to an entire confederation.” (Rubin, 1995:42) constitutes the Pashtunwali element and the Darwaish’s intervention amidst discussion signifies the side by side coexistence of Islam and Pashtunwali. This envisages the significance and inter-relatedness of Pashtunwali and Islam in the fiber of tribal life and refutes the quote by Rubin (1995:10) that tribe and state are two opposing modes of a single system. In the case of Afghanistan, tribe and state are not two opposing modes of a single system but rather tribes and state are two inseparable realities, something relevant in 1747 when the tribal confederacy constituted the State as well as today when Jergas (tribal councils) are used to discuss political issues. Although segments of the population other than Pashtuns are active in political and socioeconomic spheres of Afghan society, nonetheless, Pashtuns and their tribal arrangement constitute the determining factor in national affairs. Nonetheless, Rubin is correct in maintaining that in the Middle East and Central Asia, “tribes exist in interaction with the state”. However, tribes dominated Afghan government from the beginning, the state rendered lip service to the minorities because the rulers were Pashtun. With the modernization attempts of the Afghan government in the 1950s and 1960s, large segments of tribal young men joined the Afghan army and air force, thus, continuing and facilitating tribal-state symbiosis. In fact, tribal khans or Maliks serve as links between the state and the tribes. Although the government was in the hands of Pashtuns from one of the tribes, other Pashtun tribes exerted their demands on a regular basis. Khans and Maliks convey tribal wishes and demands to the government in Kabul and keep conflicts in check. Rubin’s conclusion that in order to strengthen the weakness of the state, the leaders of Afghanistan encourage fragmentation of society is sound. In order for the ruler to prolong a rule that, otherwise would not be acceptable to the tribes, he would resort to the notion of “divide and rule”. However, Rubin’s claim that traditionalism and localism are not the result of ancient tradition but rather the consequence of forced integration into the contemporary state system is questionable. He seems to ignore the historical development well before the contemporary nation-state came about. Furthermore, before and after the formation of the Afghan nation-state, the so-called localism was the inherent characteristic of the Afghan people. However, when the exogenous design was superimposed on the nation, conflict occurred between the foreign element and local society. So-called localism and traditionalism were not in contradiction in the infant state, because traditionalism was not conceived as a separate entity from the infrastructure of the nation-state. To an outside observer, it may appear to be so. However, if one follows the historical development of Afghanistan, the nature and social structure of the tribes and the social political dynamics of Afghan tribes, one would appreciate its complexity. Moreover, Rubin takes the orthodox, Eurocentric, formulation (Durkheim’s perspective) that explains the transition from the traditional domain to the modern. Although, some of the general notions of the orthodox formulation are valid (to explain transition from the traditional to the modern) for any society, however, Durkheim’s formulation is based on the tradition of positivism as it emerged with Auguste Comte. Since positivism is a post reformation phenomenon, that is why the value system that has to do with religion has been excluded from this formulation. In the enlightment era, Catholic Church or religion in general was considered irrational, thus, formulation that embodied rationality, i.e. positivism, was viewed superior than supernatural phenomenon. That is how, positivism is devoid of religious values. Value based development embodies positive implications for a nation-state. If the latter pursued a development policy compatible with the values and principles of that society, then if any resistance to the policy in question surfaced, its suppression would not damage the legitimacy of the authority of the state. For example, if Amanullah Khan did not adopt Western-secular values as part of his social reforms, then the suppression of any rebellion would be easy because the population would not have to deal with any claim that Amanullah Khan became an “infidel”. A final essential source is the book of Nake M. Kamrany, Peaceful Competition in Afghanistan (Kamrany, 1969). Kamrany attempts to compare and contrast the US and Soviet aid programs in Afghanistan from 1953 to 1966. Primarily, his work concentrates on the cold war competition between the United States and Soviet Union in Afghanistan that resulted in various developmental efforts. He concludes that 1) the Afghan planned economy was successful; and 2) the means through which this success was accomplished was Soviet-US competition. His strength consists of the detailed analysis of the Soviet and US competition. His weakness is the lack of qualification of the notion of success. Even-though, Afghanistan accomplished a lot in terms of establishing an infrastructure, educational institutions and a modern military system; however, the foreign aid lessened the incentives for the government to rely on the mobilization of domestic resources for development. Kamrany could have measured success by the long-term capability of Afghanistan to finance its own development plans without reliance on foreign aid. Kamrany began with the implications of the nineteenth century competition between England and Russia. The isolation resulting from the role of Afghanistan as the buffer zone between Czarist Russia and British India kept the country behind in the economic, social, educational and cultural arenas. Thus, the peaceful competition between the USA and USSR in Afghanistan provided opportunity for the country to improve its education, public health, and industry, but most importantly, it facilitated the establishment of needed infrastructure to aid in future development. 2.2 Literature on Social Change and Development The second category of literature consists of the theories of social change most relevant for this discussion, namely structural-functionalism and historical materialism and their parallel in the sociology of development namely Modernization, Stalinism and dependency schools. The three analyses of development will be discussed together with structural functionalism and historical materialism because they inspired their formulation. However, each development theory will be discussed separately. 2.2.1 Theories of Social Change The literature on social change is extensive and can not be all covered in this review. I will include here only those that have most relevance to the development experience of Afghanistan. The pertinent social change theories are structuralfunctionalism and historical materialism, and their equivalents or applications in the sociology of development, namely modernization, dependency and Stalinism. Both historical materialism and structural functionalism are the products of 19th century sociological formulations in Europe that carried into the 20th century. 2.2.1.1 Structural Functionalism Structural functionalism was pioneered by Talcott Parsons and is the 20th century continuation of the works of authors like Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. Parsons’s structural functionalism formed a prescriptive and explanatory framework for what came to be known as the modernization theory. This theory conceptualized development of all human societies through a unilinear continuum. Modernization theory views Western advanced countries as being ahead on the evolutionary continuum. In fact, LDCs (Less Developed Countries) are in the early part of the evolutionary continuum, and in time, are supposed to catch up with the developed countries of the West. For structural-functionalism, economic institutions constitute crucial dynamic forces of social change and progress. The development of society according to structural-functionalism is due to the progress of industrialism and its consequent economic growth accompanied by the differentiation of the social structure. Structural-functionalism is formulated on the basis of the experiences of the Western world. It presents the experience of the Western industrialized societies as the only model of development, hence discounting other models of societal development. 2.2.1.2 Historical Materialism Historical materialism is a theory of social-historical change that conceptualizes change through a series of epochs. Each epoch has its-own relations of production. When the relations of production of an epoch become incompatible with technologically superior forces of production, the consequence is a contradiction in the social structure that makes revolutionary change possible. Thus, historical materialism considers the relations of production as the dynamics of social change in human society. The series of historical epochs starts with hunter-gatherer societies and ends with communism. Communism is the teleological end of the societal evolution. Historical materialism puts heavy emphasis on the economic institutions, as does structural-functionalism. In order for human beings to ensure their survival, they have to participate in the production processes of society. However, this participation in production brings about social relations that entail inequality between those who own the means of production and those who do not. The resultant inequality brings about class conflict. Historical materialism inspired in part the theoretical framework known as the dependency theory. However, historical materialism does not have as direct a relationship with the dependency theory, as does structural-functionalism with the modernization theory. The difference between historical materialism and dependency theory lies in the mechanism of explanation of change. In the former, class conflict constitutes the mechanism of change because the unequal relationship between the dominant and the dominated classes allows for the appropriation of surplus value by the dominant class at the expense of subordinate classes. Meanwhile, the dependency theory holds that dependency results from the appropriation of surplus value through the spatial relationship of metropolis and satellite. What is meant by spatial relationship is the relationship between an underdeveloped country and a capitalist core country, or between different geographic regions within the same state. Dependency theory argues that European colonies were brought into the capitalist economic system during the colonial period as dependent extensions of the colonial core countries. Andre Gunder Frank articulated the spatial relations through the dichotomy of satellite (colonies) and metropolis or colonial powers (Frank, 1966:238). The perspective held by the dependency school espouses the notion that the dependency of LDCs will not change until the global capitalist system is changed. A neo-Marxist, Immanuel Wallerstein, conceptualized a similar framework. Wallerstein uses historical data to make his point regarding the development of a single capitalist world economy that had its roots firmly established in Europe (Wallerstein, 1974). Wallerstein uses a dichotomy of core and periphery that parallels Frank’s metropolis and satellite. 2.2.2 Sociology of Development The study and critique of the three models of development (modernization, Soviet Stalinism and dependency) helps better understand the different approaches applied to the development of Afghanistan and gives me elements to understand their applicability---or lack of--- to the specific circumstances of the country. Some of these approaches trace their origin to the colonial period. Some theories have a totalitarian element that makes them foreign to any society. From this analysis, I will be able to identify factors that may come in conflict with the values and social aspirations of the Afghan people. On these bases, I will be able to point to those elements that are necessary for a development approach that integrates local realities, and, hence, can have foundations that are more solid. 2.2.2.1 Modernization Theory Modernization theory is a cumulative concept that encompasses a complex array of changes developed in the West from the sixteenth century onward. It reached its peak in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This theory envisions change as an evolutionary process that is followed by all nation-states. Development is conceptualized as a movement along a horizontal continuum, whereupon all nationstates are situated. The continuum suggests a universal evolutionary path that was followed by the developed societies to reach their present. Modernization is shorthand for a variety of perspectives that were applied by non-Marxist theorists to the Third World in the1950s, and 1960s that are derived from the principles of structural functionalism identified with Parsons. The first two decades of post WW II are characterized by international changes ranging from decolonization to the division of human societies into first, second, and third worlds. The modernization theory was frequently applied to the Third World countries, first, as a consolation factor to keep the newly decolonized people in check from shifting to the east block, and second, to keep them as economic colonies and perpetuate this dependency relationship. Various authors have presented their perspectives regarding modernization theory. Some quotations can clarify their definition of modernization theory. “Modernization theory conceptualizes development as movement along a continuum of historical change upon which all national societies can be placed according to indices such as GNP, per capita income, acceptance of modern values, social differentiation, political integration, etc. The continuum is meant to describe a universal path of societal evolution, supposedly already followed by the modern, developed nations, and eventually to be traveled by the traditional, underdeveloped ones” (Fitzgerald, 1983:12-13). “… it [modernization theory] involves a fundamental proposition that people in traditional societies should adopt the characteristics of modern societies in order to modernize their social, political and economic institutions. The raison d’etre behind this is that there are certain social characteristics of enterprise, achievement and progress with which the Industrial Revolution has been identified and which subsequently have enabled the USA to provide a model of mass-consumption society. The straightforward implication is that a society which adopts these characteristics will become modernized” (Spybey, 1992:21). “Increased capital accumulation and industrialization were perceived by many writers and policy-makers to have been the vehicle by which the developed countries historically achieved sustained growth and development, and were thus widely seen as the road whereby the less-developed countries could achieve development” (Oman & Wignaraja, 1991:7). “The thinking of the 1950s and 1960s focused mainly on the concept of successive stages of economic growth in which the process of development was seen as a series of sequential stages through which all countries must pass. It was primarily an economic theory of development in which the right quantity and mixture of saving, investment and foreign aid were all that was necessary to enable Third World nations to proceed along an economic growth path which historically had been followed by the more developed countries (Todaro, 1992:98). As the various quotes indicate modernization theory is an evolutionary perspective derived from the developmental experiences of the Western industrialized countries. This philosophy gave way to a post WW II developmental project, in fact a containment policy towards the newly independent colonies. In the wake of Cold War, the West realized that the Soviet Union could not attack the West directly, but could dominate the world through the incorporation of the newly independent countries. The fact that these new countries had experienced the exploitation of the colonial powers and the post-colonial poverty and underdevelopment made them look as the ideal environment for Soviet block propaganda. To formulate their policies towards the newly independent countries, the industrialized democracies needed theories to back up their policies (Lewellen, 1995:54). The following quote from Lewellen (1995:54) illustrates this: “Theories of modernization tended to be pragmatic, that is, their aim was to provide governments with the tools to speed development, and Washington was, indeed, watching and listening. One did not have to seek far for the causes of underdevelopment; countries started underdeveloped – that was their initial condition. The crucial questions were, how do countries become developed? and what are the major barriers to development? The way to answer the first question was to examine the progress of the First World countries. To answer the second question, it was necessary to research the internal conditions of poorer countries (Lewellen, 1995:54). One of these sociologists, Parsons, formulated typologies called “pattern variables”. The pattern variables embodied, generally, the historical development of Western civilization, on the one hand, and the preconditions of the British Industrial Revolution, on the other hand, as the prescriptive framework of development for Third World nations (Spybey, 1992:22-23). Economic historian Walt Rostow (1960) used Parsons’ structural-functionalism to base his model of modernization, the Stages of Economic Growth. Such prescriptive modernizing process, when followed by Third World countries, created dual economies, the capitalist or semi-capitalist sector and the traditional sector (Spybey, 1992:14). The modern sector would adopt innovation, Western culture and entrepreneurial ethics. The traditional sector remained undeveloped in the sense that new technology had not penetrated it and inefficient methods of agriculture dominated it. The result was a widening gap between the modern and the traditional sectors (Lewellen, 1995:55). Development strategies inspired by modernization include: 2.2.2.1.1 ISI: ISI (Import-Sustituting Industrialization) had become one of the significant strategies of modernization in the LDCs. The basic premise of this strategy was to industrialize on the basis of state protectionism and entrepreneuralship. This strategy was pioneered in Latin America and in Turkey at the turn of the century. However, it fell short, primarily due to the inefficiencies built into the approach, including a tight control of technology at the core, small internal markets, and monopoly of exports also by the core. The governments that pursued this strategy also ignored the agricultural sector, which in fact was taxed heavily without practically any benefit. Richard and Waterbury argue that: “The agricultural sector was taxed through various devices to provide an investable surplus for the new industrial undertakings, while the foreign exchange earned from agricultural exports went to pay for the technologies, capital goods, and raw materials required by the industrial sector” (Richards & Waterbury, 1990:25-28). Furthermore, due to rigid tariff protections, the industries had no incentive to cut down costs or to reduce the imported elements in the production process. Governments would also overvalue their currencies in order to reduce the price of the produced commodities, and this damaged the export of agricultural produce. In the end, ISI could not achieve the competitive edge needed on the international market. Finally, the subsidies provided to the local industries brought about huge public deficits, which further contributed to domestic inflation. 2.2.2.1.2 Dualism and Agriculture-centered Development This approach focuses on the relations between the traditional and capitalist sectors or the dual economy model. This model maintained that as development continued, the modern sector expanded and the traditional sector shrunk. When dualism ceases to exist, development has been accomplished. The model advocates the development and modernization of the agricultural sector, and considers it as the essential factor in the process of national development (Lewis, 1954). In short, this approach proved inadequate in bringing development to LDCs (Lewellen, 1995:55). 2.2.2.1.3 Agro-Export led Growth The agro-export led growth strategy entailed the notion that all countries are at the agricultural stage before they industrialize; therefore, the land and labor in an underdeveloped country should be utilized in order to develop. The industrialization of a LDC would require the import of machinery, which would be paid for by the export of the agricultural commodities. The roots of this method go back to the colonial period, when the raw materials from agriculture would be sent to the metropolis and turned into manufactured goods (Jaffee, 1990: 157-161). Unfortunately, agricultural commodities bring less revenue to buy manufactured goods because a manufactured commodity is priced based on the needed skill that was required to make the product in question, and was made for specific need(s). The price fluctuation on the international market will impact the export revenue, which can in turn disrupt industrialization. In addition, even if price fluctuation does not occur, it takes a lot of agricultural produce to sell in order to buy industrial machinery. This strategy will continue the dependency process that has been initiated during the colonial period. The ineffectiveness of this strategy can be summed up by a statement made by Fidel Castro during a Third World conference: he mentioned that his country has to sell huge amount of sugar in order to get enough revenue to buy one tractor. Thus, how is it possible to rely on agricultural commodities to earn revenue for industrialization? 2.2.2.1.4 Mineral-Export Led Growth This approach differs from the agro-export strategy in a crucial way, which is the depletion of natural resources. This strategy is also at the mercy of international price fluctuations. If the prices of natural resources decline, this will translate into economic decline for the LDC. However, a sudden price rise would result in the socalled Dutch Disease, which is characterized by increased spending and consequent increased inflation. And there will not be a lot of incentives for the development of human capital. For example, in Saudi Arabia, a Saudi would have no incentive to become an engineer, when he can become a joint director of a company that has to be always Saudi. Furthermore, the influx of professionals in different fields from other parts of the world makes it even less compelling for a Saudi to work in that capacity. In short, the diverse perspectives of modernization can not escape the trap of the evolutionary perspective. This unilinear evolutionary formulation proved inadequate because the developed countries continued their sustained growth while the LDCs continued falling behind and the gap between rich and poor countries widened further. The historical development of societies became irrelevant. The usage of typologies did not serve to alleviate the backwardness of LDCs and the incorporation of Western values and experiences only alienated people from their own countries. In short, the world-view entailed in the modernization theory is a European frame (European experience) of reference that the rest of the world does not seem to follow. There are two separate issues here: • The evolutionist perspective was misleading. Even when following the path of the developed countries, LDCs remained underdeveloped. As the developed countries continued developing further, development became a moving target. • This perspective denied any value to the cultures of LDCs and in fact asked for their dismissal. It called for LDCs to abandon their ways, values and beliefs and replace them with those of Western society--- it called for a single culture, that of the West. It did not include the possibility of paths that built on existing values (Jameson, 1998:57). The rigid dichotomy of traditional and modern suggests a physical separation of the traditional and modern domains. It discounts the continuity of the past into the present. In fact, values and institutions do not vanish entirely but rather are synthesized with compatible modern institutions. Especially, the foundation of modern bureaucratic institutions can be traced back to the infrastructure of the traditional mode of organization. For example, in Afghanistan’s villages, there are village leaders, or Malik(s), who are responsible for dealing with government officials for the purpose of conflict resolution and other issues that resurface in the process of informal supervision of village affairs. Village leaders or Maliks are chosen based on their individual land holdings, tenure or age in the village, and their status and dignity. In times of crisis, the government officials deal with tribal Maliks or khans and their representative Jerga (tribal council constituted from tribal elders). Thus, the effectiveness of the formal bureaucratic infrastructure relied on the cooperative interaction between the traditional and the modern sector. The Afghan government from the onset of the nation-state realized that this was an essential method, whereby the government prevents conflict with the various tribes (interviews, 1994, 1998). Modernization theory is also flawed in conceptualizing exogenous factors in the development of society. Any external factor ---from wars and colonialism to global trade regulations, and regulations on technology transfer--- is discounted. Society is envisaged as a closed system. Furthermore, the evolutionary nature of the modernization theory discounted existing political and social realities. As such, the theoreticians of the modernization theory became instruments of legitimation of the Western world (Lewellen, 1995:54-56). The following quote illustrates this point: “The United States and the industrial democracies of Europe needed to formulate policies toward these new countries, [the former colonies] and they needed theories on which to rely. The cold war lent a special urgency to the enterprise. The “losses” of China to the communist in 1949 and Cuba a decade later were seen as the wake up calls of worldwide threat to capitalism… Development in the Third World was perceived as a matter of national security” (Lewellen, 1995:54). To sum up, modernization theory ends up with proposals that prolong underdevelopment and justify dependency. 2.2.2.2 Stalinist Model and its Critique The Soviet development strategy that was implemented in the Soviet Union starting in late 1920s to 1953, when Stalin died, is referred to as the Stalinist Model. It was designed and implemented by Stalin after he consolidated his power in the late 1920s. The industrialization debates in the 1920s among the Soviet leaders were concerned with the issue of capital accumulation. This resulted in a philosophy of development, which advocated the notion that the route to rapid development rested on very high rates of capital accumulation and investment in the capital goodsproducing industries. Stalin’s long tenure (1924-1956) gave his administration the power to shape Russia on the basis of the approach that bore his name (Spybey, 1992:146). “In most respects the development strategy adopted can be considered as a variant of internal colonialism but is better known as the Stalinist model for development. Introduced by Joseph Stalin after the consolidation of his power base by the late 192os, it was to effect the wholesale restructuring of Soviet society, and to place the country on a specific path to rapid and uneven development.” (Smith, 1989: 24) The strategy in question had three characteristics: 1, forced collectivization of the countryside; 2, central planning and rapid industrialization, and 3, mass migration. 1. The forced collectivization of the countryside was considered imperative for the achievement of socialism. Unlike other Soviet politicians such as Bukharin & Preobrazhensky, who viewed collectivization as a voluntary process, Stalin went about it by force. The following quote illustrates forced collectivization: “The collectivization of agriculture was seen merely as an intermediate measure until all land could be brought under the direct control of the Ministry of Agriculture, but because of the scale of the undertaking the process was necessarily a long one. It could only be achieved with a high level of coercion— the terror as it has been referred to—and the cost in human life to the peasantry was perhaps as high as five million.” (Spybey, 1992: 146) The forced collectivization organized the rural economy into a centrally planned economy, allowing the state to prescribe what the agricultural sector could produce and how much it should produce. The prices of the goods were also determined by the state. The surplus generated was used to finance industrialization. 2. Central planning and rapid industrialization were initiated with the first fiveyear plan in 1928. This plan was characterized by investment in industry rather than in agriculture and social welfare. The result was uneven development between country and towns. Even within towns, there existed a pro heavy-industry bias. 3. Mass migration from rural to urban centers is characteristic of development. People leave rural areas for urban centers to find employment. However, this aspect of Stalin’s development differed in such a way that it was not only migration from rural to urban centers but also a parallel migration from region to region. The forced collectivization made agricultural labor to migrate to cities (Smith, 1989: 26). Furthermore, inter-regional migration was aimed to displace the inhabitants of some areas that resisted or had the potential for resistance against the Bolshevik rule. This was especially apparent in the Muslim areas of Central Asia and Caucuses, where the Bolsheviks continued to displace the population.8 Some of the Muslims of Caucuses such as the Tartars and Chichens were sent off to Siberia, whereas Russian intervention forced Muslims from Central Asia such as Tajiks, Uzbek and Turkmen to abandon their homes for Afghanistan. This model of development industrialized the Soviet Union at a significant human cost. The magnitude of people who died from the severity and harsh conditions has been tremendous. To fulfill his vision of a socialist society, Stalin persecuted 8 Part of the information, on the forced migration of Muslims in Central Asia came from my interviews with Central Asians in Pakistan and Afghanistan 1994 and 1998. people of all persuasions and imprisoned them in gulags9. The prisoners would be housed near projects that required profound physical strain, especially, when construction machinery was nonexistent in the Soviet Union. In 1928, there were about 30,000 inmates. This number reached 10 million by 1940. In the construction of the Belomor canal that linked Leningrad to the White Sea port of Kem, 1.5 million individuals from the Gulags lost their lives due to the extreme climatic conditions (Smith, 1989; interview with general Miraki, 1999). Furthermore, the result of uneven development within the industrial sector was made apparent at the time of Soviet dissolution, when the country was able to build bombers and rockets but could not build washing machines. The version of historical materialism applied in Afghanistan addressed underdevelopment through oppression and destruction. Its version of social change through revolutionary means did not show any regard for the history, religious and social values that for 6000 years have informed a different reality. Marx’s analysis of classes is based on the European experience and does not seem to coincide with the experience of hierarchical organization of the Muslim world. Its search for equality under socialism without regard to religion goes against some of the fundamentals of Islam. For instance, it is an Islamic belief that no one in the world is equal to each other. Any attempt at bringing total equality as Marxists advocate would need to erase the fundamentals of the society, scratch the past and start a new. The assumption that the oppressed would easily join a struggle that blasts their beliefs and replaces them with the Marxian utopia represents a highly questionable beginning. It, in fact, calls 9 Gulags were prison camps, where prisoners were put to some of the harshest work conditions. The work mostly pertained to heavy infrastructure projects. There millions of people perished from harsh work and for an unlikely leap from long-held religious beliefs to a civil society built on the separation of state and religion. That is why, the communists’ attempts to transform Afghan society through the redistribution of property, while they (the communists) themselves enjoyed every luxury within reach (certainly not conceptualized by Marx), failed in Afghanistan. General Miraki articulates that as follows: “The Khalqis and Parchamis10 wanted money, cars and positions. In fact, one of the Khalqis sent a letter to the Ministry of Interior complaining that he has thus far killed 20 individuals, yet, he has not been promoted governor. The communists were taking thousands of Afghanis from administrative budgets to purchase expensive items, and would write it off as administrative expenses. When new cars were imported from the USSR, many Khalqis and Parchamis were demanding that they be given the new models. On one occasion, a minister of government said that the country is for us (communists), government is for us, and money is for us.” Initial proclamations regulated the dowry---an Afghan and Muslim marriage custom. Land reforms were enacted through another proclamation. The assumption behind the land reform was that the small landowners or agricultural laborers would welcome such re-distributive efforts. The reforms did not succeed and the majority of the peasant community opposed them after realizing the anti-Islamic character of the regime (Rubin, 1995:118; observations, 1982). Peasants were part of the social infrastructure of Afghanistan and they could not abandon over night tribal and village loyalties that had evolved over hundreds of years. Moreover, the communists started to express their disregard for Islamic values by punishing government officials who observed the holy month of Ramadan or were weather conditions. 10 Khalq and Parcham were the two factions of the communist party or PDPA (People Democratic Party of Afghanistan). The members of Khalq and Parcham are called Khalqi and Parchami, respectively. The Khalq faction was in power from 1978 to 1979 and the Parcham from 1979 to 1989. The first administration was brought into power by the direct aid from the USSR, and the second administration was installed after the USSR invaded Afghanistan. seen praying. Thus, within the first few months of the Marxist coup in 1978, rebellions inside the armed forces, resistance at the village level, and anti government activities erupted among urban professionals and university students alike. Army officers, witnessing the communists’ disregard for Islam, were as alienated as were peasants. The following quote from an interview with General Miraki illustrates: “In the Kandahar province, three months after the communists takeover, a large number of army officers were imprisoned because they attended the mosque in the garrison there. Meanwhile, in the Speen Boldak district by the border of Pakistan, an army rebelled and joined the resistant movement or Mujahideen. In the Karz village in Kandahar, people rose against the communist regime, in response to the uprisings, the communist government slaughtered men, women and children. (Interview, 1998) Therefore, the introduction of the so-called Stalinist model brought more disaster to Afghanistan than development. Tens of thousands of people were executed because they expressed disagreement with the secular Marxist prescriptions11. The centrally planned development provided opportunities of employment only in the government bureaucracy. It is worth mentioning that the five-year-development plans modeled after the centrally planned Soviet development approach proved successful in establishing the country’s infrastructure. None of the reforms were successfully completed and met with harsh resistance of most sectors of Afghan society. To sum up, the communists of Afghanistan were inspired by Stalin’s method of control of society, that is, the forceful repression of the masses for the sake of progress and development. The communists did not take into account the religious, historical and social realities of Afghanistan and went ahead with their vision of development. 11 In 1979, before the actual invasion by the Russians, the second president of the communist government unveiled an official count at 12,000. The list consists of the names that were logged (Rubin, 1987:339). The They did not have the chance to embark on any industrialization because popular uprising hindered progress. They embarked upon the task of transforming society through the enactment of a number of proclamations. These proclamations targeted the core of social, tribal and religious values of the Afghan people. 2.2.2.3 Dependency theory Dependency theory emerged as a reaction to the impractical assumptions of the modernization theory and the deception of developmentalism in the 1960s. It reached its maturity in the early 1970s. Dependency theory was an alternative to modernization theory and classical Marxist thought. It, however, discussed the phenomenon of underdevelopment from the perspective of the Third World. As Fitzgerald (1983) puts it: “Dependency theory, while having its roots in the structuralism of ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America) economists, arose most directly and forcefully as an extended critique of the modernization perspective. In the first instance, the dependency theorists undertook a series of empirical investigations and theoretical reformulation, which attacked the notion of diffusion. The strategy here was to turn the concept of diffusion on its head by renaming it “mechanisms of dependency or imperialism” and by showing that its effects upon the Third World were essentially the opposite of what modernization theory supposed” (Fitzgerald, 1983:15-16). Andre Gunder Frank (1967) maintained that the modernization process was not the same in each country. He espoused the perspective that the developed countries were not underdeveloped when they started but rather undeveloped and that underdevelopment was the result of the relations between the colonial powers and their colonies. The metropolis extracted economic surplus from the satellites communist military officers of the 4th armored division were in charge of the executions. They would take (Fitzgerald, 1983:17). Other theorists under the “umbrella” of dependency theory include Furtado and Sunkel, Cardoso and Faletto (Oman & Wignaraja, 1991:156-170). Frank’s version has the most relevance to the situation of Afghanistan as discussed below. Frank and others have developed the dependency perspective based on the experience of Latin American countries; in particular, their historical development as satellites of European colonial powers. The historical development of Afghanistan as a nation-state differs significantly from the Latin American countries. Afghanistan was never a colony. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it served as a buffer zone between British India and Czarist Russia. The developmental experience of Afghanistan stemmed from its unique strategic location. This strategic geographic location of Afghanistan led to three interdependent types of dependent development. The first factor stemmed from the Soviet desire to exercise its interest in Afghanistan and the United State’s lack of interest in Afghanistan. The Soviets wanted to build on USA’s shortcomings in political and economic matters. For example, Afghanistan wanted to modernize its army in order to keep tribal power in check especially in the early 1953 during Daud Khan’s tenure in office. For that purpose, it approached the United States on several occasions. Ironically, the United States turned down Afghanistan’s request for arms. This was due to the dispute Afghanistan had with Pakistan over the Northwest Frontier of Pakistan, which was an Afghan territory forcefully annexed by Britain to secure their interest in India. The annexed region was to serve as a buffer zone between Afghanistan and British India based on the similar rationale that Afghanistan served as a buffer zone between Czarist Russia and British India (Dupree, 1973:426 & Rubin, 1995:48-9). Moreover, the United States had a prisoners from the prison and carry them on waiting buses to the firing range, a make shift execution spot. vested military interest in Pakistan as member of both the SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) military pacts because the members of these military pacts served as a deterrence against possible Soviet aggression.12 The second factor of dependency pertained to the harsh reality of Afghanistan being landlocked. Lacking access to the Indian Ocean, Afghanistan had to use the Pakistani port of Karachi for the export and import of commodities. This situation was brought about by the English through the annexation of the eastern part of Afghanistan, added to Pakistan after the division of India into India and Pakistan. The British have used this method in other areas as well, e.g., Kurdistan. Upon the eruption of tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Pakistan imposed economic blockades on three different occasions. After the first blockade in 1950, Afghanistan signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union to use a Soviet transit route for export and import of commodities. The second and third blockades occurred in 1955 and 1961 respectively (Dupree, 1973: 493, 507, 538). Consequently, on August 27 of 1955, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed a protocol that established a commodity exchange between the two countries--- in return for Soviet petroleum products, rolled ferrous metals, and building materials, Afghanistan sent cotton, wool and rawhides. In essence, a bartered economic relation was established between Afghanistan and the 12 In early 1950s, as part of the Cold War, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles advocated the containment of communism. To that end, military pacts and alliances were actively formed. The SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) military pacts were part of the United States’ strategy of communist containment. The US used its post-WW II development assistance to lure the Third World countries into signing mutual security pacts. Most countries including Pakistan in 1954-55 joined the SEATO. Afghanistan refused to sign any mutual security alliance. That is why, the US refused to sell Afghanistan military hardware and did not provide developmental assistance. Nonetheless, with the Soviet’s developmental and military assistance to Afghanistan in 1955, the USA became anxious Soviet Union. Incidentally, in 1955, the Soviet Union made a generous offer of open credit of $100 million. This offer also coincided with the onset of the first-five-year plan of Prime Minister Mohammed Daud Khan in 1956. When the third economic blockade by Pakistan occurred---September 1961 to June 1963, again, the Soviet Union offered help. Fifteen Soviet cargo planes transported Afghan commodities daily to the Soviet Union. Consequently, another barter trade agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan on February 27, 1963 that entailed the exchange of Afghan wool, cotton, and fresh and dried fruits for Soviet cars, oil, cameras and watches. The third factor of dependency pertained to the internal structure of Afghan society. As indicated earlier, the tribal composition of Afghan society made government dependent upon tribal consensus in various policy issues. Tribal interests have dominated Afghan political and economic realms from 1747 to the present. Any political and economic reform that touched upon tribal interests puts the legitimacy of the government at stake. Therefore, any development attempt had to consider this reality. This is not to say that the tribal mode of organization of Afghan society is incompatible with development, but rather that efforts have to be made to separate development from Westernization. Due to these three factors, Afghanistan experienced its own version of dependency. In short, the type of dependency that Afghanistan went through consisted of: 1) Geographic-bound dependence (Pakistan’s blockade & USSR’s facilitation) about losing Afghanistan to the Warsaw Pact. That is why, the US started to compete with the USSR in providing developmental assistance. 2) Societal-structural dependence (tribal structure of society) 2.2.2.4 Structuration Theory Structuration theory was developed by Professor Anthony Giddens, who critiqued the 19th century sociology for being evolutionary, and proposed to explain societal development through the framework of his structuration theory. According to the structuration theory, the development of societal institutions results from social interaction through time and space. Giddens views societal development as an interdependent process that he explains through the concept of duality of structure.13 This means that structure serves as both medium and outcome. In other words, social institutions are produced and reproduced through social interaction, in which human agency is the crucial factor. Giddens (1984:25, 26) explains it as follows: “ The constitution of agents and structures, are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represents a duality. According to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of practices they recursively organize. Structure is not external to individuals: as memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices, it is in a certain sense more internal than exterior to their activities…” (Giddens, 1984:25, 26) Giddens maintains that social theory explains the development of European societies from the 1700s onward. He maintains that since the industrial revolution disrupted traditional ways of life which sociology as a discipline emerged to explain as well as the new of modern institutions replacing traditional mode of organization. Structuration theory explains societal change in terms of time and space. It explains It is “structure as the medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively organizes; the structural properties of social systems do not exist outside of action but are chronically implicated in its production and reproduction” (Giddens, 1984:374). the development of the Western societies and how Western institutions were imposed on other parts of the world for the benefit of the West. He compares the unequal relationship between the developing countries of Europe and the less developed countries of the world to the unequal relationship that initially existed between the rural hinterland and its early city-states in Europe. With emergence of the European world hegemony, the unequal, yet interdependent relationship of European hinterland and early city-states served as the mechanism of exploitation internationally. Europe achieved this by imposing its modern institutions on other parts of the world (Spybey, 1992:2-3; & Giddens, 1984:245&246). Structuration theory falls short of being an adequate framework for Afghanistan. The European experience of the industrial revolution constitutes the historical framework that this theory relies on. Structuration theory points to the urban-rural relations of early European city-states and tends to use that notion as the generalizing principle for explaining the development pattern in the Third World as well. I am not claiming that Giddens espouses an evolutionary perspective; on the contrary, he rejects it as he did reject functionalism and historical materialism as evolutionary theories. The claim here is that the factors that were involved in the historical development of Afghanistan do not lend themselves to the structuration theory. Giddens’s formulation falls short in that it does not have values as a factor in societal change. He conveys the notion that action is produced and reproduced by individuals through social practices in their daily activities. Contrary to him, this dissertation argues that individuals’ inherent values and adopted values determine their actions, and the reproduction of actions is the re-manifestation of those values. At the societal level, the individual is bound by what is a collective will (societal traits or societal friction) and at the individual level action is bound by what I call micro- and macro- individual traits. Micro-individual traits refer to the self-partiality of individual, and macro-individual traits stem from a shared location (village or city etc.). As time passes, macro-individual traits turn into societal traits that everyone has to abide by. Giddens considers individual responsible for the production and reproduction of social practice, but he does not give any mechanism to that effect. Moreover, he does not realize that the reproduction of social practice is imbedded in the societal values, shared by all, and it is the interaction of individuals within the framework of societal values. His theory is concerned simply with the reproduction of social practice, purporting the image of society as the repetition of habits, as if society is devoid of any value system that is shared by the individuals and the society at large. 2.2.2.5 Globalism and Statism Globalism and Statism are two sets of concepts discussed by Susan Greenhalgh and Edwin A. Winckler in their endeavor to explain the East Asian development experiences, especially Taiwan’s. Globalism pertains to the supranational or global processes that condition national development and sub-national outcome. Statism pertains to the autonomy of the state from both supranational influences and subnational constituencies (Winckler: 1988:5 & 9). Globalism and Statism are discussed within the context of three different orientations namely liberalism, radicalism and conservatism. In the mid-1980s, all three orientations have converged forming syntheses in regards to Globalist or supranational processes and Statism or national processes, making each paradigm somewhat of a moderate “look”. Three alternatives resulted from each paradigm. The alternatives explaining supranational processes were liberal internationalism, radical Globalism and conservative regionalism. Similarly, alternatives emerged after the three contending ideological orientations approached the national processes. The resulting alternatives to interpret national processes are liberal pluralism, radical functionalism and conservative Statism. None of these paradigms alone can explain economic development because each paradigm is formed such that no consideration is given to the possibility of the other. Thus, to have development assessed exclusively on the imperatives of each without any consideration to the other, leads to reductionism. There are weaknesses in each of these paradigms. Statism has a major flaw, which pertains to the exclusion of global influences. It concentrates exclusively on the internal domestic processes as being the forces of development. Moreover, the other flaw of Statism is its failure to touch upon the mutual influences of state institutions on each other because state institutions could provide both of the impulse and of impediment to national development. For example, in the constitutional period (1963-73) in Afghanistan, the development of and relationship between the parliament and government cabinet on the one hand, and the conflict brought on by the liberal constitution and Islam hindered development (Winckler, 1988: 278-9). Similarly, Globalism espouses a reductionist perspective by making national development contingent upon the imperatives of external influences or supranational forces. The Globalist paradigm entertains the notion as if the domestic or national environment is waiting, and would accept the prescriptions of the supranational forces without any constrains. Both of the paradigms, Globalism and Statism, have been influenced by three different orientations, namely liberalism, radicalism and conservatism, whose influences have given different outlooks to the two paradigms. However, for the most part, the two paradigms hold their initial orientation namely internal and external. 2.2.2.5.1 Conservative Regionalism This aspect of the Globalist paradigm is relevant to Afghanistan because it emphasizes the uniqueness of history, social and cultural realities, and political and economic conditions pertinent to the developmental experiences of nations. The unique history and political dynamics in Afghanistan pertains to the unique strategic location of Afghanistan; however, this approach falls short by excluding a whole global approach. Instead, it attempts to interpret national development in the context of sub-global model, wherein the interaction between neighboring nations is emphasized. The model could explain the socioeconomic, cultural, historical, political and economic aspects of Afghanistan’s underdevelopment if world powers such as Britain and Russia had not played their Great Game in Afghanistan. 2.2.2.5.2 Radical Globalism Another of the supranational processes is radical Globalism, which focus on the interpenetration of economics and politics. It maintains that global powers condition nations under the pretext of development and exploit them. Global markets are viewed as means of political control. This approach does not adequately explain the development experience of Afghanistan because it attributes underdevelopment entirely to global powers and their exploitative designs. Among the various theories that characterize radical Globalism, theories of dependent development (e.g., Bonilla and Girling 1973; Cordoso and Faletto, 1979) are more pertinent than the earlier version of the dependency theory. Theories of dependent development acknowledge that external economic forces may produce internal economic growth, however, points out that the growth is distorted in favor of the external need not internal. After the application of the three contending orientations to the Statist paradigm or national level processes, the resulting three alternatives were liberal pluralism, radical functionalism and conservative Statism. Among the three, liberal pluralism and conservative statism have some relevance to a few occasions in the development experience of Afghanistan. 2.2.2.5.3 Liberal Pluralism The conventional understanding of liberal pluralism pertains to the involvement of interest groups in the political process; however, in less developed countries like Afghanistan such interest groups either do not exist or are very weak. Hence, liberal pluralism can be viewed in terms of competing forces within the state, the traditionalists and modernists (Lowi 1979; Packenham 1973). In the case of Afghanistan, similar phenomena of competing forces were evident during the reign of King Zahir Shah especially in the administration of Prime Minister Hashim Khan (1933-1946). However, the contending forces that competed in Afghanistan were particular to the experience of Afghanistan. The four factors that influenced the development experience of Afghanistan also influenced the perspectives of different elite, who wanted to influence the development policy during the administration of Hashim Khan. Some of the elite preferred Afghanistan to have closer economic relations with Germany; others wanted it to be England; yet, others did not favor closer economic relations with any foreign state. Those that wanted Afghanistan to have closer relations with Germany rationalized their preference based on the noncolonial past of Germany and its lack of proximity to Afghanistan to become a military threat to Afghanistan’s independence. Others preferred to have England as a partner in economic development, arguing that by having closer relations with England, England would not have any incentives to muddle in Afghanistan’s internal affairs to create instability. Moreover, another elite did not want Afghanistan to have any particular economic relationship with any foreign state because they saw, in such relationship, potential threat to the independence of Afghanistan. 2.2.2.5.4 Conservative Statism This national process has relevance to my model. Conservative Statism focuses on the autonomy of the state and ideology of the elite. Development at the national level can be effective if the state is autonomous in political and cultural terms and the elite has an ideal that drives them to strive for national development. Hence, in my model I hold that as long as Afghanistan is not politically under a foreign influence, and its elite nationalist-Islamic ideology, development becomes a true reality. Thus, the review of the various sociological theories of development suggests that they are inadequate as single conceptualizations to prescribe development in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the modernization theory conceptualized development from the European experience and theories of dependency and Stalinism unique to the experiences of different regions as well. The onset of social change in Latin America as espoused by the dependency theory has its roots in the Spanish conquest of Latin America, which was an experience unique to that region. The dependency was a reaction to the prescriptions of the orthodox modernization perspective, and was advanced by various social scientists inspired by Marxist thought [not the orthodox Marxism], which was later known as the neo-Marxist perspectives. Stalinism was inspired, as stated above, by the Marxist-Leninist thought and a method of industrialization that advocated forced imposition of social change which makes it more a totalitarian method of governance than a development strategy. The globalist and statist paradigms do not explain the development experience of Afghanistan either, because each views the other as a separate phenomenon. In reality, the synthesis of the two would serve as adequate explanation of the underdevelopment in Afghanistan. 2.3 The Contribution of this Dissertation to the Literature on Development This dissertation contributes to the development literature in two main ways. First, it offers a critical history of development in Afghanistan that points to what I consider the main factors deeming traditional models unsuccessful. Second, it builds on these factors to propose an approach of social change and economic development. Development is not only viewed as a plan for economic prosperity, but rather prosperity that does not come at the cost of social and religious values of the Afghan people. On the one hand, the model holds that development encompasses economic, social-cultural and religious values as well as historical realities of the country. On the other hand, it envisages development not as a phenomenon resulting from either national processes or supranational processes. In fact, the proposed model envisages that as long as supranational forces do not intervene in Afghanistan, and the Afghan government, on its part, does not emulate foreign values undermining domestic ones, development will succeed. In addition, development has to be within the confines of religious, sociocultural-historic and political aspirations of Afghanistan; otherwise, socioeconomic development will not realize. This dissertation addresses issues in both of the two paradigms, Globalist and Statist, as well as those espoused by their derivatives, which results from the application of three orientations, namely liberalism, radicalism and conservatism, to Globalism and Statism. They address development approaches in Afghanistan from 1919 to 2000. The dissertation considers three levels or processes namely supranational, national and sub-national; in addition, it takes into account another level namely between individuals and society. Hence, the proposed model is comprehensive, in that it offers a simultaneous treatment of both the national and supranational factors in development. This analysis addresses development as a phenomenon that results from the interaction of exogenous (global) and endogenous (national) factors. In addition, the proposed model of social change also defines the position of the individual in regard to society and provides a “bridge” between individual and society. Furthermore, the proposal that I present at the end of this work addresses socioeconomic development, namely the interconnectedness of development to the population, environment and the whole social reality. It entails viewing development not solely as economic progress, rather as a phenomenon compatible with the socialreligious aspirations of the Afghan society. 2.4 Conclusions Drawn from the Literature Review Based on the review of literature on Afghanistan, social change and the three models of development, modernization, dependency and Stalinist, and the two paradigms, Globalism and Statism, I can formulate some propositions to guide my work. They are as follows: 1) The underdevelopment of Afghanistan has been related to its strategic location. 2) The strategic location imposed on Afghanistan a geographically bound dependency. 3) The disregard for social and religious values has created a negative reaction toward any modernization effort and has perpetuated underdevelopment 4) Conflict with social and religious values of Afghan society characterized the developmental experience in Afghanistan. 5) Development approaches in Afghanistan did not maintain a balance between rural and urban development. 2.5 Definitions: I would like to define some of the terms I will be using throughout the discussion. The definitions of these terms are based in the context of the experience of Afghanistan. In particular, I want to define the core terms of development, underdevelopment and dependency. A. Development is defined in terms of the following propositions 1) Making social change compatible with the social and religious values of society 2) The capacity to finance projects through the mobilization of domestic resources 3) The balance in investment between the agricultural sector and industry as well as interdependence of the agricultural and industrial sectors 4) The rise in the general standard of living as measured by clean water, health care, and education and well paid jobs for the entire population, men and women. 5) Protection of the environment from industrial pollution. 6) The installation of modern and efficient bureaucracy B. Underdevelopment: the absence of all or most of these conditions characterizes a nation’s underdevelopment. C. Dependency is the constraint Afghanistan experienced as a result of three factors namely: the Soviet Union as the northern neighbor and its efforts to control Afghanistan, the landlocked status of Afghanistan and its dispute with Pakistan, and incompatibility of policies to the tribal structure and value systems of Afghan society. Based on the three factors outlined, the dependencies that characterize Afghanistan have been: 1. Foreign aid dependence (USSR & USA) 2. Geographical dependence (Pakistan’s blockade & USSR’s facilitation) 3. Cultural-dependence (cultural modernization), and the corresponding, socialstructural dependence. Today, the first dependence is relevant only in regard to the USA. This is because the United States remains as the only superpower in the world and thus, exercises its will by imposing economic sanctions whenever a nation, especially a Muslim nation chooses to exert its independence. The United States has isolated Afghanistan politically as well as economically by imposing economic sanctions on the country. The second dependence does not exist because the Talibans are leaning toward the country’s social and religious values. Thus, any party that chooses to oppose the Taliban’s government loses its legitimacy. D. Sociohistorical reality: this refers to the historical development of the Afghan State and the way, it molded the social arrangement of its people. Chapter Three III. 3.1 Methodology Conceptual Framework: The approach used in this study is holistic. By this, I mean the interplay of various factors in the developmental history of Afghanistan and their contribution to underdevelopment and/or development. The Afghan developmental history needs to be studied within the framework of the four factors highlighted in the literature review. 1. Afghanistan’s strategic location; 2. Tribal structure of Afghan society; 3. Value systems (Islam and Pashtunwali); 4. Individual leaders and prominent figures, whose actions or inaction contributed to the larger picture of underdevelopment. Each of these factors has its own significance; however, in totality their treatment will unravel the question as to why Afghanistan remained underdeveloped. I will use these factors as my frame of inquiry in studying each period from 1919 to 1999 in order to establish whether each period’s underdevelopment can be learned within the confines of these four factors. I will discuss the four factors mentioned above, and show how they serve as a conceptual framework in the inquiry of underdevelopment in Afghanistan. Furthermore, such an approach to historical inquiry will unfold many issues that served as impediments to development, and unveil certain societal traits whose integrity may be essential for the success of any development. The four factors will serve as a map into the developmental history of Afghanistan. They help narrow and organize a broad spectrum of issues in the inquiry. Furthermore, I will use the four factors to turn the inquiry of underdevelopment into a dynamic approach by making them appear as a “cause” and “effect” relationship, which would make comprehension systematic and thus easier. While reviewing the attempts at development, I relied on unstructured interviews with individuals who witnessed some of the events under discussion or who in the past were important players in this history. My interviews with these individuals constitute the most original or primary sources, adding to the credibility of my claims. I will use the four factors to establish the relevance of all or some of them in each period in question. Sometimes all of the four factors may be readily applicable to one period and their interaction may explain the dynamics of change and underdevelopment of Afghanistan. The periods, wherein all four variables might have relevance, consist of those periods when the government introduced development policies. Understandably, at the time when the government introduced new socioeconomic policies, the impingement of such new socioeconomic measures on the status quo became visible by the emergence of reactions. In some periods, some of the factors may be dominant and some may not be. This stems from the relative independence of each factor. For example, if a foreign power were not actively seeking to influence the internal affairs of the country, leaders might not be formulating policies contrary to society’s values. Also, tribal reactions against the government might not arise. In essence, the four factors serve as checks and balances for the occurrence---or lack---of each other. Moreover, development efforts generally follow a pattern of introduction of changes, reaction, recovery and stability. For example, the period 1919-1929 was the most active in terms of the introduction of foreign ideas and values. Yet, the period from January 17 to October 13, 1929 characterized by the rejection of Amanullah’s Westernization drive. Moreover, the period from October 1929 to November 1933 constitutes the recovery from the upheaval of reactionary times. Finally, the period 1933 to 1946 exhibits stability. Moreover, in this approach the occurrence of a phenomenon can not be considered as an isolated event but rather as an event that rests on the past, and whose existence is a composite of past, present and future. In other words, doing the analysis of an event requires the consideration of the precursors to the event---where it comes from, how it occurred, why it occurred, and where it go from here. Therefore it is essential to consider the past (the history of the event), present (its present ramifications) and future (its future implications) within the context of the analysis of each historical period. 3.2 The Discussion of the Four Factors of Inquiry 3.2.1 Geo-strategic factor Since the late 19th, century, Afghanistan has played a significant role in the competition of world powers; Britain and Czarist Russia are highlighted in the literature review. In the 20th century, Britain and Russia’s roles were taken over by the USA and the USSR, respectively. The competition between USA and USSR resulted in developmental aid from both countries for infrastructure development. The political isolation of Afghanistan from the rest of the world in the 19th century furthered the underdevelopment of the country. On the same token, the allocation of development aid by the USA and USSR conditioned Afghanistan’s government to shape the country’s development plans according to the allocation of assistance. In addition, the Afghan State, in light of the availability of foreign aid, lost the incentives to mobilize domestic resources for development. The geo-strategic factor is perhaps the most important because it provided the impetus for the initiation of developmental attempts. It has also been a source of instability in Afghanistan’s history in general and its developmental history in particular. This factor refers to the strategic location of the country. Afghanistan was a highway of military conflicts throughout history, due to its strategic location as a crossroads between regions in Asia. Whether it was the spices of India or the silk of China, all had to cross Afghanistan to reach their respective destinations. Whether it was the Mongols marching to the Middle East and India or Alexander, “the Great”, aiming to obtain spices of India, all had to use this crossroads, Afghanistan (Kamrany, 1969; Rubin, 1995). Russian’s push to move south can be traced to the period of Peter “the Great”, who, according to many authors, wished to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. With the onset of British intervention in India, the possibility of such southbound venture for the Russian czars meant military confrontation with Britain. The geo-strategic location served the interest of hegemonic powers for centuries onward. However, the 19th century British-Russian rivalry and the 20th century American-Soviet rivalry were essential factors in the developmental history of Afghanistan. Either the vulnerability of Afghanistan to the threat of one power or the interest of another power to offset the threat of an existing one, became the impetus for developmental undertakings. The historical inquiry within the framework of the geo-strategic factor will enable us to understand the flow of events that shaped socioeconomic development attempts in Afghanistan (Klass, 1987:1-30 &37-70; Fletcher, 1982; Fraser-Tyler, 1953:120-136; 151-178; Gregorian, 1969:129-159). The intrusion of hegemonic giants under the pretext of development helps understand the origin of so-called development initiatives in Afghanistan. In the late 19th and early 20th century (before 1919), when Afghanistan served as a buffer zone between Russia and British India, the foreign affairs of Afghanistan were under British control who kept Afghanistan isolated from the rest of the world. With the onset of Soviet interests in Afghanistan in 1953, the United States adopted the role played by the British in the 19th century. The US aimed at countering any Soviet threat to the Western interests in the Middle East and in South Asia through its developmental aid program. The result of this assistance was, unfortunately, not development but rather dependence on foreign aid. With the influx of foreign aid, the government did not have any incentive to mobilize domestic resources such as taxes because this would make government accountable to the public, and antagonize landed aristocracy, on the one hand. On the other hand, the developmental aid conditioned the government by expecting the influx of aid to continue indefinitely. Hence, when the developmental assistance decreased in 1967, Afghanistan, with the exception of basic infrastructure, e.g. roads, airports, telephone, was nowhere close to the kind of development it needed. Initially the British attempted a military take over of the country but were defeated on different occasions. Finally, a political understanding was reached between the Afghan King Abdul Rahman and Britain in 1880. According to this argument, Britain would support the Amir Abur Rahman against outside aggression, provided that Afghanistan did not have foreign relations with any other country except British India (Ahmad, 1990:122). This was when Afghanistan started to serve as a buffer zone between Czarist Russia and British India, and was isolated from the rest of the world. The artificial frontier that separated this southeastern belt of Pashtun territory from Afghanistan is called the Durand Line. The independence movement in the annexed land called this land Pashtunistan or “Home of the Pashtuns”. After India was divided and Pakistan was created, Afghanistan pursued its claim of Pashtunistan. This dispute turned into animosity between Afghanistan and Pakistan until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Klass, 1987; Gregorian, 1969; Pollouda, 1971). It was only since 1919, when Prince Amanullah Khan proclaimed himself king and defeated the British at the third Anglo-Afghan war that the foreign policy of Afghanistan became independent. With the new communist regime in Russia, and Amanullah’s animosity toward the British, the scene was ripe for developmental attempts in Afghanistan. On the one hand, Russia became a potential source of cooperation and on the other, countries such as Germany, Italy, Poland and France provided Afghanistan with technical aid. Furthermore, while the absence of international relations in the 19th century isolated Afghanistan from the rest of the world, the defeat of the British opened the door for multiple sources of assistance. Meanwhile, the scene was ripe for the USSR and USA competition of the 1950s and 1960s. The Soviets got more of a foothold due to shortsighted American foreign policy in Afghanistan14. The United States kept up in the competition with USSR by providing foreign aid in terms of grants, loans to educational institutions, and scholarships and technical assistance. As to why Afghanistan did not benefit more than it did is an issue to be explained by the other three factors tribal structure, individual leaders and value systems. With the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the onset of globalization, the strategic significance of Afghanistan resurfaced again. The rich natural resources in land locked central Asia needed to reach the lucrative markets of Western Europe and the United States. Afghanistan provides a route to the Indian Ocean that represents the shortest route for commerce between the Central Asian countries and the rest of the world. Furthermore, the significance of Central Asia as the backyard of Russia increases the strategic location of Afghanistan. Any kind of instability emanating from Central Asia comes through Afghanistan and Iran. 14 Afghanistan wanted to modernize its army, and wanted to buy military hardware from the United States, it rejected the Afghans’ request. On top of that, when Nixon return to Washington from his visit to Kabul, he made certain insulting statements about the Afghan people. This intensified the anger of the Afghan politicians and they accepted the Soviets’ $100 million credit that also included modern military hardware. 3.2.2 Tribal structure of Afghan Society The second factor within this approach of inquiry is the tribal structure of Afghan society. Afghanistan was a collection of tribes well before its official formation as a nation-state. Only the Pashtuns (Afghans)15 are organized into tribes. There are no differences ethnically and linguistically between the Pashtun tribes. The tribes are categorized into two large groups, the Gharzai and the Durrani, and a small group called Kray’ra. The Gharzai and Durrani categories include most of the Pashtun tribes. The Pashtun tribes that did not fit in the two categories come under Kray’ra. There are other ethnic groups such as Tajik, Hazara (of Mongol origin), Uzbek, Nuristani and Turkmen in Afghanistan. The Tajik ethnic group, which speaks Dari or Persian, is the second largest group. Tajiks are not organized by tribes. The tribal organization of Pashtuns and the dominant role they played in Afghanistan’s formation and survival explains their determining position in national affairs. Moreover, the survival of the Pashtun tribes was based on both competition and cooperation. In the case of imminent invasion, the tribes would unite to fight off the enemy. However, once the enemy was defeated, the tribes would compete against each other for dominance. It was the threat from foreign invaders that served as the basis of cooperation for these tribes to unite and form the official Afghan State. In 1747, Afghanistan became a nation-state through the arrangement of tribal confederacy. Though Ahmad Shah Khan appointed a representative of each ethnic group in its respective area, Pashtun tribes, however, constituted the fighting force that Ahmad Shah Khan depended on. That is why, Pashtuns dominated the throne from 1709 15 In the ancient Iranian terminology, Afghan meant warriors and unruly lot. That is how, the Iranian labeled Afghans because these tribes did not accept any foreign domination. onward. Afghanistan was fully pacified by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan in the 1880s. Since Pashtun was the dominant ethnic group, other ethnic groups have adopted some aspect of Pashtun culture. However, they do not rely on Pashtunwali as do the Pashtuns. The historical legacy of tribal influence was clearly visible throughout the 20th century. To ensure stability, the monarch had to deal courteously with tribes. Hence, any development policies that came into conflict with tribal norms or Pashtunwali (Pashtun code of behavior) created upheaval. The tribal support or opposition to the decisions of the state has had a lasting impact on the development of the country. No government decision on development that has discounted the value and custom arrangement of Afghan tribes has succeeded in its attempts. In fact, the tribal structure of Afghan society had a crucial influence on the type of decision the government would take. For example, King Nader Khan taxed the urban classes of merchants and artisans heavily and excluded the tribes in order to keep their loyalty. Historically the legitimacy of the sovereign rested on the consensus and approval of the Pashtun tribes, and the nature of such relationship had diverse impacts on the state’s developmental policies. Though by itself the tribal structure would not explain all the complexities of underdevelopment, it can provide one significant piece of the puzzle, to the extent that development approaches did not integrate the tribal realities. The Pashtun or Afghan tribes have their unique arrangement. A khan or tribal chief leads the tribe. Tribal crises are worked out through the institution of Jerga, which is a tribal council constituted of tribal elders. The tribes deal with each other through the code of Pashtunwali, which is described in the next section. The tribal khan or malik is the intermediary between the national government and the tribe. Any consensus or conflict with the policies of the government is conveyed to the tribe by its malik or khan, who keeps contact with the officials in the provincial capital or the capital city, Kabul. The city population differs from one city to another. Tajiks, who are merchants and artisans, reside mostly in Kabul. In addition, Tajiks constituted the initial professional groups such as doctors and teachers in Kabul. In the 1950s, mostly Pashtuns were recruited into the army and the air force; consequently, minorities started entering Kabul University’s professional schools. The result was the emergence of urban classes consisting of both Pashtuns and Tajiks. The Pashtun professional groups carried more influence than did the Tajiks because of the Pashtuns dominant position. Nonetheless, the Tajik professional groups had significant influence. The Tajik is the largest minority group constituting 25 % of the population. They reside in Northern Afghanistan’s provinces such as Kunduz, Talaqan, Parwan and Baghlan as well as in Kabul. Uzbek is the second largest minority group. It inhabits the Mazar-e-Sharif, Shabirghan and Maimana provinces in Northern Afghanistan. They are mostly peasants and sheepherders. The Hazara (of Mongol origin) is the third largest minority group. It resides in the Central Afghanistan’s provinces of Bamiyan, Uruzgan and Ghazni. They are at the lowest level of the socioeconomic ladder; they also inhabit Kabul and are mostly involved in low-level jobs. However, members of the group have become doctors, professors and even a general. Moreover, they (the minorities) are more united with each other than the Pashtuns (Afghans) are. Pashtuns’ lack of unity stems partly from their tribal mode of organization, which envisages strong rivalry and competition. Their independent status as strong units within the nation-state made them potential competitors of the state in the early 20th century. 3.2.3 Value Systems: (Islam and Pashtunwali) Islam and Pashtunwali constitute two distinct, yet related value systems. All of the inhabitants of Afghanistan share Islam16. However, only the Pashtuns share the Pashtunwali as their code of behavior. Pashtunwali has influenced the customs of some of the minorities, especially, the Tajiks. Although Pashtunwali is the value system of the Pashtuns, due to the Pashtuns’ control of the Afghan throne and dominance in the country, discussion of it here as an exclusive Pashtun phenomenon is relevant. The fact that the minorities do not share it is irrelevant because the Pashtuns exhibited their discontent whenever the governments’ policies contradicted their Pashtunwali. The significance of Pashtunwali became evident in the case of Osama Bin Laden. Since he is a guest of the people of Afghanistan (the Pashtuns), the Taliban, who are mostly Pashtuns, refused to hand him over to the USA because such an act contradicts Pashtunwali and will bring indignity to Afghanistan. Unlike the Taliban, the Tajik opposition leader, Ahmad Shah Masud, advocated turning over 16 In order to exemplify the interaction of Pashtunwali and Islam, it is appropriate to mention some of the salient features of ‘traditional’ Islam, e.g., (1) Strict monotheism and piety, which engenders an abhorrence of aetheism, free-thinking and lax observance of rituals as evinced by foreigners or westernized natives; (2) Patriarchy and seclusion of women (purdah), which leads to a reluctance to allow women (native or foreign) a public voice in policy; (3) Shari’ah law seen by many Afghans as an all-sufficient legal and moral guide: strict application of Shari’ah-mandated punishments such as amputation for theft, flogging for Osama Bin Laden to the US authorities for political reasons. By submitting to the US, the Tajik leader thought that the US would favor him by toppling the Taliban and rendering the throne to him. On the contrary, the Taliban accepted economic sanctions and international isolation instead of turning their guest over to the United States. That is why the discussion of Pashtunwali matters here, since only the Pashtuns serve as the determining factor in Afghan politics. Pashtunwali, literally, means, “doing Pashto”. Pashtuns must abide by this mode of conduct. The followings are the principles of Pashtunwali: • tura, defense of the homeland with blood: The following translation of an Afghan expression should illustrate its significance: “My love, if you are shot in the back, I will never visit your shrine.” Another one is “ if you escape from the battlefield, do not bother to come home.” • nang, dignity/woman: All offenses to nang can only be avenged by death. For example, when the government advocated women “liberation” policies, Afghans were truly offended. Woman constitutes the “back-bone” of Afghans’ dignity, and for the government to intrude in the most cherished aspect of their lives (women), was offensive. For example, King Amanullah Khan advocated unveiling of women; his administrators in provinces ordered villagers to let their daughters attend schools unveiled. Currently, when the West started response to feminist organizations by pressuring the Taliban, the Taliban resisted it and considered Western intrusions offensive. The extent of concern for the honor of women becomes evident from the following example. In villages, when women are drinking alcohol or illicit sexual activities can be a deterrent to interaction not only with non-Muslims but to more liberal Muslims from neighboring countries. passing men standing nearby, the men abandon the walkway and turn their backs toward the women in order to respect another man’s dignity (i.e., the husbands or other male relatives of the women). Thus, for the government to embark on women’s “liberation” is tantamount to violating Afghan men’s dignity. • mailmastia, hospitality: Anyone that is a guest in one’s house and country, and comes peacefully, is provided with whatever the host has in his possession in terms of food and shelter. • Pana’, sanctuary to anyone that asks for it. Even if one’s enemy comes to a Pashtun’s home, and is under threat of some kind, the Pashtun can not expel him. Even if the host loses his life protecting his guest, he will not give in to any danger. • na’nawate, asking for forgiveness: If an individual has committed a horrendous crime and comes to the home of the victim accompanied by elders, the victim, owner of the house, due to Pashtunwali has to forgive the offender. • ghatch, revenge: This is another significant principle of Pashtunwali. The following proverb should illustrate its significance: “An Afghan took his revenge after one hundred years, he was still saying that he rushed it.” This illustrates the fact that an Afghan waits patiently, and takes his revenge unexpectedly (Ahmad, 1990:88-89 & Dupree, 1973: 126-7). The two-value system, Islam and Pashtunwali, is an inseparable reality of Afghan society. However, Islam constitutes the most important of the values. At points, there may be conflict between what Pashtunwali requires and what Islam prohibits. In these circumstances, the religious scholars intervene to resolve the conflict. The Pashtunwali code of honor applies not only to individuals but also to the government and its policies. The violation of this code of honor brings dishonor to anyone, who violates it and to those that are affected by it. The nationhood of the Afghans does not emanate from the nation-state, as is the case of European states; instead, it stems from this norm of Islam and Pashtunwali. The significance of this can be illustrated by reference to the inquiry of different historical periods, when reactions to radical reforms in violation of either Pashtunwali or Islam or of both surfaced. 3.2.4 Individual leaders The last factor within this frame of inquiry is the consideration of individual leaders, whose action/inaction, role and approach influenced development decisions. The significance of an individual action, whether it is a leader or an influential figure, will be looked particularly through the outcome of his actions---or inactions for that matter. The decision of an individual at an influential position has brought about decisive changes with severe long-term implications. In fact, the action of individual leaders, their associates and their respective opposition have influenced the various historical periods from 1919 to 1999 significantly. From 1919 to the present, charismatic to psychotic leaders have dominated the Afghan political arena. Amanullah Khan (1919 to 1929) was an active, energetic and shrewd man, who upon the assassination of his father took advantage of the situation and proclaimed himself king. Amanullah Khan’s mother, who was the first queen of Habibullah Khan (Amanullah Khan’s father), was extremely influential as the daughter of a powerful tribal chief, Mohammed Sarwar Khan. She influenced Amanullah significantly. Privately educated, and well acquainted with the outside Western culture and institutions, Amanullah Khan developed a very democratic disposition, which attests to his leadership of the Mashruta movement (a group of young men that advocated social and economic reforms) at the court. This movement under the leadership of Amnaullah Khan assassinated King Habibullah and paved the way for Amanullah Khan to reign. King Amanullah was known for stubbornness and emotional instability, both of which were instrumental in his miscalculated decision making. His stubbornness was visible when he decided to eradicate special privileges for the tribes, despite the advice and insistence of his minister of war General Mohammad Nader Khan. Amanullah Khan’s emotional instability reached psychotic proportions toward the end of his life in 1959, the year he died in exile in Italy. General Nader Khan (1929 to 1933) (not related to Amanullah Khan), who ascended the throne after the postAmanullah anarchy until a student assassinated him. His son Mohammed Zahir Shah, who was a young teenager at the death of his father, had a very low self-esteem and a fragile personality. He was appointed king but his uncles held the functions of government until he was in his late twenties. His cousin General Mohammed Daud Khan had a very strong and energetic personality and became his Prime Minister in 1953. He was a radical nationalist and aimed to bring about economic prosperity and maintain national integrity. However, his stubbornness earned him the nickname of “Daud the crazy”. His nickname proved appropriate, after he launched a coup in 1973 with the collaboration of Afghan Marxists, whose friendship proved deadly for himself and his family. In fact, they launched a coup in 1978 that cost him his life as well as his family. With the Marxist coup, a collection of individuals were elevated to power whose brutality sparked the flames of popular discontent and resulted in national uprisings, followed by the Soviet invasion of the country. Taraki, who was the first Marxist president, signed a treaty with the Soviets and embarked on a radical socioeconomic transformation strategy that paralleled the genocide of Stalin. His Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin, killed president Taraki. Hafizullah Amin was an US-educated teacher, who returned to Afghanistan before finishing his Ph.D. at Columbia University. His sadistic and impatient personality left its mark on Afghan history. His perspective was that the government needed only five of the 18 million people to accomplish Afghanistan’s socioeconomic transformation. With the collapse of the Marxist regime in 1992, and the subsequent anarchy until 1995, the Taliban emerged. This was a reactionary movement that sprang up against the lawlessness of the postcommunist era. It consisted of seminary students, who returned to their studies after the Russians retreated. The leader of the Taleban, Mullah Mohammad Omar, who organized a group of thirty individuals, fought local criminals and put an end to lawlessness in Kandahar province. They created the potential for economic development after they took over the capital Kabul in 1996. This was evident by the influx of international consortiums, in 1998, to invest in Afghan’s natural resources and establishing the modern telecommunication infrastructure in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the potential for economic development halted with the imposition of economic sanctions by the United States on Afghanistan. This isolated Afghanistan internationally, and forced those consortiums to abandon Afghanistan. 3.3 Sources The primary sources for my inquiry consist of interviews of individuals who had first hand experience during the various historical periods from 1919 to 1999. They are for the most part elders, who were young men in the 1920s, and others who were young during the 1930s and 1940s. They include government officials, especially my father Major General Gholam Sediq Miraki, who served as the security chief for foreign dignitaries in the 1960s. General Miraki also served as the director of intelligence of Southwestern Afghanistan, and before his departure from Afghanistan, he was the commander of Afghan intelligence and its political academy. Hence, he has first-hand knowledge of the most secret details from the mid-20th century to the 1980s. He is from the urban classes of Pashtuns with strong links to his tribe. Judge Abdul Haleem Khan, who was a new graduate from the school for judges, had eyewitness accounts of the events unfolding during the era of Amanullah Khan. The insights of tribal Khans and village elders proved very important for this dissertation. I agreed not to disclose their names. Other individuals included minorities such as Tajiks and Hazara. The interviews were unstructured and informal. I was able to complete a total ten distributed as follows: • General Gholam Sediq Miraki • Tribal Khans and Maliks---(five Pashtuns) • Individual Afghan elders (three Tajiks, two Hazras) The interviews consisted of narratives of their experiences and learnings. The secondary sources consist mostly of books on Afghanistan. I combine this information to assess the development experience of the country during this century and to identify those factors unique to Afghanistan that can guide future development approaches in the country. 3.4 Outline of the Chapters The dissertation is organized into sixteen chapters. The first three include the problem statement, literature review, research questions/hypotheses and methodology. Chapter four provides the background that is necessary to follow the historical analysis. Chapter five through fourteen focus on the ten periods in which I organize the historical analysis. Chapter fifteen summerizes the learnings from the historical periods. Finally, chapter sixteen presents the bases for a development approach that integrates the unique characteristics of Afghanistan. It also discusses some of the implications of this analysis for other underdeveloped countries---especially Muslim nations. Chapter Four IV. Brief Historical Background Modern Afghanistan was formed in 1747 under the leadership of an Afghan tribal chief, Ahmad Khan Abdali, who unified the various Afghan tribes to establish the modern nation-state under the aegis of tribal confederacy. Ahmad Khan (later Ahmad Shah Khan) was from the Sadozai clan of the Abdali tribe. Therefore, his dynasty carried the name of his clan, namely the Sadozai. It is worth mentioning that while Ahmad Khan was forming the modern nation-state of Afghanistan, Britain was in the process of colonizing India under the aegis of the East India Company. Afghanistan continued to be a stable state until the early 19th century; the stability shattered with the crumbling of the Sadozai dynasty in 1818. The downfall of the Sadozai dynasty started with two events. First, Ahmd Khan Abdali’s grandson, Zaman Shah, executed the tribal chief of the Mohammadzai tribe Painda Khan on charges of conspiracy against him. This brought about animosity between the Mohammadzai tribe and the Sadozai dynasty. Second, the next Sadozai King, Mahmud made a similar mistake by killing his trusted Minister Fateh Khan. Like Painda Khan, Fateh Khan belonged to the Mohammadzai tribe. The killing of Fateh Khan infuriated the Mohammadzai tribe, which consequently rose against the last of the Sadozais, King Mahmud. Mahmud abandoned Kabul and escaped to He’rat in Northwestern Afghanistan. The tribal feuds that resulted from the murder of Fateh Khan set the stage for the interregnum that lasted from 1818 to 1835. During his tenure in office as minister of King Mahmud, the late Fateh Khan had appointed a handful of his sons as governors of different provinces. After Fateh Khan’s death and the subsequent uprising against Mahmud, the sons of Fateh Khan turned the guns against each other, each wanting to defeat the other in order to become the next Afghan King. One of the sons of Fateh Khan, Dost Mohammad Khan, managed to occupy a few provinces including Kabul, and proclaimed himself Amirul-Mu’menin or commander of the faithful in 1826, and from 1826 to 1838 he strove to unite the country. While occupied with the task of uniting the country, Dost Mohammad Khan received a Russian envoy at his court. Dost Mohammad Khan used the presence of the Russian envoy as a strategy to alarm the British regarding possible closer relations of Afghanistan with Russia. Britain and Czarist Russia were competing for influence in Afghanistan. Russia wanted to penetrate British India, and Britain wanted to prevent Russia’s advance toward India, which is why both of these world giants wanted to have influence in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Sikh forces from the Punjab province of India threatened Afghan enclaves in Eastern Afghanistan. Dost Mohammad Khan wanted to use his meeting with the Russian envoy as a kind of bargaining chip to get the British attention and subsequent support against the Sikh forces. The British were nonetheless alarmed by the presence of the Russian envoy at the Amir’s court. In addition, in about the same time, Russia influenced Persia to invade He’rat in Northwestern Afghanistan in 1837. Hence, fearful of possible Russian advance towards India, Britain brought Shah Shuja, a former Sadozai King exiled in India, to Afghanistan, thus setting off the first of the three Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839-42). Shah Shuja was killed and the British were defeated as well by the Afghan tribes, led by Dost Mohammad Khan. With the defeat of the British and the death of Shah Shuja, Dost Mohammad Khan occupied the throne once more in 1842 and reigned until 1863. After the death of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan in 1863, his son Amir Sher Ali Khan succeeded him. The goals of both Russia and Britain were to have a foothold in Afghanistan. To that end, both of these imperial powers were sending their envoys to Kabul to influence the Afghan government under the pretext of closer relations. Though the Russians had been active in Kabul since 1873, their mission entered Kabul in 1878. Concurrently, a British mission asked permission to enter the city but was not allowed. This refusal caused the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80). The British invasion forced Amir Sher Ali Khan to abandon Kabul for Northern Afghanistan--known as Turkistan--- where he passed away on February 21 of 1879. While in control of Kabul and Kandahar, the British struck a deal with Amir Sher Ali Khan’s son Yaqub Khan and appointed him as Amir. In return, Yaqub signed the Gandamak treaty agreeing not to have any relations with any foreign state unless the British authorized them. The agreement also included the surrender of the Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi areas in Eastern Afghanistan and accepted that Britain could extend its control to the Khyber and Michini passes. These areas had strategic military significance and would help the British defend India in case of any Russians invasion of India. Furthermore, this agreement intended to prevent Russian contact with Afghanistan. Amir Yaqub Khan received sixty thousand pounds sterling annually including military assistance in case of any foreign threat. The Afghan tribes realized that Yaqub was a British puppet and revolted against him and the British, killing the British representative, Sir Louis Cavagnari and his staff. Consequently, the British occupied Kabul and sent Yaqub into exile to India (Dupree, 1973: 409). The British realized that they could not stay in Kabul, and started searching for a new Amir who had to be of royal blood, a prince, or in Afghan terms, someone, whose father or forefather had served as king or as leader of an entire tribe. The British realized that they needed someone who would be acceptable to the Afghans as well as to them. That man was Abdur Rahman Khan, who was a prince of the Mohammadzai clan living in Russian exile in Samarqand, (a city in Uzbekistan) for 10 years. In addition, the British found out that the Afghan Army would also welcome Abdur Rahman as the new Amir. Abdur Rahman Khan entered Afghanistan and declared Jihad or holy war against the British. Furthermore, he mustered popular support and swept through Northern Afghanistan all the way to Charikar, a town fifteen miles north of the capital, Kabul. There, Abdur Rahman received a letter, in April 30 1880, from the British asking him to enter Kabul and take over the government. Before this date, Abdur Rahman did not have any communication with the British; hence, he did not know whether he would be welcome or had to fight his way into Kabul. On July 20 1880, the Afghan chiefs proclaimed him the new Amir. The Jihad against the British established Abdur Rahman’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people, as worthy of their trust. However, when he accepted the British invitation to enter Kabul, his supporters asked him to attack the British forces instead. He refused and, shrewdly, persuaded his supporters to back him up. He did not face any active resistance from the people around him, because he had already established his legitimacy in their eyes. Though Abdur Rahman agreed to receive eighty thousand pounds sterling for surrendering Afghanistan’s foreign affairs to Britain, the British in turn rescinded their demand to have their representative resident in Kabul. The difference between Abdur Rahman Khan and Yaqub Khan, his predecessor, was that the former did not agree to the presence of the British representative at Kabul, while the latter had agreed to his residence in Kabul. However, when the three hundred thousand-strong volunteer army asked Abdur Rahman Khan to continue his already declared Jihad against the British, he backed off but persuaded the warriors to continue their support for him. Since the British favored Abdur Rahman to occupy the throne in Kabul because he had the sophistication and experience in the court of the Czar, that pleased Abdur Rahman. To ensure their safety against possible attacks by other Afghan tribes, Abdur Rahman’s escort accompanied British forces up to the border of India. Furthermore, Abdur Rahman signed the treaty of Gandamak through an agreement with the British envoy Lord Durand. Named after the British envoy, the Durand treaty demarcated Afghanistan’s border with India. Abdur Rahman’s rationale for surrendering Afghanistan’s foreign affairs to the British stemmed from his belief in the inevitable Russian danger to Afghanistan’s territorial integrity. Moreover, for the British, Afghanistan was important because it served as a buffer zone between Russia and India. However, Afghan historians such as Ghubar (1969) have condemned Abdur Rahman’s confirmation of the Gandamak agreement. He and other writers characterize Abdur Rahman as a traitor. To secure his throne, he resorted to extremely brutal and oppressive measures including suppression of any opposition, executions, and forced exile of individuals opposing him. Among the families Abdur Rahman forcefully exiled were the Tarzi and the Musahibin families, the two influential families of the Mohammadzai clan that will play significant roles in the post-Abdur Rahman era. Abdur Rahman maintained strict control over the tribal-religious elements of Afghan society. His kingdom ended with his death in 1901. Although, Abdur Rahman pacified Afghanistan with the material and financial aid he received from the British, he left behind a country tormented by his oppressive policies. After Abdur Rahman’s death, the British wanted to secure the Afghan throne for someone who could continue Abdur Rahman’s pro-British policy. Abdur Rahman’s son, Habibullah Khan, was that man, because he exhibited his desire to follow his fathers’ footsteps and let Britain keep control over Afghanistan’s foreign policy. In order to prevent competition from any rival, the British made sure that those princes who were living in Indian exile, were under house arrest until the new Amir was installed in Kabul. The new Amir, Habibullah Khan was crowned Shah in 1901 and reigned until 1919, the year when he was assassinated. Although he followed his father’s approach by leaving Afghanistan’s foreign affairs in British hands, he was not a tyrant like his father. Instead, his positive approach resulted in an atmosphere of cooperation between the tribes and the government. This system of cooperation, which entailed dialogue and feedback with the central government, was carried out through the establishment of a council of state that handled tribal affairs through consultation with tribal khans. The council of state was an administrative arrangement of the government whose function was solely to deal with grievances, needs, suggestions and the facilitation of meetings of tribal khans with the King. Furthermore, Amir Habibullah Khan granted amnesty to two influential families, which were forcefully exiled during the reign of his father Abdur Rahman, to return to Afghanistan. The families, the Tarzi exiled in Turkey, and the Musahibin in India, returned with their respective leaders, Mahmud-e-Tarzi leading the former and Nader Khan, the latter. Consequently, each of these two individuals will play significant roles in the future of Afghanistan. Tarzi discussed with Amir Habibullah Khan the introduction of a reform program, which would address the educational, communicational and economical backwardness, as well as the negative effects of political, cultural and intellectual isolation of Afghanistan. The Amir was convinced and appointed Tarzi as the chief of the Bureau of Translation for the Royal Court. This body of government was providing translation of foreign political, economic and technological advances and the feasibility of their implementation in Afghanistan. Amir Habibullah Khan realized that no one could address the needs for reforms better than someone brought up in Turkey, where significant reforms were already implemented. Thus, Tarzi’s function was to keep the Amir informed about political and economic developments in Europe as well as the Muslim world. Moreover, Amir Habibullah Khan granted permission to Mahmud-e-Tarzi to publish his newspaper, Siraj-ul-Akhbar or Lamp of the News, the first newspaper in the country, to educate the ruling class about modernization, nationalism and pan-Islamism. In fact, Tarzi gathered young nobles and reform-oriented intellectuals into a group, which he called the Young Afghans, inspired by the Young Turks, the reform movement in Turkey, and the new newspaper, Siraj-ul-Akhbar, in turn served as their ideological enrichment. This development set the stage for the modernization attempts, by the members of this group and future followers, throughout the 20th century. Siraj-ulAkhbar advocated the reversal of isolation, by taking control of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs from the British. The Young Afghans hoped that Amir Habibullah Khan would champion the cause of nationalism and modernization; he, however, failed to do so. The opportunity to remove Afghanistan’s foreign affairs from the British arose during WW I. As the British were preoccupied with fighting the Germans, this would have been an ideal time for Habibullah Khan to assert his control over Afghanistan’s foreign policy. Instead, Habibullah Khan kept his neutrality and did not take sides with either Turkey or Germany. This decision cost him his life in 1919 at the hands of the Young Afghans, whose members included his younger son, Amanullah Khan, because he did not take advantage of the opportunity to remove Afghan foreign affairs from the British. This insulted the Young Afghans; hence, they assassinated him. The review of these historical events reveals the relevance of several factors for these historical changes. First, Afghanistan’s strategic significance played a major role in attracting British and Russian attention. Second, the tribal structure of Afghan society served as a corner stone in the formation of the Afghan State; in addition, the defense of Afghanistan as well as the defeat of foreign forces rested on the tribal strength of Afghanistan. Third, individual leaders constituted another factor. Whether it was the charismatic leadership of the founder of the Afghan nation-state or the actions of his successors, all of them have left marks on the development history of Afghanistan. Fourth, the last factors that I drew from the review of the short historical periods consist of Islam and the Afghan national code of behavior, the Pashtunwali. The Afghans referred to their struggle against the British as a Jihad or holy war because war against the infidels is referred to in Islam as holy war. Furthermore, taking revenge is a factor that stems from Pashtunwali, whether it was revenge fought by the Mohammadzai clan against the Sadozai dynasty or revenging British intervention into Afghanistan, all of it rests on the code of Pashtunwali. 4.1 Attempts at Modernization Before the year 1919, different Afghan monarchs had tried to modernize different aspects of Afghan society; however, they did not succeed due to the continuous direct and indirect intervention of British India. For example, Dost Mohammed Khan started to modernize the army by hiring European and American military adventurers in 1835. The modernization included the adoption of formal uniforms, the establishment of a European type of regiment, and the formation of a 12,000 men strong cavalry. Modest taxation was also introduced. The government taxed mostly the urban centers and the non-tribal minority populations of Hazara and Tajik. Before any of these efforts took shape, the British invaded Afghanistan in 1839, forcing the First Anglo-Afghan War. Sher Ali Khan, Amir Dost Mohammed Khan’s son, took over the throne in 1869, and attempted to modernize the country as well. Sher Ali Khan’s developmental attempts were much more expansive than his father’s. They included the establishment of shops to build Armstrong guns and ammunitions, and to duplicate different British rifles; establishment of a small-scale home-based industry including weaving cloths and handicrafts; road building and bridge repairs; and establishment of the first regular postal service between Kabul and Peshawar---consequently, the first Afghan postage stamp was put in circulation in 1870. Sher Ali Khan founded the first public school in Kabul with two divisions, military and civilian. He also began the modernization of the army. European military manuals were translated into Pashto and Persian to serve as textbooks for students in the military division of the public school. Moreover, Sher Ali Khan established diplomatic relations with the neighboring khanates of Central Asia between 1871-79. These achievements were set back when the British invaded Afghanistan in 1879, starting the Second Anglo-Afghan War, and putting an end to Sher Ali Khan’s rule and modernization attempts. After Sher Ali Khan, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan established the first centralized regime in Afghanistan that managed to control the country fully. He instituted various reform; especially his legal and social reforms that tightened his grip on power over the entire country. He used diverse methods in dealing with tribes, ranging from the use of force to matrimonial alliances with different tribes to maintain peace and order in the country. Furthermore, he abolished slavery, which was a prevalent practice throughout northern and central Afghanistan. Abdur Rahman categorized existing Afghan laws into three categories, namely Islamic laws proper or Shari’a, administrative or civil laws or Qanun, and tribal laws; and based on the three categories of laws, Abdur Rahman established three kinds of courts. Religious courts dealt with religious and civil matters. Criminal courts were run by Kotwal (chief of police and judge of petty session) and judges. Finally, a board of commerce, which consisted of merchants, settled disputes between merchants. Amir Abdur Rahman encouraged trade and hired Europeans technicians to introduce some modern technology into Afghanistan. He rebuilt the government shops that were destroyed during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. Shops served two functions; one was making military hardware and two serving as symbols of modernity in the country. Also, he established a single monetary unit, the Kabuli rupee, which replaced various inflated regional currencies. To strengthen the basis of this new monetary unit, Abdur Rahman imported minting machinery and established a mint in Kabul (Gregorian, 1969:139-142). Almost all of the reforms that Abdur Rahman introduced were undermined by the Durand agreement, which made the Afghan economy hostage to the British authorities in India. In fact, by renouncing Afghanistan’s claims to the tribal belt, Abdur Rahman cut off Afghanistan permanently from the Indian Ocean. Since imports-exports had to go through India, any development of Afghanistan became dependent on British India. Any subsequent initiative at independent development met with retaliation from British India in the form of economic sanctions. These sanctions took the form of border closure between India and Afghanistan by the British, thus, barring Afghan nomads, whose livelihood was linked to their mobility and trade between India and Afghanistan which weakened the Afghan economy. Afghan economy benefited from the trade and commercial transactions of the nomads. Though Abdur Rahman Khan’s pacification campaigns established a centralized regime in Afghanistan that reduced tribal-clerical autonomy in the country, the direct threat posed by the British and the control of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs make discussing development paradoxical. Chapter Five V. Amanullah Khan, the years 1919 to 1929 5.1 Background and Description At the time of Amanullah Khan’s accession to the throne in 1919, Afghanistan was an agricultural society. The economy was based on the exchange of mostly agricultural commodities, dairy products, and handicrafts. Almost 100% of the population was illiterate. The government revenue mostly came from import-export and agricultural taxes, and from taxes imposed on urban merchants and artisans. The agricultural taxes will be explained below in the sections covering reforms. Foreign trade consisted of export and import to and from Russia and British India. The export to Russia consisted mostly of wool and Karakul sheepskin, and Russia’s imports to Afghanistan included chintzes, glassware, sugar, linen, silk, cotton goods, cutlery, and paper. The figures in tables 5.1 and 5.2 should illustrate the magnitude of Afghanistan’s trade with Russia and India. Afghanistan’s exports to India consisted of fruits and vegetables, grain and pulse, wool, ghi, tobacco, carpets, and horses (in order of importance). Imports from India consistef of cotton goods, dyes, sugar, tea, iron, knives, scissors, needles and thread, paper, drugs, and machinery. There was a very limited industry in Kabul. Between the year 1901 and 1904, during the reign of King Habibullah, Afghanistan had 1500 people working in the government’s workshops in Kabul. These workshops consisted of a steam-hammer shop, a mint (with the production capacity of 40,000 Kabuli rupees a day), iron and brass foundries, smithies and rolling mills, boiler and engine houses, a boot making factory with the capacity to produce 400 pairs of boots a day, and a textile mill. Table 5.1 Trade figures between Russia and Afghanistan (in rubles): Year Export to Russia Import from Russia 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1923-1924 1925-1926 1926-1927 1927-1928 1928-1929 5,946,000 2,936,000 3,622,000 2,431,000 756,000 69,000 2,541,000 3,422,000 6,849,000 7,007,000 6,299,000 2,943,000 4,689,000 6,782,000 13,559,000 1,314,000 3,271,000 4,160,000 6,698,000 11,718,000 Source: (Gregorian 1969:196) Table 5.2 The trade figures between India and Afghanistan (in pounds sterling) Year 1912-1913 1913-1914 1914-1915 1915-1916 1916-1917 1918-1919 1919-1920 1920-1921 1921-1922 1922-1923 1923-1924 Exports to India 847,000 860,000 806,000 1,116,000 1,144,000 1,194,000 1,975,000 1,543,200 809,500 1,606,160 943,350 Source: (Gregorian 1969:196) Imports from India 1,660,000 1,013,000 909,000 1,021,000 1,150,000 2,020,000 1,607,000 1,328,500 1,353,700 1,575,240 1,725,850 In addition, there were artisan shops that made guns, cartridges, soap, candles, black powder, bayonets and swords (Gregorian, 1969:190-1). The Afghan monetary unit in circulation was the Kabuli Rupee; however, at times, merchants also used the Indian Rupee. The Indian Rupee carried heavier weight than the Kabuli Rupee, because the Indian Rupee was backed by the British pound sterling. The major “urban” centers were Kabul (south central), Kandahar (southwest), Jala-Abad (east), He’rat (west), and Turkistan (north). According to rough estimates (Gregorian, 1969:53-57), the populations of the various cities about the year 1900 were estimated to be as follows: Kabul 75,000, Kandahar 31,000 to 60,000, He’rat 25,000 to 50,000 and Jalal-Abad 2000 to 3000. The criteria used to qualify these areas as urban centers stemmed from the marketplace status they held for their respective surroundings as well as their location on trade routes between India and Russia and the Muslim Kingdoms of Central Asia. Their roles as regional administrative centers for different parts of Afghanistan further molded their regional centrality as urban centers. The first task the new Amir took was to take control of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs from British hands. To that end, he declared Jihad or holy war against the British. The declaration of Jihad served two other purposes as well. These were 1) the unity of the Afghan people, and 2) a boosting of the spirits of Muslims all over the world because the post-WW I period marked the decline of Muslims all over the world. The war continued against the British until the Afghan forces neared the Durand Line. At that point, the British resorted to a diplomatic ploy by recognizing the political independence of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs. In response, Amanullah Khan ordered his forces to stop their advance. The Afghan commanders disagreed with the Amir’s order and wanted to continue their march to secure the independence of the tribes on the eastern side of the Durand Line. Amanullah Khan reasserted his order to his commanders to stop their advance; finally, they agreed to stop. This decision not to secure the independence of Afghans of the tribal belt haunted Amanullah Khan throughout his reign because it was the common belief that he had betrayed the Afghans on the eastern side of the Durand Line. After the War, the Treaty of Rawalpindi was signed on August 8, 1919 between Britain and Afghanistan. The treaty formally recognized Afghanistan as a fully independent state. Thus, Afghanistan took control of its foreign affairs from the British. Amanullah paid a price for Afghanistan’s sovereignty, which was his recognition of the Durand Line as the official border of Afghanistan with BritishIndia. This recognition resulted in the strengthening of the British position in the tribal areas on the eastern side of the Durand Line. The only tribes that had extended support to the advancing Afghan Army were the Wazir and Masud tribes, which felt betrayed by Amanullah Khan’s decision to recognize the Durand Line hence leaving them and other Afghan tribes under British rule. After the British defeat, Amir Amanullah Khan realized that it was essential to transform the country economically, socially and politically, if the independence of Afghanistan was to be ensured. The Amir was determined to bring about the socioeconomic transformation of Afghanistan. In February of 1919, he made a proclamation that conveyed his goals for the future: “By the Grace of God our sublime government will employ such measures of reforms as may prove suitable and useful to the country and nation so that the Government and nation of Afghanistan may make and gain great renown in the civilized world and take its proper place among the civilized powers of the world. For the rest, I pray to God for his favors and mercy and seek his help for the welfare and prosperity of you Muslims and all mankind. From God I seek guidance and the completion of my wishes” (Thomas, 1925:181-182). He realized that Afghanistan’s backwardness, hence weakness, made it prey for foreign powers, and its dependence on goods from British India and Russia perpetuated the underdeveloped status of the Country. Having direct relations with other European countries such as Germany, Italy, Poland and France, Amanullah Khan had the opportunity to rely on other European countries to introduce new industries into the country and to modernize the army. In order to reduce Afghanistan’s dependence on the import of consumption goods, Amanullah Khan adopted the Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI) approach, which he planned to achieve through the import of small factories that would supply consumer goods for the domestic market. In addition, the King encouraged private investment in the economy. To that end, he passed a law in 1923. The provisions of the law were to protect the capital of the private merchants in case of loss; availed government secured loans; and provided tax relief for an extended time. He also introduced commercial laws in 1922-23, to give merchants protection against any foreign competitors. Amanullah Khan believed that in order to introduce economic modernization to Afghanistan, educational and cultural modernization through the adoption of Western institutions and values were needed. The onset of economic modernization included cultural modernization, which was in violation of sociocultural and religious values of Afghanistan. Some of the cultural modernization included: official encouragement to abandon veils, requiring Kabul’s inhabitants and visitors to the city to wear Western attire, and requiring men to lift their Western hats upon greeting each other. Consequently, the cultural modernization sparked reactions all over Afghanistan, and people’s discontent turned a bandit into king, who served as a vehicle for toppling Amanullah Khan. Hence, radical reforms contributed to the failure of Amanullah Khan’s development schemes and the reversal of his reforms by the bandit king, Bacha-e-Saqao after Amanullah’s abdication, prolonged the underdevelopment of Afghanistan (Poullada, 1973: 66-79). Amanullah Khan’s character influenced the onset and magnitude of change in Afghanistan. Several factors molded his personality. The early influence came from his mother who appointed experienced kinsmen to teach him the art of state diplomacy. Although, he did not show a lot of interest in the art of diplomacy, he learned and adopted their hatred for the British. This decision of his mother acquainted the young Prince Amanullah with how the rest of the people of Afghanistan felt about the British, since he did not learn any such anti-British sentiment from his father Amir Habibullah Khan. Prince Amanullah Khan did not follow the footsteps of his father or grandfather. Instead, he launched a holy war against the British and took control of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs. He pursued to modernize Afghanistan in order to insure its independence. Another factor that influenced his personality was his negative experience with mullahs. When they failed to provide him with convincing answers to his philosophical questions in Islamic metaphysics, he adopted a firm opinion that the mullahs had to acquire more education to sharpen their knowledge in religious issues and metaphysics because without adequate education they would not be able to advise people on religious issues correctly. That is why, as part of his religious reforms, Amanullah Khan made it necessary for them to pass a state exam to qualify as mullahs; otherwise they had to attend newly established religious schools. Before becoming king, Amanullah Khan followed the publication, Siraj-ulAkhbar (Lamp of the news), written by Mahmud Tarzi.17 This publication provided the ideological fiber for Amanullah Khan’s reforms. Siraj-al-Akhbar advocated that Afghans nationalism and Islam should constitute the philosophy of the Afghan State. It encouraged Muslim unity against European Imperialism. Furthermore, Siraj-ulAkhbar argued that decline in political, social and moral terms caused by ignorance, lack of understanding of modern institutions and the lack of scientific knowledge by the Muslims. Their ignorance, it argued, brought about disunity, disharmony and misunderstanding among the Muslims. However, it reiterated that the fault did not lie with Islam but rather with Muslims. On the one hand, Muslims did not follow the prescription of the Holy Koran, which orders Muslims to acquire knowledge. On the other hand, they forgot the rich scholarly achievement of early Islamdom: while Europe was still in the dark ages, Muslims were some of the most advanced people in the world. Later, Europe built on the scholarly achievement of Muslims. The model of change advocated by Siraj-ul-Akhbar was the linkage of Islam, modernization and nationalism. Tarzi reasoned that the notion of fatherland stemming from Islam and the Afghan nationhood was not in contradiction with Islamic teachings. In fact, Tarzi quoted a saying of the Prophet Muhammad: Hubb ul watan min al iman (patriotism is a part of the faith) in Seraj-ul-Akhbar. The following quote from Gregorian (1969: 174) illustrates Tarzi’s message: 17 He was from the Tarzi family, which was exiled by Amanullah’s grandfather Abdul Rahman. Tarzi was influenced by the Young Turks of the Ottoman empire. Later, Tarzi became the father in law of Amanullah “In an attempt to demonstrate that there was no contradiction between the concept of Afghan nationhood and the Quranic concept of a single Islamic community (ummah), Tarzi argued that, though all Muslims are members of one community, there were a number of political entities within that community. These constituted fatherlands (watans) for the communities living therein, who formed nations (millets). Since these political entities were Muslim by religion, the love each citizen bore of his fatherland was perforce sanctioned by Islam and by God. To love one’s country was to love one’s religion and vice versa.” In regards to modernization, Tarzi raised similar points (Gregorian, 1969:175): “Tarzi’s next step was to attempt to identify love of fatherland with the cause of modernization. He argued that, as patriotism was explicitly sanctioned and exalted by Islam as religious duty, Islam almost by definition required a commitment to the defense of the fatherland. Since progress and modernization were indispensable in this regard, they were compatible with Islam. Only through modernization could the Afghan kingdom reorganize its army and bolster its defenses, and in so doing, protect its independence and Islam against the insatiable appetite of European imperialists. True patriotism thus went beyond the willingness to fight in defense of the fatherland; it necessarily entailed the desire to reform and modernize the fatherland as well. It was clearly the duty of each true patriot to promote learning and to contribute to the development of educational institutions, which would ensure progress in Afghanistan. Divinely ordained principles, as well as the cause of freedom and progress, required national unity. Therefore, those who opposed progress contributed to disunity and provided weapons to the enemies of Islam and the fatherland. Finally, Tarzi insisted that it was the supreme task of all Afghans to support the policies of the monarchy, whose aim was to unify the country and ensure its progress through modernization”. To sum up, the early training by his mother, the influence of Mahmud Tarzi and his publication Siraj-ul-akhbar, molded Amanullah Khan as the modernizing18 King he would become. This was evident when he embarked on a comprehensive multilevel transformation of Afghanistan including social-cultural, economic, educational, judicial, political, economic, military and religious modernization. 18 Modernizing means bringing modernization. Modernization in the early 20th century meant the adoption of Western reforms in military, education as well as socioeconomic sphere. 5.2 Reforms Some of the reforms by level follow: 5.2.1 Social reforms included • Abolition of begir (forced labor) and slavery. • Granting of rights to women to establish associations and to unveil themselves • The determination that men did not have to wear traditional caps and turbans; instead, European attire was mandated in government offices and in most of the city of Kabul. There was no law that either ordered unveiling of women or prohibited them from wearing veils; however, the common person thought that there was such a law 5.2.2 Educational Reforms included • Introduction of secular curricula • Adult literacy classes • Compulsory primary education as far as the financial resources allowed it. • A group of boys was sent to France to be educated there in 1923 and later, in 1928, a group of girls was sent to Turkey. Prior to the educational reforms, the only education that was available to the masses included the instruction of a few sacred texts and selected works of Persian classical poets such as Sa’di and Jami. 5.2.3 Political Reforms included • A legislative body formed in 1919 to share governmental responsibility with the monarch. • All Afghans that lived within the boundaries of the country were granted civil rights. • The country’s first constitution was promulgated in 1923. • Allowances to tribal Khans and distant members of the royal family were terminated or reduced. • A secular code, Nizam-Nama, replaced the Shari’a (Islamic law) though Shari’a was kept as the foundation of the secular code. 5.2.4 Military reforms included • The army was reorganized under the supervision of Turkish officers in 1922. The veteran units that had strong tribal affiliations were disbanded; instead, young recruits from different parts of Afghanistan replaced them. • A universal recruitment system was adopted that selected recruits by lottery. • The salary of the soldiers and officers was reduced by 50 %. In 1920 as part of the military reforms, a treaty that entailed the reorganization of the army by Turkish officials was signed between Afghanistan and Turkey. Reforms were initiated in 1922. 5.2.5 Religious reforms included • Abolishment of Waqfs (religious endowments), endowments that generated income for one’s descendants (Hodgson, 1974:454). • Mustahibs (religious enforcers who tested people’s knowledge of religious rituals) were disbanded. • Schools were established to train mullahs. 5.2.6 Economic Reforms included • The tax system was transformed from one based on kind to one based on cash. • The Afghani was introduced as the new unit of currency in 1923. • A modern budget was institutionalized in 1922 and an accounting system in 1923. • In 1923, Amanullah Khan on his tour in Europe introduced a limited ISI program that also encouraged private investment, resulting in the purchase of small factories in 1928. • Merchants were given official protection. This stimulated joint-stock companies between merchants in 1920. • The agricultural sector was given increased attention. This can be exemplified by the creation of a new class of peasant proprietors, who received cheap public lands. The first agriculture school opened and reforestation was initiated. • Anti corruption campaigns were initiated 5.3 Reform Processes These reforms were implemented in three phases; however, the first phase constituted the blueprint for all the reforms. Phase 1 & 2 The reforms of the first phase consisted of administrative, political, economic, educational, social and religious nature. These reforms were initiated in 1919 and accelerated to the end of 1923. After the Khost10 revolt in 1924, implementation was slowed down to recover from the political damage caused by the accelerated nature of the reforms of the first phase as well as the financial loss of five million pounds used to control the revolt in Khost. According to Gregorian (1968:255), the five million pounds constituted the total government income for two years. After the 1924 Khost revolt, few new reforms were introduced as part of the second phase of reforms that lasted from 1924 to 1928. Phase 3 The third phase of Amanullah’s reforms was initiated after he returned from his trip abroad in July 1928. Most of the reforms of this phase remained in the proposal stage. However, those that were implemented were from phase two. For example, when Amanullah returned from abroad, a group of female students, who 10 Khost is a district in south Afghanistan where the first reaction against Amanullah’s reforms surfaced. The reaction was against an administrative code, Nizam-nama that aimed to liberalize the position of should have been sent abroad for studying before Amanullah’s return from his foreign tour, were sent to Europe right after he returned from his tour. The third phase of reforms lasted only a little over six months until his abdication in January 1929. Toward the end of his reign, Amanullah Khan went on a tour abroad from December 1927 to July 1928. In addition to European countries, he visited Turkey and met with Ataturk. In Iran, he met Reza Shah, Shah of Iran. After his return in July 1928, the haste with which Amanullah Khan wanted to implement his reforms worsened his image among the population. The ideas of Ataturk had a very profound impact on him. Amanullah did not realize that there were fundamental differences between Afghanistan and Turkey. Mustafa Chokaiv explains: “Amanullah chose to follow in the footsteps of Ghazi Mustafa Kemal but forgot that the Turks had been for centuries in contact with the cultured world of Europe and that the governing class in Turkey had been long since Europeanized. Amanullah forgot [also that Turkey knew not the tribal regime], and that she had a comparatively well-ordered centralized apparatus of power, such as did not…exist in Afghanistan. Mustafa Kemal had an army that was loyal and devoted to its leader. Nothing of the kind existed in Afghanistan…We have on the one side the King-reformer considering the Afghans as a united, single political organism, as a united nation-state; on the other side the Afghan tribes, who looking at the state can comprehend it only from the point of view of the tribal interests, to the defence of which the principles of the sacred Sharia are put forward” (Chokaiv, 1930:330).19 5.4 Analysis of Reforms A significant number of Amanullah’s reforms remained in the proposal stage; he was forced to abdicate the throne before many of them could be implemented. woman, and allowed government’s intrusion in family affairs. This rebellion was carried out by the Afghan tribe of Mangal in 1924 and lasted for nine months ending in January of 1925. 19 Although valid in regards to the differences between Afghanistan and Turkey, but he is inaccurate in claiming that the Afghan tribes use the Sharia (Islamic Code of conduct) as the pretext for the defense of their interests. 5.4.1 Social Reforms In his social reforms, Amanullah Khan targeted the privileged by abolishing the system of Begir, which was actually forced labor that was not part of the social customs of Afghanistan rather a privilege enjoyed by some maliks (village elders and representatives) and khans (wealthy landowners). Tribal khans and clergy did not react to this in haste until there were other factors that served as catalyst for their reaction. An exogenous factor (Britain) would introduce elements that further intensified and in fact activated the discontent of the population. Normally, a cleric (a British intelligence officer) would be used to instigate tribal dissent into rebellion. The case of revolt of the Shinwari20 is rather instructive. When the governor of the province ignored the grievance of the Shinwari tribe with another tribe, the governor’s attitude did not turn into unrest and rebellion immediately. It needed another significant factor to serve as catalyst. The British took advantage of the situation by circulating the pictures of the Afghan Queen, Soraya, in a Western outfit, while the royal couple was touring European countries in 1928. Upon seeing it, the Shinwaris embarked on a fullfledged armed revolt. In about the same time when the royal couple returned from their tour, a group of unveiled girls, who were being sent abroad for education, passed the Shinwari region on their way to Peshawar, from where they would go to Bombay and then sail to Turkey. This further fueled the unrest. Clerics proclaimed the uprising just, Islamic, and cast legitimacy on the rebellion. Hence, the revolts were not sudden, but rather erupted in an incrementally accumulating process. Poullada (1973) holds that the uprising during Amanullah Khan’s reign was inevitable because Amir Abdur 20 A tribe in west Afghanistan that rose against the radical reforms of Amanullah and the corruption of his regional administrator. Rahman Khan had suppressed tribes and clerics during his reign whereas, Habibullah Khan’s reign, supposedly served as the period of recovery for the tribes from the oppressive measures of Abdur Rahman Khan. Hence, Amanullah Khan’s reign, Poullada claims, was the period when these opposing forces were strong enough to resurface. His analysis may be valid only to a limited extent. He envisaged the period from the reign of Abdur Rahman Khan to that of Amanullah Khan, in the frame of cyclical theory of change. That is, he treats the three periods from Abdur Rahman to Amanullah’s as cycles of change. Moreover, he does not appreciate the availability of an alternative explanation, namely the possibility of various endogenous and exogenous variables, whose combined impact might have brought about the collapse of Amanullah Khan. The element of the reform that had to do with emancipation of women proved especially debilitating for Amanullah Khan’s survival as a monarch. Especially, when the King and his wife encouraged women to form their activist organizations and discouraged them from wearing the veil, people were extremely disenchanted with Amanullah Khan because the two issues hit right at the core of Pashtunwali as well as Islam. The question of the veil per se was not the only factor that stimulated reactions rather the prescriptions that the state was giving to women, was an intrusion into the Afghan household that insulted both men and women. Otherwise, women in different parts of Afghanistan wear different costumes qualified as veils. For example, in Kabul, women wear a wardrobe called burqa, which looks like a long coat with a hood that covers face and chest. Women in cities wear burqa, and those in rural areas wear long shawls that cover head and trunk. The propaganda against veil was directed at women who were wearing burqa. Islam requires women to cover the head, chest area, arms and legs. The burqa, nonetheless, goes beyond the requirements set by Islam. In fact, burqa evolved from both local customs and the Islamic prescriptions for veiling. This is how Amanullah’s anti-veil campaign undermined both Islam and Pashtunwali. Thus, clerics and tribal leaders utilized this in expressing their outright condemnation of Amanullah Khan, and took arms against the government. Furthermore, it also provided a significant point to be manipulated by the exogenous factor, namely the British, in order to fan the fire of discontent, hence intensified the already boiling reactions by the tribes which in turn tightened the “noose” around Amanullah Khan’s neck. Reactions were further fueled by the behaviors of regional administrators, who would be walking with their wives unveiled and hand-in-hand without any sensitivity to the traditional values of the country. This was an extremely offensive behavior in the 1920s. The aspect of social reform outlawing the karakuli hat (made of lambskin) also caused alienation. This targeted a large chunk of the male population of Afghanistan. The extent of disenchantment brought about by this measure can be appreciated, when we note that until 1960s it was essential to have a hat on while sitting in a gathering; sitting with bare head was considered an insult to everyone in the gathering. Unlike in the West, where lifting one’s hat means respect, in Afghanistan having headgear at a gathering on certain occasions is mandatory. Therefore, the enactment of legal provisions to prevent wearing traditional headgear informed two issues. First, it implied disrespect to Afghan men, and second, it was an attempt to replace a long established tradition with the customs of “infidels”. Thus, this reform created feelings of discontent among men, who regarded Amanullah’s prohibitions of the headgear as well as the encouragement of unveiling as a direct intrusion into their private lives. Poullada (1973) claims that some of Amanullah Khan’s social reforms had an economic basis: “…There were also economic reasons for some measures…the export of karakul pelts had become an important earner of foreign exchange, and the turbans required several yards of imported cloth. Amanullah sought to increase exports and reduce imports by forbidding domestic consumption” (Poullada, 1973:81). Poullada continues by saying that Amanullah Khan encouraged using traditionally spun cloth. This is contradictory; if traditionally spun material was available, then banning of turbans could not be explained by his claim that wearing turbans increased demands for the import of foreign-spun materials. Even, if one accepts the economic justification for the ban, the unavoidable question posed is: where did the material for tailoring Western-style hats come from? Those who were living in Kabul as well as visitors to the city were ordered to wear Western-style wardrobes and hats. Amanullah Khan had genuine intentions for the betterment of Afghanistan but he miscalculated people’s reactions in making his radical changes. 5.4.2 Educational Reforms Modern secular education was introduced for the first time during this period. Amanullah Khan’s enemies propagated that his reforms were non-Islamic: if children attend schools they become corrupted and kafirs (infidels). The propaganda was designed to associate traditional education with Islam using the former teaching positions of mullahs as the legitimizing factors by manipulating the ignorance of people, branding the secular education non-Islamic. Since early in history rulers profited from the ignorance of the masses, by keeping education out of the tribal areas, the corrupt rulers would carry out their designs successfully. The traditional curriculum consisted of few sacred texts and poetry of classical Persian poets such as Sa’di and Jami. According to Poullada: “The curriculum tended to produce…an inward looking, mystical, and highly romanticized view of life” (1973:86) A secular curriculum organized and supervised by Indian educators. It consisted of the natural sciences, social sciences, humanities (including religious studies), foreign languages and mathematics. The impact of Amanullah’s educational reforms was so profound that young men who were sent to schools abroad during his reign assumed leadership positions later in the mid-20th century. 5.4.3 Political Reforms The political reforms of Amanullah Khan were far reaching as well. Their impact on tribal leaders and the privileged may have been one of the most important factors of discontent from that sector of the population. The King made his intentions known to his inner circle that the financial subsidies granted to the tribal Khans and extended members of the royal family for being influential figures had to be terminated because such practices contradicted his principles. He overestimated his power to carry such radical changes and/or underestimated the extent of tribal revolt. Amanullah Khan’s Minister of war, Nader Khan, strongly disagreed with the King, in regard to the eradication of tribal privileges. Nader Khan’s disagreement stemmed from his argument that the potential for instability was too great in such reforms because they could bring about discontent and instigate upheaval on the part of tribal khans. His rationale was that Afghanistan is a tribal society, the state needs the allegiance of tribal leaders and the eradication of such privileges would alienate influential tribal leaders. King Amanullah Khan somehow overlooked the complexities of tribal life, and made decisions without realizing their long-term implications. The eradication of privileges was one of the key factors as it placed him in direct confrontation with the tribal structure and leadership. Afghanistan’s first constitution was promulgated as part of the political reforms in 1923. Loya Jerga (the assembly of elders) was to meet once a year to review the operation of government. The secular codes that were legislated were assembled into a document, referred to as Nizamnamah or constitution. The Nizamnamah was an extensive legal document with legal codes ranging from handling of commercial cases to laws pertaining to the issuance of identity cards and passports. However, many injunctions were revised after the Khost rebellion. Poullada articulates the revision of the Nizamnamah: “In the autumn of 1924, when the Khost rebellion of the Mangal tribe was at its height, Amanullah assembled the second Loya Jerga of his reign for the purpose of considering some of the laws and certain provisions of the constitution which the rebels allegedly objected to. As a result several laws were rescinded and the constitution was amended” (Poullada, 1973:94). The changes to the Nizamnamah appeased, in part, reaction to Amanullah’s initial changes, however, it had to be accompanied by military operations until 1925 when the revolt was pacified. 5.4.4 Military Reforms Amanullah Khan did not fully appreciate the depth of the links between the army and various tribes. War Minister General Nader Khan expressed his intense disagreement in regards to the reorganization of the army, but his objection was overruled in favor of those reforms mandated by the Turkish officers, who could not understand the complexities of the Afghan society. Nader Khan’s rationale was that the process of transformation ought to be gradual and one should be sensitive to the fact that these men were tribesmen. The removal of older army soldiers from the army meant the alienation of the tribes. The reforms included the reduction of soldiers’ pay. This contradicted Amanullah Khan’s previous gesture of doubling the soldiers’ salary upon proclaiming himself the king in 1919 in order to win their support. However, with the onset of reforms, soldiers’ pay was reduced from 20 rupees per month to 14 and later to 5 rupees. He thought that once the pay was reduced the older soldiers would leave but that did not occur because they occupied a position of authority that they did not want to lose (Poullada, 1973:116-117). Some left the army; others stayed behind; they found it difficult to abandon the army because they had gotten accustomed to army life. Meanwhile, the Turkish advisers introduced model battalions, which did not perform well in combat perhaps due to their lack of experience. Consequently, there was discontent among tribes because most army officers and soldiers were members of different Afghan tribes. Young soldiers organized in model battalions replaced seasoned and experienced soldiers. Amidst the reorganization of the army, the old barracks were torn down with the promise of building modern barracks. This did not occur and the soldiers spent the winter in tents. The lack of effectiveness in the army became visible. When the soldiers were exposed to actual fighting in Khost, they did not perform well. The disagreement that emerged between the War Minister Nader Khan and King Amanullah Khan over the reorganization of the army resulted in Nader Khan’s resignation. He was sent as the Afghan Minister to France. Amir Amanullah Khan rationalized his decision of the reorganization of the army by maintaining that the army should represent the entire people of Afghanistan not just some specific tribes. He wanted a small professional army that would have allegiance to the central government and maintain internal security. Amanullah’s intentions were good, but he did not realize that the establishment of a mature and trusted fighting force representative of the whole nation required time. As in other reforms, Amanullah Khan did not expect that the military reforms would produce a major reaction. He did not appreciate that the various customs and normative behaviors were developed through centuries and that they could not be eradicated by a royal proclamation and cease to have any social and political ramifications overnight. 5.4.5 Religious Reforms The reason for the mullahs’ opposition was both religious and social; both of which were intertwined in the fiber of Afghan society. The opposition stemmed from the disregard for Islamic principles. Religious scholars such as Hazrat and other Afghan mullahs opposed Amanullah’s reforms on religious and social grounds. Under the religious reforms, mustahibs, who were religious enforcers traveling the country making sure the population was aware of the requirements of Islamic rituals, were removed, and modern schools were opened to free the mullahs for religious functions such as leading the prayers in mosques and teaching religious subjects only. Amanullah Khan’s father Habibullah used coercion to control those mullahs who were preaching folk Islam in order to secure their priviledges. Unlike his father, Amanullah Khan wanted the mullahs to get training in proper Islamic schools and achieve their credentials. Amanullah pursued his policy through persuasion rather than coercion in order to obtain their cooperation in his modernization programs. Furthermore, the secularization of education undermined the status of mullahs as teachers. This also compromised their economic status. The essential issue was the connection of mullahs to tribes and tribal chiefs, and the influence of mullahs over them. Though in some instances the mullahs would not be able to carry any weight without the support of the tribal khans, however, in other instances, where the authority rested with the mullahs (as interpreters of religious injunctions), the Khans could not oppose them. The authority that stemmed from the status of clergy and the respect Afghans attributed to religious figures attracted the British interest. Whenever they wanted to exercise influence in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, British agents educated in Islamic laws and Pashto language in the Deoau band seminary in India, would be sent to Afghanistan under the icon of pirs (mystical figures) and would find followers “overnight”. Pirs would be in an ideal position to cast religious proclamations and instigate discontent and unrest. The common people in Afghanistan are familiar only with the mandatory rituals such as praying five times a day, fasting for a month in a year, and what is prohibited and allowed. Therefore, they were not in any position to question the authoritative proclamations of the British agent (again a pir). The government could not jeopardize its stability by questioning the authority of such figures either. Although large numbers of so-called religious scholars working for the British intelligence service instigated opposition to Amanullah through misinformation, it is my position that there were thousands of scholars who rightfully opposed Amanullah Khan’s reforms based on legitimate religious and cultural grounds as well. Nevertheless, there were mullahs who were ignorant of Islamic doctrine other than the essential rituals, but would express their opinion in religious matters anyway simply because there was a need for the expression of opinion. Thus, the mullahs felt compelled to express themselves in order to uphold their authority. The lack of Islamic knowledge of many mullahs, who confused cultural and social myths for the teachings of the holy Koran, contributed repeatedly to the false interpretation of certain political decisions on the part of the government. However, Ahmad and Poullada make hasty generalizations, claiming that mullahs were there to secure their position of influence. Although there was a small number of corrupt mullahs, the majority consisted of sincere people. In addition, British agents functioning under the cloak of being mullahs throughout Afghanistan had much superior training compared to local village mullahs. The less educated local mullahs relied on the information they were provided by the so-called religious icons. The infamous T. Lawrence, who entered eastern Afghanistan under the cloak of mullah, was one of the British agents instigating rebellion (Ghubar, 1967: 814). Inevitably, unrest and rebellion ensued. One should not lose sight of measures such as barring men and women from certain parts of the city if they wore traditional attire, or encouraging women to rebel against their husbands. In fact, my grandfather, Judge Abdul Hakim Khan, who was studying at a law school situated at the palace of Amanullah Khan, witnessed one such incident. Judge Hakim Khan gave his story as follows: “While I was on my way out of my school at the Arg (Amanullah Khan’s palace), I witnessed a group of women gather around Amanullah Khan, complaining about their husbands; claiming their husbands would not let them appear unveiled in public. Amanullah Khan became very angry and told the women that he (Amanullah) would give them pistols to shoot their husbands.”21 Poullada illustrates this point abundantly: “The formation of the Women’s Protective Association (Anjuman-I-Niswan) headed by Qubra Jan, one of Amanullah’s sisters, in the mid-1920s was followed by publicity encouraging women to protest o the society against any injustices suffered at the hands of their husbands or other males” (Poullada, 1973:85). It was no surprise then that the British propaganda proved effective. The British agents spread the rumor among the tribal people, who had a very simplistic world-view, that Amanullah Khan had been kept abroad and someone else had been sent in his place. The reason this sounded reasonable to tribes was the fact that the Amanullah they knew would not make bizarre proclamations. Moreover, two factors should be taken into consideration regarding the measures of Amanullah Khan. First, Amanullah Khan had miscalculated his reforms in terms of their compatibility to the country. As stated above, he approached some of his reforms from an Islamic angle and ignored folk Islam, which has been influenced by local customs, and social values such as Pashtunwali. He viewed things in a rather simplistic manner. He maintained that he was introducing all these reforms for the betterment of Afghanistan, and, since Afghan people loved their country they should not oppose the reforms. This was rather a naïve way to approach reforms in a conservative society like Afghanistan. Second, he was influenced strongly by his mentor and father-in-law Mahmud-e-Tarzi, who also served as his foreign minister. Since Tarzi lived most of his adult life in Turkey, he could not fully appreciate the complexities of Afghan society. That is how, his advice to Amanullah Khan in regard to the reforms proved inadequate. 5.4.6 Economic Reforms Amanullah’s economic reforms gave special preference to agricultural development. A new class of peasants came into existence after government lands were sold to them at low prices. The first agricultural school was opened. Infrastructural development was pursued. Significant communication projects were undertaken throughout his reign. New roads were built and telephone and telegraph services expanded. Afghanistan became member of the International Postal Union. The first civil aviation program was inaugurated in 1928. A Franco-German firm was hired to build railroads and began surveying in 1928. In that way, the rapid transport of commodities within Afghanistan and with neighboring countries could be facilitated. In 1923, a law was passed that encouraged investment in small industries by giving small entrepreneurs tax cuts and other such benefits. Merchants received government protection and started joint-stock companies. The protection consisted of 21 My grandfather judge Abdul Hakim Khan told us (my mother and sister, and me) this story one night in the summer of 1980. I was thirteen years old at that time. ensuring the capital that the merchants invested in the joint-stock companies, granting of a semi-monopoly to the merchants in the imports of commodities, and reducing taxation on the import of industrial goods such as machinery and factories. In 1928, he had purchased small factories in Europe that arrived in Afghanistan well after his abdication. Although Amanullah Khan aimed to industrialize the country, his goal did not materialize. Gregorian (1969) claims: “Though Amanullah had some new workshops built, notably soap and match factories, and imported large quantities of tools from Japan and Germany, little genuine economic progress was made during his reign, primarily because he followed no systematic plan for industrial development. Machines of all kinds were ordered, but when they arrived, no one knew what to do with them: Afghanistan became a mausoleum of unused machinery and factories” (Gregorian, 1969:252-253). Gregorian is partly correct in his claims that Amanullah Khan did not follow any systematic industrial plan, and the fact that Afghanistan became a mausoleum of unused machinery and factories. First, Amanullah Khan had taken on many responsibilities of which industrialization was one. He was trying to modernize all aspects of Afghan society; for this reason, he could not pay sufficient attention to all of his reforms. Furthermore, prior to industrialization, the basic infrastructure had to be put in place and that took time. Second, most of the factories and machinery he bought in from Europe arrived in Afghanistan after his abdication. The subsequent rebellion and anarchy prioritized basic law and order for Afghan officials, and industrialization remained as a sideline objective. Gregorian is not entirely correct in claiming that Afghanistan had become a mausoleum of unused factories during the reign of Amanullah Khan. If any factories were left unused while Amanullah Khan was in power, it was due to the continuous instability of the country (e.g., local revolts) that drew his attention. As to the support infrastructure, Amanullah Khan hired mostly German and technicians. Meanwhile, Afghans students were sent to study abroad; it was hoped that they would take over the responsibilities then in the hands of foreign technicians. It is almost impossible to bring industrial development to a traditional society like Afghanistan while preoccupied with transforming all aspects of society without considering the various endogenous impediments (such as the tribal structure of society and the two value systems) and exogenous impediments (strategic location, foreign interests, namely Britain). That was precisely what contributed to Amanullah’s inability to industrialize the country: “two hands in too many pots”. For example, due to his radical social, political and religious reforms, his opponents used even economic projects to alienate the masses from him. Among the factories that were bought, was a soap factory. Anti-reform elements and British agents spread rumors that human bones were used in making soap. Most of his economic reforms as well as some social cultural reforms depended on the state treasury, which was virtually empty when he took office. Thus, to raise revenue he undertook certain measures without considering their potential consequences. When Amanullah Khan assumed the throne, he inherited a treasury with only half million rupees. Then, the independence war consumed them, and Amanullah Khan was left with an empty treasury. In order to raise revenue for the state, he levied cash payments for taxes instead of in-kind. In addition, he determined a uniform standard of measurement unit called Jareeb. A Jareeb is about half an acre. This unit was used to determine the size of agricultural land an individual had and assign a tax proportional to his land holdings. On this basis, the surveying responsibilities in the provinces were bestowed upon the provincial governors. Thus, the areas that were surveyed had to pay in cash, and lands that were not yet surveyed were paying in kind, which the government sold at market rate for cash. Cattle tax was also changed into cash at the current rate. The commercial tax constituted a significant portion of the state revenue; tax on domestic trade was substantially less than on imported products. Tax on foreign trade was regulated in such a manner that taxes on luxury and unnecessary items were heavy. The reason Amir Amanullah Khan taxed imported luxuries was to keep the social practices of people simple and to prevent them from exaggerated and wasteful expenditure and prevent the waste of foreign currency that could be used on productive goods. However, the tax on the import of machinery for manufacturing was light in order to stimulate industrialization. 5.5 Endogenous and Exogenous Factors Both endogenous and exogenous factors impeded Amanullah Khan’s success. 5.5.1 Exogenous Factors Exogenously, two powers, Britain and Russia had opportunistically damaged Amanullah’s credibility at home. In the north of Afghanistan, the Bolsheviks were fighting against the Bismachis22 supported by Amanullah Khan. The Bolsheviks’ success against the Muslims in Central Asia was becoming apparent, especially after 22 The Basmachis were the Muslim freedom fighters of Central Asia who fought against Russians in order to avenge the occupation of their lands. These lands are today’s newly independent republics of Central Asia. the death of Enver Pasha (the leader some of the Bismacchis), which also marked the end for Amanullah Khan’s wish to play an active role in the future of the Muslims in Central Asia. British agents used different types of propaganda to discredit Amanullah Khan (Ghubar, 1967: 805-6). Several factors stimulated the British. First, their defeat and significant loss of men and materials in Afghanistan humiliated the British monarchy. An independent Afghanistan with a hostile monarch posed the danger of instability for India because Amanullah could provide support for the Indian independence movement, both militarily and politically. British anxiety intensified, when Hazrat Sahib of Shor-Bazaar23, at the beginning of Amanullah’s reign, in his sermon endorsed Amanullah Khan as the Khalifa of the Muslim world because at the time he was the only independent monarch in the Muslim world. Muslims all over India would rise if a call for jihad were made. This would have proved disastrous for British hegemony in the sub-continent. Moreover, Britain opposed Amanullah’s development efforts, first, because they did not want Amanullah’s government strengthened, second, Amanullah wanted the Germans to be involved in the development projects in Afghanistan which would have been a rival for Britain in the region. Therefore, it was in the interest of Britain for Amanullah to be replaced by someone else that would have friendly relations with British India. The method of their infiltration was to dwell on the weakness of the Afghan people, namely their devotion to Islam. The only people who could exacerbate instability for Amanullah Khan had to be the British agents, because they had the religious authority to change people’s opinion regarding the King and his reforms. Three events are mentioned by Ahmad (1990) that point to Britain’s involvement. First, when Amir Amanullah Khan was on his tour in England, a suspicious meeting of alienated religious scholars, allegedly wanting to depose Amanullah Khan took place in Dara-e-Ismail Khan, which is a territory within the British controlled tribal belt defined as Pashtunistan (Ahmad, 1990:209). Since the meeting was organized under British influence, suspicion becomes an unavoidable reality. In the meeting, Ahmad (1990) claims, among other issues Amanullah’s dethroning was discussed, this is why the issue of the meeting has been brought up by some authors such as Ahmad. Second, when the grandfather of Amanullah Khan died, the British made contingency plans for succession. While they were busy finding a trusted successor, Afghan chiefs exiled to India by Abdul Rahman, “were kept under strict vigilance”. The British had smuggled exiled Afghan Prince Abdul Karim Khan to the tribal area, and later Prince Umar Khan son of Amir Sher Ali Khan (a former Afghan King) from India in 1929, in order to create a rival to Amanullah Khan. The Afghan government warned Britain about intervening in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, but they disregarded the warnings (Ahmad, 1990:226). The British intrusion in the internal affairs of Afghanistan was illegal according to the treaty in 1921 signed between Afghanistan and Britain. Third, the famous T. E. Lawrence who successfully instigated Arab revolts against the Turks was in the tribal belt on the eastern side of Durand under the cover of a pilot of the Royal Air Force. However, at some point in 1929, he (Lawrence) entered Eastern Afghanistan under the cloak of a mullah and intensified the uprisings through his malignant propaganda (Ghoobar, 1967: 814; Ahmad, 1990; Gregorian, 1969). 23 A Muslim religious leader, who belonged to the mystical family of Sirhind, India Another incident that deserves mentioning is the disregard the British had for Amanullah Khan. While Amanullah Khan and the Queen were in Italy, the British distributed photos of the Queen riding unveiled in the royal carriage in different parts of Afghanistan. The press had not even reported this information when British representative Sir R. Graham wrote in his report that “the Queen of Afghanistan and ladies of her suite were in open carriages and unveiled”(Ahmad, 1974:117). Britain later claimed that a staff member of Amanullah Khan had committed this irresponsible deed when in fact that person was in Italy, accompanying the British representative. The British had to go out of their way to make mention of the “unveiled ladies”, which illustrates their ulterior motives and animosities toward Amanullah Khan and their secret designs. Pictures of Queen Soraya which were published in British and Indian Journals were circulated in the Shinwari region, in Eastern Afghanistan, to intensify the uprising there. In fact, a picture was especially prepared in which the head of Queen Soraya was attached through montage to a half-naked European woman and was circulated in the tribal areas in order to intensify their rage. The British policy in the tribal areas on the eastern side of the Durand Line added to the loss of credibility for Amanullah Khan among the tribes at home as well as those on the eastern side of the Durand Line. First, he did not allow his forces while fighting the British in 1919 to cross over the Durand Line in spite of the insistence of his commanders. This compromised the freedom of the tribes on the eastern side of the Durand Line. Second, Amanullah Khan lost credibility by excluding the Pashtun tribes in the Rawalpindi agreement in 1919 and 1921. People blamed him for their misery. This decision of Amanullah Khan was in violation of the code of Pashtunwali, which makes it mandatory for Afghans to fight for any loss of land to any enemy (Ghubar, 1963). Furthermore, after the war of independence, while signing the Treaty of Lahore with Britain in 1921, Amanullah failed to secure the right of the Afghan tribes in the tribal belt either. Hence, Amanullah was neither able to secure autonomy for the annexed tribal areas, nor amnesty for the tribes (in the annexed tribal region) that participated in the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Since the participation of these tribes proved to be the decisive factor in the British defeat, consequently, the British decided to get even with the tribes, and assaulted the Masud tribe through air and artillery bombardments. The tribes responded by killing British officers and captured a number of Britains including a female. Amanullah granted asylum to the tribesmen. As a retaliatory response to him, the British detained his weapons en route to Afghanistan after they arrived in Bombay in 1923. These weapons were in British possession until March 1924, the date when they were finally allowed to proceed to Afghanistan. Amanullah Khan’s inaction for the fellow Afghans on the eastern side of the Durand Line damaged his leadership position at home (Ahmad, 1990:195-199). 5.5.2 Endogenous Factors Endogenously, Amanullah Khan’s radical approaches to modernization were hindered by the complexity of Afghan society, which Amanullah Khan had not fully appreciated. This complexity can be illustrated in a quote from his grandfather Amir Abdul Rahman Khan’s biography. “My sons and successors should not try to introduce reforms of any kind in such a hurry as to set the people against their ruler, and they must bear in mind that in establishing a constitutional government introducing more lenient laws, and modeling education upon the system of western universities. They must adopt all this gradually as the people become accustomed to the idea of modern innovations. So they will not abuse the privileges and reforms given to them” (Shah, 1933.65) Unlike his grandfather Amir Abdul Rahmen Khan, who used his strong army to suppress clerical and tribal powers, Amanullah Khan conceived the relations between sovereign and subjects from a patriotic, humanistic and non-coercive angle and envisioned a utopian future that he thought could be achieved in an accelerated manner. Had Amanullah relied on the army, as did his grandfather, he might not have had to deal with continuous insurgencies. Understanding of patriotism in a utopian or ideal manner compromised his judgment. Moreover, he did not take into account the social-historical realities of Afghan society, ingrained for centuries that could not be changed with the mere proclamation of reforms. Even after the Khost rebellion, Amanullah Khan believed he enjoyed the affection of his subjects. Amanullah Khan’s character served as an important endogenous factor. He was very confident of himself and was very susceptible to flattery. The suffering of his country and status of Muslims all over the world, the backing he received from all the segments of Afghan society in the Third Anglo-Afghan war and finally the support of the Ulema (religious scholars), Hazrat-e-Shor-Bazaar in particular, gave Amanullah Khan the confidence to modernize. Furthermore, all of the above factors coupled with his belief in the greatness of Afghanistan gave him the belief that he could transform Afghanistan despite endogenous and exogenous impediments. Other endogenous impediments included opposition from the religious and tribal forces to his Westernized measures in social and cultural domains. This is not to mean that the tribes disagreed and the rest of the country agreed with his reforms. In fact, the non-Pashtun inhabitants such as Tajiks, who were not organized in tribes like the Pushtuns, exhibited their discontent with the liberal measures of Amanullah Khan as much as did the Pashtuns. In his interaction with the tribes and religious elements, Amanullah Khan relied on Islamic principles only and discounted folk Islam, the Pushtunwali principles and other local customs. Amanullah Khan, it appears, did not appreciate the interdependence of the two value systems of the Afghan society. He thought that if he relied exclusively on Islamic values, people would not object. In Afghanistan, at times, conflict between the teachings of Islam and Pashtunwali occurs; local scholars in such situation intervene and resolve the differences. For example, if two persons are convicted of adultery either on the basis of a confession or the testimony of two eyewitnesses, then by Islamic law, they are punishable by death only if both individuals are already married. Conversely, according to the Pashtunwali code, if someone accuses someone’s wife or sister of adultery, the husband or brother of the female kills the female, the male accused of adultery, and anyone who made the remarks. Amanullah Khan also discounted and challenged the influences and interests of some “sacred” individuals, who were mystical figures, the so-called pirs, who were holly in the eyes of the Afghans, due to their Arabic decent, and who abused these privileges to control ordinary citizens. Since Afghans are devout Muslims, they are more prone to manipulation by anyone, claiming to be from the Arabian Peninsula and supposedly a descendant of the Prophet (B.P.U.H.). As a result, if they took a position on something, the majority of the population would follow their proclamation blindly. Conclusion It is appropriate at this point to revisit the two hypotheses postulated in the first chapter. With respect to the first hypothesis, the imposition of Western culture on traditions of Afghanistan points to the superimposition of a framework that did not have any relationship to local values and traditions and even perhaps to socioeconomic development. In fact, aspects of the reforms went against the social aspiration to the point of stimulating rebellions that caused Amanullah’s downfall and the end of his development drive. For example, Amanullah’s attempts to institutionalize Western attire served no clear productive purpose but certainly a symbolic function, which undermined the established tradition of Afghan society. Furthermore, social and religious reforms struck at the core values of Afghan society. Especially the so-called women’s liberation attempts by the king and the queen offended the overwhelming majority of the population and alienated people. With respect to the second hypothesis, the approach to development used, in fact, represented interests that were quite foreign to Afghanistan, in that they were related to the struggle of foreign powers to manipulate and control Afghanistan for their own interests. This hypothesis can be addressed at this point in the context of Anglo-Russian rivalry. At the time of Amanullah’s reign, European hegemony was dominant. This dominance was maintained at the cost of the underdevelopment of the Asian and African countries. Hence, European powers strengthened their capitalistic greed further with the resources of different parts of the world that they colonized. Since Europeans were the only people in the world with high technological advances, (apart from the distant and indifferent Americans) high levels of development and resources, countries like Afghanistan did not have much choice but to rely on the European approaches of development. Up to 1919, Afghanistan was kept isolated due to the competition of the two world giants. Therefore, Britain’s competition with Russia in maintaining their hegemony in the 19th as well as early 20th centuries and subsequent competition between Britain and Germany influenced Afghanistan’s developmental approach. Amanullah viewed the entire European experience as a necessity for the development of Afghanistan. Therefore, he viewed development as involving Westernization only. The two hypotheses thus point to broader sources of underdevelopment. To sum up, the urgency for development in Afghanistan was correctly sensed by Amir Amanullah Khan; however, he had not, on the one hand, fully appreciated the animosity of the British and the subsequent unrest instigated by them. On the other hand, Amanullah Khan disregarded the rigid tribal structure of Afghanistan and ignored its value systems. In addition, Amanullah’s personality, including the influence of Mahmood Tarzi (his father in law), made the success of his modernization efforts highly unfeasible. This important period of Afghan history ended with the abdication of Amir Amanullah Khan “Ghazi” and the conquest of Kabul by the forces of the bandit, Bacha-e-Saqau (Habibullah) in January of 1929. Chapter Six VI. The Anarchy of Habibullah (Bacha-e-Saqao) from January 1929 to October 1929 6.1 Introduction This period of Afghan history that lasted from January 1929 to October 1929 is characterized by reactions to the Amanullah’s reforms and their complete reversal by the bandit King, Bacha-e-Saqao “son of the water carrier”, whose real name was Habibullah. This period also constitutes the first wave of reactions to modernization attempts since 1919. The reactions during this period resulted from the interaction of the four endogenous and exogenous factors I alluded to in the previous chapters. The British manipulated the radical reforms of Amanullah Khan in instigating rebellions throughout the country. Bacha was used as an instrument by the religious establishment, with the instigation of the British, to topple Amanullah Khan. Otherwise, Bacha-e-Saqao did not have the caliber to serve as the head of the state. That is why, after his usefulness ran out, Bacha lost the support of the religious establishment, the former government officials as well as that of the British. Subsequently, the religious establishment, the former government officials, as well as Britain rendered their support for the entry of General Mohammad Nader Khan to the political scene in Afghanistan at the end of 1929. 6.2 Background Different segments of the population had different rationales for discontent and rebellion. However, all of them were impacted by religious, social-political and even military reforms. A local bandit of Kalakan (a village about 30 miles north of Kabul) posed the most serious threat to Amanullah Khan’s reign. Bacha-e-Saqao was originally an illiterate servant in the house of one of the chiefs of Kalakan. In 1920, he served as a conscript in the model battalion.24 While still a conscript, he started robbing travelers with a few of his friends. On Fridays, which is a Muslim holiday, when Bacha would be out with his friends, they would resort to robbery in order to have extra cash for spending in teahouses. At some point in 1924, while serving as a reserve, Bacha-e-Saqao was recalled to the model battalion to fight the rebellion in the Khost district of Gardaiz province in Southern Afghanistan. After the victory of the government forces over the rebels in Khost, Bacha went to Jalal Abad, a province in Eastern Afghanistan to visit his friends. On the way back to his village of Kalakan, Bacha confronted a small band of thieves, who wanted to rob him of his gun; he fought them off by himself, killing two and confiscated their rifles. He went to Kabul and he turned the rifles over the Ministry of War (Ghubar, 1967:815). Subsequently, he left Kabul and went to the province of Kapisa, north of Kabul, where he formed a group of bandits, and started looting. Every time, the government dispatched its security forces to arrest them, they escaped to nearby mountains. Finally, the governor of Kabul, Ahmad Ali Khan assumed personally the investigation into the robberies and lootings of Bacha-e-Saqao. This was no coincidence. He did this to persuade Bacha to join forces with another well-known bandit, in the conspiracy against the government of Amanullah Khan. Governor Ali Khan advised Bacha to leave for British India, where one of his countryman, Khwaja Babu Jan, would host him. Ghubar (1967:816) claims that it was 24 The model battalion was a modern army unit, modeled after the Turkish army structure by the Turkish advisers. known at that time that Khwaja Babu Jan served in the British intelligence service (CID) The governor instructed Bacha to return to Kabul when he were needed. In India, Bacha worked as a tea-seller (Ahmad, 1990:238). Later, he was implicated in a burglary charge near Peshawar and imprisoned in about 1927 for eleven months, however, shortly thereafter, he was released under a cloud of mystery after serving a fourth of his sentence (Ghubar, 1967:821). Back in Kalakan, he organized a group of robbers again and started robbing people, convoys and government facilities. At some point, he robbed the treasury, which was being moved from the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in the distant north to the capital, Kabul. The government dispatched forces to capture him but he found out ahead of time and escaped. Finally, Bacha’s robberies turned into a public threat. Meanwhile, opposition to modernization had increased. The onset of most of the rebellions needed events and individuals to serve as instigators. In Southern as well as Eastern Afghanistan, the conduct of irresponsible government administrators alienated many people by imposing the will of the state on the traditions of society through the administrative injunctions they received from Kabul. In most cases, an incident would serve as a catalyst to surface existing disenchanted feelings and spark unrest. This was the case in Khost (capital of the province of Gardaiz in South Afghanistan), where the first rebellion broke out. The commissioner of Khost unveiled the content of the Nizamnamah (the constitution of the country) to mullahs and other locals. The mullahs responded that sending girls to school unveiled was against the teachings of the Koran. The commissioner responded that Koran was an obsolete ancient book and was not in line with modern life (Gregorian, 1969: 255). Such a statement of disregard for Islamic principles sparked rebellion against Amanullah’s government. On the same token, the rebellion in Eastern Afghanistan by the Shinwari tribe was sparked by the lack of consideration on the part of the provincial governor for the grievances of the Shinwari tribe against the Suleiman-Khel tribe1, which had mistakenly shot dead members of the Shinwari tribe. The provincial governor released the members of the Suleiman-Khel tribe, after the tribesmen insisted that the death of the members of Shinwari tribe was not intentional but rather was an accident. The provincial governor released the defendants without consultation with the victim tribe. This sparked the existing flames of disenchantment among the Shinwari tribe against the reign of Amanullah Khan. The failure of the provincial governor served as the catalyst for the inception of unrest among Shinwaris. The continuation of the Shinwari’ revolt was ensured by the insecurities brought about in the north by Bacha and his bandit flock. That is, before the recruits could go to Eastern Afghanistan to fight the Shinwari tribe, they had to come to Kabul in order to register. The trip to Kabul was dangerous; the recruits did not want to take the trip to Kabul because the unsafe conditions brought about by Bacah and his bandit flock. At some point, the government realized that the reason Bacha was able to escape was the collaboration of the residents of Kalakan. The government decided to disarm all the residents of Kalakan. (Most Afghans own rifles for their safety; the rifle serves as a man’s jewelry). The Kalakani people resented the news and their chiefs expressed their strong discontent to the district commissioner. 1 A large majority of this tribe is settled in southwestern Afghanistan, but a segment of this tribe is nomads, which was the group that had a conflict with the Shinwari tribe. Finally, due to the need for recruits in the eastern province to fight against the Shinwari rebels, and the fact that Bacha was becoming invincible, the government saw no choice but to negotiate with him. He was offered pardon in return for his promise to stop looting; he accepted it. However, after a short time, Bacha continued robbing until Kabul asked the provincial chief administrator to settle the issue with Bacha at any cost. Negotiation with Bacha started again; the government offered Bacha and his associates amnesty in return for cooperation and bestowed the rank of Brigadier on Bacha and his right handman (Ghubar, 1967:821-2). The situation became more tense for the government when the Akhund-zada (descendant of religious scholars) of Tagab, a district north of Kabul, showed his discontent and bitter opposition to the King’s reforms. He was asked by the government officials to express his support for Amanullah’s reforms. Since AkhundZada carried tremendous religious authority, his opinion could change people’s attitude towards Amanullah; instead, Akhund-Zada expressed his neutrality to the northern administrator and chose not to endorse Amanullah’s reforms. Meanwhile, the northern administrator invited Tagab elders to request them (the elders) for recruits to be sent to the eastern front, they agreed reluctantly. After that agreement, thousands of religious leaders from Tagab came to the local commissioner’s office and exhibited their strong protest against the reforms of the government. Shortly thereafter, Bacha played the deciding factor when chiefs of Kalakan proclaimed him King. Bacha was a convenient instrument used by the opposition to topple Amanullah Khan. It is appropriate to ask who brought all these forces of discontent together. The British designed the entire conspiracy. Bacha served the role of a delivery boy for the opposition. When Bacha conquered Kabul, his actions and stories exposed Britain’s involvement in the conspiracy against Amanullah Khan. First, when Bacha entered Kabul with his forces, he gave his assurance to the British diplomats from the outside of the Embassy’s gate that they need not to worry about their well-being. Second, subsequently, when Bacha was wounded in the battle against Amanullah Khan’s forces inside Kabul, the British dispatched their medical team and took Bacha inside the British Mission, where he was provided with emergency medical care. Since Bacha was an illiterate person, the British diplomats referred to him by the title of Ghazi while he underwent medical treatment there. The term Ghazi refers to an individual who has fought a holy war against infidels. The reason the British referred to Bacha as Ghazi was to motivate him to continue fighting against Amanullah Khan’s soldiers. The third factor, however, attests to the systematic organization of the conspiracy. When Bacha-e-saqao became King, he told the story of his return from British India to a gathering of his followers, which removes any doubt of British involvement in the conspiracy against Amanullah Khan. Bacha went on saying that when he entered Afghanistan, he went to a mosque to pray the Friday Prayer. After praying there, Bacha went to the Imam or mullah to ask him to pray for his safety on the journey to his village. While he was leaving the mosque, the mullah called Bacha: “on your way, you will see a tree, and dig the foot of the tree; whatever you find there is yours” (Ghubar, 1967:816). After Bacha did as instructed by the mullah, he found four rifles and one thousand rupees there. Bacha continued his tale by saying that after he reached the province of Laghman in Eastern Afghanistan and was heading north toward his village, a mullah (whom Bacha had never seen before) ordered Bacha to do Jihad against Amanullah Khan. The day Bacha arrived to his village coincided with the celebration of Afghan Independence Day. However, he went to Paghman, a vacation spot 10 Kilometers northwest from Kabul, and came across another mullah, who ordered him to assassinate Amanullah Khan, who was viewing a program at Paghman’s theater. Bacha, however, refused to do so because he claimed that the Independence Day does not belong to the King only, rather to all the Afghans; hence, he did not want to ruin their celebration. After he returned to the village of Kohdahman, located between Kabul and Kalakan, another mullah repeated the order of the previous mullah, namely to assassinate Amanullah Khan. Finally, when Bacha went to Tagab in the Kapesa province north of Kabul, he met the religious figure Akhundzada of Tagab and a government general, who ordered Bacha to assassinate Amanullah Khan. The British used Bacha as a vehicle for toppling Amanullah Khan and their conspiracy to elevate him to the throne of Kabul succeeded. 6.3 Analysis, Economic Implications Bacha-e-Saqao reversed all of Amanullah’s reforms after conquering Kabul. He abolished compulsory conscription2 and taxation and closed down schools. Bach-eSaqao did not have the needed sophistication to formally go about rescinding Amanullah Khan’s reforms but a group of former Amanullah officials, who opposed Amanullah’s radical reforms, publicized a joint declaration signed by them on behalf of Bacha-e-Saqao. The declaration condemned Amanullah’s reforms as being anti- Islamic and anti-traditional. At the end of the official document, Bacha-e-Saqao proclaimed himself King. Soon thereafter, the Afghan people realized that this man did not have the caliber to reign as a monarch. Uprisings occurred against Bacha’s rule. In fact, the Shinwari tribe did not accept Bacha’s government from the outset, and continued their feuds with other neighboring tribes. The reason for this was Bacha’s ethnic background as a Tajik; Pashtuns could not accept a Tajik as their king. The economic effects of anarchy were as debilitating as its social and political aspects. Bacha himself felt the consequence of his ignorance when he realized that the treasury of the government emptied because he elevated the pay of his associates many terms over, generously granting money to his fellow Tajiks. To make matters worse, he had already abolished taxes. He then reinstated taxes, and sent his soldiers to collect them by grabbing people’s wealth in order to cover the expenses of his army. In order to raise revenue, Bacha resorted to another method, forcing wealthy Tajik merchants to contribute to his treasury. With the devaluation of the Afghani, Bacha decided to issue new coins. However, that did not help either because the new coins did not have any value. Due to the economic deterioration of all sectors of society, the metal mines were also idle; hence, the scarcity of metal forced Bacha to make his coins out of leather. This, however, did not add up to much. Thus, after the exhaustion of force and coercion as the method of looting the wealthy, the bandit administration offered high rates of interest to persuade the wealthy merchants to invest in the government’s treasury; however, such appeals did not fool the merchants of Kabul. 2 All men age 21 years were required to serve in the military. Since the government was composed of bandits, no one could trust thieves with their money. In addition, the trade routes between East and West Afghanistan ceased and the northern trade route was endangered as well due to instability. The instability throughout the country impeded trade, and debilitated sources of income for the population. Hence, those, who depended on rents from trading their commodities such as agricultural produce and dairy products, could not do so any longer and did not have any other means to make ends meet. Consequently, prices for food products rose and the economic situation deteriorated. The economic deterioration affected diverse segments of population. The scarcity of foodstuff elevated prices. The city population could not afford the hike in prices. Peasants and cattle owners also ceased to have revenues due to the hindrance of commerce in the country. Thus, the foodstuff peasants had produced, spoiled and wasted; hence, the livelihood of peasants and cattle owners suffered tremendously. Meanwhile, merchants lost their sources of income and village khans became anxious, because the khans were the feudal landlords, whose revenues were impeded by the lack of commerce. Even the mullahs felt threatened due to the uncertainty of the future and their own economic stability. The expropriation of people’s wealth and property further threatened people and alienated them from Bacha’s government. Since Bacha and his men were bandits, the only avenue, they could rely on was looting and forced annexation of people’s property. This practice is not only condemned in Islam but also is an insult of tremendous proportions according to the code of Pashtunwali. Anyone that enters someone’s home by force is to be stopped by any means including death according to the values of Afghan society. Therefore, a looting arrangement that calls itself government and loots its subjects is nothing more than a paradox. The victims ranged from the common worker to wealthy merchants, former officials of Amanullah Khan, students and intellectuals. Furthermore, the bandit king dissolved some ministries of government such as the ministry of education and the ministry of justice. His argument for the dissolution of these ministries was that they were not necessary and supposedly were an “unwelcome infringement on the power of the religious establishment” (Gregorian, 1969:276). Hence, the responsibility for the courts and schools was assigned to the ulema or religious scholars. Since Bacha-e-Saqau was illiterate, some of the former officials of Amanullah Khan’s government who had joined the bandit king attempted to assist him in order to give the bandit king legitimacy (Ghubar, 1967: 827-8). The nobility and the previous government officials felt threatened by such an ignorant individual and his followers. Hence, the nobility sent Ahmad Shah Khan, one of the nobles, to France to ask General Mohammad Nader Khan to return to Afghanistan and put an end to the anarchy. After General Nader Khan accepted the invitation of the nobles and left France for India, he disembarked in Bombay. On his way from Bombay to Peshawar (capital of the North West Frontier of Pakistan), Nader Khan had a stop in the Lahore railway station, where thousands of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs welcomed him. Nader Khan declared to the crowd that he would continue his fight until Amanullah returned to the throne in Kabul (Ahmad, 1990:249). It is worth mentioning that this commitment of Nader Khan haunted him during his short- lived reign, which will be discussed in the following pages.3 Once Nader Khan reached Peshawar, he decided to go to Khost in Southern Afghanistan in order to solicit the support of the tribes there. He made a wise decision to go to Khost because he wanted a solid base for his campaign against Bacha, namely wining the support of the tribes there. He knew that tribes constituted the foundation of Afghan society; hence, by having their support, Nader Khan felt confident in his struggle against Bacha. Nader Khan arrived in Afghanistan at the end of February of 1929. On March 19 of the same year, he challenged the legitimacy of Bacha’s rule and demanded, according to Afghan tradition, that he submit to a national Jerga or counsel consisting of tribal chiefs. Bacha did not have the support of the tribes. However, religious leaders had already bestowed upon him the title, of savior of the religion of Mohammad (BPUH) which gave legitimacy to his rule. Once Bacha received Nader Khan’s demands, he became angry, imprisoned Nader Khan’s relatives and confiscated their property. Nader Khan, and his brothers, who returned from France with Nader Khan, campaigned vigorously to secure the allegiance of the tribes. In the beginning, Nader Khan had a difficult time securing the support of the tribes. First, Nader Khan did not have the money to organize himself an army; that is why he needed the support of tribes in organizing a tribal army. Second, the various tribes were not in good terms with each other; hence, agreement on the same issue was close to impossible. However, the tribes put their differences aside, because their Pashtunwali did not allow them to let a bandit rule their land. After Nader Khan 3 According to the code of Pashtunwali, an afghan does not breaks his word However, when Nader Khan became king, supporters of Amanullah Khan confronted him about his promise rethrone Amanullah. received tribal support, he carried out a number of military missions against Bacha’s forces but failed. In June of 1929, Sher Agha, the brother of the Hazrat Sahib of ShorBazaar (a member of the mystic family of Mujaddidi that carried a lot of weight among Afghans), threw his support behind Nader Khan’s campaign. Since Sher Agha represented the religious establishment, his support added the needed boost to Nader Khan’s campaign. Nader Khan was ready to embark on the fifth and last attempt to defeat Bacha. On September 25, 1929, with the help of his brothers he started a three-pronged assault. Bacha’s forces were defeated on October 6. On the same day, a tribal army led by Nader Khan’s brother Shah Wali Khan and Allah Nawaz Khan, chief of the Wazir tribe, after breaking Bacha’s last line of defense, entered Kabul. On October 13, the fortress where Bacha had taken Nader khan’s family members hostage, fell and Bacha escaped. On October 15, Nader Khan arrived in Kabul and was welcomed by an enthusiastic crowd. Nader Khan did not have financial resources to reward the tribes that helped him defeat Bacha because Bacha and his flock of thieves had already looted the government treasury. Subsequently, the Wazir tribal army of twelve thousand plundered the city, including government buildings and businesses (Gregorian, 1969:285-286). Most of the tribes that helped Nader Khan were from Southern and some from Western Afghanistan. The Wazir tribe, however, is located on the eastern side of the Durand Line. Meanwhile, Nader Khan extended amnesty to Bacha in return for surrender. Subsequently, Bacha surrendered; he, his brother and close associates were hanged. They were told that the pardon covered the cost he imposed on the Royal Family, but could not be extended to the crimes he, Bacha, had committed against the rest of the population. On October 16, 1929, General Nader Khan in the Dilkusha palace, one of the lavish palaces, expressed his gratitude and appreciation to all those that supported him. Meanwhile, he referred to the good services that Amanullah Khan had rendered the fatherland, and referred to his own poor health indicating that he did not want the throne. Instead, he expressly stated that he would support anyone the national Jerga (tribal assembly) selected. At that juncture, the notables insisted that Nader himself should become the new King. In fact, the tribesmen brandished their rifles, shouting that Nader Khan must accept the nomination, otherwise, they, the tribes, would leave Kabul. Subsequently, Nader Khan accepted the responsibility to serve as King of Afghanistan. At this point, Amanullah Khan’s supporters expressed their disenchantment with Nader Khan, claiming that Nader Khan’s rule did not have legitimacy, alleging that Nader received the support of the tribes based on his promise to fight for Amanullah Khan’s restoration to the throne. This issue became a loom of internal conflict between Nader Khan and Amanullah Khan’s supporters, especially with the Charkhi family (whose name stems from an area in Logar province, Charkh-e Logar), which was a strong supporter of Amanullah Khan’s return to the throne. It is worth mentioning that a member of the Charkhi family assassinated Nader Khan in 1933. Nader Khan’s success in defeating Bacha’s forces and the subsequent execution of Bacha and his close associates marked the end of anarchy brought in by him and his flock of thieves. Conclusion The reactions of this period contributed to the underdevelopment of Afghanistan, through the reversal of Amanullah’s reforms. It is appropriate to ascertain whether the two hypotheses postulated in the first chapter conform to this chapter or not. Since the period of Bacha-e-Saqau consisted of reactions against Amanullah Khan’s reforms, Bacha’s anarchy could only be discussed within the context of Amanullah Khan’s reforms. The failure of Amanullah Khan’s reforms materialized in the post-abdication through the anarchy brought in by Bacha-e-Saqao. The events occurring at the onset of anarchy seems to agree with each of the two hypotheses. Amanullah Khan’s introduction of Western culture disregarded the Islamic and social values (Pashtunwali) of Afghanistan; hence, the reforms provided the bases of legitimacy for the uprisings. Furthermore, the radical nature of reforms gave the British the opportunity to intervene against Amanullah. The intervention of British agents and their systematic campaign of misinformation accelerated the onset of Bacha’s rule, which is characterized by underdevelopment. Amanullah Khan wanted to modernize Afghanistan to ensure its independence and prevent any future threat to the country’s territorial integrity. However, he thought that the country needed a preparation first, by introducing foreign social-cultural values opposed to the traditional values of the Afghan society. The British did not want any development. Amanullah’s introduction of social-cultural reforms provided a very convenient excuse for the British to implement their secret designs. Hence, the hypotheses suggest the failure of this development push by the intervention of endogenous and exogenous factors. Endogenously, the endorsement of Bacha’ reign by religious figures legitimated his rule in carrying out plunder and violence that furthered the underdevelopment of Afghanistan. In addition, the alliance of former Amanullah administrators as well as elements of nobility attributed legitimacy to Bacha’s actions, which afflicted serious costs on the economic, social-cultural, educational and political systems in Afghanistan. Individual thieves served as Bacha’s officers, whom were given infinite authority in their actions. Therefore, whatever did not make sense to them based on their limited world-view, they would eliminate and condemn. The Pashtun tribes of the Shinwari and others did not accept the bandit’s rule from the outset because Bacha’s actions, according to Pashtunwali, were considered cowardly. Meanwhile, the strategic significance of Afghanistan served as a crucial factor in attracting British attention in the first place; however, with their subsequent failure in Afghanistan, Britain wanted to get even by conspiring against Amanullah Khan and supporting the bandit king, Bacha-e-Saqau. The lesson learned from this chapter points to the significant role that societal values such as Islam and Pashtunwali and social-historical realities played in the socioeconomic as well as political development of Afghanistan. Disregard of religious and social values of Afghan society, turned a bandit into a “trusted” ally of the religious establishment, and thus provided opportunity for him to become the king of Afghanistan. The reversal of all that was achieved during the reign of Amanullah Khan contributed to the prolongation of underdevelopment in Afghanistan. Modern schools for boys and girls were closed down; laboratories, libraries and museums were looted. Ancient books and manuscripts were either destroyed or sold for pennies. In fact, for about three pennies, one could buy as many books as one could carry. A complete state of ignorance prevailed. Bacha viewed students as his secret enemies, and those that opposed him were beaten, tied to a canon’s mouth and blown to pieces, or starved to death. Finally, this period of reactions and anarchy ended with the conquest of Kabul by the forces of General Nader Khan led by his brother Marshal Shawali Khan, and the execution of Bacha-e-Saqao and his associates in October of 1929. VII. Nader Khan’s Reign the Years 1929-1933 7.1 Introduction This period of Afghan history lasted from October 1929, when General Nader Khan became king, to November 1933, when he was assassinated. Furthermore, this period can be characterized partly by pacification in terms of bringing law and order to the country and partly by reactions to reforms as well as the reaffirmation of what Bacha’s administration had already reversed. In order to satisfy the conservatives, Nader Khan reaffirmed the measures taken under Bacha. Moreover, he went further by systematically reversing all the reforms implemented or proposed by Amanullah Khan. The reversal of reforms satisfied the clerics, whose endorsement added legitimacy to Nader Khan’s reign. This in turn contributed to the onset of law and order. 7.2 Background Although Nader Khan put an end to Bacha’s anarchy, he was not satisfied until he reversed all of Amanullah Khan’s reforms, including those that had already been implemented as well as those in the proposing stage. Nader Khan needed the longterm support of the conservatives and the tribes for the stability of the country. In fact, Nader Khan wanted to satisfy both endogenous as well as exogenous factors to ensure the stability of his rule. When General Nader Khan sailed from France to Bombay, the British did not oppose his return, primarily because he had royal blood and better understood the complexities of British interests in India and the entire region than did the administration of the bandit Bacha. Nader Khan’s entry to the political scene in Afghanistan put British worries at ease. His return and subsequent efforts at having normal relations with Britain constitute the exogenous factor in this chapter that Nader Khan wanted to satisfy for the onset and continuation of normalcy. Since Britain was involved in the conspiracy against Amanullah Khan, Nader Khan did not need to worry too much about British conspiracy against him as long as he did not alienate them. Thus, the first thing Nader Khan wanted to be certain about was Britain’s neutrality toward him. He accomplished that by taking a pro-British stand and abandoning his active support for the Afghan tribes on the eastern side of the Durand Line. He exhibited loyalty to the British in order to ward off any secret British designs against him. Furthermore, one of the reasons the British did not oppose Nader Khan’s return to Afghanistan was the continuation of instability in Afghanistan during Bacha’s rule. Instability mattered to the British because it would have facilitated Russian support for the Indian independence movement against the British occupation. After Amanullah Khan’s abdication, Russians took advantage of the anarchic situation and crossed Afghanistan’s border to pursue the Central Asian anti-Bolshevik freedom fighters. Thus, it was possible for the Russians to support anti-British elements directly through Afghanistan, especially, when the anti-British organization of the tribal belt of the Durand Line Red Shirts, which had closer association with the Indian National Congress (Indian independence movement), had no restriction on their mobility within Afghanistan. In addition, an anarchic situation would have also eliminated the official arrangement that oversaw the implementation of the 1921 Rawalpindi agreement, which recognized British rule over the tribes on the eastern side of the Durand Line. By having no official arrangement to carry on the terms of the agreement, the influx of support for the Afghan tribes on the eastern side of the Durand Line would make life difficult for the British in India. Another factor that made the British not to oppose General Nader Khan’s return to Afghanistan was related to his unique diplomatic skills in dealing with tribal politics and discontents, which in turn meant stability in Afghanistan. Nader Khan thanked the British for the help they rendered him in his struggle against Bacha-e-Saqao. The British had granted Nader Khan 175,000 pound sterling, 10,000 riffles and five hundred thousand cartridges. In return, Nader Khan agreed not to incite the tribes on the other side of the Durand Line. Furthermore, he was the first Afghan monarch who did not consider “the British policy of intervention in tribal territory “ as a significant issue. In fact, Nader’s submission to British wishes can be illustrated by the following comment, made by a British official: “ The present ruler, King Nader Shah, has honorably lived up to his agreement and shown himself most fair and loyal…. It is greatly due to his influence that the red shirt movement has not spread into the independent territory to a greater extent…” (Gregorian, 1969:329; Ahmad, 1990:256). 7.3 Endogenous factors Endogenously, several factors served as elements of stability. One of them was individual leadership. Contrary to Bacha, who was ethnically a Tajik, Nader Khan was an Afghan (Pashtun) leader, an accomplished soldier and a tribal diplomat with royal blood. His ability to muster tribal support and his consequent victory over Bacha’s regime attested to his leadership skills. Although, Nader Khan believed in change, he preferred a slow pace of modernization. He disagreed with Amanullah Khan over the pace of modernization over the potential for reactions from the conservative establishment. Moreover, after his victory over Bacha, Nader Khan realized that the post-Amanullah reactions proved him right in his disagreement with Amanullah Khan over his reforms. Therefore Nader Khan decided to satisfy the religious and tribal establishments by reaffirming most of the reversals made under Bacha. His rationale for the reaffirmation of Bacha’s reversals stemmed from his belief that these reversals would bring stability, and in the long run, the onset of stability would create opportunities for modernization. 7.3.1 Reversal of Religious Reforms The village mullah was given his former responsibility of teaching the village school, Amanullah’s requirement that mullahs completed schooling were suppressed. The Deoband clergy and graduates banned from Afghanistan by Amanullah, were granted complete permission to visit and reside in Afghanistan as they pleased. Nader Khan did this in order to get the consensus of the clergy and tribes. Ahmad explains Nader Khan’s reversal of reforms and his difference with Bacha as follows: “… Nader became slow and cautious to an extent that he put back the clock of progress at least by fifty years. It seems that he tried to vie with the illiterate and ill-bred Bacha in trying to be extremely reactionary, in pampering the Ulema (religious scholars) and in extending subordinate cooperation to the British” (Ahmad, 1990:251). King Nader Khan’s concessions to the conservative quarters undermined the advances made during the reign of Abdul Rahman Khan (Amanullah’s grandfather), including the curbing of tribal and clerical powers (Ahmad, 1990). The compromises that King Nader Khan resorted to had the strategic objective of bringing peace and stability as well as facilitating opportunity for future modernization in Afghanistan. Nader Khan’s rationale was that as long as the country was stable, and the religious and tribal establishments were content, future opposition to moderate modernization efforts would be minimal. Additional actions by Nader Khan included his strategic move to appoint Hazrat-e-Shor-Bazar25 as minister of legal affairs. Hazrat’s brothers were granted significant positions as well in return for their loyalty. Hazrat-e-Shor-Bazar is important in the eyes of some the people of Afghanistan because he and his descendants represented the legacy of mystics of the 15th century. Hence, their opinions in different issues matter because they represent such a sacred school of thought in Islamic history, which is why mostly illiterate people support them. This action of Nader Khan bestowed dignity upon Hazrat, who was degraded when imprisoned by King Amanullah. Furthermore, this move of King Nader Khan also meant one of many reversals of Amanullah’s religious reforms. Fazl Rahim, or Hazrat-e- Shor-Bazar, was a member of a religious family of Arab descent, the Mujaddidi26, which migrated to Afghanistan in the early 19th century. Hazrat played significant roles during the reigns of Amanullah Khan, Bachae-Saqao and Nader Khan. In the signing of the treaty in 1921 with the British that excluded any clause that would have granted protection to the tribes on the other side of the Durand line, the animosity of Hazrat toward Amanullah emerged. It is 25 The Hazrat-e-Shor-Bazar title is assumed by the successors of Qayuum Jan Agha, a Mujaddidi, who migrated to Kabul from Sirhind, India and settled in the Shor-Bazar area of Kabul, which was the center of merchants of the old city of Kabul. The term Hazrat means excellency. speculated that Hazrat’s behavior later could have been associated with British instigation to topple Amanullah Khan. Such speculations were drawn after the Khost revolt, in 1924, was sparked by him, subsequent to which he left for India, where he resided under British supervision until Nader Khan’s reign. Nonetheless, Hazrat instigated the dethroning of Amanullah Khan under a legitimate claim, which accused Amanullah Khan of betraying the Afghan tribes, by not securing their rights in the 1921 Rawalpindi agreement. Indeed, Amanullah Khan’s failure to gain such concession from the British, resulted in Hazrat’s support for Bacha-e-Saqao and conferring upon Bacha the title of “defender of the faith of Islam”(Ahmad, 1990, Anwar, 1988). Subsequently, Hazrat abandoned Bacha, the same person he had called “defender of the faith of Islam”, and joined Nader Khan. Once Nader Khan appointed Hazrat to the Ministry of justice and his brothers to other influential positions, he secured their loyalty to him. It was a widely held belief among Afghans that the Hazrat family was associated with British imperialism (Ahmad, 1990 and Poullada, 1973). However, there is absolutely no definitive evidence to link Hazrat to any British conspiracy. 7.3.2 Reversal of Political Reforms In the political sphere, Nader Khan promulgated a new constitution in 1931 in such a manner as to please the clerics and tribal leaders through the incorporation of some favorable injunctions. They included bestowing the inspection function of new policies on clerics and the enactment that any tax increase had to obtain the approval 26 The name of a family of religious leaders who are descendants of the Sufi reformer, Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, (purported to be born in Kabul province in 1564 and buried in Sirhind, India in 1624), called of the tribal leaders. The military reforms were also done away with. A number of tribes that assisted Nader Khan in Bacha’s over-throwing were exempted from military conscription. The tribes were given autonomy in the selection of recruits rather than keeping Amanullah's lottery system. In essence, the military was virtually put back in the hands of the tribes. For example, when tribal armies were sent for any emergency, they would function under their own tribal commanders. Amir Abdur Rhaman Khan’s control over the various tribes and clergymen was done away with, and brought Afghanistan back to the period (when tribes were much more autonomous) before the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. It was indeed a reversion to the ultra conservative traditional social-political arrangements. Finally, his pro-British inclination cost Nader Khan his life, after a student of the German-sponsored high school, Amania, shot him dead while he was distributing prizes to students on Nov 8, 1933. The assassination was the result of animosity from the pro-Amanullah forces, which accused Nader Khan of being pro-Britain and having gone back on his word to restore Amanullah Khan to the throne rather than reign himself. 7.4 Exogenous Factors During Nader’s short reign, he was confronted by three foreign political tasks to resolve, namely the settlement of the economic and political crisis with Germany, elimination of the Soviet political and economic penetration, and resistance to British “forward policy” in the tribal area east of the Durand line. The economic and political crisis with Germany rose over the payment of the credit Germany had issued to Amanullah Khan for his development projects. Nader’s Mujadid Alf-I-thani or Renwer of the second millennium. government insisted that Germany should fulfill its obligations to projects during the reign of Amanullah Khan, before Nader Khan’s government could make any repayment. But Germany presented counter claims, which could not be validated, maintaining that during the anarchy they lost resources. No details were given as to which resources. However, it was only after Nader Khan’s death that his son, King Zahir Shah, settled the repayment of foreign credit in 1935.27 To curb any Soviet political and economic penetration, Nader’s government renegotiated the neutrality pact of 1926, which included two new provisions initiated by the USSR. These provisions were: 1) to stop Afghanistan’s support, which Amanullah Khan began, for the freedom fighters of Central Asia that fought against the Russians for the independence of their lands. 2) Neither Afghanistan nor the USSR would have a military pact with a third country; in reality, the aim was to prevent Afghanistan from having military relations with Britain or another power. However, the second provision of the neutrality pact had ramifications for Afghan-Russia relations and the underdevelopment of Afghanistan in the long run. For example, in the early 1950s, the United States’ reason for not establishing closer political and military relations, stemmed from the neutrality pact of 1926 between Afghanistan and the USSR hindering either state from having a military relationship with a third state. The USA feared that if it rendered military assistance to Afghanistan, it would be viewed by the USSR as a pact between Afghanistan and the USA. Hence, the United States’ refusal to sell military hardware in the 1950s compelled Afghanistan to accept the Soviet Union’s military aid and economic assistance. This provided the opportunity the Soviet Union sought eagerly from the 27 The terms of the arguements are unknown. early 1930s on to penetrate the Afghan economy and politics. The underdevelopment brought about by closer relations with the USSR became evident after the Soviet’s indoctrinated Afghan military officers launched a coup in 1978, and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan which resulted into a disaster of great proportions. 7.5 Socioeconomic Analysis Once Nader Khan assumed the throne, Bacha and his flock of thieves had already plundered the treasury. There was no source of revenue. Nader Khan did not possess the power to enforce tax collection. In fact, the promulgation by King Nader Khan of the constitution in 1931 was the result of several factors including the consensus of clergy and tribes, the economic desperation of his regime, and the lack of coercive capability to enforce the collection of revenue. It took Nader Khan two years with an army of 40,000 to pacify the country that had suffered from the chaotic reign of the bandit Bacha-e-Saqau. Hence, Nader Khan’s compromises in part stemmed from the financial debilitation of his regime. In fact, the lack of money as compensation to the tribes resulted in the looting of the Royal Palace, most government buildings and Bacha’s village of Kalakan by the victorious tribes (tribes that assisted General Nader Khan). Since the tribes constituted the formidable force assisting Nader Khan to defeat Bacha-e-Saqao, it was customary to compensate the tribal levies for their service. Such monetary compensation also maintained the hierarchical relationship between the tribal khans and their followers. Nader Khan needed the consensus of the clergy and tribal leadership for the establishment of normalcy and possible development schemes. The economy was totally disrupted at the time of Nader Khan’s accession to power: trade had ceased, and the flight of capital had occurred when merchants moved their capital from Kabul to Peshawar. Schools had reopened in the beginning of 1932; however, there were 22 schools, 1,350 students and 105 teachers in the entire country. The roads were in poor condition; they were fit for cars as long as there was no rain or snow; otherwise, they were not fit for any motorized traffic. Due to poor road conditions, foreign trade was hindered as well. In addition, the lack of gasoline further exacerbated transportation problems. The government was receiving revenue by 1932 from taxes on foreign trade. Nonetheless, this source fluctuated significantly (Fry, 1974). That is why private efforts were undertaken to raise revenue for the government; young-men of Kabul established a National Relief Committee that would collect donations for the treasury. This undertaking had some advantages. First, any action taken by the new government would have invariably come into conflict with some faction and interest in the country. In contrast, private efforts would bar any potential hostility towards government. Second, private efforts also managed to collect badly needed money for emergency matters. Moreover, during this period, the government in alliance with merchant groups focused almost entirely on the export of primary products such as karakul skin, fresh and dried fruits, wool and cotton. The significance of this arrangement stemmed from the fact that direct taxation of these commodities did not require any coercive measures. In 1930, the government permitted the formation of a bank. The founder of the bank was a famous Afghan capitalist Abdul Majid Zabuli, who had studied economics in the USSR and used his genius to become a billionaire. Once the bank was formed, Mr. Zabuli named it Sherkat-e-Sahami-e-Afghan or Afghan Joint Stock Company. Initially, the institution was not called a bank in order to avoid conflict with the religious establishment because in Islam, taking profit or usury is a sin, and the founder of the bank wanted the name “Joint-Stock Company” to reflect that profit could also be made from trade as well. The other goal of the joint stock Company was to render the merchant class productive. In 1932, when the company was reorganized, it was called Bank-e-Melli (National Bank); however, under the aegis of Bank-eMelli, a large number of investors formed joint-stock companies that were involved in the import-export business. The bank, which drew on both private and public funds, was granted significant authority over the economy, including monetary policy and foreign exchange responsibilities and the import of sugar and trucks (Gregorian, 1969:314-16). Since Bank-e-Melli and the joint-stock companies were involved in trade rather than production, the purpose of the formation of Bank-e-Melli and the joint-stock companies was to make the capital of the investors more productive. Meanwhile, the weak bourgeoisie needed the support of the state, and the best way to get that support was through the merchants establishing patronage links to the members of the royal family. The consequence was corruption (Rubin, 1995: 62). The formation of Bank-e Melli or National Bank was a component of the socalled Overall Economic Development Plan formulated by private businessmen and government officials and adopted in 1932. Although it was a mixed private and public economic undertaking, private enterprise was given more control of the economy. The so-called Overall Development Plan was not an ISI approach, but rather a selective modernization of the economy. Primarily, the plan intended to achieve a recovery of the economy from the destruction brought about by Bacha. The goals of the plan were: 1) to draw up a financial and currency report, and stimulate foreign and domestic trade; 2) promote industrialization; 3) introduce agricultural reforms; 4) enhance education and communication, and 5) improve people’s health care. The aim of the government was to put a significant portion of the economy in private hands in order to attract individual investors to participate in development. 28 Consequently, due to the encouragement of the bank, about thirty joint-stock companies involved in the export of commodities such as karakul skin, fresh and dried fruits, and wool opened in the city of Kabul. Other large companies exporting cotton opened in the north of the country. As to the import portion of trade, the largest was the Petroleum Company of Kabul, which was granted a monopoly over the import of oil. In addition to these private joint companies, there were a limited number of state-owned enterprises, namely a textile mill in Jabal-ul-Siraj, and match and leather factories in Kabul. These companies were leased to private entrepreneurs (Gregorian, 1969: 315 to 317). The joint-stock companies and the Afghan National Bank contributed to the enhancement of foreign trade and to the accumulation of capital. The bank attracted a large number of wealthy Afghans, who bought its shares. The capital that was accumulated by the bank was reinvested in joint-stock companies that Bank-e-Melli controlled. The government enacted new customs laws in 1931. The significance of 28 The development approach was private enterprise in conjunction with government’s shares in the enterprises such as Bank-e-Melli. this measure stemmed from the strategic moves of the government, which gave Banke-Melli the monopoly in the affairs of the economy, including control over the domestic currency and foreign exchange as well as the promotion of foreign trade. Hence, government revenue came from taxing these private enterprises and the jointstock companies. Since, tribes and religious quarters did not carry the burden of taxation, the potential for conflict was alleviated. The differences between Nader Khan’s and Amanullah Khan’s approaches were not so much in substance but in the social-political circumstances that characterized the times of each monarch. Amanullah Khan’s approach was a government-led mixed economic approach, in which, ISI was to serve as the avenue of industrialization. Nader Khan’s reign had a different socioeconomic and political atmosphere and required a more subtle approach toward development. His approach was mixed, the Bank-e-Melli and its associated joint-stock companies drew on both private and public resources, but due to the social-political fragility, he granted the private sector almost total monopoly over the economy, especially in fiscal issues. On the one hand, this was due to the lack of resources in terms of capital on the part of government. On the other hand, the involvement of the private sector served as a strategy to devoid the government of any political responsibility to the religious establishment. Since the country had already gone through anarchy and destruction, the government took all the necessary precautions. For example, if the British or the Russians had a plan to discredit Nader Khan’ economic development attempts, Nader Khan could counter by referring to the private sector as the moving force of the economy rather than his government. Commodities were categorized and taxed accordingly. Import items such as coffee, cocoa, cotton and silk underwear, towels, handkerchiefs, toilet articles, and mirrors that were considered luxury, were taxed by 30 per cent of their cost to the merchants. However, some luxury items such as Persian and Central Asian silk thread were taxed at 2 percent of the cost of the goods; jewelry and foreign currency were taxed only one-half of one percent. Other imported items such as sugar were subjected to a 25 percent tax; soap, copper wire, combs, scissors, hats, hand mirrors, boots, chemicals, medicines, matches, lamps iron and steel were taxed at 20 percent. Items such as carpets, rugs, woolen mats, maps, charts, photographs, and postcards were taxed 10 percent. Afghan exports were also subject to taxation by the Afghan government. For example, taxes on fresh and dried fruits ranged from 25 to 80 percent (Gregorian, 1969: 316-317). The foundation of his customs law resulted, in part, from the tribal structure of Afghan society. The King relied on Afghan tribes for the defense of the country and his dynasty, and these tribes owned agricultural land whose taxation would have reduced their revenue from the land. Hence, King Nader Khan did not wish to antagonize them by increasing their agricultural and land taxes. Moreover, the constitution prohibited land tax increase without the consent of the Loya Jerga (grand assembly). The Afghan tribal elders, who dominated the Loya Jerga, understandably, would not approve an increase in land taxes. In addition, as a Pashtun, who received the assistance of the tribes in toppling the bandit Bach-e-Saqau, the king could not break his word of Pashtunwali to the tribes by imposing taxes on them. Consequently, Nader Khan had to tax the merchant class heavily. In its haste to raise revenue by taxing the merchant class, the government lost sight of the need to differentiate between true luxury and necessity. That is, the aim was to tax the imports as well as exports in order to raise revenue for the government rather than to differentiate between what should be taxed more for being luxury and what constituted necessity, or primary consumption. No measures were taken to protect either the handful of infant Afghan industries or the Afghan export trade. The reason for this was the government’s reliance on customs duties as revenue. That is, if tariff walls were erected to prevent the entry of items that competed with the infant industries, government would lose badly needed revenue. At the same time, it gave industry the opportunity to operate without competition. Taxes from other sectors such as land and animals constituted only one-third of the total income of the Afghan government. Though excessive taxes overburdened the merchant class and the urban sector in general, they were essential for the implementation of the Overall Economic Plan (Gregorian, 1969: 317). Incidentally, the 1930s were a period of economic depression in the United States and Europe. Since the economies of the Western countries were hit by the depression, the demand for luxury items such as karakul skin or dried fruits diminished significantly. This decrease in demand slowed Afghan export, which constituted the “basic machine” of development, and consequently the decrease in export lowered the value of the Afghan currency, the Afghani. Gregorian (1969:317) states: “Between November 1 and December 23, 1930s the exchange rate of the Afghani dropped from 38.6 in a pound sterling to 45.4”. The weakness of the Afghani was due to a balance of payment deficit that resulted from the decrease of Afghan export accompanied by increasing imports, however, the intention here is not to blame the depression for the balance of payment deficit. For example, Afghan exports to Britain, in 1932, amounted to 15,535 pounds, while imports from Britain amounted to 65,935 pounds. Trade with the Soviet Union during the period 1932-1934 was characterized by a similar deficit. The increase in the balance of payment deficit further lowered the value of Afghan currency. Due to such a high trade deficit, the value of Afghan trade was about the same in 1931 as it was in 1901, at five million pounds sterling. In addition to the private sector’s dominance of the economy, another major shortcoming was the private sector’s commitment to commerce rather than industrialization. Such reliance on commerce benefited the merchant class since the margin of profit for them was higher in commerce than investing in industrial projects because industrial projects had a larger uncertainty than did commerce that already had an established market. The other flaw was the neglect of agriculture. The government concern over stable relations with the tribes influenced its decision to support private joint-stock enterprises and give Bank-e-Melli the monopoly for the purchasing of foreign currency, government imports and other Afghan government business rather than to invest in agriculture. One aspect of the rationale behind such an approach was to bestow the responsibility of development on the private sector and accordingly, the private sector would carry the burden of any unintended outcome. Thus, if reactions were to form, the dynasty in question would not be held responsible. The other aspect stemmed from the government’s dependence on tribes for national defense and their consensus for the perpetuation of the monarchy. Hence, the concession made to the tribes in terms of exemption from taxation and land grants would come in conflict with any land reforms or even agricultural projects that would impinge on their land holdings. This, consequently, would have resulted in tribal discontent. The tribes did not appreciate the benefits they could have received if roads were created to their areas, or government started some agricultural projects. They did not want their autonomy to be compromised by having modern communication linking cities and their areas. 7.5.1 Public Health In order to improve public health, Nader Khan established the school of medicine in Kabul with a diagnostic laboratory used by the hospitals that were affiliated with it. In addition, “a well-equipped X-ray and electrotherapy institute, a mental institution, dental clinics, and a hospital for women were opened” (Gregorian, 1969:313). The Mallali School, which was the girls’ high school during the reign of Amanullah Khan, was turned into a nursing school. Furthermore, two sanitariums, one for women and another for men, a vaccination department and a public inoculation center were established.29 The overall benefits of Nader Khan’s economic plan were only superficial. Since Nader Khan’s government relied heavily on customs duties by taxing import-export heavily, it did not establish a domestic resource mobilization such as taxes on land and animals and stamp duty. Hence, when the United States and 29 This information came from Gregorian, 1969:313, and my interviews with a senior official of public health in the 1940s. Europe were hit by depression in the 1930s, the government could not pursue even modest modernization (Gregorian, 1969:317). 7.5.2 Education Nader Khan was a firm believer in the importance of education. To that end, he reopened schools for men and did not reopen schools for women due to the sensitivity of the issue. He had reiterated in his speeches to the country the significance of education for the country. He was as much a supporter of education as was Amanullah Khan, however, he undertook an interesting approach to it. He is quoted as saying: “You can not build a nation anymore than you can build a house by starting at the top. Amanullah tried to change the minds of people by changing their hats. The painstaking, difficult tasks involved in preparing the ground take as much time as sending the structure into the sky. Such work at first does not make a big display” (James, 1935:267). The quote indicates Nader Khan’s commitment to education as the avenue for the development of Afghanistan, and ridicules King Amanullah’s Westernizing reforms that required people to wear European style of cloths and hats, which were used to greet people as it was done in the West. I agree with Nader Khan that one does not need to be westernized in order to be modernized. Conclusion At this juncture, it is appropriate to sum up whether the two hypotheses have conformed to the substance of this chapter or not. As in the previous chapter, the two hypotheses could not be discussed exclusively within the confinement of this chapter. The reason for this is that Nader Khan’s period was a response to the anarchy of Bacha-e-Saqau, as well as a more institutionalized reversal of the radical measures of Amanullah Khan. Nader Khan chose to rescind all of the reforms in order to assure the religious establishment of his conservative inclinations. In doing so, the hopes for any serious development diminished in the short-term. For example, most agricultural and livestock taxes were done away with and the Southern tribes were exempted from compulsory conscription. This exemption from conscription in the army eliminated the opportunity for young men from southern Afghanistan to experience an aspect of modernity, the army. Conscripts that come to the army from rural areas are mostly illiterate; however, they learn to read and write in the army and adopt a broader world view. When they return to their localities, most of them are appointed malik or village representatives. Hence, the sustenance of alienation from modernity among non-urban population contributed to the underdevelopment of Afghanistan. Instead, a small sector of society, merchants and urbanites, had to pay for the overwhelming portion of government’s revenue. Moreover, most developmental projects were confined to Kabul and a small portion in the north of the country, to avoid conflict with the conservative establishments. The reason Kabul was chosen to serve, as a modernization symbol to the rest of the country was that Kabul City’s inhabitants, who were mostly Tajiks, were more tolerant to modernization than were the Pashtun tribes. Thus, the rest of the country did not benefit from any development. Nader Khan wanted to confine his meager development measures to urban centers to avoid any type of conflict with the conservatives. Nader Khan’s reign was part of the lengthy reaction to Amanullah Khan’s reforms. As to the second hypothesis, King Nader Khan acknowledged that the reason Amanullah embarked on his radical modernization was to safeguard Afghanistan’s independence. However, by emulating the customs of the west, Amanullah provided an opportunity for his external enemies to manipulate his reforms against him. Nader Khan did not want to let any foreign power manipulate his mistakes. This reason compelled him to leave the economy in the hands of the private sector. Meanwhile, Nader Khan also tried to keep the British content with his policies. Furthermore, Nader Khan’s eagerness to re-negotiate the neutrality pact of 1926 was also aimed at reducing the possibility for any external power to manipulate Afghanistan’s development approaches, and perpetuate underdevelopment. On the endogenous side, this period also confirms the importance of internal conditions and elements to contend with any development initiative. Nader Khan wanted to please the religious segment as well as tribes. In order to keep the religious establishment, he appointed Hazrat-e-Shor-Bazaar as the Minister of Justice and his brothers to other significant positions. Since Hazrat carried a lot of weight, his appointment also pleased the Pashtun tribes, especially, the Suleiman-Khail. This tribe is known for being a fierce fighting force among Afghan tribes. Thus, Nader Khan could not formulate any reforms that would remotely alienate either the Pashtun tribes or the religious establishment. The tribes that assisted Nader Khan defeat Habibullah, and Bachae-eSaqau, were exempted from taxes and conscription. The exemption of tribes from taxes reduced the government revenue; similarly, exempting tribes from conscription had two implications for the tribes and the country at large. First, the conscripts became familiar with aspects of modern life ranging from modern weapons to developing a world-view different from those of their tribes. Therefore, the conscripts served as links of modernity to their respective areas. Exemption from conscription prevented the exposure of tribal members to modernity and the possibility of change in their world-view. Second, the army was the nation-building institution of the country; hence, serving in the army served as a cohesion mechanism between the tribes and the central government and the nation-state. Exemptions pre-empted this possibility for tribes. Individual leaders also served as impediments for development. Hazrat of ShorBazaar was one such individual. Initially, he supported Amanullah Khan become Khalifa of the Muslim World, but later, he instigated the rebellion of Khost in 1924 to topple Amanullah. Furthermore, he, also, called Bacha, the defender of the faith of Islam. Similarly, he took a stand against Bacha-eSaqau and sided with Nader Khan. As it appears, he was a very opportunistic individual. Therefore, Nader Khan had to be careful in formulating any reform to avoid Hazrat’s alienation. The exogenous factor was also key in this period. On the one hand, Nader Khan took a neutral stand in regards to the Afghan tribes on the eastern side of the Durand Line by not supporting any type of anti-British sentiment. His neutrality was aimed to please the British in order to safeguard under the pretext of security violated Pashtunwali. On the other hand, the Russians were unhappy with Nader Khan’s decision of neutrality in regards to the tribal belt and the Indian independence movement. The Russians considered Nader Khan’s passivity as a tacit collaboration with British imperialism (Gregorian, 1969: 331). Nonetheless, Nader’s government needed to have closer relations with the USSR in order to safegurad Afghan independence from any potential Soviet aggression. When the Afghan government exhibited desires for having friendly relations, the Soviets responded positively, despite of their harsh overtone of Nader Khan’s relations with the British. The Afghan government needed the good relations with the Russians, therefore, to express its good will, Nader’s government concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR in 1931 (Gregorian, 1969: 332). Similar to his policy toward the Durand tribes, Nader Khan prevented any support for the Basmachi movement from the Afghan soil. In fact, the Afghan government expelled Ibahim Beg, among the last leaders of Basmachi, from Afghanistan. Therefore, Afghanistan was constrained both by the USSR in the north and British-India in the East. Any decision of the Afghan government that had implications to any of the two powers endangered the independence of Afghanistan. Subsequently, Nader’s government negotiated a commercial treaty with the USSR and postal and telegraph agreements. The pupose behind these agreements was to increase trade with the USSR and reestablish contact with European countries through the USSR. Nader Khan’s decsion not to pursue Afghans’ claims to the eastern region of the Durand Line and his lack of support for the Afghan tribes against British imperialism, trapped Afghanistan in the chains of geographic dependency. Thus, Afghanistan had to rely on the Soviet Union goods as well as a link for contacting European countries. Hence, all four factors contributed to the underdevelopment of Afghanistan during this period as well. VIII. Zahir Shah and Premier Hashim Khan from 1933 to 1946 8.1 Introduction After the death of Shah Nader Khan in 1933, his son Mohammed Zahir Khan was crowned as Zahir Shah. Nader Khan’s brothers made the decision as to who should succeed. Since Zahir Shah was nineteen years old, his uncle, Mohammed Hashim Khan, assumed total control over the responsibilities of government including domestic and foreign policies. Hashim Khan had served as the Prime Minister during the reign of Nader Shah and continued in that capacity until 1946. Prime Minister Hashim Khan was an able administrator, who maintained order throughout the country via a strong central government and a ruthless secret police whose horrendous practices are legendary. His totalitarian measures were aimed at bringing law and order and suppressing any opposition. Zahir Shah continued to be the king, but due to his age, he was not burdened with the task of governing the nation. In fact, starting in 1953, Zahir, actively, participated in the decision making of the government, until then, his role was secondary. However, in regard to both of his uncles, Prime Minister Hashim Khan and his successor Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan, Zahir did not exhibit any authority out of respect for his elders. In Afghan tradition, elders occupy a significant position in relation to young people; that is, young people have to respect elders whether they are related or not. Hence, in 1953, when General Mohammed Daud Khan, who was Zahir Khan’s cousin and classmate, became Prime Minister, Zahir took active part in the affairs of the state. This period is characterized by the promotion of Afghan nationalism and support for reforms and modernization. During this period, Afghan modernists and nationalists began to serve as literary “vehicles” of change; their writings appeared in different journals of the day, emulating the literary tradition of Siraj-ul-Akhbar. The reformers covered topics not only pertinent to Afghanistan but also to the rest of the Muslim world. They addressed the disunity of the Muslim world as the cause of their backwardness. With the support of the King and the Prime Minister, these agents strove to teach the Afghan public that Islam and modernization were compatible with each other. In fact, they stressed that modern knowledge and technology would ensure the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan. This period represents a conservative middle ground namely keeping the religious establishment content while the silent forces of reform and modernization are on the rise, stressing the significance of modern education and technology for the cultural innovation of Afghan society and strengthening of Afghan nationalism (Gregorian, 1969:342-343). The incremental efforts by Prime Minister Hashim Khan and the new generation of Afghan modernists were aimed to legitimize reforms and modernization in the eyes of the traditional and religious establishments emphasizing the need for modern education and technology. The Afghan nationalists and modernists strove to show not only the compatibility of modern education and technology to Islam, but also reiterated the urgency with which Muslim societies must incorporate them. These slow moves on the part of the government served two purposes: on the one hand, to maintain the loyalty of the religious establishment and traditionalists, and on the other hand, to pursue a modest socioeconomic development and keep any foreign interest in check. 8.2 Background Much of this period of Afghan history is characterized by the efforts of Prime Minister Hashim Khan not only to keep Afghanistan out of the influence of powerful actors, but also to follow an economic development plan that would not rest on any foreign assistance. The reason for this stemmed from the negative experiences of Afghan rulers with foreign powers. As articulated in the previous chapters, Amanullah’s anti-British position cost him his throne and Nader Khan’s closer relations with the British cost him his life at the hands of Amanullah’s supporters. However, with the onset of the Nazi regime in Germany, on the eve of World War II, Afghanistan (again) started to play a role in the calculus of powerful actors. As in the past, Afghanistan served as the buffer zone between the heir of Czarist Russia, the relatively new USSR, and Britain. With the onset of WW II, it was widely speculated that Afghanistan might become prey for both USSR and Britain. The scenario was that the USSR might invade the northern flank of Afghanistan and the British, as a counter offensive against Soviet advances in Northern Afghanistan, would invade the Southern flanks. It was presumed that the British would be asked by the Afghans to do so in order to curb further Soviet penetration. The British reassured the Afghans that such a scenario was extremely unlikely. However, Prime Minister Hashim Khan did not rely on this reassurance. Instead, Afghanistan took advantage of the Japanese expansionist moves in Manchuria, while the USSR was on the defensive there, and established diplomatic relations with Japan. Once Afghanistan established diplomatic relations with Japan, the Soviets attitude appeared much humbled compared to their previously harsh tones. Consequently, with the arrival of Japanese ministers in Afghanistan, previous border disputes and protests of various kinds with the Soviets ceased to resurface (Adamec, 1974: 214). In 1935, Zahir Shah invited dignitaries of Afghanistan including government officials, tribal chiefs, and members of parliament along with Afghan envoys to London, Tehran, and Ankara. Among this group of people, there were individuals from the Afghan elite, who had their own agendas for Afghanistan’s foreign policy. Some were pro-German, others pro-British, or pro-Soviet and yet there were those who preferred an isolationist approach to foreign policy. Nonetheless, most of the parties supported independent national policies that ensured the protection of Afghan sovereignty from foreign aggressors and would satisfy the country’s hunger for speedy socioeconomic development. The conference concluded in favor of economic and military relations with Germany (Adamec, 1974:219-20). In 1936, Afghan foreign minister Faiz Mohammed met with German officials and was assured that Germany did not see any problem with the sale and delivery of industrial and military products to Afghanistan. To that end, an agreement was reached between Afghanistan and Germany on October 23, 1936, which provided a credit of 55 million DM to be repaid within seven years. The aid was to be used to purchase weapons and arms (Adamec, 1974:224). Furthermore, in August 1939, additional financial agreements were signed between Germany and Afghanistan that entailed a long-term credit for purchases of machinery and plants for the production of textile, cement, sugar, and electrical turbines and for coal mining from Germany. In return, Afghanistan was to export raw material, such as cotton and wool (Gregorian, 1969:380). However, one month after signing this extensive agreement, Germany invaded Poland and became embroiled in the war with France and Britain. Subsequently, German factories were involved in supplying the war needs, and, Afghanistan was consequently left trapped in its shackles of underdevelopment by having its industrial development as well as the modernization of the army put on hold. Moreover, Germany’s involvement in war with the USSR made Afghanistan to rethink its exclusive policy of collaboration with Germany. The only other power that had similar characteristics was the United States, which exhibited no interest in having diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. After repeated efforts of good will by Afghanistan, the United States finally opened a permanent embassy in Kabul in 1942. Before the onset of WW II, Afghanistan had negotiated a business transaction with Czechoslovakia that entailed purchasing weapons from that country. Czechoslovakia’s offer of military hardware was well below the price the Germans’ offer, and, thus, was more suitable to Afghanistan. Moreover, the deal with Czechoslovakia occurred when the German government did not offer any unique services except to serve as a mediator between German industries and the Afghan government. However, as Germany invaded Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1938, Afghanistan also lost that country as a source of military hardware (Adamec, 1974:224). Hence, the opportunity for having a modern army was not possible with the onset of WW II in Europe. Consequently, the Afghan government had to rely on an ill-equipped army. Incidentally, a revolt occurred in the Katawaz area (in Western Afghanistan: home of the Sulaiman Khel tribe) in protest for the government’s indifference towards the ill treatment of the Afghan tribes by the British on the eastern side of the Durand Line. The Afghan tribal uprising on the eastern side of the Durand Line resulted from the British forward policy, which was a containment policy aimed at keeping any threat to India’s security in check. This inspired the tribes in Western Afghanistan to take up arms against the government in Kabul. These tribal revolts were based on the violation of the principles of Pashtunwali, claiming that the government in Kabul had betrayed the Afghan tribes on the eastern side of the Durand Line by failing to secure their rights in the Rawalpindi treaty between Afghanistan and England in 1919. As was the case with previous uprisings, certain events served as catalysts for emerging dissent among the people. This time, it was the stationing of the Afghan Army garrison in the Katawaz district in Western Afghanistan. Its aim was to settle land disputes between feuding foes in the Sueleiman-Khail tribe. However, the stationing of the army backfired and became a stimulus for the uprising in Katawaz. The aim of the rebel tribe, Sulaiman Khail, was to topple the existing Afghan government and eradicate British intervention in Afghan affairs. To that end, the tribe in question attacked the government’s garrison in July of 1937 (Adamec, 1974:227 & 228). The anger of the tribe was further intensified when the government decided to collect taxes from the nomads, an act that went contrary to the Afghan tradition, namely freedom from governmental authority. Some of the nomads shared tribal links with the Sulaiman Khail tribe, which made them turbur30 or extended cousins. Thus, according to the Afghan tradition, the defense of the nomads became mandatory for the Sulaiman Khail tribe. Nomads were autonomous people moving, continuously, back and forth, between Afghanistan and India. Seasonal change dictated their mobility. Any attempt to tax them would compromise their autonomous status. Furthermore, the freedom that these nomads exercised epitomized the past of the settled Pashtun tribes. Taxing them was a mistake on the part of Government because it impinged on this icon of traditional Afghan culture, namely nomadic lifestyle. The conflict was eventually resolved due to a stalemate between the government troops and the tribes. A tribal Jerga was formed to bring the conflict to a peaceful resolution. Meanwhile, as it was the case with Amanullah Khan’s reign, this period had its share of problems brought on by the so-called holymen with ulterior motives. The religious figure of this period was a man of Arab lineage, who appeared on the tribal frontier and served as an instigator for the uprising in that area. His name was Mohammed Saadi Al-Kalani, and he was a distant relative of Amanullah Khan’s wife, Queen Suraya. He came to the tribal frontier and gathered local people to fight for the restoration of the exiled King, Amanullah Khan. Al-Kalani led the attack on the Afghan frontier fortification; however, he failed to capture it. Consequently, the Afghan government expressed its disenchantment to the British authorities in India for allowing such an incursion to happen. The British, in turn, offered 20,000 British pounds as a bribe to the so-called religious figure to abandon his adventure and Kalani accepted it. Subsequently, the British flew him back to his ancestral homeland, Damascus. Many in the Afghan elite circles believed that the British instigated this incident in order to pressure the Afghan government to abandon its close ties with 30 Turbur literally means cousin. It refers to one’s uncle’s (father’s brother) sons. It also refers to members of the same tribe or sub-tribes. For example, Amar Khail is a sub-tribe of the Sulaiman Khail, members of Germany (Gregorian, 1969:384). While these scattered uprisings were being put down, Prime Minister Hashim Khan turned his attention with the approval of Zahir Shah, to improving different sectors of society such as education and the economy. 8.3 Development Measures 8.31 Education Prime Minister Hashim Khan believed that public education could serve multiple purposes: it could unite the country and pave the way for modernization. According to Gregorian, education was an instrument to unite the country through the institutionalization of Pashto as the official language of the Royal Court and the government. Hence, in 1937, Pashto was declared as the official language of Afghanistan. Although, Amanullah Khan had kept Pashto as a coequal of Persian as the official language of Afghanistan, Hashim Khan, however, wanted to do away with Persian totally. Persian was the dominant language in the Muslim Courts as Latin was formerly in the West. Hashim Khan wanted that to change in Afghanistan and to promote national unity and consciousness through the institutionalization of one national language, Pashto. The educational efforts during this period constituted the beginning of a renaissance of Afghan tradition whose hallmark consisted of the institutionalization of Pashto. Hashim Khan built on Nader Khan’s educational policies and expanded them to include also two girls’ schools. One of the girls’ schools, Malalai, which was closed each tribe are each other’s turbur. down during Bacha-e-Saqau anarchy and was reopened by Nader Khan to serve as a school for nurses and midwives, was converted into a ninth grade girls’ school during Hashim Khan’s administration. Both Zahir Shah and Prime Minister Hashim Khan shared the view that a sound school system constituted the only solid base for the modernization of Afghanistan (Gregorian, 1969: 351). Public education, until 1940, was structured on a ten-year program, four years of primary school, three years of middle school and three years of secondary school. During the school year 1940-41, the primary school term was lengthened from four years to six years. The students that graduated from the middle schools would enter vocational schools. The graduates of the middle school had qualifications as those of the middle schools in Germany. In other words, they had already completed the first level of calculus, two levels of inorganic chemistry and two levels of physics on top of geography, history, religious studies and literature. The number of existing vocational schools increased from four to ten. They included the Kabul Mechanical School (1937), the Secretarial school and Commerce School (both 1938), the Teachers Night School (1942), Teachers Training Institute for Intermediary Schools (1943), and the Theological School (1944). Hashim Khan also founded certain schools that served, in 1946, as the basis for the inauguration of Kabul University. The new programs included the Department of Political Science and Law (1938), the School of Natural Sciences (1941), and the School of Letters (1944) (Gregorian, 1969:354-5). By 1945, public education had grown significantly. The number of primary schools increased from 324 in 1940 to 346 in 1945. By the same token, in 1940 enrollment was 60,000 with 1,990 teachers, by 1945, enrollment increased to 93,000, and teachers to 2,546. 8.3.2 Economic Policy The economic development approach in this period has been characterized as an approach somewhere between laissez-faire and German State socialism, that is, “government intervention was called for only when individual action and initiative was deficient or absent” (Gregorian, 1969: 362). It was primarily an incremental (payas-you-go) approach. The government did not want to borrow and accumulate debt for capital investments and did not wish to grant concessions to any foreign firm either. Hence, according to Gregorian (1969), as part of the continued process of development from the early 1930s, the process of accumulation and centralization of commercial capital occurred in two stages. The first one occurred in 1932 during the reign of Nader Khan which consisted of the creation of Bank-e-Melli. The second one was the creation of major trading companies between 1932 and 1934. These companies controlled the major export and import commodities of the country. However, to a lesser extent, they invested in industry as well. In 1932, when Bank-eMelli opened, it had a capital of 35 million Afghanis or 3.5 million dollars. By 1948, the Bank had 2000 shareholders and a capital of 454 million Afghanis or about 40 million dollars. The bank drew on both public and private resources, and was run by the board of directors, especially, the founder and main shareholder of Bank-e-Melli was Mr. Zabuli. The government’s share in the Bank-I-Milli and its associated jointstock companies amounted to 40 to 45 %, whereas the private investors possessed 55 to 60% of the shares. Meanwhile, the weak bourgeoisie needed the support of the state, and to secure that support, the merchants established patronage links to the members of the royal family (Rubin, 1995: 62). Part of the corruption resulted from the unrestrained monopoly of the Bank-e-Melli and the Joint-stock companies over the economy, resulting in conflict between the government and Bank-e-Melli. The investigation of some of the shareholders in the Bank-e-Melli and the Joint-stock companies by the government resulted in the imprisonment for a six-years-term for one of the shareholders (Gregorian, 1969: 367). This conflict became instrumental, in 1939, in the formation of the Da Afghanistan Bank or Bank of Afghanistan and the revocation of the monopoly rights of Bank-e-Melli. Da Afghanistan bank served as a fiscal agent of the Ministry of Finance, assumed the function of controlling the Afghan currency, and kept an eye on foreign exchange transactions. This responsibility used to belong to the Bank-e-Melli; however, Bank-e-Melli was left in charge of the private sector of the economy controlling personal, commercial, and foreign credit. The two banks served as the instruments of control for the government, overseeing investment in national industry as well as the export and import of commodities. The government through its oversight of the economy strove to maintain a favorable balance of payments in the purchase of industrial machinery and the compensation of foreign technical experts (Gregorian, 1969: 362-364; Kamrany, 1969: 13). Cotton Joint-stock Company as well as other companies founded under the aegis of Bank-e-Melli, paved the way for industrialization in their respective areas. The Cotton Joint-stock Company invested in cotton cultivation in the north of the country. The output of cotton increased significantly: before 1935, the entire country produced 450 tons of cotton, and by 1946, that number had increased to 36,000 tons. Subsequently, a textile mill was established at Puli-Khumri in the north that converted cotton into cloth. In 1937, the Vatan Joint-stock company installed several cotton gins and processes in different provinces. In 1943, the Kandahar Woolen Textile mill was founded, producing 120,000 yards of clothing materials annually. The Kabul Woolen Factory was expanded with the capacity of 170,000 yards of cloth yearly. The Hera’t mill in the province of Hera’t produced 10,000 pounds of silk yarn annually. A ceramic plant was built in 1940, as a joint venture between Bank-e-Milli and the Afghan Ministry of Economy in the province of Kunduz in Northern Afghanistan. Several other factories that produced soap, sugar, matches, and shoe were constructed in different cities around the country. Despite the construction of various textiles, sugar, footwear and other such industries, they could only meet about 10 to 15 percent of domestic demand. The depression of the 1930s and the WW II in the 1940s resulted in the reduction of hard currency from the export of karakul skin and dried fruits and nuts.31 The result was slow economic development. This convinced the modernist circles among the Afghan elite that there was an urgent need for serious socioeconomic development. To that end, they pressured Prime Minister Hashim Khan to step down. It is worth mentioning that Hashim Khan was not opposed to development; instead, he wanted to follow a slow approach to development that would not result in debt formation. In such a situation the independence of Afghanistan would be endangered. Finally, Hashim Khan stepped down in May of 1946, and Hashim Khan’s brother Shah Mahmud Khan, who was also supported by Zahir Shah, became the new Prime Minister. 8.4 Socioeconomic Analysis The events in this period have to be related to the past events. For example, the danger of Russian and British rivalry kept Afghanistan on its toes in the 19th and early 20th centuries; hence, any relations with a foreign country had to be gauged against the type of danger posed by Britain and Russia. Hence, the relevance of the exogenous factor was evident in this period, as in the former ones. Afghanistan’s decision to have an exclusive economic relationship with Germany stemmed from its past negative experiences with Britain and Czarist Russia. Considering the various powers, Britain, the USSR, and their ulterior motives, Germany suited Afghanistan’s situation well as it did in the reign of Amanullah Khan. Three factors played crucial roles in the affinity of Afghanistan to Germany: One, Germany was the ally of Ottoman Turks during WW I and hence was the enemy of England and Czarist Russia, which were also hated by the Afghans. Germany’s association with the Ottoman Turks mattered to the Afghans because the Ottoman 31 Karakul skins were produced by ethnic minorities in the north of the country, and the dried fruits were produced in Kandahar and He’rat. The farmers as well as the herdsmen benefited from the export of their Sultan was regarded as the caliph or Khalifa of the Sunni Muslim sect. The reason for the importance of caliph stemmed from his position as the commander of the faithful. Naturally, Germany’s association with the Ottomans found favorable inclination and sympathy among the Afghans. Second, Germany’s attractiveness to Afghanistan also stemmed from its noncolonial background. In addition, the type of threat posed by the USSR and Britain to Afghanistan, was not imminent when it came to Germany, since Germany was neither geographically near Afghanistan such as the USSR nor had any colonies in the region, like the British had. A third crucial factor was the affinity of German and Afghan relations due to the desire of the Germans to accept employment in Afghanistan. This stemmed from the German lack of colonies, which meant lack of markets for their commodities and skilled labor, with limited employment possibilities at home. Lastly, as Afghanistan headed toward development, it became a significant market for German manufactured goods and skilled labor. Hence, with Germany’s involvement in the Afghan development projects, Afghanistan did not need to worry about the kinds of threats, militarily or otherwise, posed by Russia and Britain. Moreover, Afghanistan was in dire need of a modern army in order to maintain authority over the powerful tribes in case of any revolt. Germany was willing to provide hardware and training. By having close economic relations with Germany, Afghanistan would not have sacrificed its development as a trade-off for security concern and its territorial integrity. Hence, Germany served as the logical source of economic and military aid (Adamec, 1974: 228 to 229). commodities; however, the decreased revenue did not mean any unrest on the part of the population. Prime Minister Hashim Khan’s aim was to make Afghanistan economically independent. His view was similar to that of the previous Afghan monarchs such as Amanullah Khan and Nader Khan, that is, in order for Afghanistan to preserve its independence, it has to be economically independent or self-sufficient. Prime Minister Hashim Khan continued the Overall Economic Development Plan, which was initiated by King Nader Khan in conjunction with Bank-e-Milli in 1932, lasted until 1938. However, the Overall Economic Development Plan was replaced in 1938-39 by a Seven-Year Economic Plan, which was developed by the Ministry of National Economy with the goal of building the country’s agricultural economy and developing agriculture-based industry. The Overall Economic Development Plan was a general plan aimed at reviving the debilitated economy of Bacha-e-Saqau. Consequently, the cultivation of cotton continued and enhanced, especially, in northern Afghanistan, which had suitable land and water resources for such various crops. Due to the investment in cotton cultivation in northern Afghanistan, an infant textile industry emerged. The aim of the regime was not exclusively economic but also political and social. The government was trying to achieve some extent of economic independence from the Soviet Union in the north because historically Northern Afghanistan served as a convenient market for the bazaars of Central Asia. Moreover, since northern Afghanistan was inhabited mostly by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens, most of whom immigrated from Central Asia during the Czarist and later Bolshevik occupation of Central Asia, the Afghan government pursued a strategy of relocating Afghans to the north. The government started relocating Pashtuns from different tribes in the South to the North of the country, where minority ethnic groups such as Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen were dominant. This policy of relocation aimed to offset the dominance of the minorities in the north by increasing the percentage of Pashtuns. The dominance of Tajik, Uzbek and Turkmen there, posed a potential danger to Afghanistan’s territorial integrity. This type of danger became evident after the onset of civil war in 1992, when, the twenty- percent Pashtun population in the north, in part, prevented the minority opposition from seceding from Afghanistan.32 Similar development projects were undertaken in the south of the country in order to provide some basic commodities, and diminish the southern markets’ dependence on goods from India. Thus, the government was trying to establish some degree of economic independence from the outside world. However, the government was trying to avoid an unfavorable balances of payments. Hence, it did not borrow from the outside because such practice was considered a threat to Afghan independence. Ironically, the onset of WW II hindered the progress of the Seven-Year development Plan. Certain fundamental flaws in the development approach of this period were inherited from the period of King Nader Khan, although, they were inevitable. The first was Nader Khan’s decision to involve the private sector in the financial arrangement of the country. Second was King Nader Khan’s reliance on the Afghan 32 In 1992, when the civil war started between the Mujahideen factions, the minorities formed alliance among each other based on ethnic and linguistic lines. The resulting coalition was called the Northern Coalition. Its aim was to dominate the Afghan government and submit the majority Pashtuns. However, due to the differences between the members of the Northern Coalition along ethnic lines, the goal of dominating the government ceased. Consequently, an alternative, the formation of a separate state for minorities in northern Afghanistan, emerged which also failed after the Taliban dominated the military and political scene in Afghanistan. This is how, they lowered their legitimacy as Afghans. tribes for the defense of the country and his dynasty. Third, Nader Khan chose not to break his word of Pashtunwali to the tribes by imposing taxes on them. He decided instead to tax the merchant class heavily. Similar factors molded Hashim Khan’s administration. Although similar endogenous factors molded Hashim Khan’s administration, however, since Hashim Khan’s period was more stable than Nader Khan’s was, he could have used the opportunity to adjust the role of the private sector in the economy. Unfortunately, he allowed for the continuation of excessive power in the hands of the private sector, which prioritized its own profit over the public. The second factor in the failure of the private and public arrangement was the lack of control over the commodities being imported. For example, some merchants were involved in the manufacturing of a certain commodity, yet they would still import the same type of commodities. The reason for this type of multiple enterprising on the part of the merchants stemmed from the higher profit margin of the imported commodities. This resulted in the creation of multiple tastes on the part of the consumers; that is, the rich ones would buy foreign items and the poor would buy the domestic products. Since the purchasing power of the rich was higher, it translated into higher imports and profit margin for the merchants. This in turn reduced the desire to industrialize because the incentives to industrialize were not there. Hence, this was one of the major flaws of the economic policy of Prime Minister Hashim Khan. Furtado discusses such practices in the case of Latin America. Such practices in Afghanistan by the merchants to increase their profit margins damaged the national interest, which aimed to curb economic dependence on foreign commodities. Furthermore, the import of such commodities also damaged or hindered the progress of the domestic industries. Hashim Khan’s policy of gradualism was a sound one because he did not want to see any disruption in the country’s social-political atmosphere. However, Hashim Khan should have curbed the autonomy of the private sector sooner. Nonetheless, an argument contrary to the aforementioned one could be made. Since Hashim Khan considered a favorable balance of payment an essential element of his economic policy, perhaps, he might have thought that by having the economy in private hands, it will grow and the need to borrow from the outside would not occur. Meanwhile, an unfavorable balance of payment would not accumulate either. With the exception of the unrest in the Katawaz area with the Sulaiman Khail, no major confrontation occurred between Hashim Khan and the tribes, because he neither imposed any liberal reforms on the country, nor violated Islamic values and Pashtunwali principles. Furthermore, the tribes whom Nader Khan had exempted from taxation and conscription also enjoyed those exemptions under Hashim Khan’s administration. Therefore, Hashim Khan did not need to worry about any uprisings among those tribes. The exemptions continued until late 1950s and early 1960s. Furthermore, as I stated above, WW II had a profoundly negative impact on Afghan economic development plans. Since foreign technicians ran most projects, their exodus left most industrial projects in shambles. As to the effects of WW II, the prices of commodities increased significantly. According to Gregorian, the prices of some commodities rose, by as much as 20 percent in the first year of war alone. Furthermore, the situation was worsened when private capital was shifted to Peshawar, where the merchants took advantage of the unstable situation and wanted to make fast profits; hence, they invested in real estate and farms. Inflation was becoming worse, especially when the government issued a huge quantity of Afghan currency into circulation. The following table will illustrate the influx of paper money that had entered circulation from 1938 to 1946: Table III Comparison of paper money in circulation from 1935 to 1946 Year Currency in Circulation 1935 20 Million Afghani 1938 60 Million Afghani 1939 180 Million Afghani 1946 600 Million Afghani (Gregorian, 1969:390) Therefore, the potential threat by the two powers, and failure to establish relationship with Germany (due to the onset of WW II), interrupted industrial development and also prevented the establishment of a modern mechanized army to counter any endogenous threats such as tribal revolts. Hashim Khan would have been successful had it not been for the onset of WW II. Conclusion Since Amanullah Khan’s reforms alienated the religious establishment and tribes, and violated Islam and Pashtunwali, Hashim Khan strove to distant his government from such radical measures. Thus, the Prime Minister continued to prepare the religious sector and the conservative rural-tribal establishment for future modernization while building on the economic recovery that was initiated by Nader Khan. Among the factors that contributed to the underdevelopment of this period were the threats of external powers. Neither the USSR nor England could be trusted in the modernization of the Afghan army due to the negative experiences Afghanistan had with both powers. Among the three endogenous factors, tribal supremacy remained dominant and resisted the extension of any modernization their respective areas. Consequently, modernization efforts concentrated in cities notably Kabul. Tribal supremacy in return was conditioned by the exogenous factor, namely Afghanistan’s strategic location and the imminent threat from the USSR. Prime Minister Hashim Khan saw the need to keep the tribal consensus as well as that of the conservative/religious quarters in order to maintain stability. Tribes whom Nader Khan exempted from taxation and conscription continued to enjoy those exemptions under Hashim Khan’s administration. Lacking a modern and capable army could not have handled any tribal resistance the government in Kabul. The stalemate between the government forces and the Suleiman Khel tribe in the uprising in Katawaz, in Western Afghanistan, proved the inability of the Afghan army to contest tribal military might. However, several problems stemmed from such an arrangement. First, their exemption from taxes put constrains on the revenue generation of the government; consequently, the government had to search for alternative avenues of capital to bring about economic recovery. Bank-e-Melli was one such arrangement that the government thought would be beneficial since it was a private enterprise. The result was, ironically, a strong hand of the private sector that was concerned more with higher profit margins for themselves rather than development; hence, excessive profit of the private sector resulted in the conflict between Bank-e-Melli and the government as explained earlier. The second factor, exemption from conscription, eliminated an opportunity for the tribal population to become acquainted with a relatively modern life in the army different from that of their villages. The reason why serving in the military would have proved beneficial was that the military was an institution where they (the conscripts) could have gotten a glimpse of modern life and consequently, the conscripts would have served as links between some aspect of modernity and their village lives. In most cases, conscripts in other parts of Afghanistan when they returned to their villages from the army became village Maliks or representatives because most of the conscripts had learned to read and write, and adopted broader world-views. Thus, exemption from military service also meant keeping modernity out of the conservative tribal areas, on the one hand, and on the other hand, exemption meant, tribesmen did not send their sons to the army; they stayed at home. In a tribal environment, for a father to have his sons by his side translates into prestige, which is based on wealth, power, clan and one’s sons. The fear of potential unrest forced the government to concentrate modernization in urban centers, hoping that they would serve as models for the rural population. Unfortunately, this concentration of reforms in urban centers excluded the modernization of the agricultural system. Thus, modernization served as a phenomenon inclusive to urban centers. Hence, Hashim Khan adopted an incremental approach, and rejected any developmental aid from foreign powers especially the two powers in order to avoid endangering Afghanistan’s independence. The reasons for both, Zahir Shah and Prime Minister Hashim Khan, to have strong economic relations with Germany stemmed from the negative experiences Afghanistan had with the two competing powers, Czarist Russia and British India. By having political and economic relationship with Germany, Afghanistan would not have to sacrifice its development in order to safeguard its independence. Especially, the modernization of the army would have made the government capable of curbing tribal supremacy. In return, the work in Afghanistan was going to provide as an excellent market for German goods and talent. Its exclusive involvement in Afghanistan would have increased its ability to compete with Britain and other European powers. Afghanistan would have benefited from its economic and political relationship with Germany, had it not been for WW II. Although, a foreign power would have been involved in the modernization of Afghanistan, it, Germany, was geostrategically in no position to pose any threat to Afghan’s independence. Unfortunately, the hopes for the development of Afghanistan and the modernization of its army faded away with the involvement of Germany in WW II. Lack of comprehensive taxation as in Amanullah Khan’s period, the loss of demand for the karakul skins and dried fruits and nuts in Europe and America contributed to the decline in revenues needed for the development of projects. Thus, throughout the 1930s and 1940s, taxation on agriculture and pastoralism declined significantly because the farmers and herdsmen lost revenue and could not pay any taxes. The early 1930s witnessed the economic depression world wide and lowered demands for luxury goods in New York, London and Munich which constituted markets for karakul skin and dried fruits and nuts. Consequently, the economic situation within Afghanistan deteriorated. The unpleasant experiences of this period, especially, the isolation imposed by WW II, convinced the modernist circles among the Afghan elite that there had to be serious attempts at the socioeconomic development of Afghanistan. Subsequently, the modernist elite, which consisted of the young men educated in Europe, pressured Prime Minister Hashim Khan to step down because they did not think that Hashim Khan’s modernization efforts were far-reaching. They wanted a more aggressive and broad social and economic reform that consisted of the allocation of land to poor peasants, and development of light industry. Due to the continuous pressure and deteriorating health, Hashim Khan stepped down in May of 1946, and his brother Shah Mahmud Khan succeeded him as the new Prime Minister. IX. Primier Shah Mahmud Khan, years 1946-1953 9.1 Introduction Educated in France, the new Prime Minister, Shah Mahmud Khan was inspired by European democratic institutions and ideals of representative government. In fact, the year 1946, the onset of Shah Mahmud Khan’s administration marks the beginning of the second wave of political liberalization since Amanullah Khan’s reforms. Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan’s policies molded Afghanistan for the coming decades. 33 Internationally, Afghanistan faced problems that made its position weak. With the defeat of Germany in W.W.II, Afghanistan found itself once again in the sphere of competing world powers, this time the USSR and the USA. With the British out of India, the potential Soviet invasion of Afghanistan appeared imminent to Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan. He continued his efforts to attract US attention as did his predecessor Prime Minister Hashim Khan, in order to have closer economic and political relations with Afghanistan, which would serve two purposes: 1) assist Afghanistan in its development, and 2) deter potential Soviet aggression. Despite the continuous friendly gestures of the Afghan government, the United States did not show any interest. The indifference of the United States eventually forced Afghanistan to fall into the Soviet sphere of influence. 33 When Shah Mahmud Khan became Prime Minister, King Zahir Shah still played a secondary role. On the one hand, Shah Mahmud Khan was the King’s uncle and out of respect, he did not want to assert his independence as a sovereign. On the other hand, Zahir Khan was busy “having fun” and did not pay 9.2 Background Shah Mahmud Khan embarked on a democratic experiment by bringing free elections, which resulted, in the liberal parliament of 1949. Of the 120 members of the parliament, 50 were hard core reformers. The reformers took their jobs seriously, questioning government ministers about budgetary issues. 34 They got the parliament to pass laws that gave complete freedom of press and speech. Such measures provided the opportunity for different radical Marxist groups and their publications to emerge. Their publications served as a vehicle for their anti-traditional propaganda. Students were allowed to form a union at Kabul University that debated many issues ranging from communism to religion. Theatrical pieces were played in which the Royal Family and Islam were insulted. As a response to some anti-Islamic rhetoric in one of the newspapers, a large crowd of the religious scholars and preachers from Kabul and around the country rallied in Kabul, demanding punishment for the individual who had written the blasphemous statement in regards to a sacred shrine (Dupree, 1973:494-6). The student union at Kabul University was viewed as a threat for the status quo. Therefore, the government outlawed the union. However, it was a little too late because the activities facilitated by the freedom of press and speech of Shah Mahmud Khan had already resulted in instability for the future decades. World War II had seriously impaired the Afghan economy. Generating financial hardship for the producers of export items, namely peasants and livestock breeders. In attention to the affairs of the nation. This is why when the King actively participated in national affairs, from 1953, he was a stranger to his own country. addition, the Afghan trading bourgeoisie manipulated its position of monopoly over the import of goods to Afghanistan by setting high prices. The frustration of financial hardships and isolation brought on by the Second World War made development more urgent. The post-WW II period was characterized by the development project of European reconstruction under the Marshall Plan. Afghanistan’s urge to modernize coincided with the post-WW II New World Order. Afghanistan was hoping that it would also become a beneficiary of such aid, since it occupied such a strategic location in the world. The Afghan government’s continuous efforts to interest the United States in rendering development aid to Afghanistan was met with cold responses from the United States. In 1946, Prime Minister Hashim Khan, as a gesture of good will, hired an American company (Morrison-Knudson of Idaho) for the development of the irrigation system of the Helmand Valley (located in Southwestern Afghanistan). The Helmand Valley Project was about the control of water flow as water varies seasonally. Historically, control of water flow was a problem as is evident from the silted canals and deserted towns and large cities. The Afghan officials dreamed of resurrecting the bloom of the deserts again. The plan was to control the flow of water of the Helmand River and build dams. The elements of the project were: the initial construction of roads necessary for the construction of the dams, the construction of two dams and extensive canal system, which included intakes, waterways, laterals and sublaterals. The government set the goal to settle the Afghan nomads upon the completion of the project. Afghanistan paid for the project with its $20 million foreign exchange surplus earned from Karakul export. This deal was made in order to impress 34 The ministers often refused to appear in front of the parliamentary committees. and persuade the United States to establish closer political and economic relations with Afghanistan. This investment absorbed excessive resources and failed as a viable source of revenue. The fact that Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan did not object to this and in fact invested further in the project stemmed from the desire of the Afghan government to strengthen relations with and secure economic and military aid from the United States. The insistence of Afghanistan on having closer economic and political relationship with the US stemmed from its lack of trust in the USSR. Meanwhile, tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan surfaced. When Britain divided India and created Pakistan, the Afghan tribes on the eastern side of the Durand Line were incorporated into Pakistan. Only major urban centers such as Peshawar and Quetta and a few small towns were ruled directly by Pakistan’s government, but the tribal areas were not. Even though, the Pakistani government representative resided in tribal areas, only local khans ruled according to their customs and traditions. Occasionally, uprisings against Pakistan’s authority surfaced, which were met with Pakistani bombing raids. On June 12, 1949, a Pakistani aircraft bombed the village of Moghulgai, 2100 yards inside the Afghan border. Pakistanis claimed that it was not intentional. Afghanistan disagreed and referred to the bombing raids as deliberate. Subsequently, the Afghan government convened the Loya Jerga (Grand Assembly) on July 26 of the same year. The Loya Jerga unanimously voted in favor of complete support for the Pashtunistan issue (Afghanistan’s claim to the tribal area east of the Durand Line) and declared the Durand Agreement of 1893 and its reaffirmation through the subsequent agreements illegal and dead (Dupree, 1973:491-2). Meanwhile, Wali Khan, the leader of the Afridi tribe, led his tribal army into Pakistan, vowing to secure the independence of his fellow Pashtun and Afghan brothers from Pakistan. Consequently, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan worsened; and, in protest, Pakistan imposed the first of the three economic blockades on Afghan intransit goods. Due to the economic blockade, Afghanistan signed a four-year barter agreement with the Soviet Union in July of 1950. Under this agreement, the Soviets offered Afghan cotton and wool at a much higher exchange rate than any Western country offered before. In return, the Soviet Union exported petroleum products, cotton cloth, sugar, and some other commodities to Afghanistan. Thus, items, which were previously imported from the West, were now available from the USSR. This trade agreement marked the beginning of the Afghan-Soviet trade relations since the reign of Amanullah Khan. The urgency of such agreement stemmed from the dependency of the Afghan economy on trade. In fact, thirty percent of the Afghan economy depended on the import and export of goods; without it, the Afghan economy would be debilitated. 9.3 Economic Development In 1947, severe drought imposed significant costs on the population and the economy in general; this intensified the necessity for extensive economic development. To that end, Abdul Majid Zabuli, an entrepreneur and Afghan Minister of National Economy, devised a 12-year development plan estimated at $450 million that covered industry, mining, oil, education and public works. This plan was to embark on a series of interdependent projects including badly needed infrastructure such as roads, hydroelectric power stations and irrigation networks. The rationale of the plan was that formulating interdependent projects would enable the scarce resources to be evenly distributed throughout the economy and bring about socioeconomic development. The way the plan worked was that projects from the different sectors of the economy would depend on each other for productivity, namely irrigation channels would improve agriculture output, which would be processed in the agriculture-based industries. Modernizing coal mining and installing hydroelectric power stations would provide industries as sources of energy. The Afghans were hoping that the US would provide the financing. Therefore, Minister Zabuli accompanied with other Afghan officials flew to Washington in 1949, in order to obtain an economic development loan. The US government referred the Afghan delegates to the Export- Import Bank. The plan was, informally, submitted to the Export- Import Bank, which rejected it for being too ambitious. Subsequently, a six-year development plan was drawn replacing the twelve-year plan. The estimated cost of this plan was expected to be between $95 to $100 millions. The six-year plan was a smaller version of the twelve-year plan, hoping to persuade the Export- Import Bank to agree to a developmental loan. The Afghan government was hoping to borrow $50 million from the USA and the rest of the money would come from Afghanistan’s accumulated exchange reserves. The US government advised the Afghan delegates to analyze the economic difficulties of Afghanistan before presenting the plan to the Export-Import Bank. When the plan was presented to the Export- Import Bank, the Afghan mission had two goals. The first was to devise a plan that would quickly lead to a loan, and the second was to satisfy the industrial needs of Afghanistan, without cutting from existing irrigation projects. The six-year plan was also rejected based on the inclusions of industrial projects. The Export-Import Bank recommended only agricultural development. It argued that agriculture would serve two ends: satisfy the domestic needs as well as export. The bank mentioned to the Afghan delegates that it would not deal with the entire economic development plan; instead, it would consider individual projects. Minister Zabuli reasoned that the projects in the development plan were interdependent and thus to have positive economic impact, they had to be carried out as a whole entity. Zabuli maintained that the textile project was dependent on cultivation of cotton in the north of the country, expanded electric energy, and improved and expanded transportation services. The cement and brick factories were to supply the construction boom all over the country. Furthermore, electric power and coal were needed to run the textile, cement and brick factories. Finally, by increasing the production of fruits, nuts, cotton and meat for domestic consumption as well as export the Afghan economy would expand. Initially, the Afghan delegates were impressed by a US’s $100 million loan to Israel. The Bank had allocated $35 million for specific, approved projects and $65 million for other projects later. Afghan delegates were hoping that Afghanistan would get a similar treatment. Evidently, they were wrong. After the Bank rejected the requested loan, the president of the MorrisonKnudsen Company of Idaho, which was developing the Helmand Valley agricultural project, approached the Export- Import Bank. The Chairman of M-K (Morrison- Knudsen) persuaded the Bank to allocate the loan for agricultural development underway in the existing project of the Helmand Valley, because his company miscalculated the necessary cost and time required for the completion of the project. The company had not studied the project before committing to it. Once the company fell short from finishing the project, the chairman of M-K wanted to save his face. In fact, the M-K chairman’s rationale in persuading the Export-import Bank stemmed from his concern for the potential defamation inherent for the integrity of American Engineering. Thus he wanted the loan to be tailored such to provide funding for the completion of the Helmand Valley Project. Consequently, the bank made the loan contingent upon the exclusion of industrial projects from the plan, so that all the funding is spent on the development of the agricultural projects mostly on the Helmand Valley Project. His aim was that money would be availed to finish the Boghra Canal, part of the Helmand project and the Arghandab Dam, also part of the Helmand Valley project. The Afghan Minister of National Economy, Mr. Zabuli protested that this type of approach would bring on uneven development because this would waste the resources of the country on only one project. When Zabuli recommended to Kabul to forgo the loan, Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan ignored Minister Zabuli’s recommendations and went along with the restricted development loan, simply for political reasons. In fact, any development loan that was made during this period would for the most part be allocated to the Helmand Valley Project. The result was a one-sided investment that adversely affected other sectors of the economy by shifting funding and work force to one agricultural project. It took two decades to see any result from the Helmand Valley Project, all to impress the US for political and economic reasons. According to Kamrany, and other sources, the Helmand Project was a failure. The project constantly required more funding, the transfer of specialists from other sectors of the economy, lack of proper planning, waste of resources, failure to produce revenue and a source of friction between Afghans and Americans. 9.4 Socioeconomic Analysis Since Afghanistan was situated strategically near the oil of the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, this attracted the USSR’s interest to penetrate Afghanistan first economically and later politically. The existence of potential Soviet aggression, the withdrawal of the British from India and the defeat of Germany in the War forced Afghanistan to seek US interest. Furthermore, the hostility that was cultivated by Britain between Afghanistan and Pakistan after the incorporation of the tribal belt into Pakistan restricted Afghanistan in two ways. Afghanistan demanded the right of self-determination for the Afghan tribes, which Pakistan ignored. Thus, Pakistan was in a position to strangle Afghanistan economically because Afghanistan is a landlocked country; however, the incorporation of the tribal area into Afghanistan would have provided access to the ocean. Second, Pakistan was the ally of the United States, which did not want to sell military hardware to Afghanistan in fear of potential Afghan-Pakistani confrontation over the Pashtunistan issue. Thus, past geopolitical problems continued to haunt Afghanistan, and its development efforts. The goal behind the US insistence on the Helmand Valley Project was Agriculture Led Development. The Helmand Valley irrigation system would irrigate the lands and the results would be extensive agricultural produce that would generate revenue from exports. Consequently, the revenue would further the Valley Project and enrich other aspects of the economy as well; a type of domino effect was envisioned for the entire economy. This approach stemmed primarily from the Western perspective that Third World Countries would develop if they relied on the notion of comparative advantage. This type of assumption has excluded some crucial aspects of reality. The export of agricultural commodities to the international markets would make the development of a country like Afghanistan contingent on the fluctuation of demands in other countries; hence, price at international markets would dictate and condition development projects. When the price decreases the revenue decreases as well, and the development efforts become hostage to the imperatives of international markets. This type of behavior was evident during the early 1930s, in the United States as well as some other European countries during the Great Depression. Afghan exports such as the karakuls and dried fruits, which were exported to New York and Germany, were no longer in demand due to the financial hardship brought on by the crash of the stock market. Furthermore, agricultural development can not succeed by itself, if it is not complemented by modern technology. The standard of products has to be kept in line with the international standard for agricultural commodities. Packaging, for example, needs to keep food products from spoilage. Furthermore, for any such a large development project to succeed, managers and other specialists (that are limited in number in the underdeveloped countries) are needed to supervise the project, which taxes other sectors of the economy: an uneven growth results. In fact, the demand for managerial personnel imposed by the Helmand Valley project, taxed other sectors of the economy. In addition, factors such as the availability of markets, trade deficits and consequent impacts of the foreign exchange capability of a country diminishes the potential for success and contributes to the perpetuation of underdevelopment. Another factor that will further reduce the chance of development, is the difference in price between manufactured and non-manufactured goods. Manufactured goods are more expensive than agricultural goods. The reason for this is that manufactured goods are not sold based on the value of the substance that constitutes the manufactured goods rather the price stems from the notion of Know-how, possession of manufactured goods, the cost of the raw material, labor, and method of production. That is why a significant amount of agricultural commodities must be sold in order to purchase a little industrial machinery. Thus, agricultural led development by itself is not really development but rather underdevelopment exhibited in a different form. This was evident in the 1970s, when the Helmand project could not even cover its operational costs. Economically, the Helmand project did not create any secondary effects, according to Kamrany (1969). This was due to the location of the project, being distant from any major population center; total investment in the project relative to the rest of the economy, which slowed the rate of growth in other sectors of the economy. In addition, the land was not suitable for efficient productivity; hence, the project did not attract any foreign private investment (Kamrany, 1969:32). Some commentators claim that the decision to initiate this project in the Helmand area came from the influence of powerful Pashtun government members, who wanted to settle the nomad Pashtuns. If the 150 million dollars were invested in projects as initially proposed by the development plan of Minister Zabuli, the cost would have been justifiable because the revenue would have covered the cost. The development plan that was proposed by Minister Zabuli was an evenly developed plan that had stressed industrial and agricultural developments alike. Meanwhile, the Afghan economy had suffered from the disruption caused by WW II. World markets, where karakul and dried fruits and nuts which brought home hard currency, ceased to serve as the source of revenue. Most joint-stock companies fell apart and industrial machinery and parts stopped working. However, by the end of 1947, most shirkats or joint-stock companies recovered from the effects of WW II. Before WW II, due to bad harvests, famine became widespread throughout the country. Consequently, in 1947, 1952 and 1953, the Afghan government began importing wheat, to reduce the effects of bad harvests. The government provided wheat through the program of Commodity Assistance, which provided flour at a reduced price to the public. This, in addition to price control on bread, kept prices down and reduced the production of wheat. The government did not buy the wheat from the farmers to alleviate their financial burden and to provide them with incentives to continue harvesting. For example, the government was encouraging farmers in the north to grow cotton, but farmers did not see much incentive in doing so due to the price differential between cotton and wheat; hence, they grew wheat instead. The lack of effective public policies to induce farmers to produce various crops resulted in unfortunate effects for the agriculture based industries. In 1946, when the wheat harvest failed, the government allowed farmers to grow wheat instead of cotton and sugar beet. The ramification of this was felt in the textile and sugar factories. Textile factory was operating below capacity, and the sugar factory was shut down due to lack of sugar beets (Fry, 1946:49-50). The government’s flaw in agriculture sector is illustrated by the following quote: “…As far as the economy as a whole is concerned, the real problem is to encourage the farmers to produce a marketable surplus to feed that part of the population which lives in towns or does not own land. In this, the country’s agricultural policy has failed. Indeed, the more interference from the government in the agricultural sector, the more the Afghan farmer seems to retreat into the shell of self-consumption or barter.” (Bharier, 1972 in Fry, 1974) Import substitution industries had also failed in achieving the desired outcome. The development approach that the government pursued was uneven by investing heavily in irrigation projects such as the Helmand Valley Project. However, after the Export-Import Bank rejected Zabuli’s proposed plan, and made the development loan contingent upon its expenditure on the Helmand Project, the result was excessive investment in one sector of the economy. Consequently, the type of coordination that the plan proposed between the industrial projects and pertinent agriculture projects did not come about. Subsequently, most industries functioned below capacity because farmers did not have incentives to grow pertinent agriculture produce. For example, textile and sugar factories were idle due to the lack of cotton and sugar beet. Thus, the success of most public sector industries suffered from the flawed agricultural policies. The following quote points to the failure of the public sector enterprises: “This is not surprising since, typically, public industrial enterprises operate at 30 to 40 percent of capacity” (quote in Fry, 1974). Meanwhile, conflict between private industrial entrepreneurs and government had been evident. After Nader Khan gave the private sector a virtual monopoly over the economy, it aimed at profiting through the import of consumption goods and luxury, and avoided, for the most part, investment in industry. Hence, the private sector was restrained in the period 1953-1963. 9.4.1 Social Costs There were social costs associated with the Helman Valley Project. It failed to provide a sustainable environment for the nomads, some of whom settled there, but could not support their livelihood from the proposed agricultural opportunity of the project. Not only, did they not benefit from the project. They actually abandoned the valley. The disruption of their way of life had tremendous socioeconomic costs in terms of the families, which first settled, and then returned to their nomadic way of life. Furthermore, the concentration of resources in one region of the country deprived other regions of other important and economically fruitful projects. Since Pashtuns or Afghans inhabit Southwestern Afghanistan, the over-investment in that area not only alienated the Tajiks and Uzbeks in the north, Hazaras in center Afghanistan, and Nuristanis in the east of the country, but also other Pashtuns in the east and south of Afghanistan. Thus, the social costs of such one-sided development were endured by all the segments of population, including the inhabitants of Helmand. Meanwhile, the young and more radical members of the Afghan Royal Family were not content with the foreign policies of Shah Mahmud Khan because they did not accelerate the rate of progress needed in the country. He was especially criticized for not stimulating East-west competition in Afghanistan. The basis for such criticism stemmed from the small amount of aide received from the United States that was not sufficient to bring the type of large-scale economic development needed. Consequently, Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan was forced to give up his position and let General Mohammad Daud Khan occupy the post of Prime Minister of Daud Khan became Prime Minister in 1953. Conclusion The substance of this chapter confirms the first and second hypotheses. The introduction of liberal measures such as unchecked freedom of press and freedom of speech provided opportunity for so-called modernists to attack the religious establishment and single out religious leaders, Islamic values and cultural and social values under the pretext of modernization. Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan, with the support of the European educated modernists, imposed on Afghanistan a sociopolitical arrangement that contradicted the basic tenets of traditional Afghan society. Radical student groups and other leftists used the newly institutionalized freedom of speech and press to publicly exhibit their animosity towards Islamic values. These groups also advocated “women’s liberation”, which went against the code of Pashtunwali. Moreover, students from different parts of the country who were studying in Kabul University were taking anti-traditional ideas when returning to their homes during school breaks. This created conflict between sons and their fathers. The elders blamed the government and its educational system for alienating their sons from the traditional-Islamic way of life; therefore, resentments toward the government of Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan and the Royal Family circulated throughout the country among the religious traditional sector of society. That is why, toward the end of this period, Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan acknowledged the emerging discontent in society and started to abandon his liberalization experiment. By that time, strong disagreements had sprung up within the Royal House with the Prime Minister’s policies, because the freedom of press and speech facilitated the opportunity for the anti-monarchy elements to discredit the existence of monarchy in Afghanistan. Since Afghanistan had suffered from Anglo-Russian competition in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Prime Minister Hashim Khan, in the 1930s to early 1940s, tried hard to avoid closer relations with any powerful state except Germany. However, with the defeat of Germany in the Second World War, Hashim Khan tried to attract the interest of the United States in having diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Closer relationship with the USA was to serve two purposes, Soviet deterrence and socioeconomic development. After Hashim Khan’s resignation in 1946, Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan followed the policy of his predecessor to impress the United States for establishing closer political and economic relationship. In order to impress the US, Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan expanded the development of the Helmand Valley Project that Hashim Khan had contracted with the American Company, Morrison-Knudson of Idaho. Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan’s decision to accept the conditional loan stemmed from his plan to deter potential Soviet aggression toward Afghanistan. Hence, the threat that Afghan government felt from the Soviet Union, provided the Americans with an opportunity to save the face of the M-K Company. In the process, Afghanistan had to accept investing in a project that neither brought prosperity to Southwestern Afghanistan, contrary to what was hoped, nor produced any secondary economic effects (Newell, 1972: 122; & Kamrany, 1969). Hence, in the 19th century, the competition between Britain and Czarist Russia isolated Afghanistan from the rest of the world leaving it in its primitive state of underdevelopment. In the 20th century, the competition between the USA and the USSR provided opportunity to the Afghan government to safeguard the country’s independence by adopting developmental approaches to persuade the United States to have closer relationship with Afghanistan. Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan went as far as accepting the development loan from the Export-Import Bank contrary to the recommendations of the Afghan National Economy Minister, Majid Zabuli, simply to attract the US to deter the USSR. Therefore, both endogenous and exogenous factors played roles in hindering development. Endogenously, Europe-educated leaders such as Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan saw the development of Afghanistan in the adoption of the European value system. Shah Mahmud believed measures such as freedom would bring development to Afghanistan. In essence, Shah Mahmud viewed European ways independent of the social and historical realities of European culture. Concurrently, he ignored the social and historical realities of the Afghan culture and resorted to the imposition of a sociopolitical arrangement that brought instability to the country. Sudden and unconstrained freedom of speech and press discounted the value systems, Islam and Pashtunwali. Hence, among the endogenous factors are individual leaders and their adoption of a system that violated Islam and Pashtunwali. The exogenous factor consisted of the threat from the USSR to Afghanistan. Accepting the restricted development loan was supposed to serve as a vehicle to attract the interests of the United States in order to serve as deterrence for any potential Soviet aggression toward Afghanistan. Consequently, the younger members of the royal family reacted against Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan for not manipulating the competition between the USSR and the USA to acquire development aid. In addition, Shah Mahmud was criticized for his excessive freedoms, which only brought instability and discontent. Under pressure, Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan stepped down on September 20 1953 and the King appointed his cousin and classmate General Mohammed Daud Khan as the new Prime Minister (Dupree, 1973:498). X. Daud Khan’s Administration, 1953 – 1963 10.1 Introduction This period, 1953-1963, of Afghan history was led by Prime Minister Mohammed Daud Khan. General Mohammed Daud Khan (44) was an imperious prince, self-confident, arrogant and a strong nationalist, who was determined to bring development and progress to Afghanistan. Since he was a student during the reign of Amanullah Khan, he appreciated the complexities of development in the country (Ahmad, 1990:268). This period constituted the second main wave of modernization since the reign of Amanullah Khan. Prime Minister Daud Khan’s administration was a reaction to his predecessor Shah Mahmud Khan’s policies. He criticized his Predecessor, for being too passive because he failed to acquire enough development assistance by manipulating the strategic significance of Afghanistan in order to accelerate the development of Afghanistan. He also shared the opposition of the religious establishment and others to his political liberalization, the sluggishness of the Helmand Valley Project, his strong pro-Western stand, his lack of commitment to the Pashtunistan issue, and slow social and economic reforms (Dupree, 1973:499). This period is characterized by increased foreign aid from the USSR, large-scale infrastructure projects, and modernization of the Afghan army and air force. The construction of basic infrastructure such as roads, airports, river ports and telecommunication network put- in-place the needed framework before any development programs could be implemented. In addition, the Afghan army and air force were modernized, thus, enabling the state to have the upper hand over the powerful tribes. The development approach pursued during this period consisted of state planned and -guided economic development. 10.2 Background After the British withdrawal from India and the defeat of Germany, Afghanistan approached the American government officials at all levels to establish strong economic and political relations including the desire to purchase military hardware and training for Afghan officers. Unfortunately, the American government rejected the continuous requests for military aid. The Afghan officials wanted such American military relations with Afghanistan to serve as deterrence against possible Soviet aggression. Instead, President Eisenhower approved the first American military aid to Pakistan in February of 1954, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles rejected Afghanistan’s request for the sale of arms in December of the same year. Moreover, Secretary Dulles sent a copy of the rejection letter to government of Pakistan. Sending that letter to the government of Pakistan signaled the lack of respect on the part of the US to Afghanistan as a nation-state on the one hand, and on the other hand, it increased tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Understandably, Prime Minister Daud Khan accepted a Soviet military offer one-month later. Understandably, Prime Minister Daud Khan accepted the Soviet military offer one month later (Poullada, 1987). Furthermore, the hostility between Afghanistan and Pakistan stemming from the incorporation of the tribal area east of the Durand Line (Pashtunistan) into the nationstate of Pakistan continued. Consequently, Afghanistan voted against Pakistan’s membership in the United Nations. As retaliation, Pakistan initiated a number of blockades that either hindered goods in transit from entering Afghanistan, or delayed the goods in transit until the rent of storage of goods exceeded the actual value of the goods. Among the commodities that were affected by the blockade were petroleum products. The purpose of this was to immobilize the Afghan army. Daud Khan, who was a general and ex-defense-minister, was strongly distressed. Consequently, in June 1955, Afghanistan asked to renew the 1950 transit agreement with the Soviet Union to relieve the stress of Pakistan’s economic blockade on Afghan economy. Furthermore, the Soviet Union extended the 1950 transit agreement for five years. It offered free transit, and airlift for perishable goods such as fruits. On August 27, 1955, a barter agreement on commodity exchange was signed between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Closer relations with the USSR served multiple purposes. On the one hand, Afghanistan needed an alternative transit route due to Pakistan’s economic blockade. On the other hand, Prime Minister Daud Khan needed to modernize the Afghan army and air force in order to establish the government’s upper hand over the tribes. General Mohammed Daud Khan was a young man during Amanullah Khan’s reign. He appreciated the significance of a modern mechanized army because he witnessed how a group of 300 bandits under Bacha-e-saqao attacked Kabul and defeated the government forces forcing Amanullah Khan to abdicate the throne. He was among the students sent abroad during the reign of Amanullah Khan and benefited from the modernization of the 1920s; hence, he was eager to modernize Afghanistan. Daud Khan started to modernize the army and air force prior to any other modernization, so that the modern armed forces could secure his administration and development efforts against any tribal insurrection. Subsequently, when the tribes of the Khost area (which also revolted against Amanullah Khan in 1924) revolted against Daud Khan’s women liberation policies, the modern mechanized army was able to put down the rebellion quickly. The Soviets, however, built on the shortcomings of the United States, illustrated by the Helmand Valley Project. Afghanistan faced difficulties in obtaining loans from the US because until the early 1950s, the USA did not have any bureaucratic arrangement to process and handle any requests for development assistance. This, however, changed when the responsibility for foreign assistance was assigned to the new International Cooperation Administration (ICA), which ultimately gave way to the Agency for International Development (AID) in 1961. The Soviets wanted to build projects whose fruitfulness could be appreciated in the short run because the visibility of such projects would also reduce the suspicion of the Afghan people regarding the Soviet Union. For example, the Soviet Union provided construction implements and financing to pave the roads and built new ones. Meanwhile, the USA had rejected the request of the Afghan government because they claimed that such projects were non-productive. The Soviets also built a wheat silo and a mechanized bakery that further strengthened their image in the eyes of common people and their effectiveness in development projects, unlike US financed projects that lingered on. The third economic blockade imposed by Pakistan occurred from September 1961 to June 1963. Again, the Soviet Union offered help. During the blockade, 15 Soviet cargo planes transported Afghan commodities daily to the Soviet Union. Consequently, another barter trade agreement was signed between Soviet Union and Afghanistan on February 27, 1963 that entailed the exchange of Afghan wool, cotton, and fresh and dried fruits for Soviet cars, oil, cameras and watches. 10.2.1 Educational Policy Interestingly enough, the school system in Afghanistan grew rapidly in the mid1950s, due to the assistance of the United States. The United States did this in an effort to counter Soviet involvement. It was part of the USA’s efforts to contain the expansion of communism. Primary schools opened in some villages and district centers; secondary schools were established in provincial centers and secondary boarding schools in Kabul. Though a number of colleges were established in the 1930s, that number grew in the 1940s to form Kabul University in 1947. With the influx of foreign aid and sponsors for different colleges, Kabul University expanded. Thus, during the years 1955-1963, the number of students in primary and secondary school almost tripled whereas students in post-secondary schools, most of whom, were at Kabul University, quadrupled. Table 10.1 illustrates the growth of the school system: Year Primary Secondary Total University & Students Students 1950-51 91,414 4,908 96,322 461 1955 111,658 9,300 120,958 758 1961 213,676 20,133 233,809 1,987 1965 358,037 45,248 403,285 3,451 other 3rd level Source: Barnett Rubin’s The Fragmentation of Afghanistan 1995. It is worth pointing that the educational system was not evenly distributed throughout Afghanistan. For example, in 1959, 73.7 percent of all secondary school students were in Kabul because the number of secondary schools there by far exceeded the schools of all the provinces combined. 10.2.2 Economic Policy Prime Minister Daud Khan was unhappy with his predecessor’s slow pace of development, his failure to secure additional loans from the Export- Import Bank to complete the Helmand Valley Project, and the phenomenal profits made by the private joint-stock companies at the cost of national development. This is why, Daud Khan’s development approach was that of statism or government planned and guided economic development, wherein the state plans and leads the economy (Dupree, 1973:507). Turkey had adopted statism or planned and guided economic development in its bid for national development in April 1931. The Afghan Minister of Finance and National Economy, General Abdul Malik, had significant influence over Daud Khan in adopting this approach because Abdul Malik was educated in Turkey, and was impressed by Turkish achievements. In 1955, the USSR granted a one hundred million dollars long-term loan, which was to be spent on projects determined by the joint Soviet-Afghan survey teams. After signing the official agreement in January 28, 1956, Prime Minister Daud Khan embarked on his first five-year plan in March 1956. The $100 million development loan offered by the USSR was large enough to finance all of the projects of the first-five-year plan in 1956 without any delay. The goal of the first five-year plan was to build the basic physical infrastructure that ranged from extensive roads system, airports, and hydroelectric plants to dams with canal systems. As part of the first plan, the Afghan army and air force were modernized. Consequently, the Soviets supplied Afghan air force with MIG 17 jet fighters, tanks, heavy artillery, and radio communication systems (Newell, 1972:72-73). The first five-year plan achieved some remarkable accomplishments (Gankovsky, 1982:257-8; Dupree, 1973:509). Encouraged by the success, Prime Minister Daud Khan launched the second-five-year plan in 1962. The plan’s emphasis was on the development of the basic sectors of the economy, namely mining, power, transport and agriculture. The road construction projects continued from the first-five year plan. By the end of the plan, the country had more than 1200 miles of paved roads connecting all the major regions to the Soviet and Pakistani railheads (Newell, 1972: 180-1). Again, the Soviet Union provided a credit of $200 million to finance the second-five-years plan. Due to Daud Khan’s resignation in 1963, the development plan was completed in 1967 by the following two Prime Ministers, Dr. Yusuf and Hashim Maiwandwal (Kamrany, 1969). Reliance on foreign aid did not allow the government to mobilize internal resources for development such as a tax system capable of capturing of capital for productive investment. A small portion of taxes came from agricultural land-holdings; most of the revenue that came from taxation was from indirect taxes such as import and export taxes. Table 10.2 indicates development expenditure during the first and second plan: Table 10.2 Planned Financing of Development Expenditure (Millions of Afghanis) Development Expenditure First Plan 1956-1961 Second Plan 1962-1967 Public sector 10,499 39,369 Private sector 0 269 Finance of public sector Foreign Aid Commodity Assistance 10,499 39,100 7,508 26,699 5,818 (Fry, 1974:70) 10.3 Socioeconomic Analysis Prime Minister Daud Khan was determined to bring socioeconomic development to Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the United States did not show any interest in helping either in economic development or in the modernization of the army. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s precarious, land-locked location and strategic significance left no alternative for the country but to turn to the Soviet Union. Two factors were responsible for this: 1) the need for a transit route in light of the economic blockades by Pakistan and 2) the modernization of the military to maintain internal security in the case of any potential uprising. While Daud Khan was Prime Minister, Pakistan imposed the second economic blockade in 1955 bringing yet another hardship on the economy and the people. Therefore, Afghan commodities had to find an alternative export route. On August 27 1955, a protocol was signed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan that entailed commodity exchange. Under this protocol, the Soviet Union exported petroleum products, rolled ferrous metals, and building materials in exchange for Afghan cotton, wool and rawhides. In essence, a bartered economic relation was established between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Hence, a dependency relationship, in which Afghanistan was dependent on the USSR, was established. This dependency relationship was related to the indifference of the United States. Britain’s defeat in Afghanistan seems to have influenced the American administration to distant itself from Afghan development of any type. This was evident in the treatment of Prime Minister Daud Khan on his trip to England where he was received coldly by Britain’s Prime Minister. After his return to Kabul, Prime Minister Daud Khan gave a speech in Kabul Polytechnic in which he conveyed his harshest criticism to England. The position that was occupied by Britain before WW II was occupied by the United the States after WW II. However, the US refused the sale of military hardware to Afghanistan based on two factors. 1) The US thought that such a deal would provoke Russia since the Soviet Afghan Treaty of 1931 had forbidden alliance with any third state that would endanger the interests of one of the contracting parties. 2) Any United States’ military sale would have undermined the US’s plan to build up Pakistan’s military because Pakistan was an ally of the United States that had strained relationships with Afghanistan (Ahmad, 1990:263-4). The army served as vehicle of nation building. Daud recruited mostly Ghilzai Pashtuns to the army and air force, prevented minorities such as Shia and Ismaili as well as some Tajiks with sectarian affiliations from the military and foreign affairs. Consequently, the minorities entered civil educational institution such as the school of medicine and public education. Education in civil institution served as vehicle of social mobility. Daud Khan’s and his predecessor’s discriminatory policy mustered the formation of various leftist radical groups, which opposed the governance, and they demanded participation in the political process. At the end of the first-five-years plan, the national income of Afghanistan had increased by 50 percent (Kamrany, 1969). Since the Soviet Union played a crucial role in the first plan, Zahir Shah, Prime Minister Daud Khan and the national assembly thanked the Soviet Union for its active role in enhancing the Afghan economy. Projects completed as the result of the first-five-years plan include: a. The Naghlu hydroelectric project; b. Pul-i-Khumri hydroelectric project; c. Darunta irrigation project; d. Salang pass road (the three-mile tunnel that connected north and south Afghanistan through a modern highway); e. Bagram airfield; f. Jungalak (a suburb of Kabul) automotive workshop; g. Kabul airfield (expansion of runways); h. Qizil Qala port; i. Arms and military equipment; j. Petroleum exploration program and aerial survey; k. Kushka-Herat-Kandahar road and Shindand airfield. Prime Minister Daud Khan was able to instigate foreign aid to Afghanistan via the Cold-War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the US. With increased Soviet economic assistance, the US Congress became nervous at the possibility of losing Afghanistan to the Soviet sphere, that is why, the US increased its yearly aid to Afghanistan from $1 million per year from 1950 to 1954, to about $10 million from 1954 to 1957 (Kamrany, 1969: 58). Consequently, the Soviet Union further increased its aid to Afghanistan as a response to the American assistance. Once the competition between the two superpowers in regard to development assistance accelerated, Afghanistan sent letters to Moscow and Washington DC in 1959, that it will not accept development assistance in the form of credit, rather as grants. The Soviet Union and the US both responded positively. Although the USSR and the United States financed the various projects, they were expected to implement them as well. However, this type of practice contributed to the future failure of development projects, because the donors conditioned the Afghan officials to accepting that the donors would also supervise and complete the projects. Consequently, the badly needed professional planning staff for future projects that could formulate, implement and evaluate development plans did not evolve because the Afghan officials did not think strategically by investing in the long term development of Afghanistan. In addition, foreign aid had conditioned the Afghan officials to thinking that the implementation of the project was the domain of the donors. Due to the excessive reliance on the donors for supervision and the lack of commitment on the part of Afghan officials, development resources were mismanaged and wasted (Fry, 1974:81). Moreover, foreign aid contributed to the inconsistency in development. Development had to be tailored according to the availability of foreign aid. That is, whatever the development assistance was earmarked for, it had to be spent on. Thus, development could not continue, for the most part, according to a predetermined plan. In fact, foreign aid had influenced the entire planing and implementation process of development. It created an atmosphere wherein the Afghan government expected foreign aid to continue and saw no incentives to mobilize domestic resources such as taxation and natural resources. Development was also impacted by the objective of donors as to whether the project in question was for short-term or long-term benefits. Donor’s specification as to what the grants could be spent on had further contributed to the whole “picture” of underdevelopment. Although investment in infrastructure was crucial because it was the foundation of economic development, starting with the first development plan, development was not planned such that different projects reinforced and supported each other. The funding of the first development plan was allocated in such manner that 40% of the funds were allocated to agriculture and related constructions, 30% justifiably to transportation and communication (mostly for building paved roads); however, industry and social services received the least of the funding (12.5% each). The first part of the funding was mostly eaten up by the Helmand project. That is why not enough was left to other sectors of the economy. The second contribution to the long-term underdevelopment of foreign aid was the lack of mobilization of domestic resources. As reiterated in the previous sections, taxing agriculture and livestock diminished significantly; in fact, Afghanistan had the second lowest tax revenue in the world after Burma. The success of any donorfinanced plan should be gauged on the future success of domestic resource mobilization. That is, the various developmental plans would have been successful if the resulting infrastructure served as the foundation whereupon the domestic resources could have been mobilized for future development. Contrary to Amanullah Khan, who relied on agriculture in mobilizing domestic resources for his development plans, yet starting from 1953, agriculture and livestock taxes have continuously decreased, and diminished as serious sources of development. For example, agriculture and livestock taxes amounted to 18 percent of domestic revenue in March 1953, however, by 1958 taxes decreased to 7 percent (Rubin, 1995:65). The agricultural sector, meanwhile, did not see much investment, even-though, agricultural commodities constituted 90% of Afghanistan’s export. Large projects, like the Helmand Valley Project, were not well thought out. The only agricultural commodities that brought hard currency were fresh and dried fruits and nuts. The non-agricultural products, such as rug production also encountered strong international competition; especially, the demand for hand-woven rugs declined owing to the introduction of factory woven carpets. In addition, his strong control of the economy forced many businesses to shift their resources abroad. Prime Minister Daud Khan was pressured by the King to resign in 1963. He had contributed significantly to the development of infrastructure. However, he paved the way for Soviets penetration of the Afghan military and economy. Thus, the USSR had achieved access to the Afghan economy and to influence its political system, a goal the Soviets had tried from the 1930s. Conclusion At this point, it is appropriate to discuss the conformity of the hypothesis (1) to the substance of this chapter. Some of Prime Minister Daud Khan policies violated Islamic and Pashtunwali principles of Afghanistan. The religious establishment was not content with Daud Khan’s closer relationship with the USSR, because the USSR was the same Bolshevik state that oppressed the Muslims of Central Asia, and subjugated them to atheistic communism. By having closer economic and political relationship with the USSR and the adoption of a planned economic development exposed Afghan military officers as well as students from civil institutions to communist ideological indoctrination. In addition, the ulema were not content with the “women’s liberation” moves of Daud Khan in 1959, when he and his wife along with cabinet members and their wives showed up unveiled in the Independence Day military parade. He did so at the time when his army and police force were strong enough to crush any kind of rebellion. In fact, fierce rebellion occurred in Kandahar in southwestern Afghanistan. The conservative people of Kandahar considered Daud Khan’s women liberation as an insult to their Pashtunwali. However, the rebellion was put down with the newly mechanized army after significant bloodshed. To investigate the conformity of hypothesis (2) to the substance of this chapter, it is appropriate to take a holistic view as in the previous chapters. Afghanistan’s vulnerable strategic location, and its landlocked position, compelled Prime Minister Daud Khan to seek a transit route through the Soviet Union. This served two purposes: first, it alleviated the economic burden imposed by the Pakistani blockade; and second, by accepting its developmental assistance, it alleviated any potential aggression from the Soviet Union. The economic blockades as well as potential threat from the USSR continued the issue of the Anglo-Russian rivalry of the 19th and early 20th centuries on Afghanistan. With the American government’s refusal to sell military hardware to Afghanistan, Daud Khan turned to the Soviets for military hardware as well as developmental assistance. This provided Prime Minister Daud Khan with the opportunity to use the Soviet development assistance and follow a planned development approach. The USA’s indifference from the 1930s onward and Daud Khan’s desire to urgently embark on development projects, turned Afghanistan into a ground of opportunity which both Soviets and Americans manipulated under the pretext of development. The Soviets wanted to hinder Western influence in Afghanistan while preparing the ground for the long-term control of Afghanistan. Americans attempted to counter Soviet designs by maintaining intelligence operations through Peace Corps volunteers. Therefore, both endogenous and exogenous factors played roles in this period. The Pashtunistan issue, the consequent economic blockade by Pakistan coupled with the influx of the USSR’s military and economic aid attest to the strategic significance of Afghanistan and the attempts of world powers to gain control. As the USA took sides with Pakistan against Afghanistan after WW II, the Soviet Union was able to penetrate Afghan society at various levels. As a result, Afghanistan was unable to lead its own development. Instead, it fell prey to the interests of dependency and control of foreign powers. Hence, the strategic significance as the exogenous factor influenced the perpetuation of underdevelopment in this period as it has in the past. Prime Minister Daud Khan realized that the existence of a modern mechanized army is essential for the onset of any development because a modern army could suppress any tribal uprising if it occurred. Past events validated Daud Khan’s determination. In other words, the tribal structure of Afghanistan served as one of the endogenous factors making it necessary to have a modern army. This time, tribal resistance to the intrusion of projects such as the construction of roads and telecommunication and taxation did not succeed. For example, in the fall of 1959, the Mangal tribe in the south revolted against Daud Khan’s plans to build roads and telecommunication. Daud Khan used his newly acquired modern army and crushed the resistance. Daud Khan’s personality, stubbornness and unorthodox ways of dealing with social ills---corruption in particular served as another of the three endogenous factors in hindering long-term development. For example, on one occasion he entered a bakery in Kabul to inspect as to whether the baker abode by the established standards required by the government or not. After weighing the amount of dough for bread, Daud Khan found out that the baker was cheating. He then held the baker from his arms and threw him into Ta’nur, a traditional oven fixed in the ground. That is why Daud Khan earned the nickname, Daud the Crazy. His rigid and uncompromising personality and insistence on his own ideas gained him the opposition of many in the ruling elite. Thus, Zahir Shah, who was Daud Khan’s cousin and classmate, and who had, by this time, had become active in government affairs, and requested his resignation as Prime Minister in 1963. The combined effects of endogenous factors such as Daud Khan’s personality, the tribal structure of the country, and “women liberation” policies as well as the exogenous factor of strategic location and foreign interests, got in the way of development, and, in fact, placed the country at the mercy of foreign powers interested in their own advancement and the continuation of a weak Afghanistan. XI. Constitutional Liberalization, 1963-1973 11.1 Introduction After his resignation of Prime Minister Mohammad Daud Khan, the constitutional period (1963-1973) was initiated through the promulgation of a new and liberal constitution in 1964, followed by elections for parliament in 1965. Until this period Zahir Shah had not participated actively in the government out of respect for his uncles, Hashim Khan and Shah Mahmud Khan, who served as Prime Ministers from 1933 to 1953. However, during the ten years of Daud Khan’s premiership, 1953 to 1963, he started actively to participate because Daud Khan was both his cousin and age peer. It was in the constitutional period that Zahir Shah asserted his rule by trying to develop a constitutional monarchy (Dupree, 1973:555). The new parliament included representatives of various backgrounds ranging from conservative ulema to Marxists and women. This period is characterized by social-political upheavals brought about by contradictions within the administrativepolitical infrastructure of the state and facilitated by freedoms granted by the liberal constitution. During this period, Kabul University became the breeding ground for Marxist and Maoist groups as well as for their counter-parts, the Islamic activist organizations. The various new ideas, whether they were Marxist or Pan-Islamic, inspired many students; however, the liberal constitution facilitated an atmosphere for these groups to produce instability. The social-political situation had been marked by student demonstrations including the death of the Maoist student leader at the hands of the members of the Islamic organization at Kabul University. In fact, one of the Marxist groups, the Parcham, springing out of this constitutional period, would play a decisive role in the 1973 coup of former Prime Minister Daud Khan. The political instability during this period could be gauged from the continuous appointments of Prime Ministers. During the ten years from 1963 to 1973, five different Prime Ministers and cabinets came and went. 11.2 Background Acting under pressure from the USA, according to some former Afghan officials, Zahir Shah asked for the resignation of Prime Minister Daud Khan and introduced a representative form of government enshrined under the title of democracy in 1963. Subsequently, the king instructed a panel of experts to draft a liberal constitution. The promulgation of the liberal constitution in 1964 made this period a constitutional monarchy and prohibited members of the Royal Family from holding any political office. However, the King retained control over the government. Neither was the government elected from parliament nor was it responsible to the parliament. The king appointed the Prime Minister, who elected the cabinet. The parliament ratified the Prime Minister and his cabinet. This period of Afghan history had two causative factors from the previous periods. The first was the inception of political groups, excessive freedom of expression and press and the instability in 1946-1953, during the administration of Shah Mohammed Khan. Shah Mahmud Khan’s permitting freedom of the press and of expression encouraged students at Kabul University to become organized into an infant political force. Furthermore, the expansion of educational institutions during Daud Khan’s premiership, and the increased influx of graduates from colleges in Afghanistan and foreign universities flooded the job market with no opportunities in sight. The economy was not in a position to support the growing number of graduates. Discontent increased among the newly educated/intellectual segment of the population. The second factor was the lack of control over the newly released left wing political prisoners, who were imprisoned by Daud Khan during his tenure as Prime Minister. Upon their release from prison, these individuals took advantage of the constitutional period to organize themselves into a serious political force advocating for the legalizing of political parties and a demarcation between the powers of the king and those of the government. In the economic realm, availability of foreign aid from the USSR and the US removed any need among Afghan politicians to increase domestic revenue. As a result, foreign aid constituted nearly the only source to finance development projects. The impact of this shortsightedness was felt particularly after 1966 when foreign aid declined, bringing about a fiscal crisis. Fry (1974:75) illustrates some of the reasons for the decline in foreign aid: “Several factors may account for the decline in foreign savings [foreign aid]. One factor must be that Afghanistan’s own fiscal and financial efforts were lax. If, in the country’s own estimation, its development did not deserve a substantial input of domestic savings, why should savers elsewhere take up the slack? Another factor must be the accelerating rise in Afghanistan’s foreign debts for accruing interest and amorization. On the national balance sheet, debt to the outside world has been rising relative to the national equity, and that is always the warning signal that makes creditors back away from new commitments. (Fry, 1974:75) Due to heavy reliance on foreign aid, the government planned according to the availability of aid; development plans had to be adjusted to the availability of foreign aid. Hence, due to the adoption of such a mentality on the part of Afghan officials, no consistency existed in expenditure from one year to the next. Expenditure was contingent upon the availability of foreign aid. In essence, the government was conditioned from 1956 by foreign aid, and development was compromised by the fluctuation in the amount and type of foreign aid available. Naturally, not too many productive projects were completed. In addition to the two factors above, the lack of qualified planners and planning mechanisms even further the exacerbated the situation (Rubin, 1995; Kamrany, 1969). Foreign aid was available; however, qualified individuals to supervise the various projects did not exist. In some cases, consulting firms were hired to supervise the projects. That, nonetheless, cost the government. Meanwhile, foreign aid was not allocated proportionally all over Afghanistan. Rather, it was dispensed to parts of the country where tribal power was dominant in order to foster support for the government. This addresses the tribal structure of Afghan society and its relationship to the central government in Kabul, as the government in Kabul always needed tribal approval in regard to its policies. 11.2.1 Political Reforms The implementation of a liberal approach in a traditional society like Afghanistan is bound to create conflict rather than harmony. Zahir Shah’s liberal experimentation facilitated the environment for elements opposing the monarchy to reorganize and grow. A Marxist political party, called Khalq, emerged. This party split later into two, Khalq and Parcham. As a reaction to these left-wing organizations, Muslim student political organizations also sprang up at Kabul University. Since the liberal constitution of 1964 guaranteed freedom of speech and press, the Marxist groups used such opportunity to attack Islamic and traditional values in a blasphemous manner. This furthered instability by alienating the ulema, and alienated people from the monarchy. Though, the new army and police suppressed organized uprising, they were, nonetheless, unable to pacify them. The decade of Daud Khan, political reactionaries were imprisoned and suppressed. Their imprisonment served as the reaction formation phase35 for political prisoners, as the period 1933-1946 served as a reaction formation phase for the period 1946-53. In a nutshell the period of 1963-73 served as the intensification of the liberal undertaking of 1946-1953 and the promulgation of 1964 liberal constitution set the stage for a deep rooted social change. 11.2.2 Educational Reform The constitution of 1964 decreed education to be compulsory and free; however, the government did not have the needed resources to implement that. Lack of textbooks, chairs and desks, and teachers to conduct classes made the government unable to live up to its slogan of compulsory and free education. Hence, literacy continued to be below ten percent. In some instances, volunteers from the US, England and West Germany served as teachers. However, that did not add up to much (Dupree, 1973:599). Until 1964, units of Kabul University were scattered; however, in 1964, all the schools of Kabul University were housed under a single physical plant in the Aliabad district of Kabul. From early to late 1960s, several schools were added to Kabul University. They were the faculties of Home Economics (1962), Education (1662), Engineering (1963), Pharmacy (1963) and the Polytechnic (1967). Almost all colleges of Kabul University had foreign sponsors. The French sponsored the college of Medicine and that of Law and Political Science; the Germans sponsored the college of Natural Sciences. The USA sponsored the collge of Engineering and the Russians built and sponsored Kabul’s Polytechnic. Meanwhile, Kabul University became a battleground for competing foes. 11.2.3 Economic Reforms On March 18, 1963, Prime Minister Dr. Mohammed Yusuf announced fiscal reforms. The Afghani (Afghanistan’s monetary unit) was fixed internationally at forty35 Reaction formation refers to the maturation of political activists who focus their attention on future political agenda. Thus, when they are released from prison, these activists were more radical than before five Afghani to the dollar. To that end, the International Monetary Fund granted five million dollars to the Afghan government. In addition, the government made other announcements that included public work projects with aid from the USSR and the USA. Later in 1967, the Afghan government announced the implementation of the third five-year development plan. Since the first two five-year plans covered transportation and communication projects, the third five-year plan was to cover agricultural projects. The plan set a target of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs by the year 1972. To that end, it embarked on various irrigation projects in different parts of the country. The Afghan government and AID (Agency for International Development) initiated a joint project as part of this plan and chose six locations (at Kabul, Jalaabad, Lashkar Gah, Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Hera’t) from where various Mexican wheat, fertilizer, and agricultural implements were dispensed to Afghan farmers. 11.3 Analysis 11.3.1 Sociopolitical Analysis The sociopolitical analysis is necessary because the political development had implications for the socioeconomic development. On the one hand, the freedom that facilitated the emergence of Marxist groups resulted in discontent. On the other hand, the constitution barred members of the royal family from holding political offices. This antagonized former Prime Minister Daud Khan, the king’s cousin, toward the king and his constitutional arrangement because as a member of the royal family, he could not hold an office. Consequently, Daud Khan launched a coup with the help of one of the their imprisonment. Afghan communist factions, Parcham. That is how the stage for continuation of underdevelopment was set. Hence, it is necessary to discuss political development and analyze it. Zahir Shah’s lack of appreciation for the complexities of Afghan society influenced his decision to introduce a liberal constitutional monarchy. Until the mid1950s, Zahir Shah was out of touch with his own people. Although he was the king, the responsibility of government was in the hands of his uncles. It was during the administration of Prime Minister Daud Khan (1953-1963) that the king started to play an active role in the affairs of government. In the 1950s, he toured Afghanistan to make himself known to his subjects, and familiarize himself with life outside Kabul. General Miraki, who was in charge of the King’s security details while on tour, should illustrate Zahir Shah’s ignorance of his own country: “On his tour of Afghanistan, Zahir stopped by a nomad settlement near the city of Kandahar in Southwestern Afghanistan to mingle with them. With a camera in his hand, the king approached a nomad young woman to take her picture. She did not know that the person with the camera was the king; hence, as the king insisted on taking her picture, she stopped and looked at him, and told him: what a shameless man you are. The king was embarrassed and ordered me to give the nomad woman ten thousand Afghani.” In other words, the King was a foreigner in his own country. He did not know that such behavior was against Pashtunwali. This is common knowledge; yet, the King did not even know that. How, then, could he appreciate the complex dynamics enshrined under the code of Pashtunwali and Islam? That is why he tried to institutionalize a liberal constitution, which permitted complete freedom of speech and press, thus paving the way for leftist groups to attack the status quo. The social and political atmosphere of freedom allowed for organizations and maturation of leftist groups, which later led to new political adventures. There was no overlap between the cabinet and parliament. Anyone that was appointed to the cabinet had to resign his parliamentary seat. Thus, such absence of overlap provided each branch with an incentive to outdo the other. For example, if a ministry initiated some project of economic development, the parliament would prevent development by hindering any increase in taxes, or prevent the expansion of ministerial power that might prove essential for the supervision and management of some programs. However, if the cabinet ignored parliament, then there would be no purpose for representative government because such arrangement necessitates participation in the modernization process by all segments of society. The government was debilitated as the antagonistic relationship between the parliament and the cabinet continued. Such relationship stemmed from the determination of the parliament to hold every minister accountable for the budget of his ministry. Most of the time the minister refused to appear in front of the investigative committees to answer questions in that regard. Different opposing forums in the parliament put the stability of the government in jeopardy, especially in light of the complete freedom of speech (as I stated above). In one of the parliamentary sessions, Babrak Karmal (a Marxist leader at Kabul University, who served as the Soviet-installed president in the early 1980s) made remarks which were blasphemous according to Islam and the Afghan tradition. Since members of parliament were granted immunity, they could make any statement they wished --- although they could be reprimanded by the parliament itself. It is worth mentioning that in Afghanistan, Islam and politics are inseparable. Moreover, the educational system created discontent in rural tribal Afghanistan. Students at Kabul University were exposed to secular and anti-traditional ideas, which alienated sons from fathers. Enrollment of young men and women in the boarding schools of Kabul, including Kabul University exposed the rural youngsters to radical ideas. The students, in turn, would expose them to their elders. The elders would, according to Afghan tradition, disown their sons, and develop animosity against the government and the modern educational infrastructure in general; hence, the population realized that their sons and daughters were trained to challenge Islam and social values. The necessary political infrastructure for a democratic government did not exist. For example, the development of political parties was curtailed because the King did not formally legalize political parties. Political parties would have provided the mechanism whereby individuals could have sought political offices. The legislature did not possess the needed discipline for addressing issues. Hence, intense debates including physical assaults had taken place between opposing sides. Furthermore, the way the left used freedom of speech against Islam alienated large sectors of the population. The purpose of the leftist organizations was not cooperation with the government but toppling it. The Prime Minister was primarily accountable to the king not the parliament; so that the Prime Minister did not honor parliamentary summons for some hearings. Thus, due to extreme separation of powers, potential hostility was endemic between the Prime Minister, who had little or no control over parliament, and the parliament. Another crucial factor that resulted in the failure of the constitutional period was the exclusion of the members of the Royal Family from holding any political office including the positions of Prime Minister. This factor prevented any potential contribution to development of Afghanistan by charismatic leaders such as former Prime Minister Mohammed Daud Khan whose goal was to contribute to the development of Afghanistan. This factor, in addition to his forced resignation in 1963, antagonized Daud Khan towards the regime. He then formed a coalition with one of the two Marxist groups, Parcham, launched a coup in 1973 and proclaim Afghanistan a republic and himself the president of the republic. Furthermore, Zahir Shah accepted one aspect of liberalism, parliament, but not the other, legalizing political parties. Therefore, those with political ambitions and ideological inclinations were not willing to cooperate with the government; instead, they aimed to debilitate it. Student demonstrations were instigated by Babrak Karmal, a student leader at Kabul University, with the demand to widen the function of government. On one such occasion, student demonstrations became instrumental for the resignations of Prime Minister Dr. Mohammed Yusof. The political prisoners imprisoned during Daud Khan’s administration took advantage of the opportunity in this new constitutional era to raise their demands, and instigated student demonstrations. If a clear demarcation of authority were set for the king in the constitution, and political parties were also allowed, such arrangement would have provided the basic infrastructure for a democratic government, and these political activists could have taken advantage of a legal system to pursue political power. The existence of such arrangements would have proved fruitful politically, socially and economically for Afghanistan. The constitutional experiment had some basic flaws that proved contradictory to the Islamic and social values of Afghan society. For example, if the parliamentary laws came into conflict with Islamic laws or shari’ah, parliamentary laws took precedence over shari’ah. Such arrangement does not serve very well in a conservative Muslim country like Afghanistan. Meanwhile, when the government budgets that were subject to the review and approval of the parliament encountered a hurdle in parliament the king would threaten the parliament with dissolution for the measures to be passed. The king also had the power to disapprove parliamentary bills, which facilitated an avenue for the cabinet to avoid parliamentary summons, and function through the powers of the King, who had the last word on legislation. 11.3.2 Economic Analysis During this period, Afghanistan still relied on foreign aid. Due to this, the government did not have much control of development. By the end of the period, Afghanistan was still an agricultural society, with ninety percent of its population engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry. The country did not have a solid base of hard currency except the traditional items such as the karakul, fresh and dried fruits, and nuts. At the end of the Third Five-Year Plan, the goal of self-sufficiency was not achieved. The plan would have succeeded if the government had assisted subsistence farmers. In Dupree’s words (1973: 634): “…The government could easily improve productivity by purchasing what it needs from Afghan farmers and releasing all the foreign wheat loans and grants to the open market. Because the price of wheat in the bazaar varies both annually and seasonally, many large landowners store their wheat until urban prices rise perceptibly and then sell. Smaller, subsistence farmers, of course, must sell if they need money, regardsless of the price.” Although, the new road systems enabled some farmers to become part of the cash economy, the low price of wheat added to the harsh conditions of poverty among Afghan farmers. In fact, there was little or no increase in the area under cultivation or productivity per acre. In order to increase wheat production, the government abandoned the previously compulsory cultivation of cotton and sugar beets that were required to keep the textile and sugar factories running. As to the relationship between agriculture and industry in the 1960s, there existed a fundamental flaw. The major industries such as textile and sugar relied on raw material such as cotton and sugar beets from the agricultural sector. However, a policy of price ceiling for cotton was aimed at lowering the prices of manufactured cotton without taking into account the need and necessity of cotton farmers. Hence, from 1963 to 1966, lands that were cultivated for cotton decreased from 74,000 hectares to 48000. The decrease in cotton was also due to the government’s encouragement to grow wheat as part of the Third five-year development plan to meet the goal of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs. Accordingly, production of cotton decreased from a peak of 110000, in 1962-3 to less than 70000 tons in 1966 (Newell, 1972:141). Consequently, the textile mills and sugar refinery were on many occasions inactive for weeks a year. Differently, due to favorable increase in fruit prices, fruit output increased by 150 percent. This was primarily the result of land allocation by the landowners to growing fruits. The favorable price hikes shifted land cultivated from grains to fruits because fruits were in demand due to its export significance. Thus, on the one hand, agricultural-industrial relations severed, and on the other hand, domestic economic productivity was sacrificed for export purposes. Furthermore, there was a serious side effect of the first two development plans, which was the uneven allocation of resources. Most of the projects of the first two five-year developmental plans were construction projects. The onset of those construction projects increased employment and consequently, the supply of money increased, which in turn created demand for consumer goods. Since the development plans entailed construction projects and not production facilities to produce consumer goods, the result was increase in money supply with increase in demand for imported consumer goods. Accordingly, the increase in imported consumer goods diverted resources from industrialization, and the inflation caused by the increased supply of money contributed to the increase in prices of subsistence goods, such as wheat. Hence, there was a higher profit margin in imports for merchants than for investment in industry. The impact of this increase was more profound on the urbanities that relied on their meager salaries. Consequently, such economic disparities affecting government employees created political discontent. On the foreign aid domain, developmental aid started to drop in 1967, when Afghanistan embarked on the Third Five-Year Plan. Since foreign aid conditioned Afghan development, its consequent decline in 1967 provided Afghanistan with a shock therapy. Any subsequent development aid came as loans rather than grants. At about the same time, the government faced the increasing cost of servicing its foreign debt. By mid 1960s, the influx of foreign aid created “ problems of economic management” (Newell, 1972). Due to the revenue created by foreign assistance, the import of non-productive commodities increased twice the amount of foreign exchange the Afghan economy could earn through export. Consequently, inflation increased and resulted in two unpleasant consequences. One was a squeeze on the salaries of government officials, some of whom supervised government projects. The second factor was the transfer of private capital to real estate, and among large landowners, the inflation resulted in hoarding of agricultural commodities, which elevated prices in the economy. The flawed vision for economic development, conditioned by foreign assistance stemmed from the Soviet and American competition, did not bring about development in different sectors of the economy. A major problem in the economic development throughout had been the lack of economic integration of the various sectors of the economy that also, in part, stemmed from conditioning effects of the foreign aid. That is, the availability of the amount and type of development assistance molded Afghan government as to the type of projects they could undertake. The foreign consulting firms hired to supervise various projects did a poor job of training the Afghans for management and supervisory capacities. Consequently, development faced yet another problem, which was the lack of qualified planners and managers. The various factors discussed left Afghanistan underdeveloped. Conclusion The substance of this chapter has adequately confirmed the first hypothesis. Constitutional liberalism represented the imposition of approaches foreign to Afghanistan. Though the aim of constitutional liberalism was a representative government hoping to bring about economic and political development, instead, it created instability and animosity, between the traditional and Islamic sector and the government and liberal forces. Freedom of speech and press were used to target religious figures and practices as well as the deepest social values of Afghan society. Instability within the country became worse with the instigation of individual leaders such as Babrak Karmal and his associates of political insurgencies. The second hypothesis seems to be confirmed as well. The Cold War competition between the USA and the USSR turned Afghanistan into their “battlefield”. The introduction of constitutional liberalism was influenced by the United States as a mechanism to keep Russian influence in check. The anarchy brought about by leftist student organizations was widely believed to have been instigated by the Soviet Union. Different sectors of society started to feel the effects of such instability until former Prime Minister Daud Khan launched a coup, toppled the kingdom, and proclaimed Afghanistan a republic with himself as the president. It is appropriate to mention that the four main factors were pertinent to this period. With respect to the exogenous factor of strategic location, the Russians wanted to position themselves strategically closer to the oil fields of the Middle East and the Indian Ocean in order to threaten Western interests. Especially, without the oil the Western industrialized economies would be idle. Thus, the strategic location of Afghanistan attracted Soviet and American aid competition; meanwhile, their competition made Afghanistan dependent on foreign aid and reduced the incentives to mobilize domestic resources. Among the endogenous factors, the value systems of Islam and Pashtunwali were violated by the political arrangement. The freedom of speech and press were used to target religious figures and values; “women liberation” and Westernization of culture within Kabul disenchanted the overwhelmingly conservative population. Consequently, rifts between various segments of the population surfaced. The rural population dispised the educated to the extent that the latter represented the untraditional ideas. Meanwhile, Kabul took a life of its own by becoming socially, economically and politically different from the rest of the country because Kabul served as the nucleus of Westernization for the rest of the country. Furthermore, student demonstrations created an atmosphere of instability. Blastphemous comments by the communist members in the parliament during the parliamentary sessions added to the alienation of the population from the government; in fact, during this period, there was more instability than development. Among the individual leaders, the king himself contributed to the underdevelopment of Afghanistan by establishing a liberal political arrangement which gave the opportunity for the communists to attack Islamic and traditional values. Up to the mid-1950s, Zahir Shah was busy “having fun”, and was foreign to his country’s traditions and norms. Once in control, he instituted political arrangement opposed to the value systems of Afghanistan. The instability brought about by these factors and by student demonstrations, produced, in fact, the resignation of Prime Minister Yusuf Khan. Individual leader, former Prime Minister Daud Khan was mustering support for his planned coup to topple the monarchy. Finally, while the king was in Italy seeking medical treatment, Daud Khan launched a coup that toppled the monarchy in 1973, proclaiming Afghanistan a Republic and himself the President of the Republic. XII. Daud Khan’s Republic, 1973-1978 12.1 Introduction The continuous political instability and the deterioration of the economy made Afghans wary of the constitutional period. The educated segment lost hopes for any political or economic improvements. With the hope of improving the political and economic situation, the former Prime Minister, Mohammed Daud Khan launched a coup on 17th of July 1973 and dethroned the king while he was in Italy getting medical treatment (Gupta, 1986:15). Daud Khan carried out the coup with the assistance of Parcham, one of the two branches of the Afghan Marxist party. After the coup, Daud Khan proclaimed Afghanistan a republic and himself as its president. However, when President Daud remained in office without holding elections, it became evident that a representative government was not to be. Duad’s coup coincided with several international events. The Soviet Union engaged in support of Marxist-Leninist groups involved in revolutionary drives (Rubin, 1995:74). Less than three months after Daud’s coup, oil prices increased due to the Arab oil embargo. Furthermore, the Shah of Iran extended developmental assistance to President Daud Khan as part of the Shah’s grandiose vision to reestablish Persian’s ancient influence in the region. In fact, Iran promised two billion dollars over ten years to be spent on the construction of the first Afghan railroad linking Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar, and Her’at to Bandar Abbas, the Iranian sea port. This would have alleviated Afghanistan’s dependence for over land transit through the Soviet Union and Pakistan. Unfortunately, it did not happen because on the one hand, Iran did not have the capacity to become the major donor to Afghanistan. On the other hand, Daud Khan’s presidency lasted until April 1978, when Marxist military officers with the help of the Soviet Union launched a coup and killed President Daud Khan and his family. 12.2 Background The enactment of a clause into the constitution of 1964 to exclude members of the royal family from political participation made Daud Khan’s future bleak. His participation in and contribution to the development of the country was hindered. Meanwhile, the sociopolitical situation had become worse as reflected in the change of Prime Ministers five times in the period 1963-1973. Three different student protests in the years 1965, 1968 and 1971 debilitated the government in Kabul (Rubin, 1995:70). The intellectuals, who were members of the parliament, were as disappointed as were those in other sectors of society. Their disappointment stemmed primarily from the domination of parliament by the so-called traditional segment of the population namely tribal khans, village Maliks and clerical elements. The objective of these traditionalists was to perpetuate their influence and protect the interests of their own constituency rather than the development of Afghanistan. With no opportunity in sight, the educated segment or intellectuals, both nationalist and Marxist refused to work within the system. Instead, they sought for ways to topple the regime, which represented the old system. Daud Khan took advantage of the situation and formed a coalition with one of the two Marxist groups, Parcham, which had split from the original organization, the Khalq. Parcham was lead by Babrak Karmal, who would serve as the president after the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Meanwhile Daud Khan, who modernized the Afghan army and air force during his tenure as Prime Minister, was serving as the commander of the Central Forces36 in Kabul at the time of the coup. In addition, he used his influence in the military and formed alliance with Parcham military officers to launch the coup in 1973. After he toppled the monarchy, Daud Khan proclaimed Afghanistan a republic and himself as the President, Prime Minister and defense minister of the republic. At the beginning of his presidency, he appointed a large number of the Parcham group members to several ministry positions, as well as to positions at provincial levels. Eventually, the Marxists disenchanted President Daud with their disagreements with his policies (Gupta, 1986:19). Daud Khan was a very stubborn man, and was resistant to the views of others. Consequently, those, who disagreed with him, were excluded from the cabinet, and some were re-appointed to district and province level positions. However, three of the Marxists, who served as the official agents of the Soviet Union, remained as government ministers. One of these three individuals was Mohammed Hasan Sharq, who was brought to Afghanistan at a younger age from Iran after the Persian Shah, Reza, executed his father on charges of treason. Hasan was raised in the house of an Afghan Khan in the province of Farah in Southwestern Afghanistan, and received elementary education there. Subsequently, he was enrolled in the secondary schools of Kabul and entered 36 The Central Forces are Kabul’s army whose function is to defend the capital city, Kabul. medical school. He was introduced by the Soviets to Prime Minister Daud Khan in the 1950s (Haq-shinas, 19?:294). Ironically, he earned the trust of Prime Minister Daud Khan and became his right hand-man. In fact, when Daud Khan resigned his post as the Prime Minister, Hasan Sharq resigned his post in the Prime Minister’s office as well.37 This earned him Daud Khan’s trust even more. After the coup in 1973, Daud Khan appointed Hasan Sharq as the foreign minister of Afghanistan. That is, where the Soviets wanted him to be. While all these events were unfolding, the Soviets policies in the 1970s shifted dramatically toward the Third World Countries. The Soviet Union was losing interest in Third World nationalists and, instead, it started supporting Marxists-Leninist parties in bringing revolutions to the Third World Countries. This shift in policy proved fatal for Daud Khan at the end because the Marxist coup of 1978 resulted from the shift of this new Soviet policy toward the Third World. Moreover, internationally, the early 1970s were the détente or reconciliation period between USSR and USA. Thus, Soviet and American’s reconciliation reduced significantly the influx of aid from both superpowers to Afghanistan. The 1970s were also marked by the influx of petro-dollars to Afghanistan. In fact, in the 1974, Iran had agreed to furnish an aid Package of $2 billion, a significant amount of that, $1.7 billion, was to be spent on building the first railroad system in Afghanistan (Rubin, 1995:74). Saudi Arabia and Kuwait promised to grant economic aid to Afghanistan as well. Another source of revenue came from Afghan workers in Iran. The remittance that was sent home by these workers in addition to the sale of Afghan natural gas to the USSR provided hard currency for the government. 37 Interview with General Gholam Sediq Miraki. Toward the end of his presidency, President Daud Khan went on a tour abroad to revitalize Afghanistan’s relations with the Muslim countries and those of the nonallied bloc, such as Yugoslavia. His visits to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Pakistan were the most important. Daud Khan received promises from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for grants that would be used to repay the entire Soviet debt. His trip to Pakistan was important because it served as the first step in normalizing relations with Pakistan. In addition, Daud Khan’s trip also had a significant symbolic value because during his tenure as Prime Minister, Daud Khan’s emotional attachment to the Pashtunistan issue brought Afghanistan to the brink of war with Pakistan. Finally, when President Daud Khan returned from his tour abroad, a short time before his death at the hands of the Marxists, he made his first stop in Kandahar. Since my father Major General Sediq Miraki was the intelligence director of southwest Afghanistan, he supervised the security details at the Kandahar airport as well as the entire security protocol for the President’s visit in Kandahar. During President Daud Khan’s visit to Kandahar, my sister, Najiba (9) and I (11) accompanied our father to the airport. Before Daud Khan’s arrival, a group of military officers in a vehicle stopped by the terminal’s entrance and asked the security officer there as to when President Daud Khan was arriving and at what exact location would the President’s limousine be parked. The security officer came to General Miraki and informed him of the situation. General Miraki realized that an assassination attempt was planned, and advised the President to cancel his journey to Kabul via motorcade, and travel by airplane. Jalaalar, the commerce minister, had leaked the details of the President’s meeting with the Saudi King and other dignitaries. The subject of the meeting was to abandon the Soviet sphere of influence, and repay all of the loans by the Saudi financial grants. When Daud reached Kabul, General Miraki was informed by one of his informants about the coup that was going to take place at the end of May 1978. However, after President Daud imprisoned leftist leaders, the date for the coup was changed from the end of May to April 28, 1978. Hence, the communists launched their coup with the help of the USSR’s air force from the city of Tashkent in the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan. General Miraki, then colonel Miraki, continued sending a barrage of information to Kabul regarding the coup. However, either a third party, possibly the Chairman of intelligence in Kabul intercepted the messages, or Daud Khan chose to ignore it. We may never know. 12.2.1 Socioeconomic Policies In the first few months after the coup, a handful of measures were taken aimed at socioeconomic stability. In order to stabilize prices of immediate necessities, the government formed district committees in Kabul to combat profiteering and control trading operations of shopkeepers. A list of prices of staple foodstuffs was distributed to shopkeepers and merchants and police were ordered to monitor the shopkeepers whether they were observing the new regulations or not. Furthermore, strong efforts were underway to combat corruption, bribery and smuggling. As part of the Republic’s economic development policies, the Supreme Economic Council was established to deal with long-term planning as well as to coordinate key industries and farming. In 1974, the government nationalized all private banks and a major textile company, Spinzar. In the same year, the council increased direct taxation by 60 percent over the 1972 level. As a result, direct taxes constituted 11 percent of the government’s budget. Furthermore, foreign trade became the monopoly of the state; accordingly, custom duties on imports increased by 60 percent over the 1972 level. The Fourth Five-Year Plan, which was adopted for the period 1973 to 1977, was replaced with a Seven-Year Plan covering the period 1976 to 1982. The SevenYear Plan relied on foreign financial aid from the USSR, Middle Eastern oil producing countries and some other countries. This plan emphasized the construction of large dams, irrigation systems, hydroelectric power stations and roads, the mechanization of farming, and the mining of mineral deposits (Gankovsky, 1985:296-99). The government distributed state-owned, irrigated land to a little more than 5,000 peasants. Subsequently, with a systematic program of land reform, the government promulgated the Land Reform Law, which limited landownership to 20 hectares. Any surplus land was supposed to be distributed to landless peasants, who paid a set price through installments. President Daud Khan wanted to cut Afghanistan’s dependence on the Soviet Union, and broaden the scope of opportunities for the development of Afghanistan. To that end, he moved in the direction of establishing normalcy of relations with Pakistan and enhanced further closer ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia as well as other Gulf countries. The United States also favored closer relations between Iran and Afghanistan. Daud Khan knew that Afghanistan would benefit from such a relationship and the petrodollar that Afghanistan would receive from the oil producing countries would help in the development of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the increased number of school graduates flooded the Afghan labor market with no opportunity in sight. The only place for an educated man and woman was the government bureaucracy. As Rubin (1995:76-77) puts it, “ The investment in a centralized state infrastructure had not led to any increase in private employment.” 12.2.2 Sociopolitical Policies & Problems After Daud Khan took over as the first President of Afghanistan, he resorted to dictatorial rule. A committee of ten founding members of the republic constituted the revolutionary council that advised President Daud Khan on matters of government. The board, however, served in an advisory capacity; otherwise, the decision of the President, was final in any matter. The sociopolitical situation worsened as Daud Khan started the persecution of Islamic organizations. The reason why Daud targeted the Islamic organizations stems from their opposition to the communists, who occupied influential positions in Daud Khan’s cabinet. The leaders of the Islamic organizations fled to Pakistan in fear of their safety. These religious-political groups received the support of the Pakistani government in the form of financial support and arms. Later, in 1974, President Daud Khan excluded members of the Parcham group from the government gaining their opposition. Meanwhile, by 1977 the USSR’s support for Daud Khan had also decreased significantly (Bradsher, 1985: 64-6). Another segment of the population, the feudal landlords, was alienated after Daud Khan introduced a moderate land reform program. Amidst all this, Daud Khan realized that he had become friendless. That is why, Daud Khan moved in the direction of establishing normalcy of realtions with Pakistan. On both of his visit to Pakistan in 1977 and 1978, Daud Khan held talk with Pakistani leaders that he would set the Pashunistan issue aside if the Pashtun tribes of Pashtunistan were given autonomy as articulated under the clause of regional autonomy in the Pakistani constitution of 1973. 12.3 Analysis Both endogenous and exogenous factors were responsible for the onset of any substantial development. The onset of foreign aid in 1954 that started the aid competition between the USSR and the USA in Afghanistan marked the penetration of Afghan economy and politics by the Soviet Union, and to much lesser level by the United States. Although the Soviet Union reduced its developmental assistance in the 1970s, the Russians did not want Afghanistan to escape their dependency trap. Furthermore, since this dependency on the USSR emerged from the utility of Afghanistan’s geostrategic location, and it took the Russians more than two decades to achieve such a firm foothold, its abrupt termination was bound to have deadly consequences for President Daud Khan. As already mentioned, foreign aid had reduced the incentives for the Afghan government to mobilize domestic resources; hence, termination of closer relationship with the USSR had to be accompanied with an alternative sources of development. International changes in the 1970s provided Afghanistan with an alternative source of developmental assistance, the influx of the Middle East oil revenue. Shah of Iran promised to finance the construction of railroads in Afghanistan that would extend from the Afghan-Pakistani border through Afghanistan connecting Afghan cities to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, Afghanistan’s transit problems would have been solved permanently. Hence, the transit dependence on the USSR and Pakistan would cease. However, in 1977, it was established that Iran did not have the capacity to become a major contributor to development projects in Afghanistan. Bradsher (1985: 62) illustrates: “Numerous consultations on specific projects had by 1977 exposed the tiny reality behind talk of Iran’s becoming the dominant benefactor in Afghanistan.” He continues: “Irritated Afghan officials offered to release Iran from all its promises, but the proud shah insisted he would go ahead with some aid” It is worth mentioning, Saudi Arabia promised to repay all of Afghanistan’s debt to the Soviet Union. Labor migration to Iran and Arab countries resulted from the lack of opportunities at home. In the 1970, there were only thirty thousand industrial workers, or one percent of the economically active populations. In 1978, the number of industrial workers increased to forty thousand, which was still not large enough. The remittances of the workers who migrated to Iran and the Arab countries contributed to the economy’s stability. In addition, nationalization of the banking system and foreign aid added to economic stability. A number of reasons can explain why was there the need for an alternative source of foreign aid. First, the mobilization of domestic resources takes time and until that happened, development could not be put on hold. Second, although, Daud had used his military in keeping tribal power in check, he did not want to impose taxes suddenly; this constituted the endogenous factor constraining Daud Khan’s development. Daud Khan has already undermined the Islamic values by forming a coalition with the Parcham faction of the Marxists and establishing closer relations with the USSR. The institutionalized dependency of the Afghan economy could not be reversed over night. Furthermore, the dependency was not only on foreign aid, but also geographical. Since Afghanistan was landlocked, it needed the cooperation of Pakistan and Iran to access international waters. Daud Khan wanted to shift from Afghanistan’s dependency on world powers, especially the USSR. To that end, Daud Khan wanted to have closer relations with neighboring countries like Pakistan and Iran to secure transit rights for Afghan commodities through their respective territories. In addition, this would also end Afghanistan’s transit dependence on the USSR. Daud Khan’s stubbornness serves as another endogenous factor in hindering development. He did not listen to anyone unless he himself was convinced of an issue. Daud Khan was informed, on several occasions, by some of his associates that several of his cabinet members were KGB agents. He did not take advise. Some of his cabinet members like Hasan Sharq served Daud Khan as far back as his premiership; that is why Sharq among others had won Daud’s trust. Nonetheless, the country benefited tremendously from extensive investment in building highways that connected the north and south, east and west of Afghanistan. This brought commerce, tourists and made travel faster and cheaper. However, the inefficient utilization of these trucking lanes failed to contribute to the economic prosperity. This was, for the most part, due to the lack of construction and maintenance of smaller roads that could connect rural production canters to markets. The establishments of such interconnection of small production centers to the main domestic market of large cities would have contributed to the domestic exchange of commodities and increased trade between regions. The outcome of such activities would have meant prosperity for the impoverished sectors of society and would have brought a degree of equity in the distribution of national resources. As an example of inefficient utilization of resources, the power generation projects were not utilized fully. In fact, only 40% of the power generated was consumed; the rest was wasted. This was the result of the inadequate transmissiondistribution of networks. The distribution of electricity to the tribal areas was nonexistent. Initially tribes resisted the government’s intrusion, in terms of road building, however, tribal resistance was put down through the use of military. The distribution of electricity to tribal areas might have created an appreciation for modernization. As a consequence of the electricity distribution, tribal population might have been exposed to the government propaganda and constructive programs relayed through radio, which was becoming popular at this time. Furthermore, the utility of electricity would also have benefited the population, by lighting their homes and mosques. In fact, the early 1980s experience of the Pakistani government established the effectiveness of modern facilities such as electricity, healthcare and transportation to the Afghan tribes of the frontier. After the introduction of such modern infrastructure, the tribes started exhibiting an increasingly positive inclination towards the Federal Government in Pakistan. The large landowners resisted the land reforms; hence, the reforms were not implemented. Instead, toward the end of his reign, Daud Khan promulgated progressive taxes on land, which consisted of taxing large landowners heavily, and smaller landowners lightly. The rationle for this approach was that large landowners would give up their lands voluntarily because they would not be able to cope with heavy taxes. However, daud Khan did not remain long enough to materialize his plans fully. Meanwhile, Kabul had turned into a place different from the rest of Afghanistan, in fact, people would refer to Kabul as one Afghanistan and the rest of Afghanistan as another. Furthermore, the conservative visitors from villages as well as cities could not identify with Kabul because they were offended to see unveiled women roaming throughout the city. Moreover, sons and daughters, who studied in Kabul, alienated their fathers and other family elders because they would bypass traditional respect, and present untraditional views, challenging the status quo. In fact, a split occurred between the newly emerging intellectuals and the traditional establishment that included the population outside Kabul as well as Kabul’s residents. It is worth mentioning that the Tajik population was able to deal with them much better than could the Pashtuns because Tajiks especially those living in Kabul served as the channels of modernization. That is, they would adopt Western cultural imperatives and diffuse them; the Pashtuns, however, did not adopt Western culture easily. Due to the development of dependent underdevelopment, the government failed to increase its debt service payments, even though, 80% of Soviet debts was serviced by the export of natural gas to the Soviet Union. The latter problem was the result of the miscalculated development strategy that concentrated on increased expenditure with long term implications rather than on projects that could be finished faster and would possess the capacity to yield more. Therefore, the development tried under Seven-Year Plan failed as well, partly, because domestic resources were not mobilized and development was hostage to foreign assistance. Furthermore, the mismanagement of loans and credits also contributed to the failure of the plan. According to Gankovsky: “Part of foreign loans and credits, as a result of inadequate accounting and their poorly organized distribution, was pocketed by the ruling elite infected with the corruption [and] marked it under the monarchy [since it was already toppled]”. (1885:305) In 1978, after President Mohammed Daud Khan returned from his trip abroad, with the goal of drawing himself away from the USSR, Soviet agents such as Commerce Minister Jalalar, betrayed him and informed the Soviets of Daud Khan’s plans. Jalalar reported President Daud Khan’s intentions to the Soviets. Meanwhile, Daud imprisoned the leaders of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The imprisonment served as a proof to the Soviets that Daud Khan was truly changing sides. The Soviets assembled the two factions of the PDPA (Khalq and Parcham) and forced them to unite before launching the coup in 1978. After achieving a compromise between the two factions, the Russians gave the go-ahead signal for the coup, which was supported by the Soviet Air Force from Tashkent, Uzbekistan. President Mohammed Daud Khan and all the members of his family, except for his daughter in-law, were killed. His daughter in-law was not in the palace at the time and took sanctuary in the French Embassy in Kabul. Conclusion At this juncture, it is appropriate to find out if the two hypotheses of the dissertation have been confirmed by the substance of this chapter. As in the previous chapters, the hypotheses in this chapter could not be discussed independently of past events. First, the liberal constitutional experiment of the 1960s and early 1970s resulted in instability and antagonized different segments of the population toward the government. Unchecked freedoms alienated an overwhelming population, and opposition to the government surfaced from the conservative establishment. Moreover, unchecked freedom also availed opportunities for the leftist student organizations to create instability by aggressive demonstrations, one of which, forced Prime Minister Yusuf Khan to resign. Freedom of expression was used by foreign elements to encourage upheaval. It enabled the leftist groups to make blasphemous---un-Islamic--statements in the parliament that alienated many sectors of the country. The superimposition of the liberal constitutional monarchy on Afghan society was to serve as mechanism to enhance socioeconomic development, instead, it allowed for maturation for various insurgencies, such as the communists. The introduction of such liberal system resulted in conflicts and mistrust rather than harmony and development. The negative image of modernity created by the liberal measures hampered the type of cooperations needed at different levels of society in socioeconomic development. Hence, when the communists participated in the coup and joined Daud Khan’s republic, they carried with them the negative image of the liberal period to the presidency discrediting it. Daud Khan failed to bring the type of legitimacy needed to implement development programs successfully. Led by Muslim Brothers and Muslim Youth organizations, various uprisings occurred simultaneously in different parts of Afghanistan as a result of bitter polarization between communists and the Muslims. Daud’s reliance on the communists disenchanted the conservative segment of the population---especially, his persecution of Islamic organizations. His compromises with the communists in launching the coup constituted the superimposition of a foreign approach to socioeconomic development that contradicted the social-religious values of Afghan society. Particularly, Daud’s rhetoric in the first few months resembled those of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries than a nationalist. However, by the time he decided to distance himself from the USSR, it was too late. The second hypothesis is also confirmed in this chapter. The post-WW II competition between the USA and the USSR served to condition Afghanistan’s development by reducing the incentives for Afghan government to mobilize domestic resources for development. The competition between the USSR and the USA was played out through the pretense of concern to Afghan development, when, in reality each of them was trying to gain control of the country for its own agenda of domination. The USSR and US’s competition did not contribute to the development of Afghanistan. This became evident by two events. First, in late 1960s and early 1970s, the USSR changed its foreign policy of providing development aid to the Third World countries nationalist regimes for support of Third World Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries. Second, the 1970s was marked the détente era which brought almost to nothing the Soviet-US aid competition in Afghanistan. Once Daud Khan realized that basing Afghanistan’s development on the Soviet Union was not a sound policy, he decided to draw himself away from the Soviet sphere of influence. However, he ignored that the Soviet Union had already penetrated Afghanistan’s political, military and economic system too deeply to evade them. In fact, during the two decades before Daud Khan’s presidency, the USSR’s involvement in Afghan economic and political spheres institutionalized a new form of dependent development in Afghanistan. Thus, it was virtually impossible for Daud Khan to trick the Russians and change sides abruptly. Instead, he and his family lost their lives in the Soviet-led coup. Thus, the four main endogenous and exogenous factors again interfered in the development of Afghanistan. The exogenous factor, Afghanistan strategic location, had attracted the USSR to Afghanistan. The indifference of the United States toward Afghanistans’ requests led Afghanistan to accept help from Soviets---with all the implications discussed earlier. The Soviet Union’s foothold in Afghanistan provided them with the opportunity to place their people in position of control and to indoctrinate the Afghan military personnel while studying in the USSR. Furthermore, it enabled the Soviets to exercise added influence over the Afghan communists and provide financial support for them. Hence, when Daud Khan imprisoned the communist leadership, the Soviet Embasy united the two branches of the communist party to stage the coup of 1978. The implication of this exogenous factor was the inability of the government to escape Soviets dependency and stage its own independent program of development. The three endogenous factors have also hampered development. First, Daud Khan’s association with the communists and persecution of the Muslim Brothers and Muslim Youth alienated the religious and traditional sectors of society as it undermined Islamic values which furthered opposition from the religious establishment. Furthermore, few minor tribal uprisings occurred but were not significant enough to bring instability. However, they added to the opposition and stood in the way of Soviet program. President Daud Khan’s stubborn personality constituted a major factor in these events. He did not listen to anyone. He appointed individuals who were known for their inability to lead, or for their illegitimacy. Although patriotic, his actions led to a new crisis that stood in the way of self-determined government---in fact a set back as it interrupted any ongoing development, unsuccessfully trying to change course. XIII. The Stalinist Period, 1978-1992 Phase One, 1978 to 1979 13.1 Introduction This period of Afghan history consists of two closely related phases, phase one pertains to the communists’ coup of 1978 and the establishment of the communist government until the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in December 1979. The second phase started with the invasion of 1979 and continued until the Soviet retreat in 1989 and the fall of the Soviet supported regime in 1992. I will analyze them together in this chapter because, at their root, they represent a single effort. The coup of 1978 marked the most radical socioeconomic efforts at change. The years 1978 to 1992 also illustrate the rigidity of the religious and social values of Afghan society. Violation of these values, by the Marxists to transform Afghan society, strengthened the opposition by the Afghan people and intensified their deeprooted hatred toward the Russians and the communism. The Marxist imposition of the Stalinist model in uprooting traditional Afghan society via coercive measure not only perpetuated underdevelopment but also eradicated any socioeconomic gains made in the preceding decades; this will be established below. 13.2 Background The new Marxist regime launched radical reforms that were aimed at transforming traditional Afghanistan into a “revolutionary Afghanistan” by uprooting its traditions and values and replacing them with the practices of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Afghan people denounced the new reforms two weeks after they were initiated in July and August of the same year, 1978, by voicing their opposition in mosques, tea-houses and informal gatherings. 13.2.1 Reforms The reforms consisted of a thirty points program, called “basic line of Revolutionary Duties of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan” (Sen Gupta, 1986). Implementation was carried out in the form of decrees. In this chapter, only those decrees will be discussed that pertain to socioeconomic and political change. Decrees numbers 1 and 2 addressed the formation of a 30-member revolutionary council and the appointment of party members to the cabinet of the PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan). Decree number 3 abrogated the 1973 constitution. Decree number 4 articulated the new design for the nation’s new flag. The traditional flag, which was inherited from 1747, the date of the inception of the Afghan nation-state, was replaced by a red flag that resembled the flag of the Soviet Union. The new flag was solid red with gold symbols. The color of the flag was evidence enough for the Afghan people to reject the claims of the first communist president, Noor Mohammed Taraki that his regime were not Marxists, and validated the suspicion of the rural population about the true face of the regime. In fact, before the unveiling of the new flag, people speculated that they would not be surprised if the new flag were the same as that of the Soviet Union. 38 This suspicion rose from the well-known facts about the communists and their designs. The 1960s leftist rhetoric was remembered well by the Afghans of the same generation. The solid red color of the flag also established the government’s close association with the Soviet Union. The Afghans resented the Bolsheviks for the annexation of the Muslim Kingdoms of Central Asia. Decree number 5 also went against the established legal norms of Afghan society, which were, that no Afghan could be deprived of his citizenship as an Afghan. Decree #5, however, stripped 23 members of the Afghan Royal Family of Afghan citizenship. These 23 members had been forced out of Afghanistan when Daud Khan succeeded in his coup in 1973 and proclaimed Afghanistan a republic. Decree number 6 was primarily designed to strengthen the peasants’ position in villages. It entailed the abolition of usury aimed to relieve indebted peasants in villages. Much weight has been attached to this decree by some authors such as Sen Gupta (1986). However, this decree was not in conflict with Islamic principles. Islam forbids usury in the strongest terms and those individuals that practice it are looked down upon in society. Decree number 7 decree entailed equal rights for men and women, and regulated dowry and marriage expenses. Equal rights for men and women as a reform issue had contributed to a significant extent to the anti-Amanullah rebellion in 1928-29. According to the Afghan tradition of Pashtunwali, a woman constitutes the backbone of Afghan dignity; that is why Afghans are very protective of their females. When the state intervenes in this aspect of social values, such intervention is perceived as 38 I was in the sixth grade in Kandahar; the school took us to the inauguration of the flag. There I witnessed people from different walks of life speculating about the possibility of seeing the Soviet flag. offensive. According to Islam, men and women are equal because both are humans; however, they are not identical in function. In addition, the dowry is an Islamic right of a woman; she can request any amount. However, in Afghanistan tradition dictates that daughters grant that right to their fathers. The Marxist government gave itself the right to interfere in peoples’ family issues. An intrusion in one’s family by government constitutes a blow to the code of Pashtunwali. Entering a Pashtuns home without his permission is tantamount to death and it is firmly established by the code of Pashtunwali. Decree number 8 covered “land reforms”. It carried out forced expropriation of land under the aegis of reforms with a set ceiling of 30 acres per family. The reforms were to be carried out through confiscation and redistribution (Gupta, 1986:48-50). This was in contradiction to measures mandated in Islam. Islam points out that one’s private property can not be confiscated, unless the property had been taken away by force from others. To compensate for economic disparities, one of five mandatory pillars of Islam, zakat (alms giving) is a compulsory practice that every Muslim must obey. Every Muslim who earns money and possesses property is obligated to dispense an agreed amount of his wealth to the poor (Zaman, 1991: 177-180 & 189- 191). Some people do not abide by this principle; this is when the government steps in and enforces it as a mandatory commitment of every Muslim living in a Muslim State.39 Such an approach tends to reduce financial insecurity as has largely been the case in Pakistan during the rule of General Zia’ul Haq. The late President of Pakistan, Zia’ul Haq, made it mandatory for everyone who earned money and possessed wealth to pay zakat. 40 39 40 This is part of Sha’ria or Islamic Law and it is common knowledge. Interview with a Pakistani official. Such an arrangement is based on Islam, however, confiscating someone’s wealth by mere proclamations makes opposition inevitable. Furthermore, the Marxists attempts to reform lands, and their claims of bringing equality at all levels, contradicted another Islamic principle. It holds that all mankind came from one father and mother (Adam & Eve); however, god created them with different socioeconomic levels, physical appearances and tribes. The equality of poor and wealthy is not possible because world is a place where human beings are tested by god and this test is carried out in such unequal environment. However, the Holy Koran mandates that Muslims have to make efforts to prevent injustice (Zaman, 1991: 316). Though the issue of land reforms had been discussed during Amanullah Khan’s time and Daud Khan’s presidency, they have never been carried out. The Marxists wanted to implement all these reforms between July and December of 1979. Moreover, anyone who publicly resisted land reforms was either imprisoned or executed (Rubin, 1988: 7). This created an atmosphere of terror and discontent. In fact, the terror that accompanied land “reforms” forced millions of people to abandon their villages to safeguard their families. They took refuge in Pakistan and Iran.41 The two factions of the PDPA, Khalq and Parchan wanted to emulate Stalin’s model of “development” in a conservative Muslim country like Afghanistan, where any type of affiliation with foreign powers reduces the legitimacy of the government. Such considerations were of no value to the Khalqis and Parchamis, who simply wanted to eradicate the old system and instead institutionalize a Marxist philosophy in 41 Personal experience, eyewitnessed Afghan families in refugees camps in Pakistan in 1981. Afghanistan42. While distributing land, the Marxists also initiated cooperatives. Marxist supervisors of cooperatives exhibited disregard for Islamic principles. Especially when peasants and other individuals were performing their daily prayers at the cooperatives, the Marxist supervisors would be listening to music and would raise the volume to disrupt the peasants’ prayers. This was part of a systematic campaign, not an isolated case. The peasants, who attended the cooperatives, conveyed the behavior of the Marxists to the rest of the villagers. Discontent increased and eventually, the Muslim organizations that were outlawed by President Daud Khan and had abandoned Afghanistan for Pakistan sponsored the insurgency and assumed the leadership of the anti-communist campaign43. Concurrently, the Khalqis initiated a type of national purge both in rural and urban areas. Anyone that had exhibited any kind of disapproval of the regime in public was arrested and eventually executed. A quote in Rubin (1988: 7) describes a woman’s eyewitness account of massacre in March 1979 in the village of Kerala, Konarh Province: “ The Godless Commander Nezamuddin said, prod! [should be written as Prot] (Pashto for lie down). There were perhaps twelve hundred people who lay down. Then he gave the order, Fire! Twelve hundred people, all the Muslims, were killed in this firing. And then there was a tank, what you call a bulldozer. This tank drove over the Muslims and lifted them up in the air and threw them in the ground. Some were still alive, but they were burried in the earth. The others were dead. They were burried in the earth.” 42 It is worth mentioning that the communists were a handful of individuals that emerged during the constitutional period, 1963-73. Those individuals that participated in the demonstration in the late 1960s were students, who wanted opportunities of career and advancement. Hence, the smaller percentage did not represent the intellectual of the Afghan society. 43 The Islamic organizations were those that emerged as opposition to the Marxist groups at Kabul University in the 1963-73 period, and they consisted of the former intellectuals, students and professors at Kabul University. Most of the time, when a few individuals were arrested for expressing their opinions against the government, they would disappear. Their families would go to prisons to find out about the condition of their relatives. There the communist officials would deny the existence of those prisoners. The families would go back to their localities, where the news spread and villagers joined the resistance which further stimulated organized insurgency against the communist regime.44 In other cases, the news of large-scale executions spread like shock waves, which further strengthened organized resistance. For example, in Kandahar on one occasion in 1978, an informer reported that the villagers were carrying out antigovernment activities. Communist officials assembled between 70 to 80 individuals from the village. The old and young men of the village, most of whom, were peasants, were brought to the administrative building of Kandahar governor. Thirty-five of them were released based on the intervention of some noncommunist officials who relied on their age as an excuse to ask for their release. The remaining 40-45 prisoners were executed. The prisoners were taken to the back yard of the governor’s office, where the communists stoned them to death. The executed individuals had never participated in any uprising.45 Moreover, Marxist officials would go as far as to give candies to young children in neighborhoods to find out about their father’s attitude toward the regime.46 In fact, in 1978-79, there was so much fear in every household that a common belief emerged 44 Several of my relatives went through such agony. Interview with an Afghan government official in 1997 who served as a director in one of the government departments in Kandahar. 46 At one time in Kabul, a young boy was persuaded by giving him a candy to find out about his father’s behavior about the government. The young boy was six years old who obviously could not know the consequences of what he had said. Marxists surrounded the house, took the father to prison, where he was later executed (Interview with a resident of Kabul in Peshawar in 1998). 45 that the government used listening devices to listen to antigovernment conversation. The conduct on the part of the communists undermined every value of Afghan society. That is how a national uprising sprang up against the regime. The second president of the Soviet-installed communist regime was Haffizullah Amin, who became president after killing his predecessor in September 1979. He was quoted stating that “we need only 5 million people to build a true socialist society” (Kabul Television, 1979).47 Every night buses left the infamous Pul-e-Charkhi prison, to the desert near the prison. In the desert, military personnel had dug large ditches ahead of time to serve as makeshift graves. They shot the prisoners, into the ditches and bulldozed dirt over the half-dead prisoners (two former prisoners who escaped, 1982).48 The Khalqis held that the failure of Amanullah Khan’s reforms had been caused by the alliance between traditional social and religious leaders and British imperialists. Since land ownership constituted the core asset of power, they thought that if they destroyed this source of power (traditional land ownership), they would neutralize and breach any opposition before it could start operating against the government. They tried to superimpose a drastically different system over the traditions and socialhistorical realities of Afghan society. Furthermore, the Khalqis ignored the traditional and conservative factors that influenced farmers, namely their extremely strong devotions to Islam, and the established roles of landowners as the leaders of villages (Noorzoy, 1987). 47 Amin made this statement in one of his speeches on Afghan television in 1979. This account was provided by a several high ranking Khalqi officials and two Mujahideen prisoners who were not hit by bullets and were burried alive. After the communists abandoned the sight they dug themselves out and escaped to safety. This information was provided by two prisoners in 1982. 48 In the economic sphere, the communist regime advocated a Soviet-aided, stateled development plan consisting of: • Heavy industry • Manufacturing of consumer goods • Protection of handicraft • Modernization of agriculture, and • Raising of the living standard of the people (Gankovsky, 1982:310) Rubin (1995:85) articulates the development approach of the communist regime as follows: “ The PDPA advocated economic development fostered by state investment in heavy industry, together with the protection of handicrafts and the manufacture of consumer goods. Rather than supporting allocation of major state resources to agriculture, through investment in major irrigation works or new productive technology, the PDPA advocated redistributive land reform, calculated to enhance production…” 13.3 Phase I Analysis The land reforms met with resistance and social chaos (Noorzoy, 1987:83). Initially, when the government committees consisting of armed Khalqi activists went to the villages to distribute the land and win social control. Most of the land recipients abandoned their villages because they did not want to cultivate the land or respond to the communists (Noorzoy, 1987:84). They feared that the government would force them to cultivate the distributed land, and they would lose their legitimate position in the village community, and, in the tribe (personal observation). Since peasants had their ancestral roots in their respective villages, they could not afford to lose their roots for a mere piece of land. Had they cultivated the land, they would have lost face to their reltaives and other villagers. Furthermore, religious adherence exists in its purest form in village communities; thus, the peasants did not want to undermine either Islamic values or the traditional Afghan code of Pashtunwali. Both value systems condemned the communist regime. In fact, peasants led the initial rural resistance. The continuous resistance against the communist government removed from government most of control in rural areas (Rubin, 1995:117). Although some peasants kept the lands they received, but upon the on set of the jihad or holy war against the communist regime and the Russians, they abandoned them out of fear from the previous owners. The land redistribution and the abolishment of debt to moneylenders, mostly feudal landlords,49 worsened the socioeconomic situation of peasants. The distribution of public land to peasants provided them with land, but they had neither adequate sources of water nor other essentials of production such as draft animals (bulls used for plowing the ground) and seeds. The following quote from Rubin illustrates: “In one case in Laghman, in eastern Afghanistan, the Musallis, an impoverished qawm [clan] of grain cleaners, were allotted land in far-off Helmand, in the Southwest. Thousands of Musallis moved there, only to find that there were no tents or houses, no one to demarcate the plots, no water, and no tools. After subsisting for a few months on World Food Program handouts, they returned home more disillusioned than ever.” (1995:117) As to decree number six that abolished debt to landlords, no alternative source of credit was provided to the peasants. Rubin (1995: 117) continues: “Abolishing debts to landlords and moneylenders without providing alternative sources of credit deprived small peasants of the ability to obtain loans. Most 49 Peasants in need of money go to village moneylender to borrow money. Although unjust, the reforms eliminated the only source of borrowing money for the poor peasants. The communist government failed to provide alternative means of credit for poor peasants. Therefore, in time of emergency, the peasants had no source to borrow money. landlords supplied seed, and some furnished draft animals, so landless peasants and laborers who received land from the state had no alternative source for these essentials of production.” Meanwhile, land redistribution and ideological indoctrination under the guise of literacy programs accompanied by coercive interventions and terror by the communist government, intensified reactions and resistance in the countryside (Rubin, 1995: 185; Noorzoy, 1987:83). The continuous influx of young men, who would otherwise be working as peasants, into the ranks of the resistance contributed to the subsequent economic chaos (personal observation). Subsequently, in 1979, when the Russians invaded Afghanistan, they pursued a policy aimed at depopulation through bombardment of villages, destruction of crops and traditional irrigation system. Since villagers provided the support mechanism for the Afghan Mujahideen50, the Russians pursued a campaign of depopulation to force villagers to abandon their homes in order to eradicate the support bases of the Mujahideen (Noorzoy, 1987:83 & 173). Consequently, significant losses mounted in the agriculture sector. According to the official statistics provided by Noorzoy (1987), in 1975/76 3.882 million hectares were under cultivation; that number dwindled to 2.9 million hectares by 1987. Between 1980-84: • Wheat output decreased by 80% • Corn out put decreased by 77% • Barely and rice decreased each by 74% • Cotton by 88% Farm labor between 1978 and 1987 had declined by 52 percent (Noorzoy, 1987:84). The usage of the term economic development was paradoxical, because the communists and the Russians reversed all of what they wanted to achieve. An overwhelming portion of the economy was idle, so that, cities that relied on the agricultural output from villages started to suffer from the shortage of produce and dairy products. The manufacturing plan also failed. By early 1979, the communist regime was facing stiff resistance from the Afghan Mujahideen all over the country. Army units had defected on many occasions. Hence, the priority for the communists was to fight off Mujahideen assaults, rather than industrialize. Consequently, manufacturing did not advance. Instead, the industry before 1978 was functioning well below capacity. According to Noorzoy (1984:85): “ The general picture in manufacturing indicates that this sector is suffering from labor shortages, shortages of raw materials, outage of power, idle capacity even in the small manufacturing base that existed before 1978. Consumer needs such as textiles and sugar, previously largely met by domestic production, are now met by the imports from the USSR.” For example, in Balkh, in northern Afghanistan, 50 percent of the manufacturing facilities were inactive. Furthermore, the textile and sugar manufacturing plants which previously met domestic needs declined in productivity. The result was the imports of sugar from the Soviet Union (Noorzoy, 1984:85). The reforms led to the confiscation of property and the dislocation of people. The result was economic chaos. As people abandoned their villages, wheat production declined significantly. 50 Afghan resistant fighters called themselves Mujahideen or holy wariors because they were fighting a holy war against a non-Muslim enemy. The other factor that exacerbated the economic situation was the disruption of trade within villages, between villages and cities, and between different regions of the country. The war of resistance disrupted all levels of the economy; naturally, the priorities of people changed from subsistence and accumulation of wealth to war against the Marxist regime. Due to the lack of control over the countryside (Griffiths, 1981: 189), the meager agricultural taxes that existed before the coup were reduced to zero. The only tax the government relied on was indirect tax, which was imposed on foreign trade; however, foreign trade was also minimal. Hence, taxation did not constitute a significant source of revenue. The revenue from the sale of the natural gas serviced the loans Afghanistan had borrowed from the USSR. In addition, the various goods ranging from automobiles to building materials delivered from the USSR were paid for by natural gas. Thus, natural gas was exported only to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the onset of uprising brought about a new form of social mobility for the peasants, laborers and other blue color workers.51 Those peasants, drivers, and laborers, who had taken the initiative to travel to Pakistan to request arms and ammunitions from the different Mujahideen groups, were appointed as commanders. Thus, they did not need to be peasants any more because their new status provided prestige including financial assistance from the political wing of the Mujahideen whose resources came mainly from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries and from the USA. Thus, the first phase of the Stalinist approach to “development” contributed to further underdevelopment in Afghanistan. The imposition of a model supported by a 51 Unpublished paper, presented in the research forum of the College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs in 1997. small minority was resented by a traditional majority because it tried to replace the traditional society with a totally foreign system, disregardful of the past. It was a clash between two social concepts, in which the status quo, the tradition, prevents the other from success through resistance by the traditional forces and powers. Phase Two 1979-1992 Terror intensified rebellion and resistance all over the country. Rebellion also took the form of mutiny of armed units of the Afghan Army. For example, in March 1979, the Seventeenth Division of the army in Her’at (in Northwestern Afghanistan) rebelled against the regime and massacred the Soviet advisers in that city. Similarly, other military units under the leadership of nationalist Afghan officers joined the resistance groups. This weakened the regime’s control over the country. As the resistance became stronger, Marxists realized they had to do something to salvage their revolution. Before the direct invasion of the USSR’s forces, a power struggle had played out between the first President Nur Mohammed Taraki and his Lieutenant and right hand man Hafizullah Amin. Consequently, Amin toppled Taraki and later killed him, proclaiming himself the new President (Rubin, 1995:111 & 120; Poullada, 1987: 56; Gupta, 1986: 82). Since Amin was an ultra-radical in the implementation of his communist ideal, he resorted to wholesale execution of all those that disagreed with his rule. Consequently, people’s hatred further increased and Mujahideen operations became more effective. The government army was losing virtually every battle they fought against the Mujahideen. Finally, Amin realized that his army could not hold its end against popular uprising, and asked the Soviets to send some combat units to reinforce his demoralized army. Upon sending a few divisions into Afghanistan, the Kremlin was ready to put an end to Amin’s rule. They then brought Babrak Karmal, leader of the Parcham faction of the PDPA, from Moscow to Kabul. Before the arrival of Karmal to Kabul, special KGB combat units toppled and killed Amin. The Russians installed Babrak Karmal as the new president. They thought that with Amin out of the way, Karmal would be able to muster support from the population by decelerating reforms and broadening the base of the government. Karmal released political prisoners under the pretext of amnesty and changed the Khalqis red flag into two. One of the flags was the traditional Afghan flag with three colors, representing the Afghan nation, and the second one was solid red representing the PDPA or the communist party. The Russians did not realize that irrespective of what they tried, they would not soften the resistance because the presence of the Soviet troops endangered Afghan independence. Consequently, the resistance intensified. The economy deteriorated further. The destruction of villages forced families to flee to the safety of Pakistan or to urban centers, especially Kabul. Afghans in the opposition endured all difficulties, fought back and lost their lives, but did not compromise their strong religious and national values, and resisted the designs of the self-sold communists and Russian forces. After a great number of Soviet forces were defeated at the hands of Afghan Mujahideen in different parts of Afghanistan, the Russians intensified their assaults against the civilian population (Noorzoy, 1987: 83; Rubin, 1987:340-44). The Soviet air force targeted villages and towns through carpet-bombing, and deployment of thousands of tanks and Special Forces units. The morale of the Afghans, however, remained as high as ever. The following quotes from Noorzoy (1987: 83-84) illustrates the Soviets’ depopulation strategy: “It is clear from the beginning of their [Russians’] open involvement in December 1979, the Soviets have carried out a policy of depopulating much of rural Afghanistan through a campaign of massive bombardments, crop destruction, the destruction of the intricate underground irrigation systems or Karez on which production depends, the slaughter of livestock, the destruction of orchards and vineyards, above all through a terror campaign of massacres and atrocities in many areas… The result has been the large-scale abandonment of farming and farmland, much of which will revert to desert without continuous care and maintenance.” “ There are two basic reasons for the Soviet policies of depopulating rural Afghanistan and destroying rural life: since 1978, the rural communities have been the strongholds of opposition to communism and have provided the support base for the Mujahideen. Moreover, agricultural land is largely privately owned and farmed, and the farmers who resisted land distribution will also resist collectivization.” In late 1981 and early 1982, the Russians with the collaboration of the Parchamis and a few Khalqis came up with two plans: one was to annex Afghanistan into the Soviet Union, alternatively divide Afghanistan into Northern and Southern portions. The Northern portion would be a safe heaven for the Parchamis and Khalqis, and Southern Afghanistan was to be left to the rest of the Afghans. The first option did not succeed due to the resistance of the Khalqis because they were Pashtuns, and, they claimed to have “nationalistic feelings”. The second did not either, since the Russians were defeated and the communist regime was toppled. Major General Gholam Sediq Miraki exposed both of these plots to the international community through his interviews with the international media, after taking refuge in Pakistan in 1982. This further embarrassed the Russians until they removed Karamal from his position, and replaced him with the chief of KHAD, the secret police of the regime, Dr. Najibullah. This occurred after Gorbachev’s accession to power in 1985. He realized that the war was not winnable. Moreover, his policy of Glasnost would not make headway internationally while Russian soldiers were exterminating Afghan people. Thus, Gorbachev’s appointment of Najibullah was aimed at bringing about a national reconciliation, while fierce bombardment of the countryside and attempts to seal the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Afghanistan and Iran, continued. The term national reconciliation was a paradox in essence, after Afghanistan lost one and a half million people, had one million more disabled and six million lived as refugees in Pakistan and Iran. Najibullah offered to share power with the Mujahideen and appointed nonpartisan individuals to high-ranking positions and armed minority (Uzbek) and others ethnic militias to secure their areas. In the latter case, Uzbeks were imported from Uzbekistan and were granted Afghan citizenship to join the existing Uzbek militias. However, after the collapse of Soviet Union, the influx of resources from the Soviet Union ceased, and the militias saw no incentive to continue their support of Najibullah’s government (Rubin, 1995: 265). With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Uzbek militias formed coalition with the Tajik resistance commander Ahmad Shah Masood of Panjisher Valley in northern Afghanistan in 1992. His own Army units prevented Najibullah from escaping to India to join his family in New Delhi. A small number of security forces that were Khalqis, who were mostly, Pashtuns, fought against well-armed Parchami military units and the militias, but were outgunned by them. The Khalqi military personnel joined the Pashtun Mujahideen groups, especially that of Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami. Consequently, a power struggle erupted inside Kabul between the Mujahideen and the Northern coalition forces, which consisted of the former communist army units, militias and Tajik commander of Mujahideen Ahmad Shah Masud (Rubin, 1995: 265). This is when the second of the two Russian plans, which General Miraki exposed, started to take a different shape; this time along ethnolinguistic lines. That is, alliances were formed based on ethnic lines. The Northern Coalition made up of minority groups inculcated the notion to split northern Afghanistan from the southern portion as a homeland for the non-Pashtun population. The fighting between the two forces erupted in Kabul; the result was the destruction of Kabul and the loss of 50,000 civilian lives. Najibullah, however, took sanctuary in the United Nations office in Kabul, where he was caught when the Taleban conquered Kabul in 1996, and was killed and left hanging for three days and nights from a traffic pole in the middle of one of Kabul’s intersections. 13.4 Phase II Analysis Due to the continuous bombardment, many peasants became refugees in Pakistan and Iran. Many others flooded cities, especially Kabul. Hunger and disease spread throughout the country. The meager trade that existed between regions within Afghanistan ceased, further weakening the local as well as the national economy. Some fruit merchants would take chances and buy fruits from areas that were not destroyed yet, and deliver them from rural areas to Kabul and then to Pakistan for profit. Rural villages became ghost towns with their inhabitants, either killed, or refugees in Pakistan or in a few urban centers. With one third of the country’s population either refugees or killed, the demand for manufactured commodities decreased significantly. The following figures (Noorzoy 1987:85) serve as indicators for the conditions of the manufacturing sector: • Between 1978-1982, textile output declined by 70 percent, from 5,463 billion Afghani to 1,651 billion Afghani • Consequently, textile imports from USSR increased by 180 percent or from 3.3 to 9.26 million meters • As of 1986, Afghanistan owed the USSR $2.135 billion dollars. • The Soviets imported Afghan natural gas well below the international price; the USSR paid $48 per 1000 cm, while the international price for natural gas was $114.78. The imported goods from Russia were sold at much higher price to Afghanistan. In essence, there was no national economy left. The only major cities with some economic transactions were Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif and Her’at. Kandahar was turned into rubble and did not serve as a viable economic center. The Russian strategy was aimed to induce starvation and famine in the countryside. This would result in abandonment of villages by the population, which the Russians thought would result in the reduction of support for the Mujahideen and cooperation with the communist regime. The economic loss for the population was the continuous decimation of agricultural produce and crops in the countryside by Napalm bombs. This further contributed to the shortage of foodstuffs, and raw materials for factories. In Rubin’s words (1987: 343): “One effective way of driving people out of their homes is to deprive them of their livelihood, and the intentional destruction of food, agriculture, and pastoralism has been one of the Soviets’ main counterinsurgency tactics. Farmers working in the fields are frequently gunned down by Soviet helicopter gunships or jets…Virtually every Soviet attack includes the burning of foodstuffs, especially wheat, the main staple of Afghanistan. The Soviets have a variety of incendiary weapons for burning wheat from air or from the ground, for grain standing in the field, gathered on the threshing floor, or stored in the home.” Although, the rural population abandoned their villages, this increased their anger. Subsequently, in Pakistan, families that had two or more male members would send one or more back to Afghanistan to join the jihad against the Russians (personal observations, 1982). Finally, after heavy losses at the hands of Afghan resistance, the loss of one and a half million of Afghans, and the destruction of the entire country, Russian forces retreated in 1989 (Lohbeck, 1993: 269-70). However, they left a crumbling Marxist regime in Kabul. The regime received a great amount of financial aid, and military hardware, which ensured the continuous support of the Uzbek militias52. However, after the Soviet Union collapsed, the financial and military support for Najibullah’s regime also ended. Therefore, Najibullah’s government collapsed (Rubin, 1995:265). 52 The Uzbek militia or juzjani (from Juzjan a province in northern Afghanistan) militia consisted of the Uzbek people of Juzjan province in northern Afghanistan under the leadership of Rashid Dostum. Before, the Russians retreated, they recruited large number of Uzbek families from Uzbekistan, numbering one hundred thousands, gave them the necessary documents reflecting Afghan citizenship. They served as replacement for the retreated Russian forces. Each member of the militias received a set salary furnished by the communist government of Najibullah in Kabul. To that end, the Russians provided billions of dollars and weapons worth five billion dollars. The militias turned against Najibullah in 1992, after the Soviet Union collapsed and Najibullah stopped receiving money and weapons from Moscow (Rubin, 1995: 265). Conclusion The substance of this chapter confirms both of the hypotheses of this dissertation. The impositions of socioeconomic and political changes foreign to Afghan culture, violated Islam and Pashtunwali and therefore, were resisted by Afghanistan’s majority. The decrees of the Marxist regime impinged upon family values of Afghans including marriage. The confiscation of land and disregard for Islamic rituals such as the daily prayers violated both Islamic principles and Pashtunwali norms. The arrests, imprisonment, and execution of men and women violated both Pashtunwali and Islamic values alike. People were killed because they exercised their religious believes and refused to give up their independence. The result was destruction of the country, loss of one and half million Afghan lives, and one million individuals are handicaped. With respect to the second hypothesis, the imposition of this mode of control over Afghanistan was part of the Cold War competition between the USSR and the USA. The Soviets wanted to control Afghanistan through Afghan Marxists. Under the pretext of development, progress and equality, Afghan Marxists wanted to pave the way for the USSR to exercise influence in the two regions neighboring Afghanistan, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. This factor became evident, as mentioned above, in 1981-82 after the Parcham faction of the PDPA agreed with the USSR to incorporate Afghanistan into the Soviet Union. However, the plan did not materialize because the Khalq faction of the PDPA objected; instead, Afghanistan was to be split into northern and southern portions, with the northern portion for the Afghan communists. The dominance of the Soviet Union over Afghanistan would have endangered American interests in both the Middle East and South Asia or the Indian Ocean. Both endogenous and exogenous factors perpetuated underdevelopment and misery in Afghanistan. Endogenously, the violation of the value systems, Islam and Pahtunwali prevented the success of the communists as well as the Russian occupation. The communists’ disregard for Islam and persecution of anyone that expressed a negative opinion against the government alienated the overwhelming majority of the population. In addition, the mass execution of the prisoners further exposed the truth behind the regime, as anti-Islamic. The massacre of whole villages by the Russian forces produced the reaction of the population. Islam orders Muslims to fight against infidel aggressors, and Pashtunwali orders Afghans to sacrifice their lives for their land. Individual leaders, is another factor. The communist leaders proudly expressed their association with the Soviet Union on Afghan radio and television. Their violation of Islamic values as well as the Pashtunwali made them surrogates of the Soviet Union to the Afghan public. Hence, jehad against them, according to Islamic and Pashtunwali values, was a necessity which the Afghans pursued. The imposition of a foreign ideology on Afghanistan followed by the invasion (exogenous factor), invoked reaction from the Afghan people leading to the Russians defeat and the defeat of the Marxist regime in 1992. The fall of the communist regime in 1992 and the subsequent emergence of the Taliban resurrected the most conservative elements of Afghan society, reversing the effects of cultural modernization in Afghanistan to a traditional ultra-conservative country. XIV. 1992 to present 14.1 Introduction This period of Afghan history is characterized by the onset of civil war and anarchy, the restoration of peace and order and reaction to modernization. The collapse of the Marxist regime in 1992 resulted in a civil war that plagued Kabul like a dreadful disease and caused the loss of fifty thousand lives53. The loss of lives and the continuous lawlessness were challenged by the emergence of a movement called Taliban. Taliban is a Pashto plural of the Arabic word talib or student. The movement carries the name of a group of seminary students that joined the fight against the Soviet army in the 1980s. The only difference they had with the rest of the Mujahideen groups was their status as seminary students or Taliban. Reorganized in 1994 under the leadership of a prominent religious scholar, Mullah Mohammed Omar, they were joined by many other seminarians and Mujahideen groups throughout Afghanistan, becoming a mass movement. The Taliban marked the emergence of an ultra-conservative reaction to the modernity imposed on Afghanistan from the 1950s onward. The Taliban saw modernity as the adoption of Western cultural symbols and the presence of freedoms like those of the 1960s. However, their emergence also marks for the first time an 53 I collected this data about the crimes of the Hazara and Uzbeks as part of the research I conducted in 1995 to satisfy the thesis requirement for my second Master degree. opportunity to embark on a socioeconomic development compatible with the value systems of Afghan society. 14.2 Background In 1992, as part of a Soviet-led and UN brokered peace-plan, political power had to be transferred from the Soviet installed communist government of President Najibullah to an interim government. Initially, the interim government was supposed to consist of former non-communist officials and the former king Zahir Shah, but that was rejected by the resistance political parties in Pakistan. Therefore, an alternative proposal was forwarded by Boutros-Ghali and approved by the United Nations on April 10. The alternative was a pretransition council or interim authority consisting of impartial leaders in Pakistan and in Kabul. The leaders in Pakistan were to be flown in a UN plane into Kabul where they would select an interim government on April 15-16. There, in the airport, Najibullah was to transfer power to the pretransition council, and he was going to leave the country on the same UN plane. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the influx of Soviet aid to Najibullah’s government. Consequently, the communist militias had no incentives to continue supporting Najibullah. The military as the last remaining state institution dissolved, and alliances formed based on ethnic and linguistic lines. In the north of the country, the Tajik army commanders (from the Parcham faction of the communists) and the communist militias joined the Tajik commander of Mujahideen from Jamiat-eIslami, Ahmad Shah Masud. They saw an opportunity to control the future government of Afghanistan. To achieve that goal, these Parcham army units, the communist Uzbek militias, (Rashid Dostum was its leader), Ahmad Shah Masud, the Ismailie militia54 and the Hazara55 group of Hezb-e-Wahdat, formed a coalition, known as the Northern Coalition. Masud served as the leader of the coalition. Meanwhile, the Mujahideen political leaders in Pakistan held a meeting with the Pakistani Prime Minister in Islamabad.56 In the meeting, two of the Mujahideen leaders, Rabbani of Jamiat-e-Islami and the Mujaddidi leader of the National Liberation Front for Afghanistan disagreed over the UN arrangement. Rabbani wavered because his forces as part of the Northern Coalition were ready to take over Kabul. Conversely, Mujaddidi proposed a Mujahideen government instead of the pretransition council because he “harbored ill-conceived ambitions to serve as president of the country” (Rubin, 1995:269). Mujaddidi, like his father, who betrayed Amanullah and used the population for his personal gains, wanted to achieve his own ends at a cost to everyone else. In Kabul, as part of the implementation of the UN sponsored plan, Najibullah resigned on April 15. Since the pretransition council was supposed to be flown from Pakistan into Kabul by the Un plane, Najibullah was ready to embark on the same plane to India to join his family. However, he was prevented from leaving the country by troops loyal to his rival, Mahmud Baryalai, the brother of the ousted president Babrak Karmal who was removed by the Russians in favor of Najibullah in the early 54 Sayyid Mansur Naderi led the Ismaili militia. It was a custom of this group that any new bride had to spent the first night of her wedding with the senior Naderi (interview with an Afghan elder in 1997). 55 The Hazrara is an ethnic group who are of Mongol by descent. They were situated at a very low level of the socioeconomic ladder. They belong to the Shiite sect of Islam while the Pashtun are Sunni. 56 Two of the political parties in Peshawar, namely Hezb-e-Islami (Islamic party) and Jamiat-e-Islami were the most powerful; Gulbudin Hekmatyar, ethnically Pashtun, led the former, while Burhanudeen Rabbani, ethnically Tajik led the latter. Hezb-e-Islami was the most diverse among all the Mujahideen parties. The Tajik and Uzbek population, nonetheless, dominated Jamiat-e- Islami. Moreover, the Tajik commander of 1980s. Baryalai wanted to take vengeance on Najibullah for being his brother’s rival. In coordination with the Northern Coalition, he flew 750-1000 troops from northern bases and occupied the Kabul airport. Unable to leave, Najibullah took sanctuary in the United Nations’ office in Kabul (Rubin, 1995: 270). On the morning of April 16, the UN representative flew into Kabul alone since the Mujahideen leaders in Pakistan were still debating power sharing. After the Parcham army units formed the Northern Coalition, it defeated the Khalqi army units57 in the north. The remaining Pashtun units in the south surrendered to Pashtun Mujahideen who dismantled and demobilized them because before the Russians’ retreat they were the enemy siding with the Russians against Mujahideen. Therefore, the Mujahideen and the overwhelming majority in the country had no sympathy toward them. However, the Sarandoy, mobile police units which consisted of Khalqis, joined the Hezb-e-Islami forces of Pashtun Gulbudin Hekmatyar in the south, strengthening his conventional forces (Rubin, 1995:265-6). Hekmatyar wanted to take over Kabul before Masud did. In order to prevent the Northern Coalition from entering Kabul, Hekmatyar dispatched several of his small unarmed units to enter Kabul, where they would be furnished with weapons by their sympathizers in the ministry of the Interior. Their aim was to take over the government before the Northern Coalition entered Kabul. However, the news alarmed Masud who ordered the Northern Coalition, Ahmad Shah Masud, was a member of the Jamiat-e-Islami. However, he was much more independent. Masud paid only lip service to Rabani’s Jamiat-I-Islami party. 57 Khalqi army units consisted of Khalqi officers and their loyalists (Khalq was one of the two factions of PDPA or Afghan communist party). The first two communists Presidents, Taraki and Amin, were leaders of the Khalq party. President Najibullah led the Parcham faction after the Russians replaced his predecessor Babrak Karmal with him. The majority of the Khalq faction members were Pashtuns; similarly, the Parcham faction consisted of Tajiks and some other minorities. Therefore, when Najibullah lost the allegiance of the militias, he started to play the ethnicity factor in order to prolong his stay in office, but failed. the Nothern Coalition forces to enter Kabul, where they destroyed Hezb-e-Islami units in the Interior Ministry. Although the Northern Coalition took over Kabul, the Hezb-e-Islami did not accept their rule and a civil war broke between the Northern Coalition and Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami group and his ally Abdur-Rab Sayyaf. This was in part due to a rivalry between Ahmad Shah Masud and Gulbudin Hekmatyar which predates the civil war in Kabul, and partly due to the anti-Shia sentiment of Sayyaf because the Shiites were members of the Nothern Coalition. Several of the Mujahideen leaders and their parties remained neutral. Meanwhile, the political wing of the Mujahideen58, which consisted of several political parties, and was based in Peshawar, Pakistan, had not yet reached a comprehensive power sharing agreement. Thus, they did not have a common political platform to offer as a mechanism of stability. Although, they reached a tentative agreement, this did not go far enough to ensure stability in the country. Furthermore, the Shiite Hazara groups in refuge in Iran were not represented in the council for the interim government because Saudi Arabia, which paid for the expenses of the interim government, did not want Shiites to be part of the government. Therefore the Iranian government organized and supported the eight Shiite groups into a united front in order to ensure their representation in the government. Moreover, Mujahideen commanders were not included in the interim government cabinet either; 58 The political wing of Mujahideen consisted of seven political parties, led by former Islamic activists who were persecuted during Daud Khan’s tenure in office as President. Among the parties, Hekmatyar’s Hezbe-Islami (better organized) and Jamiat-e-Islami of Burhanudeen Rabbani were the most powerful. After rejecting the Soviets’ proposal for an interim government in Kabul before their withdrwal, the Mujahideen parties in Peshawar debated and tentatively agreed on the framework of an interim Islamic government Rubin, 1995:247-8). consequently, many commanders were disillusioned with political parties in Peshawar and various regional commanders formed their own alliances (Rubin, 1995: 248-9). The factional fighting marked the beginning of open ethnic hostility between Pashtuns (Afghans) and the minorities. Since the Northern Coalition was in control of Kabul, members of the coalition, especially Uzbek and Hazara, initiated an ethnic cleansing campaign against the Pashtuns. Thousands of Pashtuns were killed. The Pashtuns looked up to Hekmatyar. In Rubin’s words (1995:266): “The emerging conflict over the control of the central state---and even over the definition of Afghanistan---led some traditionalist forces among Pashtuns to look for leadership to Hekmatyar, who alone among the Pashtuns commanded the mobile, conventional forces needed in the struggle for power.” Moreover, it was soon revealed that members of the Northern Coalition did not trust each other because each belonged to a different ethnic group and wanted to have a larger portion of power in the government. Due to mistrust and subsequent armed conflict among the members of the Northern Coalition, a number of alliances formed and broke between them. As a result of conflict among the members of the Northern Coalition, in 1994-95, the Uzbek and Hazara members of the Northern Coalition joined Hekmatyar. However, the conflict between Pashtuns (Afghans) and minority groups continued. The Hekmatyar Hezb-e-Islami group was primarily dominated by the Pashtun Gharzi tribe59, which dominated Afghanistan from 1709 to 1729. The Durrani tribe, which ruled Afghanistan from 1747 to 1978, remained indifferent to Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e- Islami. Their indifference was not only based on the dominance of Gharzi but also on the Pan-Islamic rhetoric of Hekmatyar, who did not favor any ethnicity; which was proven by his alliances with Hazaras and Uzbek militias. Hekmatyar’s coalition undermined the Pashtunwali of both the Gharzi and Durani Pashtuns alike, because he formed coalition for strategic reasons with both the Hazara group and the Uzbek militia in order to defeat Masud. According to Pashtunwali, these minority groups had imposed indignity on the Pashtun population when they looted their homes, kidnapped women from their homes and sold them as commodities.60 The Pashtuns saw, again, as a dishonor the presence of Dostum’s Uzbek militias and the Hazara group, Hezb-e-wahdat, led by Mazari with Hekmatyar. The Hezb-eWahdat members committed most of these crimes. Hekmatyar’s association with these groups, however, came out of necessity and survival for Hekmatyar. Furthermore, since the minorities were dominant in northern Afghanistan, rumors of secession circulated around the country. Thus, an alternative force had to emerge to reinstate Pashtun honor as well as Islamic values. This new force was the Taliban. After the deterioration of law and order throughout Afghanistan, the Taliban movement emerged under the leadership of a religious scholar, Mullah Mohammed Omar. Mullah Omar, who was a former Mujahid, was studying in a madrasa or seminary in the Singesar village in the Maiwand district of Kandahar province. In fact, the formation of the movement started with an incident that took place in 1994. A former commander of a Mujahideen group abducted three women, raped and murdered them. In the summer of 1994, 59 Pashtuns are divided into two main large tribes, the Gharzi and the Durrani. Each has many sub-tribes, and each of the sub-tribe has its own sub-tribes. The third smaller group is the Krayr’a. The remaining small number of tribes belong to Krayr’a. Mullah Omar, who was distressed by this dreadful incident, vowed to put an end to this type of indignity (Davis, 1998:43-4). Therefore, he and thirty of his comrades, of whom only fourteen were armed, confronted the criminal, put an end to his terror, and executed him. Thereafter, the Taliban movement organized formally under Mullah Omar was joined by Mohammed Ghaus as well as Taliban studying in madrasas in the southern NWFP (North West Frontier of Pakistan). Davis (1998:44) explains: “The Taliban themselves had their own long-established links with the Madrassa network of the Jamiat-e Ulem-a-e Islam in Baluchistan [southern NWFP] where thousands of Afghan refugee youths and some students from inside Afghanistan were engaged in Koranic studies.” William Maley (1998: 14) adds: “The advent of war in Afghanistan in the 1980s saw Talibs [Talib means one individual of Taliban] taking to the battlefield; they were witnessed in 1984 by Olivier Roy in Uruzgan [in central Afghanistan], Zabul [southwest] and Kandahar. Other students emerged not from Madrassas in Afghanistan, but from those run by Maulana Fazlur Rahman, which offered a conservative religious education to boys from Afghan refugee camps, especially orphans or sons of very poor families.” After Mullah Omar organized the movement, Afghan Taliban from the refugee camps inside Pakistan also joined them. Mullah Omar expanded the goal of his thirty followers from ensuring women’s dignity to issues of law and order in general, and the social, cultural and political cleansing of Afghanistan (N. H. Dupree, 1998:145). Furthermore, the Taliban reiterated another objective, namely to complete the unfinished job of the Jihad by establishing a pure Islamic state. The following quote by Nancy Hatch Dupree (1998:145) illustrates this: 60 I established this through my research for my Masters paper, titled: The Nightmare that Began in Dashte-Barchi, at the University of Chicago in 1995-96. “The avowed purpose of the Taleban Islamic Movement is to complete the unfinished agenda of the Jihad: to install a pure Islamic state, cleansed of evils perpetrated by their predecessors. Great stress is placed on the creation of secure environments where the chasteness and dignity of women may once again be sacrosanct.” They received support from local khans, because they wanted the return of peace and stability to the area. Their support expanded throughout Afghanistan. An incident led them to the takeover of Kandahar, the second largest city. Pakistan wanted to have a safe overland route from the Pakistani border to Turkmenistan via Kandahar and Her’at. On October 12 1994, the Pakistani government supported a group of 200 Taliban fighters in their assault of Spin Boldak, the Afghan border district center. Taliban succeeded in destroying Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami garrison and captured heavy loads of weapons and ammunitions. Subsequently, on October 29 1994, the Pakistani government sent a convoy of thirty trucks loaded with goods to Turkmenistan. The convoy was stopped by local warlords near Kandahar and was delayed until November 2. Since Mullah Omar and his supporters were fed up with the continuous series of highway robberies, they attacked the warlord’s forces, managing to defeat them and on 3 November released the convoy. Following this victory, the Taliban entered Kandahar and defeated all warlords in the city and established law and order. The non-selfish acts of the Taliban were accompanied by their successes. They became an inspiration for people seeking peace and stability. Subsequently, as the news of the movement spread, other Afghan students studying in madrasas or seminaries in Pakistan joined them. This further strengthened the Taliban until they became a formidable force which became evident at their conquest of Kabul in 1996. The Taliban defeated Hekmatyar’s forces and the Northern Coalition abandoned Kabul and retreated to the few provinces they controlled. A large council of Ulema selected and appointed Mullah Omar him as Amir-ul-Mu’minin or commander of the faithful. 14.3 Social and Economic Development Policies 14.3.1 Social Policies Whenever the Taliban took over a town, women were ordered not to leave their homes unless it was an emergency. Otherwise, their male relatives should accompany them. When the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996, they announced various decrees via Kabul Radio. Some of the decrees read that women should not attend schools and should abstain from going to work, and promised women their salaries at home. The reason for these decrees was to prevent women from any type of indignity and dishonor from the perspective of Islam and Pashtunwali while they were in control of the city, since such an act would insulted the entire Taliban movement. In addition, Taliban ordered women to wear Islamic attire, cover themselves, and abandon Western wardrobes. The Western media criticized these measures as a “human rights violation”. Irritated by the continuous intrusion of Western officials, Taliban authorities asked why the West had not objected to the violation of women’s rights in Kabul from 1992 to 1996. Quoting from ‘The News’, Nancy Hatch Dupree wrote (1998:147): “Abduction, forced marriages, rape and trafficking in little boys and girls were universally acknowledged, but the international community chose not to make an issue of these violations.”61 The acting Minister of Information and Culture expressed Taliban’s outrage by saying that their sole goal was “to protect their sisters from corrupt people”62. Meanwhile, the Taliban also ordered men to follow a prescribed dress code, namely to wear turbans and grow beards. It is worth mentioning that most of the members of the Taliban movement come from Kandahar, which has a distinct culture. Therefore, some of their socioculrural decrees, such as forced wearing of turbans or mandatory growth of beards have nothing to do with Islam. They rather represent the imposition of the culture of Kandahar on the rest of the country. 14.3.2 Economic Development Policies The Taliban aimed to rebuild the country immediately after they took over Kabul in 1996. Since the Western media had defamed the Taliban in the West, there was no influx of foreign aid to assist their government in any reconstruction project. Therefore, the Taliban decided to exploit Afghanistan’s natural resources and use the revenue from them in the reconstruction and development of the country. They invited foreign firms to invest in the extraction of Afghanistan’s rich natural resources, such as iron, copper, gold, silver, nickel, natural gas, petroleum, lapis lazuli, emerald and ruby. They also decided to use the strategic location of Afghanistan as an asset in 61 The quote is from Dupree (1998:147). However, the source that she relied on is Iram Noor, “Abuse of Women in Afghanistan Persists”, The News, from June 27, 1995. attracting investments. One such investment was the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmanistan to Pakistan. The pipeline had to cross Afghan territory and pay transit fees to Afghanistan. However, the projects had not even risen from the ground when the United States imposed economic sanctions and political isolation in mid-1999. The US was demanding the extradition from Afghanistan of Osama Bin Laden, an Arab Mujahideen leader, who had fought for fifteen years against the Russians side by side with the Afghan Mujahideen. Projects that were under way and were affected by the US imposed sanctions included a consortium of telecommunication firms that came to Afghanistan to introduce modern telecommunication such as telephone and Internet links connecting Afghanistan with the outside world. The US sanctions prevented manufacturers from selling needed implements for the project. The US-imposed sanctions hampered the economic development efforts of the Taliban at its inception. In this way, not only did they interfere with locally driven development, but turned all development projects into an uphill fight. Despite the US-imposed sanctions, the Taliban government is mobilizing Afghanistan’s domestic resources including natural resources and taxes for small development projects. The Taliban started collecting taxes from the areas under their control.63 They did not face any significant opposition because they were not violating the value systems of the country, Islam and Pashtunwali. The Taliban had already established its legitimacy as a force that saved Afghanistan from being divided. This 62 The acting Minister of Information and Culture, Amir Khan Muttaqi said this in his interview with The Frontier Post in its October 6, 1996 issue, titled “Aid agencies for Taliban compromise on women rights”. 63 The drought this year has imposed severe human and material costs on Afghanistan. Therefore, there is nothing for the Taliban to tax. according to Pashtunwali represents saving the honor of all Pashtuns. Furthermore, anyone that rebels against the Taliban will lose his legitimacy in the eyes of Afghan People. The US imposed sanctions isolated Afghanistan from the rest of the world as the US’s European predecessor England had isolated Afghanistan from the world in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Consequently, the economic sanctions and isolations imposed severe hardship on the Afghan people, some of whom were receiving letters as well as financial help from their immediate family members living abroad. Unfortunately, they can not receive this help any more thanks to the US-imposed sanctions. Furthermore, the sanctions also eliminate the ability of the Taliban’s administration to purchase medicine for hospitals, though the sanctions have supposedly precluded humanitarian aid. An analogy can be made between the so-called humanitarian preclusion to the practice of the Romans, who (according to their Germanic adversaries) would destroy and flatten cities and claim that they brought peace and tranquillity to the inhabitants of the destroyed cities. Therefore, the sanctions hampered all of these productive projects and forced Afghanistan to accept its fate of poverty and underdevelopment. 14.4 Analysis The emergence of the Taliban served two purposes; first, to bring peace and order to the country; second, to establish a pure Islamic state. The continuous lawlessness had turned the country into an uninhabitable place. Furthermore, the atrocities committed against the Pashtun population in Kabul by newly assertive minorities increased theTaliban’s anger and firmed their determination to put an end to this chaos. Meanwhile, these minorities had bruised the pride of the Pashtuns after they challenged the two and a half centuries political dominance of Pashtuns (Davis, 1998: 43). Moreover, since Taliban were educated in religious institutions and had participated in the war against the Soviet army, both of these factors compelled them to end the unfinished business of Jihad or holy war, by establishing a pure Islamic State. Furthermore, the Taliban believed that the roots of troubles in Afghanistan started in the 1946-53 and 1963-73 periods with the Afghan governments’ liberal policies facilitating the inception of communist parties and imposing Western cultural values on Afghanistan. The Taliban also represented a conservative reaction against modernity. Their reaction was molded by two factors: first, the Islamic philosophical school that they follow, and second, the opposition between modernity and Islam/Pashtunwali. The Taliban’s position has been influenced by the Deoband School, which emerged in the Dar ul-Ulum Deoband, an Islamic institution founded in the town of Deoband in India in 1867. According to Maley (1998: 14): “The Deobandi School preached a form of conservative orthodoxy, and madrassas under its influence provided the bulk of Afghan ulema. In this orthodoxy, evil and apostasy could be defined at least in part in terms of departure from ritual---that is, action wrapped in a web of symbolism---and it is for this reason that the Taliban emphasize the enforcement of modes of behavior which to outside observer seem peripheral to solving Afghanistan’s major problems.” Hence, the Taliban reacted to modernity by opposing its cultural symbols ranging from Western attire to television sets. Since the Taliban leadership is drawn from former Mujahideen groups, they were aware of the US role in the onset of civil war after 1992. They were determined to achieve self-determination, since foreign hands had brought disaster to Afghanistan. When Afghan officials and dignitaries approached the US officials in 1992 and requested the United State’s help in putting an end to the civil war, the American government ignored them. The US official responded to the Afghans that the civil war was the problem of Afghans and that Afghans themselves should deal with it.64 Since the USA achieved its objective when the Afghan Mujahideen defeated and humiliated the Soviet army, the United States did not see any reason for helping the Afghans in preventing their internal strife. Disappointed by the US indifference and hidden agenda, the Taliban gave sanctuary to Muslim reactionaries sought by the US and its allies. The Taliban resented US interventionism in the Muslim World, imposing its own ways and disrespecting Muslim cultures and traditions. This fact became evident with the continuous rejection by the Taliban of the US requests for turning over Osama Bin Laden to them. The Taliban consider the reconstruction and development of the country as the priority; however, unlike past attempts, they refuse to compromise their value systems and adopt Western cultural symbols. Conclusion The chaos and subsequent emergence of the Taliban as the dominant political force confirms both of the hypotheses of this dissertation. 64 The recent declassified CIA documents attest to this fact that the CIA knew that the civil war was starting, but chose let it happen because instability in Afghanistan was one avenue for the US to intervene in the region and use terrorism as a pretext to eliminate Muslim radicals in Afghanistan. From 1946 to Marxist rule, different approaches to development have been tried in Afghanistan that created reactions and discontents because they violated either Islamic values or Pashtunwali or both. Due to the strategic location of Afghanistan, Afghan rulers attempted to safeguard Afghanistan’s territorial integrity by trying to establish relationship with one power to deter the other, and at the same time trying to develop the country. Attempts at development were simply quick fixes due to Afghanistan’s dependence on foreign aid and the interests of total domination of foreign powers. Moreover, the tribes reacted to reforms because Afghan leaders concentrated on cultural modernization or adoption of Western cultural symbols. Therefore, imposition of Western culture in many instances served as a legitimate point of discontent for violating the values of the country. Consequently, the government in Kabul associated with such changes had repeatedly lost its legitimacy to the population. The post- 1992 anarchy resulted from the superpower game for supremacy in Afghanistan. Before the Russian defeat, the American government called the Afghan Mujahideen freedom fighters; however, once the Russians were defeated the former freedom fighters were labeled terrorists. The indifference of the United States toward Afghanistan’s development hopes and their call for a closer relationship forced Afghanistan to fall into the Soviet trap. The result was the invasion of Afghanistan and the total destruction of the country during the war of resistance. After the Russians invaded Afghanistan, the Americans appeared enthusiastic in helping Afghans in their struggle against the red army. However, after the collapse of the Marxist regime in 1992, American enthusiasm disappeared; instead, probably preventable bloodshed was allowed to continue. Currently, the USA and Russia have formed a special task forces to intervene in Afghanistan under the pretext of combating international terrorism. Since Afghanistan’s strategic position has significant economic gains for both Central Asian countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan itsel, the USA and Russia have a common goal, to prevent an Islamic government from becoming powerful. Their opposition results from Afghanistan’s resistance to the New World Order under USA hegemony. The stability that the Taliban brought about offer conditions for socioeconomic development and reconstruction to Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the USA is unwilling to cooperate with development efforts that respect Afghanistan’s culture while securing its self-determination. As a result, the embargo imposed by the USA has hindered local efforts at development along the lines just indicated. The Taliban want to use Afghanistan’s natural resources as well as its strategic location in producing development in the country. The plan to contract the construction of oil and gas pipelines stemmed from the geo-economic position of Afghanistan. For example, Turkmenistan needs to market its natural gas and petroleum in Western markets and, at the same time, reduce or end its economic dependence on Russia. The delivery of Turkmenistan gas is most efficient by constructing a gas-oil pipeline through Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Afghanistan could use the transit fees for the reconstruction and developmental of the country. The estimated transit fees of nearly one hundred million dollars yearly would be a tremendous source of revenue for Afghanistan. The Taliban’s aspirations for development appear to rest along the lines of Islam, Pashtunwali and self-determination of the future of Afghanistan. However, in order for the Taliban to succeed in bringing development to the country they have to work on the endogenous and exogenous factors that could both bring development as well as underdevelopment. Endogenously, the Taliban may need to tone down their utopian approach of building a pure Islamic state. Certain of their practices can be considered extremist as they violate the teaching of the Holy Koran, which teaches moderation all the time. Exogenously, they have to look for alliances with the Newly Industrialized Countries by providing them markets in Afghanistan in return for certain incentives such as technology transfer and help in development projects. XV. What Have We Learned: analysis and evaluation The previous chapters demonstrated that Afghanistan’s various attempts at development in the 20th century failed. As discussed above, the development efforts in Afghanistan can be understood within the frame of four variables: strategic location, tribal structure of society, value systems (Islam and Pashtunwali) and influential individuals. The value systems and the tribal structure of society are interdependent, and have been a crucial force for Afghan leaders to reckon with. In addition, development was held hostage by the strategic location of Afghanistan and the associated foreign interests. Afghan leaders considered Western symbols necessary for development. The imposition of these cultural symbols contradicted Afghan culture and values. The extent that Afghan people viewed Westernization as a direct attack on their most precious values. They opposed not only the symbols but also the accompanying economic reforms. The various development processes discussed exhibit a pattern of introduction of social change---reaction---recovery from reaction. This pattern appeared four times from 1919 to the present as follows: 1. Introduction of social change 1919 to 1929 2. Reactions to social change 1929 to 1933 3. Recovery from reaction 1933 to 1946 4. Introduction of social change 1946 to 1953 5. Reactions to social change 1953 to 1961 6. Recovery from reaction 1961 to 1963 7. Introducing social change 1963 to 1973 8. Reaction to social change 1973 to 1976 9. Recovery from reaction 1976 to 1978 10. Introducing social change 1978 to 1992 11. Reaction formation 1978 to 1992 12. A type of interregnum from 1992 to 1994 13. Reaction and social change 1994 to 1998 14. Recovery and moderation 1998 to present 15.1 First Efforts at Social Change and its Reaction During 1919-1929, Amanullah Khan’s reforms countered the societal traits of traditional (Pashtunwali) and Islamic values of Afghanistan. The most conflictive reforms were: • The requirement of Western dress • Discouragement of the use of veil and seclusion of women, with the personal example of King Amanullah and Queen Soraya. • Prohibition of turban, karakul hat and other traditional caps. • Regulation of student life through measures such as the discouraging of marriage, and the requirement to greet each other in a foreign language. • Accelerated military reforms: reduction of pay and abrupt dissolution of the older arrangements in the army. • Reduction or abolition of mullahs’ pay and abolishment of allowances to tribal leaders • Precedence of secular law over Shari’a, Islamic law. • Changing the official Muslim holiday from Friday to Thursday. All of the above reforms opposed deeply rooted centuries old social-cultural and religious values. The violation of these values damaged the credibility of Amir Amanullah Khan. His reforms eliminated some of the privileges of the conservative elements, while providing the opportunity for Britain to undermine government and prevent development by instigating rebellions. Ahmad (1990:221) illustrates this point: “He [Amanullah Khan] was, however, badly let down by the conservative elements entering into partisanship (if not conspiracy) with the “Mighty” Britain who did not like the Afghans to be a progressive nation and thus pose a threat to her imperial interests in India. Undeterred, he continued his efforts to transform Afghanistan into a modern state.” (Ahmad, 1990:221) Britain preferred a weak king that they could manipulate. In an effort to procure foreign assistance for his modernization schemes, Amanullah relied heavily on the Germans and to some extent on the Russians. The British, of course, resented this because both Russians and Germans could support the Indian independence movement. The reforms Amanullah Khan introduced affected different segments of society. As part of the political reforms, he eliminated the financial compensations made to tribal khans and extended members of the royal family. The elimination of these privileges affected the financial situation and the standing of these privileged individuals. Moreover, reductions in the size and pay of the army as well as the disbanding of veteran units and their replacement with younger recruits antagonized the tribes, whose members, served in the army. Thus, it reduced the influence and power of the tribes. Mullahs were weakened also as their allowances were reduced or abolished. All of these reforms created discontent and stimulated rebellion. At a different level, the intrusion of government in people’s personal and family life hit at the heart of Afghan traditions (Poullada, 1973:70-78). Collective reaction to such reforms brought down Amanullah’s reign and the development initiative altogether. It facilitated the emergence of Bacha-e-Saqao, who not only reversed Amanullah’s reforms but also destroyed any advances in crucial fronts like education. In order to achieve the support of the tribes and clerics to end the chaos of Bach-e-Saqau, Nader Khan had to restore privileges to both tribal khans and mullahs. Tribes did not like to see any infringement from the central government on their internal affairs and local customs. Thus, Nader Khan exempted tribes that assisted him against Bacha-e-Saqau from taxes, and removed the opportunity to build roads, electricity, public transport and healthcare in tribal enclaves. Meanwhile, the tribes would rather go without these facilities than sacrifice their internal autonomy. As a result, until the late1950s, these areas did not have paved roads linking them to Kabul. Amanullah’s reforms challenging the privileges of mullahs overlooked the role of mullahs as interpreters of the law capable of starting rebellion. Subsequently, mullahs proclaiming the illegitimacy of the reforms called for rebellion against the king. It is appropriate to mention that British agents in the guise of mullahs would appear in tribal areas and stir discontent. Meanwhile local mullahs with meager knowledge could not challenge British agents educated in Islamic jurisprudence. Hence, rebellions were facilitated by the confluence of threats to the British (and their ensuing instigation of and support for revolt), direct attacks on centuries-old privileges (alienating elites to the point of rebellion), blatant disregard for traditions and values, and the decision of the king to go against all odds. Prime Minister Hashim Khan followed on the footsteps of his brother Nader Shah. On the one hand, he kept tribal and religious elements content; and on the other hand, he embarked on an extensive efforts to reconcile Islam with modernization, while initiating a nation-building campaign through institutionalization of Pashto as the official language of the country. He went about this through his sponsorship of the Afghan modernists, the new generation of writers, to write on nationalism. The aim of the writers was to establish a common history, religious background and ethnic origin for all the people of Afghanistan (Gregorian, 1969:344-45). The writers pursued their campaign to promote the notion that the Pashtun tribes and other ethnic minorities emerged from the same ancestry, namely Aryans; and that there was no difference in blood between all of them. The excavations by French archaeologists served the purpose of these writers well. The French archaeologists unearth the Bactrian and Kushan heritage of Afghanistan. The modernists built on these findings, contending that the tradition of the Afghan people has not only been impacted by the Kushan and Bactrian heritage but also by Islamic civilization. The latter was to address the diversity in appearances among afghan people ranging from the Pashtun Mediterranean looks to the Mongoloid appearances of Hazara and Uzbek. The campaign of these modernists in conjunction with the domestic reconciliatory and gradualist policies reinforced by the isolationist exogenous policies enabled Prime Minister Hashim Khan to partly recover from the losses brought on by Bacha-e-Saqau. Thus, Hashim Khan kept tribes and clerics content by not violating Islamic values and Pashtunwali. 15.2 Second Social Change and Reaction In the period 1946-53, Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan introduced new liberal political measures unleashing forces that eventually produced new conflicts and instability. They included: • Release of political prisoners and holding of elections to the seventh parliament. • Lifting of press censorship restrictions, which opened the doors for liberal thinking. • Formation of an organized group, Tahrik-e-Naujawanan-e- Baidar (TNB) or the Movement of Enlightened Youth, of students, college graduates and liberal thinkers. This group advocated discarding traditional customs. • Unchecked freedom of expression which proved detrimental to stability in the political and social spheres. Consequently, political newspapers were allowed that alienated the religious community. • Turn of TNB toward socialism, hence setting the stage for future instability. Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan introduced liberal measures that proved detrimental to the stability of the government. The introduction of such liberal measures provided opportunity for the disenchanted to raise their voices in a radical manner. The political liberalization of this period created short- and long-term instability, while his economic development efforts failed because he was unable to secure necessary funding. Instead, an overwhelming proportion of the loan finally borrowed from the US Import-Export Bank was invested in the Helmand Valley Irrigation Project proposed by the Bank and benefiting American interests. The subsequent period of 1953 to 1963, during the tenure of Prime Minister Mohammed Daud Khan, served as a reaction to the liberal government of Shah Mahmud Khan. Daud Khan’s reactions consisted of suppressing opposition and fighting the corruption that had increased during the liberal period of Shah Mahmud Khan. Daud imprisoned most of his opponents, and aimed to modernize Afghanistan as rapidly as possible; however, he, too, thought that social modernization was essential for economic modernization. Aware of Amanullah Khan’s failure, he acknowledged that in order to emulate Amanullah Khan, he had to have a modern mechanized Army. He then: • Accepted Soviet military and economic aid and launched two five years development plans. • Consequently, he paved the way for the Soviet economic and military penetration of Afghanistan, and the indoctrination of Afghan military officers and intellectuals. • Enacted the emancipation of women. • Imprisoned all opposition. Since Daud Khan was among the students who were sent by Amanullah Khan abroad, he felt, in part, indebted to Amanullah. To that end, he renewed Amanullah Khan’s reform programs. Daud Khan realized that in order to initiate development (social and economic), he had to have a modern army to suppress opposition to his programs. Thus, when he achieved the establishment of a modern army, he introduced the “liberation” of women. Consequently, people reacted in Kandahar and a rebellion took place against such changes. The rebellion was suppressed through a bloody military campaign. An uprising in Khost was also suppressed through military intervention. Daud Khan relied on the strategic significance of Afghanistan to obtain military aid from the Soviet Union. This approach of dependent development led to the 1978 Marxist coup and the Russian invasion of 1979. Human loss, complete destruction of transportation, telecommunication, economic and intellectual infrastructures pushed Afghanistan at least fifty years back. A third social change and reaction occurred starting with the period 1963-73. During this period, the political prisoners of Daud Khan’s era were released and the constitutional liberalism period provided them with the arsenal to undermine religious and cultural values which, in turn, antagonized the religious community against the government. The measures that facilitated such instability were: • Complete freedoms of speech and press granted to the parliament served the interests of leftist elements. • Consequently, when the Marxists’ representatives in the parliament made blasphemous statements, the antigovernment Islamic student organizations confronted them, and anti-regime activities increased from all sides. • The freedom of expression also opened the door for Marxist demonstrations which debilitated the government and forced the Prime Minister Dr. Yusof to resign his post. • An imposed system of parliamentary monarchy not only resulted in instability but also impeded development by facilitating an opportunity for the leftist groups to establish themselves, and bring disaster in 1978. Though the government relied on foreign aid and possessed modern coercive means to suppress any revolt, it did not give much attention to the social cost of such liberal measures. Again, the reliance of the government on the strategic significance of Afghanistan in obtaining development aid from the Soviet Union and USA. Reliance on foreign aid and the imposition of the liberal constitutional arrangement confused things for a society with very different foundations and conditions. The period 1973 to 1978 was a reaction to the 1963-73 liberal period. The collaboration of Daud Khan with the Parcham, one of the two branches of the communist party or PDPA in Afghanistan, made Afghanistan a republic. Babrak Karmal, who led the Parcham faction, paved the way for the total penetration of Afghan government and military institutions by the Soviets. President Daud Khan took measures that alienated many. They included: • He targeted religious conservatism for persecution. • Consequently, the Islamic organizations that had emerged as a reaction to the communists’ disregard for Islam during the constitutional period of 1963-73 fled to Pakistan for their safety. • Land reforms were introduced that further blurred the political stability of the government because the feudal landlords, who were mostly tribal chieftains, were alienated. The arrangement of presidency violated societal traits because Daud Khan formed a coalition with the Parcham faction of the communist party which discredited Daud Khan in the eyes of the people. Although, he excluded the communists from the government, his policies of suppressing Islamic political organizations did not win him any positive image. However, toward the end of his tenure in office, Daud Khan started to draw the country from the Soviet sphere of influence and dependency by establishing closer relations to the Muslim countries of the Middle East. His visit to Saudi Arabia and performing the pilgrimage were effective in terms of his image among the conservative segments of the population. In addition, Daud Khan initiated closer relations with Pakistan by visiting that country twice from 1976 to 1978. His purpose was to stabilize relationship with Pakistan, that way special arrangement could be worked out in regard to Afghan transit through Pakistani territory. Moreover, Daud Khan wanted to work out the Pashtunistan problem with Pakistan pending an autonomous status for the Pashtuns of the frontier. Daud Khan’s stubbornness and his failure to recognize Soviet surrogates among his closest associates in addition to the availability of foreign aid and modern military that stemmed from the strategic location of Afghanistan, perpetuated underdevelopment. With the imprisonment of the Marxist leaders, his days were numbered which came about with the communists’ Soviet-aided coup in 1978. The period 1978-1992 was the fourth period of social change. This period is characterized with the onset of the Marxist regime, which tried to transform Afghanistan into a Marxist society, and imposed the Stalinist approach on the country. This approach of “development” rested on the Stalinist Model of socioeconomic transformation. It was the most radical social change that violated the social and cultural values of Afghan people. Reactions formed all over the country and Afghans rejected the Stalinist approach and the anti-Islamic and anti-Afghan behavior of the communists. The violation of societal traits included: • Forced indoctrination of students and government employees in an explicit anti Islamic persuasion. • Murdering of the opposition. • Forced annexation of people’s property under the umbrella of land reforms. • Advocating divorce through the pretext of women liberation. 15.3 The Failure of Development The various economic approaches adopted during the different periods failed to develop Afghanistan even under the version of dependent development of countries like that of Latin America. Moreover, their viability was affected by their lack of compatibility with the societal traits of Afghan society. By introducing Western culture and values, various governments alienated significant sectors of the population, who then organized to oppose all changes--- including economic changes with a potential benefit to the country. For example, King Amanullah Khan’s accelerated and radical reforms in sociocultural and religious areas served as a trap for his success, and provided a set of tools for the British to manipulate. Although Amanullah Khan could not control British propaganda and its agents, he could have approached modernization, especially its sociocultural aspects, in a more grounded manner. Amanullah Khan was impressed by the success of modernization in Turkey, but did not realize that Turkey and Afghanistan were two different countries with distinct historical roots. Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan pursued a liberal experiment in order to attract USA’s support in the development of Afghanistan and the modernization of the army. His problems stemmed from the introduction of political and social reforms that contradicted agreements that created the nation and the value held by society for millennia. The instability stemmed from freedom of speech, which enabled infant radical groups to attack religious figures, the royal family and tradition. The development attempts of Prime Minister Daud Khan brought about significant advances in the infrastructure of the country including roads that connected different regions of the country, civil aviation and airports and a modern army and air force. His development efforts, however, created an unintended consequence, exposing Afghan military officers and other educated segment to the Marxist-Leninist ideas. Since foreign aid flooded Afghanistan during this period, a question arises as to why South Korea and Taiwan, countries that also received foreign aid, developed and Afghanistan did not. It is important to point out that both Taiwan and Korea developed industrially under Japanese colonization. Then when the United States paid particular attention to these states as part of the cold war, Taiwan and Korea already had a significant industrial base, modern institutions and an educated workforce. With the influx of massive American economic aid to Taiwan and South Korea, the existing industrial, transportation, telecommunication and intellectual infrastructures were further expanded. From 1951 to 1965, Taiwan received $1.5 billion for economic assistance and $2.5 billion in military aid. Similarly, between 1953 and 1961, South Korea received $2.6 billion in economic aid and $1.6 billion for military purposes (Gereffi, 1994: 41-43). Joint-venture research projects were set up in both countries in order to enhance their technological capability as well as to give them flexibility in creating their own production (Gereffi, 1994; Schve, 1990). Moreover, the availability of foreign markets, the USA in particular, further enhanced their development. An opposing economic argument may arise to question why the US would create competitors for itself by aiding these countries. The answer to this question lies in the concept of “commodity chain” as developed by Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986:159). Gereffi (1994:45) points out, that “commodity chain” is composed of four stages. They are 1) raw material supply; 2) production; 3) exporting; 4) marketing and retailing. South Korea and Taiwan expanded their production and export. By the time South Korea and Taiwan were in a position to flood American markets with their commodities, the advanced industrialized countries such as the US were drifting away from manufacturing of commodities to the marketing and retailing end of the commodity chain. This was primarily due to the comparative advantage of different countries in different stages of the commodity chain; that is, the question as to where the economic surplus is concentrated. Hence, South Korea and Taiwan had retained economic surplus from the production of commodities, which stemmed from the low cost of labor. Accordingly, the distribution and retail of commodities in the advanced countries is much more profitable, especially, when the commodity is produced abroad, it brings higher economic surpluses to the capitalists in the core country. Thus, American foreign aid did not create competitors but rather served a multitude of purposes. On the one hand, it strengthened these countries’ socioeconomic situation on the brink of the communist threat there. On the other hand, it created labor-intensive manufacturing in countries where labor is cheap, and furnished the profitable end of the commodity chain at home. Afghanistan in contrast, received $551 million from the Soviet Union from 1954 to 1962, and $300 million from the USA. The entire aid from both countries, with the exception of the first $100 million from the USSR as open credit, was ear marked for particular projects. Thus, Afghanistan could plan only according to the kind and amount of foreign aid available. Most of the aid packages consisted of loans; only towards the end of 1950s did the donors dispense grants. Towards the end of the 1960s, foreign aid declined to Afghanistan. The Afghan government, which was conditioned by the influx of foreign aid, was taken by surprise. However, towards the middle of Daud Khan’s tenure as President, he decided to distance himself from the Soviet Union. To that end, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Shah of Iran promised massive economic aid to President Daud Khan. However, the USSR found out, toppled and murdered him and his family as part of the Marxist coup of 1978. 15.4 Hypotheses and Factors At this juncture, it is in order to summerize the substance of the dissertation in the context of the two hypotheses. First, I will discuss the various approaches imposed in different periods in the context of the first hypothesis. Second, I will also discuss, in the context of the second hypothesis, how the effects of the competition between world powers in Afghanistan kept the country underdeveloped. 15.4.1 Hypothesis One Approaches to development have been superimposed on Afghan society without integrating its own conditions, realities and aspirations. The result has been the rejection or failure of government initiatives to develop the country. As the hypothesis points out, development efforts from 1919 to the 1980s were unsuccessful and produced anti-development reactions. The anti-Islamic and anti-Pashtunwali tone of social changes convinced Afghans that development was simply the imposition of foreign customs, and values that contradicted Islamic and Afghan value systems. People wondered and questioned the relationship of prosperity, as it was envisaged by the development plans, to the adoption of Western customs and values. Furthermore, development or modernity is presented to the people in Afghanistan as a list of conditions that they are required to follow in order to be developed. Therefore, people had to sacrifice the substance of their beliefs and traditions, their nationhood in exchange for the uncertainty of development. In fact, they were asked to let their traditional oppressors take away the country, shape it according to their interests of profit and domination and renounce their right to self-determination. Furthermore, the liberal measures of the 1946-53 and 1963-73 paved the way for the rise of communist groups. Their members took advantage of the freedom of speech and the press to target Islamic and traditional values, alienating the largest sectors of the population. Eventually, this population saw no economic prosperity or rises in their living standards but the imposition of ideas and practices that conflicted with their values and principles. Moreover, these periods imposed a form of liberal democracy on Afghanistan that kept excessive powers in the hands of the king rather than entrusting them in the hands of the Afghan people. Unaware of the socialhistorical realities of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah wanted to separate religion from the state, something that was totally rejected in the periods before or after him and came at the expense of Islam. Rather than producing prosperity and self-determination, these initiatives led to devstation and traditionalism. Throughout the years from 1919 to the 1980s, Afghan politicians had been impressed by the cultural symbols of the West; hence, they focussed more on the symbols of modernity than on real development or development along the lines of Afghanistan’s realities and aspirations. Real development could have focussed on higher standards of living, better healthcare, universal literacy, modern sanitation, reduction of poverty and infant mortality, and an environmentally sound and competitive industrial sector. Instead, the politicians were overly concerned about Western attire and behavor. The royal family and its associated tribesmen in the government were only about using people rather than working for the people. The result was a bare-bones form of dependent development, which favored limited interests and sectors. 15.4.2 Hypothesis Two The second factor as espoused by the second hypothesis is that the approaches tried in Afghanistan emanated from the struggle of world powers around their interests, under the pretext of development. This analysis has shown that, in fact, the approaches used represented interests that were quite foreign to Afghanistan, in that they were related to the struggle of foreign powers to manipulate and control Afghanistan for their own interests. The strategic location again has been a factor in attracting world powers to Afghanistan. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, British-Russian competition wherein Afghanistan served as a buffer zone kept Afghanistan isolated from the rest of the world. This competition emanated from the British concern for possible Russian advance toward India. In the process, Afghanistan remained underdeveloped. The dynamics of this underdevelopment become clear when Afghan leaders are brought into the equation. “Corrupt” Afghan leaders signed the Gandomak and Durand agreements which gave Britain authority over the Afghan lands east of the current border of Afghanistan, and thereby kept Afghanistan landlocked. Hence, any trade had to be with British firms and had to come through British India. Afghanistan’s political isolation was worsened by its physical isolation which was brought about by the British annexation of the eastern Afghan lands, denying Afghanistan access to the Indian Ocean. The British intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan during the reign of Amanullah Khan is also related in part to the strategic location of Afghanistan. The British could not afford to have in Afghanistan an anti-British ruler having friendly relations with the USSR. The British manipulated Amanullah’s shortcomings and conspired with anti-Amanullah forces by instigating rebellions. Consequently, the British achieved their goal of toppling Amanullah Khan. The Anglo-Russian competition of the 19th and 20th centuries has had a long lasting effect on Afghanistan. After the post-Amanullah anarchy up to the Second World War, sensing a possible threat from Russia, Afghan leaders forced the country into self-imposed isolation because Britain and the USSR could not be trusted with any development projects in Afghanistan. Having experienced the consequences of the external intrusion in Afghanistan, Prime Minister Hashim Khan resorted to a policy of gradualism in development and isolationism in order to keep foreign interests at bay. Throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, the Afghan government tried to establish a relationship with a third power, especially Germany, because Germany did not have a colonial past and had no colonies in the region to endanger Afghanistan’s territorial integrity. Unfortunately, Germany’s dispute with world powers brought this to an abrupt end. In the post-WW II period, the indifference of the USA towards Afghanistan’s aspirations and corresponding requests for assistance left no alternative but to turn to the Soviet Union for development assistance. This provided the Russians with long- sought access to Afghanistan. Although in the mid-1950s Soviets-American competition resulted in some development aid, this event conditioned Afghanistan to rely almost exclusively on foreign aid. It prevented Afghanistan from following a consistent plan of development because the donors had earmarked aid for specific projects of their own making and interest.65 Therefore, Afghanistan had to follow a zigzag path to development by accommodating development plans to the availability of foreign aid. Furthermore, from the late-1970s to the early 1990s, Russia attempted to make Afghanistan a part of the USSR. Although it failed, in the process, the Russians destroyed the entire country thereby reversing everything gained from the SovietAmerican competition. Currently, the New World Order and its mechanism prevent Afghanistan from development. The US has been pursuing an approach that I call the Paradigm of Forced Socioeconomic Underdevelopment which consists of international isolation and economic sanctions. And the justification for this is the alleged violation of human rights, women’s rights and the promotion of terrorism or protection of terrorists. In fact, the current US-imposed economic sanctions follow the trends that have maintained underdevelopment. It may be an effort to force Afghanistan into its fold. The sanctions have prevented development in the country, have destroyed the incipient trade and have produced serious bottlenecks for the Afghan economy. As a result, thousands of people have lost their lives or have become malnourished due to the lack of food and medicine. 65 Furthermore, the United States used some of the development assistance as monetary reward to highranking officials for them to serve as their agents. Ironically, the United States is using the rubric of terrorism to form a joint Russian-American anti-terrorist force to undermine Afghanistan’s independence. The actual reason is not counter-terrorism but rather hindering the opportunity for a strong Islamic regime in Afghanistan. Once again, foreign powers dictate to Afghanistan the type of development they may pursue, namely dependent “development”. I formulate the development experience of Afghanistan to have resulted from the effect of exogenous factors in stimulating endogenous factors, especially when the endogenous factors are prone to manipulation by exogenous forces. That is, when development approaches contradicted the societal traits such as the social and religious values of Afghan society, development approaches failed to make headway. 15.5 Implications It is essential to integrate the four factors in any future development efforts. First, development efforts need to be within the realm of Islam and Pashtunwali because these constitute the value systems of the country. Any adjustments and changes need to be progressive and to the extent possible come from the natural flow of development rather than being imposed from above. Second, the Afghan tribes must be involved in the process. After the onset of stability, the government should consider partnerships with tribes in which these could assume or share responsibilities pertaining to the reconstruction and development of their regions. Third, leaders must be held responsible and be questioned about their actions. This requires the development of checks and balances so as to avoid any government absolutism. Fourth, Afghanistan must seek to secure access to the Indian Ocean through peaceful negotiations with Pakistan. In fact, Afghanistan could use the geo-economics inherent in its strategic location as an advantage in its negotiation with Pakistan. That is, the Central Asian countries can serve as very profitable markets for Pakistani goods; to access them, Pakistani goods must travel through Afghan territory in order to access those markets. Fifth, Afghanistan should explore with other Muslim leaders and their countries the possibilities of a regional development drive and market that mutually strengthens their economies, while increasing their negotiating power vis-à-vis hegemonic world powers. 15.6 Final Reflections on the Literature: The literature section (see chapter 2) already discussed the foci and limitations of relevant works on Afghanistan. It also helped identify the endogenous and exogenous factors used in this dissertation to analyze underdevelopment in Afghanistan. To close that discussion, I want to summerize here my position and what I believe to be the contribution of this work. As suggested in that chapter, the literature on Afghanistan falls short in discussing socioeconomic development in the context of endogenous and exogenous variables. With limited exceptions, the literature does not provide any systematic inquiry into the dynamics of the tribal structure, value systems and individual leaders, and the strategic location of Afghanistan. This dissertation differs from the literature, since the literature does not investigate underdevelopment in the context of the factors discussed here. The literature on social change and sociology of development fall short in their ability to account for social change and underdevelopment in Afghanistan. The treatment of social change in this dissertation reflects the relationship of social change to the sociohistorical, cultural and political realities of Afghanistan. Moreover, the literature on development does not account for development and underdevelopment in the context of both endogenous and exogenous environments. Development literature often focuses upon either domestic or global factors. However, here, I argue that underdevelopment as well as development is the product of both domestic and global factors---historically established. The exclusion of societal traits (Islam, Pashtunwali & local customs) from development attempts has contributed to the failure of developmental efforts in Afghanistan. Hence, the need for approaches that starts where the country is and actively involves the population and its idiosyncrasies in a process that they can own and control. 15.7 Implications for Future Development Initiatives The historical analysis has shown that development had some success in Afghanistan, among some ethnic groups and social categories, especially in Kabul and other major centers. Kabul was the largest recipient of development compared to the rest of the country. Centralization of development in Kabul created a rift between the capital and the rest of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the historical survey also established that change was continuously introduced and superimposed on the population without knowing whether it was feasible, ignoring the value system of the majority of the population, indeed antagonizing them openly. However, development could be re-introduced provided that: • People see a benefit in development • It goes from the least controversial or complex to the more complex • It is introduced progressively • Decentralize development from Kabul and explore partnerships that respect self-determination and that, in the long run, may result in change among tribal and other groups. The following chapter introduces a methodology of change and some preliminary elements for a socioeconomic development approach to the development of Afghanistan along these lines. Based on the historical survey, those aspects of change that most directly contradicted the values of the population often resulted in opposition to practically any change. Therefore, the proposed method builds on an understanding of the ways in which change occurs and advances a process that challenges people to evolve on the basis of their own dynamics of change, and does it incrementally. In this way, people may not feel attacked but stimulated to change and may do it at the proper pace and as part of their own development. Similarly, the preliminary proposal for economic development follows the findings of the historical analysis, namely, that development can take hold as it did in Kabul. In fact, the progressive creation of nuclei of change, mini-Kabuls throughout the country can provide the stimulus for change that Kabul has provided for its hinterland/periphery. Also decentralization of investment in infrastructure would introduce the conditions for other change. In other words, unlike the past, development must not concentrate only in Kabul but rather be decentralized. Based on the proposed method of social change, development would be incrementally introduced to the rural population by involving them in the operations of these economic units or townships, e.g., through job opportunities and public services. Furthermore, rather then attempting to modify people’s values by inducement, this approach calls for building on the ingrained sociocultural traits of the population. Meanwhile, the proposal might work under the Taleban’s administration if it continues its liberalizing policies. The Taleban have been changing their initial rigidity and are more open to change. For example, the Taleban hired women in Defense and Public Health ministries and, the types of restrictions imposed on women doctors and nurses have been completely eliminated. Moreover, schools for girls up to age 12 have been opened. The implementation of such liberalizing policies points to a trend suggesting that the Taleban might further furnish opportunities for women to be part of the work force and for other successive changes as well. At any rate, the experience discussed here calls for new approaches that start where people are; that respect the culture and values of the country; and that, ultimately, promote development based on the people of Afghanistan---rather than using the country as a battlefield for competing foreign powers or a neocolony of such powers. XVI. Proposal Summary In this chapter, I introduce a methodology of social change that can serve as the mechanism or map for the formulation and implementation of socioeconomic development. I am proposing this methodology based on my understanding of social change, my knowledge of Afghanistan, and my speculation of what would work in Afghanistan. The method of social change provides the dynamics of how people respond to new information. The knowledge provided by the dynamics of the social change methodology can be used to promote social change effectively. This social change method argues that people can stomach change as long as it is compatible with their value system. If it is incompatible, people tend to reject it adamantly. This factor is also established by the historical analysis, namely, that the incompatibility of change influenced the rejection of change. Acceptance or rejection are based on their level of tolerance (how loose or fixed their values and beliefs are), ability to change, and the nature of the challenge (compatibility). In my approach, change is introduced carefully, perhaps progressively, starting with changes that are not in direct contradiction with people’s values and social organization. These changes in turn may open people up to other changes, and so on. The preliminary proposal for socioeconomic development, in the second portion of this chapter, consists of a series of industrial townships or economic units dispersed throughout the country. Each township represents a micro-economic unit of the socioeconomic proposal. All of the economic units or townships are expected to contribute to the national socioeconomic development by stimulating change in their peripheries/hinterlands---as Kabul did in its own. Development is initiated at the micro level (local unit) and elevates to the macro level, namely the national economy. This relates to the historical analysis which established that development was confined to Kabul while the rest of the country was kept out of the development efforts lacking a development stimulus like Kabul. All of the economic units, as components of the preliminary proposal, function collectively within the country to bring about economic rejuvenation and produce a collective remedy for an underdeveloped country. To the extent possible, they should complement each other. Figure 1 depicts the terminology and processes of the method of social change and its relationship to the priliminary proposal for socioeconomic development. Some short definitions are in order. The new change people encounter is called the Outer Link. The reaction to Outer Link is called the Inner Link. The reaction emerges from an individual’s societal traits. Societal traits consist of individual Macro-individual Traits. The Macro-individual Traits constitute the social understanding, culture, and mode of communication, and illustrate what is acceptable and unacceptable in a society. Macro-individual Traits of a large population in a shared medium transform into societal traits. Micro-individual Traits stem from the individual’s genetic infrastructure, their psychological state, and the individual’s self-partiality (selfinterest). The method has micro and macro components that differ from the way micro and macro notions are looked at in sociology, namely in terms of a continuum. Outer Link Status Quo Change Middle Inner Link Figure 1. The Social Change Mechanism Micro refers to individual as well as other smaller levels of social analysis [compared to larger level of social analysis], and macro to society or any larger level of social analysis that encompasses the smaller level of analysis. Societal threshold constitutes people’s level of tolerance, namely how lose or fixed their values and beliefs are. Societal friction is the standard of acceptable behavior in society whereby everyone’s behavior is measured as either acceptable or unacceptable. Some concise definitions of the preliminary proposal are in order here as well. Township or economic unit is one of the many such units of the preliminary socioeconomic development proposal. The peripheral layers refer to villages proximal to distant to the township. Township as Outer Link Figure 2. Township and Peripheral Layers The populations in these villages depend on the townships and vice versa. The township and the changes that occur there constitute the Outer Link to the population in the peripheral layers. The reactions or responses of the populations form the Inner Link, as depicted in figure 2. The Societal emulation process refers to the process whereby new information is processed, and that process could be used to introduce change incrementally. For the purpose of simplicity, I will be referring to the proposed methodology for social change, the social change method and to the preliminary proposal for socioeconomic development, the socioeconomic proposal. 16.1 Foundations The proposal consists of two parts: the first is a sociological method of social change that takes individual and societal traits into account while serving as a mechanism for successful implementation of social change. The basic philosophy of the social change method is to focus on individual traits, which serve as the precursors to societal traits66, and provide a mechanism of social change. The method indicates how individuals respond to new information and how the understanding that they get can be used effectively to promote social change. The second part consists of a preliminary proposal for socioeconomic development which rests on the social change method for guiding the actual content of what economically needs to be done. Hence, the social change method will create an understanding of the dynamics of social change and will serve as the mechanism for implementation of the socioeconomic proposal. The social change method is rooted in theories of social change67. It envisages how social change can address development, since socioeconomic development itself is a form of social change. There are differences and similarities between the social change model and theories of social change. The similarities with these theories satisfy a portion of the social change method, and the differences represent my contribution. 66 Societal traits in Afghanistan consist of Islam, Pashtunwali, and history of the country and tradition in general. 67 The works of a large number of theorists have relevance to my work. Of particular importance are Talcott Parsons, Jeffrey Alexander, Anthony Giddens, Richard Muench and S. N. Eisenstadt. The social change method covers the initiation of change, the process of change, and the multi-levels consequences of change. The reason for this effort is considering this proposal in the future development initiatives in Afghanistan. The social change method proposes that change starts from a position of status quo (whatever status quo may be), and continues until it reaches change, whatever change is. A reversal occurs when change produces negative results. The reversal is differential, that is, it is based on the severity of the negative effects of change, differential (variation in reversal) reversal occurs. In other words, the severe negative effects would result in complete reversal to the status quo; however, in time those returned to status quo would move to the Middle (sometimes the middle portrays a notion of 50 % and sometimes it pertains to a compromise of status quo and the abandoned change). The individual traits and societal traits are part of the mechanism of social change. The notions of micro and macro principles are viewed in the frame of social change, what I call the dimension of status quo and change. Status quo is the position from where the shift toward change [whatever change may be] is initiated. Throughout the process of social change, from status quo to change, the individual is “shaped” by diverse micro and macro phenomena. For example, an individual action is a microphenomenon within society---which is the macro-phenomenon. In addition, the principles that guide an individual’s action could be both micro (his self-partiality) and macro (societal normative understandings and values) principles. Micro refers here to individual as well as other smaller levels of social analysis [compared to larger level of social analysis], macro to society or any larger levels of social analysis that encompasses the smaller levels. Micro also means any individual disposition influenced by a larger level of societal value. For example, micro-individual traits pertain to the individual’s self-partiality or self-interest, and macro-individual traits refer to the individual’s common bond with society. Micro and macro levels are related through established values or normative understanding, namely, societal traits. When the individual is not bound to the established societal values or normative understandings, in that case, he/she is influenced by his/her micro-individual traits. An individual cannot escape the societal values of his/her environment because as long as he/she lives there, he/she has to abide by them. That is why, in a shared environment, he/she relies on his/her macroindividual traits to coexist and avoid conflict. For example, an individual cannot drink alcohol publicly in Saudi Arabia because alcohol is prohibited and such prohibition is part of the societal traits of Saudi Arabia. However, if the individual likes to drink alcohol (his/her micro-individual trait), he/she could do so in his/her home. Thus, the dual value systems at the micro- and macro-individual traits serve two functions. The macro-traits are used to avoid conflict with society, where the person lives, and the micro-traits are used to sustain one’s own desires. Macro-individual traits fuse the individual to society. Moreover, in this proposal change cannot be conceived as if it is the product of the cause and effect of independent and dependent variables, but rather as the outcome of a collection of variables. It would prove especially fruitful for the implementation of a developmental policy of a nation state, if the basic mechanism of change that occurs at the societal level were understood adequately. Before discussing the social change model in depth, it is necessary to define the different terms in more detail. 16.2 The Proposed Method of Social Change The social change method that I am presenting is a unifying method of social change that attempts to explain, interpret, and project the outcome of change, be it globalization or individual behavior. It is unifying in the sense that it postulates the mechanism, hence processes of change in society. It explains action and change at the macro- and micro-level, separately and simultaneously. In addition, this method could be used as representation of how change occurs, such that other postulated hypothesis in the social sciences could consider it as a testing “ground”. The method is called the Universal Social-Behavioral Transition Method (USBTM). The USBTM assumes that individuals tend to shift from traditional to modern medium through the process of societal emulation (a five-step process facilitating value-based change). This process of change continues until individuals (differentially) are in that modern setting; reversal also occurs differentially, which is depicted in figure 3. This tendency via the emulation process continues until or to the extent that individuals become victims of the new setting or modernity. Because of victimization, the “victims” become disenchanted, after which they initiate a reverse process. Reversal is aimed at abandoning the change, e.g., modern life, which includes modern perspectives, way of life, cultural innovations, among others. Status Middle Change Quo Figure 3. Differential Return to the Middle Depending on the severity of victimization, if it is less severe a smaller percentage would return to the traditional way of life, but most would gravitate to the middle. This is because or to the extent that most of them have been used to the comfort of the modern life style. Hence, the extent of reversal is based on the magnitude of victimization (either materially and/or sentimentally). The severely affected would become severely alienated, and thus would revert to the original position, and the less severely altered would not abandon modernity entirely because they also benefited from it. Therefore, they would adopt a synthesis of modern and traditional values, which in the social change method is the middle position of the horizontal “pathway” as depicted by figure 16.4. The movements to the status quo and middle positions are based on the rigidity of the individual’s belief and attachment to traditional values or lack of them. Victimization can range from the most severe to the least severe; hence, the context of the situation would define the type of reaction. For example, a Muslim family that immigrated to the United States could be severely victimized (by their own decision to come to the US) if their children finished high school and adopted punk outfits and ear and nose rings. However, if the same children danced in front of their parents upon hearing a “house music mix”, that would not constitute severe victimization. The former situation might cause the parents to abandon the United States and return home; however, in the latter situation, the parents could take their children on Saturday and Sunday to a mosque, and pay more attention to their children’s upbringing. The social change method has different components, each playing an explanatory function. 16.2.1 Outer Link The Outer Link is an "outside" stimulant or factor. The Outer Link could take many forms ranging from the prescriptive to the perceptive. For example, in a development scheme it may be the government’s adaptation of a foreign model of development that would constitute the Outer Link. Alternatively, in some completely different scenario, a rumor may serve as the Outer Link that may influence individuals to initiate action toward some matter. Another example of Outer Link is the imposition of development efforts by Afghan leaders that contradicted the values of Afghan people. In short, any outside stimulant that may affect a person’s or group’s behavior in a negative or positive manner is called the outer link. 16.2.2 Inner Link The inner link is the reaction to the outer link. For example, Amanullah Khan introduced some reforms which were contradictory to the customs of Afghan society; the reaction that stemmed from the values of the people constituted the Inner Link. In such a situation, people were following what their values inherited from generations before them dictated as being right. The Inner Link is also the frame of reference against the Outer Link, or the positive/negative reaction to the Outer Link. 16.2.3 Individual and Societal Traits Societal Traits are the “summation” of individual traits; in other words, the macro-individual traits constitute the Societal Traits. The collective behavioral pattern of individuals makes up the societal traits. Individual traits are divided into two categories. First are the micro-individual traits that emerge from the individual’s inherent tendency or genetic infrastructure, their psychological state, and the individual’s self-partiality. Second are the macro-individual traits that are acquired in the environment wherein the individuals live. There is, however, an overlap between the micro- and macro-individual trait levels. The overlap rests in the fact that an individual’s psychological state is the product of both genetics and environment. Therefore, micro- (genetics) and macro- (environment) individual traits affect an individual’s psychological state. Microindividual Traits Macro-individual Traits Societal Traits Figure 4. Macro-individual Traits Fusing Micro-individual Traits to Societal Traits The macro-individual traits constitute the social understanding, culture, and mode of communication. They illustrate what is acceptable and unacceptable in a shared medium. The macro-individual traits are also the micro-societal traits, since they (macro-individual traits) constitute the foundation of the societal traits, as depicted in figure 16.4. Societal trait cores are the definite or long-established values of a society. They emerge from the most cherished of societal traits. In other words, the societal trait cores are the main value entities of a society. In Afghanistan, when Amanullah Khan changed the rest day from Friday to Thursday, anti- Amanullah propaganda surfaced alleging that Amanullah Khan would destroy the mosques. Also, in order to provoke the simple people of villages that their dignity had been violated, British agents went to tribal areas and exposed a picture of a naked European woman claiming that it was Queen Soraya. British propaganda exploited the societal traits or values that stemmed from the Societal Trait Cores of Afghanistan. However, the societal traits may have elements of other groups. For example, in a multi-ethnic society like Afghanistan, the existence of minority groups has also brought some of their societal traits (Extra Societal Traits) and has contributed to the (national) societal traits of Afghanistan. 16.2.4 Societal Friction (boundedness) Societal Friction is the standard of acceptable behavior in society whereby everyone’s behavior is measured as either acceptable or unacceptable. It pertains to societal reaction or societal response to an individual or group undertaking. Furthermore, Societal Friction exists at both the individual and societal levels. At the individual level, this standard plays out in the individual’s micro- and macro-traits dichotomy. Societal friction stems from societal traits or values, keeping a balance at the individual level between the micro- and macro-individual traits in which the macro-individual traits conform to the societal traits, keeping micro-individual traits in check. In other words, as long as an individual fears the consequences of a wrong action, then he/she might not carry out that action. The factor that keeps the individual’s behavior in check is the dominance of his macro-individual traits over his/her micro-individual traits, or conformity to society’s standard. For example, an individual may have the tendency to commit a crime because he/she is a pathological criminal; however, his/her understanding that the police would apprehend him/her (this knowledge is part of his macro-individual trait), would make him/her wait for the right moment so as to avoid being arrested. Also, the individual’s understanding that the action that he/she carries out is unacceptable to the population makes him/her carry it out, say, at night. Societal friction imposes this “wait until nightfall” on the individual. In fact, at the individual level, an individual’s mode of behavior exhibits the magnitude of societal friction that kept his/her action in check. In other words, if the individual is able to carry out the illicit action without too many problems, the explanation might be that the societal friction that could have hindered this individual’s action is low, and vice-versa. At the societal level, societal friction is based on the societal traits, which stem from the societal trait-cores or the established values of society. The rigidity of the societal friction depends on the cohesiveness of the Societal Trait Cores. For example, liberal reforms in a conservative Muslim society like Afghanistan will be difficult to achieve. Conversely, the implementation of liberal measures in Turkey will be relatively easy because Turks are used to liberal undertakings. Hence, for Turks, the societal trait core, Islam, does not occupy the same position as it does for Afghans. Furthermore, if the individual is in a setting somewhere where his/her action is monitored by others, his/her behavior will be different even if his micro-individual traits or self-partiality are dominant. This stems from the fact that his/her macroindividual traits hinder any action that might be contradictory to societal traits or values. Since the societal traits consist of the macro-individual traits, the individual would be constrained by this social pressure. Conversely, if the individual attributes no significance to either his/her image or peaceful existence in the society, then the situation would not be hindered by the societal friction either at the individual or societal level. 16.2.5 Societal Threshold Societal threshold is another related concept that represents the societal endurance point, and consists of individual thresholds. Societal- and Individualthresholds' lower and upper limits are linked by the societal trait cores and macroindividual traits, respectively. The influence of the micro-individual traits over the macro-individual traits and vice versa determines the outcome of the individual's threshold. For example, when it comes to making profit from a deal at the expense of other individuals in a society, which may influence other people adversely, an individual's micro- and macro-traits would determine the outcome of the individual's decision. The macro-individual traits would influence the individual's decision not in favor of the deal, if the individual has formed social responsibility as one of his/her main values. Whereas, if the individual gives into greed and wants personal gains at the cost of others, his/her decision in favor of the deal would be influenced by either or both of the macro-and micro-individual traits---for example, the weakness of his/her macro-individual traits, namely his/her lack of concern for the well being of others, or the weak predetermined blueprint of an individual’s behavior. His/her microindividual traits would propel him/her to personal gains. Individual threshold is the result of the interplay between micro- and macro- individual traits. Their interaction constitutes the individual threshold. The upper limit would serve as the upper boundary, which signifies the maximum extent for a stimulus to trigger reaction in an individual, and by the same token in a group. The lower limit signifies the minimum stimulus needed to draw reaction from an individual or a group. Hence, there is a maximum and a minimum limit for an individual or group response. The societal trait cores within the “horizontal” continuum of societal threshold links the upper and lower limits of societal threshold. The collapse of the upper and lower limits of the societal threshold would create a collective outburst. In other words, stimuli capable of affecting both minimum and maximum limits violate societal trait cores. 16.2.6 The Societal Emulation Process Social Emulation68 is the process that facilitates value-based change. “Emulation” has similarity to the standard definition, namely: 1, one is compelled by one’s values to emulate, and 2, to make others emulate what one wants them to emulate (namely the subjects’ values); hence, it serves as a “link” to one’s frame of reference. The term “societal” refers to a phenomenon affecting almost all in a society. Societal Emulation consists of five stages (sequences) in the order given: 68 Social Emulation does not mean accepting or rejecting change; rather it is a process that facilitates the acceptance or rejection of a change. Emulation, however, means imitation in time and space. In other words, the source (religion or conventions) from where one’s values originate serves as the object of emulation. Furthermore, a stimulus invokes individuals or groups to emulate the prescriptions and use them as a reference point, against which the compatibility of the incoming stimulus can be judged. 1. Societal trait expectation: it builds on the established norms. The norms or traits in this model include any characteristic of an individual, a group of people or society that has the propensity for manipulation, or the Inner Link. 2. Societal traits created expectation: refers to the “ awakening” of an individual or a group of people through the impact of societal traits-driven stimulus, initiated by the party advocating change. This stage is the familiarization stage. 3. Societal expected legitimacy: this is the beginning of the process of acceptance. It is the stage when the introduced change is given a tentative approval because the change in question is compatible with the values of those affected by the change. 4. Societal attributed legitimacy: this is the stage when the familiarity with coming change increases and its legitimacy fully occurs. 5. Societal attributed significance. This is the stage when the change is accepted, before any potential negative impact of the change takes place. As the full impact of the coming change is fully appreciated and is in accordance with traits in question, it is then internalized. Once the negative impact of change is felt and is significant enough, the victims69 will reevaluate the direction toward which society is going and may try to change it. Those that are victimized would turn in the opposite direction, that is, they would abandon change. The severely affected would advocate complete eradication of the change, and the less severely affected would move to the middle position of the continuum, meaning they would compromise. The less impacted would not want a reversal of the status quo---the situation before the onset of change-- yet would not advocate such a change in the future, or at least not in the frame they experienced it. The middle position they may take may be due to the potential benefits that they may have experienced from the change. Thus, the middle position is achieved via two avenues, 1) direct resumption to the middle; and 2) indirectly, which would experience a generation gap, that is it would be the next generation, namely a person’s children who would "move" to the middle. In the second case, those who abandoned the change completely would not compromise, but their children may compromise because the younger generation might be affected by some other stimuli and might be attracted to the change that their parents abandoned. The middle in my model means a conglomeration of old and new, that is, it would be a hybrid of status quo and change. Figure 5 represents the mechanism of social change or the dynamics of fluctuation in group or individuals’ responses. The trend exhibited by figure 5 has occurred throughout the periods studied. For example, the change initiated by the reforms of Amanullah Khan alienated the conservative segment and clergy who reacted adversely to Amanullah’s reforms. Some of the clergy supported Bacha-e-Saqao, who reversed all of Amnullah’s reforms. The last years of Nader Khan’s reign characterize recovery and a slow move to the middle. Within the model, the Outer Link represents Amanullah Khan’s reforms that were not compatible with the Societal Traits of people. The Inner Link, the value systems, served as a reaction to the imposition of foreign values, namely some of the reforms. The societal emulation process was active between the Outer Link and Inner Link, which can be derived from the occurrences during the period. 69 Victims are those individuals who are negatively affected by the change. Outer Link Middle Change Status Quo Inner Link Figure 5. Mechanism of Social Change or Dynamics of Fluctuation in Responses For example, Amanullah Khan was the victor of the jihad that was fought under his leadership against the British; thus, his reforms were expected to be compatible with the societal values. This perception was heightened when the British intensified their anti Amanullah propaganda. 16.3 Detailed Discussion of Various Concepts When Inner Link is not compatible with Outer Link, the actor strives to satisfy his internal gratification by accommodating the stimulus of the Outer Link, before rejecting it. It is a simultaneous process involving a pause before reaction. The pause will be shorter if the Outer Link is in sharp contrast with the Inner Link. This notion can be explained by the principle of Societal and Individual Thresholds, which are the endurance points of society and individuals, respectively. The individuals’ behaviors are situated at different points of the continuum between status quo and change. Some would be at the middle, others somewhere in between, or at either extreme. Thus, individuals at each location would exhibit different behavior; not everyone reacts uniformly. The individuals’ intentions to act depend on how the proposed change relates to his/her conditions. Those in need for the proposed change will exhibit their intentions consciously; yet, those whose needs are not as urgent might be influenced subconsciously. Why some individuals take longer to reach or grasp change? It depends on the differential function of the rigidity of societal friction, which consists of individual and societal traits. Individuals’ macro-individual traits determine whether the individual accepts or rejects change. What that means is whether the individual’s adherence to his/her value system is firm or loose. For example, people who were supporters of modernization during the reign of Amanullah Khan were living in Kabul and had welcomed his reforms. Men started wearing Western attire and women went out unveiled. The explanation for such pro-modernization behavior rests on both the individual and the environment of Kabul. Kabul had a more open atmosphere than did the rest of the country. Therefore, the introduction of a small level of modernity before Amanullah Khan fitted Kabul inhabitants who could stomach change better than the rest of the country. Moreover, the advocates of reforms, the Young Afghans, surfaced in Kabul under the leadership of Mahmud-e-Tarzi. In addition, Tarzi published a liberal newspaper, Seraj-ul-Akhbar, which served as a powerful instrument to propagate two of his themes advocating modernization: “ Muslims must modernize or Perish” and “colonialism and imperialism must go” (Poullada, 1973: 41). The newspaper published every two weeks between 1911 and 1918 influenced the perspective of most of Kabul’s inhabitants in favor of modernization. Contrary to Kabul, the standard of behavior in the rest of the country was much more conservative in part because they were exposed to the campaigns and modern life of the city. In addition, since Amanullah Khan’s government relied on land and livestock taxes, peasants who were heavily hit by the taxes were willing to join the rebellion. Although merchants in Kabul paid heavy taxes, they were much more exposed modernization before the onset of Amanullah Khan’s reign and had paid taxes from the beginning. They understood taxes as a cost of doing business and could pass them on to the consumer. The Outer Link stimulates the onset of change, and the Inner Link determines if it is accepted. At the individual level, again the inner link consists of micro- and macro-individual traits. That is, individuals use both their self-partiality (microindividual traits) and accepted standards (macro-individual traits) because before achieving their own interest individuals have to compare it with the accepted standards in their immediate environment. The outer link targets the societal traits or the individual level macro-individual traits because change cannot be tailored to the self-interest of every individual. In other words, social change is an all-encompassing effort, trying to influence everyone in society; whether they accept it or reject is another matter. Thus, when an individual confronts change from some source, his/her micro- (inherent capability) and macro (values)-individual traits influence the type of response he/she gives to the source of change. The source of change, the Outer Link, tries to influence the values of individuals; the Inner Link emerges from the utility of both micro- and macroindividual traits, reacting to change by comparing it to both self-interest and values. In other words, it is easier to reject change than to accept it; nonetheless, acceptance or rejection depends on the issue and circumstances surrounding the introduction of change. The conception of societal friction can be applied to the rigidity of individual beliefs, principles, and any attachment to whatever the status quo holds, which, collectively, constitute the Inner Link. All the movements on the “horizontal” continuum would reach change, based on their definition and degree of satisfaction, which are contingent upon the manipulations of the respective traits. 16.3.1 Priority in Change The difference in the priority of the wanted change hinders the less urgent in favor of the more urgent. The less urgent change stays in the subconscious. Once the urgent change is fulfilled, the next change from the subconscious resurfaces and accelerates. This occurs by initiation of the Outer Link and through the societal emulation process. The extent of favorable response to change depends on the effectiveness of the Outer Link, its impact on the Inner Links and the rigidity of the societal friction. The societal friction emanates, in the case of the individual, from macro-individual traits, and in the case of group from both macro-individual traits and societal traits. In the case of a group, however, an individual’s macro-trait (depending on the sensitivity of the issue in discussion) could influence the decision of the group, especially if the issue relates to the society’s religion, in which case everyone may have to agree. Even in this situation, other variables may play roles, such as how conservative or liberal the society or the group is. Thus, Societal Friction is an individual as well as a collective process. Whether change is accepted by the Inner Link depends on the individuals’ previous experience, namely, if the previous experience stemming from the previous outer link imposed costs on the individual. Then, the extent of accepting change depends on the severity of the previous experience. In other words, acceptance depends on the reaction of individuals to the previous change, whether they abandoned change and moved to the status quo or only moved to the middle. The Outer Link could be the individuals' actions within the collectivity, that is, each individual’s action is an Outer Link to another individual, and vices versa, until ultimately individual actions turn into a collective problem. The societal traits become the frame of reference, whereby any desired or undesired change is judged. This is how the collective dynamics would function within a collectivity. 16.4 Interaction among the Concepts This social change method, or USBTM, is not confined only to the individual notion of change, but rather it incorporates groups and nation-states as well. Nation- states consist of individuals whose traits add to a whole category of societal traits, which ultimately determines the course of change. In other words, the macroindividual traits surface from a shared medium among a group of people; the recognition of the macro-individual traits as an accepted standard turns macroindividual traits into societal traits. Continuously sharing the same medium and abiding by societal traits, result in the formation of the most important of the societal trait, namely the societal trait cores. For example, in the writing of the American constitution what became the societal trait cores were issues of the most importance, e.g., protection of private property and freedom of expression, to the founding figures of the USA. Sociologist Auguste Comte held the belief that society cannot be decomposed into individuals. Differently, I sugget that the macro-individual traits are the links between the individual and society. It is via this bridge (macro-individual traits) that society can be envisaged as consisting of individuals because macro-individual traits give way to societal traits. The aggregate societal traits or Societal Trait Cores would then, constitute the traits of the entire society. What is meant here again is that within individuals there are micro- and macrotraits, the former being inherent to the individuals and the latter being shared with everyone else in society. They (shared macro-individual traits) are the societal traits, which stem from Societal Trait Cores such as religion, culture, language, and patriotism. As to an individual’s achievement, it is contingent upon the individual's position in that society. If the individual's position were one that could influence change, then it would be contingent upon the opportunity of some impetus as the vehicle of social mobility in society, what would enable the person to influence change. For example, the desire of General Mohammed Daud Khan to play a decisive role in the development of Afghanistan came to reality when he occupied the post of Prime Minister. Another individual who might serve as an example for the mechanism described above is Mullah Mohammed Omar, the leader of the Taliban. When he decided to fight for peace, stability, and the dignity of the Afghans, in a short time he won the support of people who were disenchanted with the prevalent lawlessness. Mullah Omar’s scenario can be conceptualized through the proposed method of social change. There was urgent need for peace in order for people to carry on with their lives. Here, lawlessness and its impact on people constitute the Outer Link that contradicted people’s Inner Link. Peaceful life in an Islamic environment was the Societal Trait Core, which Mullah Omar advocated. This raised him through the ranks of power. The Societal Trait Cores represent the overall legitimacy of a particular society, because when an issue or issues arise, they impact all the cores and, hence, responses from each core, as a particular trait, are shared and signified by all the members of a society differentially. Each core is an aggregated sum of the same values. In other words, individuals in the same medium may have many behavioral traits ranging from the desire to eat to the eradication of hunger. Many of the traits that are not inherent to the individual's particular psychological state and genetic infrastructure are shared by most of the people living in a shared medium, and each respective shared trait gets solidified into a societal trait core. Then the collections of Societal Trait Cores constitute societal traits. Figure 6 depicts the formation of societal trait cores from societal traits. The numbers represent the societal trait cores, and the arrows represent the macroindividual traits or societal traits. After macro-individual traits are formed in a shared medium, they constitute the societal traits, which give rise to the aggregate values or societal trait cores of a society. The societal trait cores are components of the societal threshold. The basic roots of these trait cores are historical and cultural. Societies will not change unless the change is according to their established traits or convenience. Nevertheless, a temporary change may occur, but might ultimately fail. The reversal from the change could be explained by the principle of societal threshold, which is the collective endurance point of society. Societal Threshold is an average of the individuals' thresholds. It is analogous to the mathematical average. For example, Amanullah Khan’s reforms were many and affected different societal trait cores of people; none proved so disastrous as his campaign to unveil women. That is why the societal trait cores that held the upper and lower limits of the societal threshold “collapsed” since women’s dignity far out weighed other societal trait cores that held the societal threshold together. Once the most important of the societal trait cores is violated, reversal should occur. Individual response or lack of response to change is the interplay between the individual threshold and the societal threshold. As I stated above, the societal threshold is an average of individuals' thresholds; hence, the average is made of low and high numbers. Figure 6. Formation Societal Trait Cores Similarly, individuals respond to an issue differentially.Their differential thresholds could explain their differential responses, i.e., those with low thresholds would respond to the impact of change sooner than those with high thresholds. This mechanism of the proposed method of social change, or USBTM, is depicted in figure 7, in which the upper limit signifies the most important of the societal trait cores. The lower limit sets the location for the societal trait cores that provokes reaction relatively slowly and is relatively less important than those near the upper limit. Thus, the societal threshold depicts the change in behavior of Individuals. Contrary to Amanullah, whose reforms did not rest on the societal trait cores, if an individual advocated change based on the societal trait core of the society, he/she would facilitate an atmosphere for the onset of change. In fact, anyone observing this particular individual would go through the social emulation process and accept change, or exhibit positive tendencies towards it---not every one can go at the same "speed" through the process of social emulation. Although society cannot be conceived in terms of individuals, nevertheless, the individuals’ manipulation can alter it. Each Trait Core can contain instigators, who could advocate change. An individual contemplating some change can bring about change in the long run through the process of societal emulation by forming clusters of followers. Therefore, the formation of societal trait cores from societal traits (previously macro-individual traits) establishes the notion that one can view society in terms of individuals. This, again, disagrees with Comte's notion that one could not view society in terms of individuals. It suggests that society could be viewed in terms of individuals whose macro-individual traits make individual the link between the micro- and macrolevels of society. Lower Limit Trait Core Trait Core Trait Core Upper Limit Figure 7. Societal Threshold 16.5 The relevance of the Method of Social Change to Development The relevance of the dialectics of the method of social change, or USBTM, to economic development is quite straightforward. In the method of social change, the introduction of a new economic development venture would serve as an Outer Link to the population. Therefore, economic development would be introduced in such a manner as to be compatible to the values or societal traits of the population and hinder any negative reactions from them. The negative reaction of people, their Inner Links, would surface in response to the incompatible message of the Outer Link or economic development efforts. One possible form taken by the negative reactions from Inner Links to the economic development or Outer Link, would be the lack of identification of the population living nearby with the development at stake. That is, if an economic development project is undertaken without involving the people living around the project, the efforts would remain foreign to them and they will not identify with it. In other words, if the population near development projects understands the goals behind them, they would identify with and benefit from them. Such lack of identification was evident in the Helmand Valley Project. As Dupree (1973:500-1) states, “From the beginning of the Hilmand Project, both Americans and Afghan [governments], by ignorance and not design, virtually ignored the human problems. Between 1949 and 1951, I asked many American M.K.A. [MorrisonKnudsen Afghanistan Inc.] technicians and administrators who would be responsible for preparing the villagers for the new influx of water, which, theoretically, would permit two grain crops per year and greatly increase the production of vegetables in the summer. Replies varied from ‘who cares?’ to ‘that is properly the business of the Afghan government.’ ” He continues: “ ‘How’ I asked ‘will the old villagers be prepared to use the extra off-season water?’ At the time I asked this question I had been studying a village within twenty miles of the gigantic Arghandab dam then under construction, and the people in the village had never even heard of the project, a common phenomenon up and down the Hilmand and Arghandab rivers. Even those who knew could not conceive of its magnitude. To them dam meant a knee-or hiphigh pile of mud to block off their small village canals when watering their fields.” As the quotes above establish, villagers did not know what the Helmand Project was about. That is one of the reasons why they did not benefit from the project as it was hoped. Afghan officials as well as the Construction Company should have prepared the villagers to make optimal use of the extra off-seasonal water. Aligning development along these suggestions could reduce any shocks associated with social change. Meanwhile, if development projects involve the population near them, this could serve two ends. First, people could identify with and benefit from them. Second, conflicts with values or local customs might be prevented. In order to implement this approach in socioeconomic development, I am proposing a mechanism for socioeconomic development along the lines of the method of social change, or USBTM. The following section is a preliminary proposal to do this. 16.6 The Preliminary Proposal for Socioeconomic Development 16.6.1 Introduction The preliminary proposal for socioeconomic development consists of a series of industrial townships or economic units dispersed throughout Afghanistan. Each township represents a micro-economic unit of the preliminary proposal. The proposal emerges from the historical analysis. Historically Kabul was the center of development; it was very much an island of development in the country. This Kabulcentric development efforts created a rift between Kabul and the rest of Afghanistan. Therefore, the preliminary proposal for socioeconomic development attempts to decentralize development by building small townships or economic units throughout the country. They can serve as “mini-Kabul”, in different parts of Afghanistan and make development compatible with people’s values. This preliminary proposal also builds on the historical survey of Afghanistan by introducing development progressively. All of the economic units or townships would contribute to the national socioeconomic development. Development is initiated at the micro level and elevated to the macro level, the national economy. All of the economic units, as components of the model, must function collectively within the country to bring about economic rejuvenation and produce a collective solution to the underdevelopment of the country. The population around each economic unit would be associated with the respective economic unit. The association of each peripheral layer of villages surrounding each economic unit, in terms of trade, can serve as a mechanism to involve the next distant layer of villages in the economic unit. Each layer of villages would link the next layer of villages to the economic activities of each township or economic unit. Factories in these townships would reflect the nature and possibilities of the area and would complement local produce/resources as best possible. Since some of the factories would hopefully rely on agriculture and dairy produce, peasants from the first peripheral layer could bring their produce to the respective factories. Each layer thereafter could supply raw materials for the factories of each township. Similarly, manufactured goods of each township would be marketed across the different layers of villages of each township. As suppliers of each township, villagers could become part of the cash economy, and would earn revenue from their transactions. Consequently, peasants could have the buying power to consume the manufactured goods of their respective townships. Figure 16.8 depicts the preliminary proposal for socioeconomic development. Meanwhile, more inter-village merchants70 would surface who would be trading the items manufactured in the economic units to each peripheral layer of villages; subsequently, the number of inter-village merchants would increase and trade would resume throughout the country. Moreover, excess agricultural labor could be absorbed into the workforce of the factories, trade and other activities in the townships. In order to stimulate productivity, workers could be offered shares in each respective factory. By making workers part owners of the factories, productivity71 would hopefully rise, and wealth could be spread out, thus, improving the purchasing power and stake of the population in the endeavor. As shareholders of the factories, workers will be more likely to accept lower wages in times of crisis. Each township or economic unit would specialize in the production of certain consumer goods. Specialization would promote trade between townships because each township and its surrounding area would need the manufactured goods of the other townships. In other words, each economic unit would have a competitive advantage in relation to each of the other economic units. In the process of inter-town trade, a stratum of merchants would emerge that would be serving as the links between economic units. 70 What I call inter-village merchants are merchants who roam around the countryside selling various items they brought from nearby cities. 71 Since workers would be part owners of the industries, they would have a lot of incentives to sacrifice comfort for hard work because increases in productivity would mean higher profit for the workers. To enhance competitive transactions in the domestic economy, the economic unit in each region has to specialize in a line of consumer goods. Thus, they can trade commodities throughout the country via regional, need-based competition. Meanwhile I suggest that efforts be made to make sure that the produced commodities be compatible to the ecological conditions of the region. The consumption pattern of the population and their association with the economic units as partners or shareholders would be a good mechanism to keep the domestic economy stable. It is not a centrally planned development as in the case of communist countries. Rather it is a partnership between government and the owners or shareholders of the economic units, because full private ownership usually creates negative social externalities. This would be in a sense a mixed economic arrangement. This is also related to the findings of the historical analysis. In the administrations of Prime Ministers Hashim Khan and Shah Mahmud Khan, the private sector abused the authority it possessed in the economy. Concerned only about making profit, it preferred importexport to investing in industrial development. To improve the buying power I am proposing that within economic units, the income generating means belong to the shareholders, namely workers, government and others. Since the populations of each unit would be employed in townships, as well as in agricultural work, and since the produce would be utilized by the consumer goods industries in each unit, therefore, each socioeconomic unit or township would be a somewhat collective economic entity. Figure 8. The Preliminary Proposal for Socioeconomic Development Each economic unit would be specialized in some category of domestic goods, such that, all the economic units would depend on each other’s outputs. Furthermore, as I stated above, efforts would be made so that the economic units are built on the specific availability of agricultural or mineral resources in each area. Moreover, the produce of the periphery of each economic unit could also be traded with the peripheries of other economic units. Each socioeconomic unit has peripheries, starting with the proximal one to the economic unit, to each subsequent periphery. Therefore, the produce of each periphery would be exchanged with the next proximal periphery, and then that periphery would exchange the produce of the previous periphery including its own produce to the next proximal periphery and finally to their respective township, or socioeconomic unit. The townships would be using the produce of the periphery/hinterland as inputs in manufacturing. In addition, each unit would invest in artisan production, if there were any in the peripheries, so that their products would be brought to the townships, and then the townships would exchange their respective products. The industrial townships would also serve as banks. The incentive for the workers would be that they could invest further in the stocks of the industries and hence would increase their ownership of the industrial units. Workers could be given shares in each of the industries. The cost of the shares could be, incrementally, subtracted from their monthly salaries. This would maintain the capital stocks and, the invested revenue would be reinvested in other industries in order to expand the industrial base. Making workers shareholders of the industries, I believe, is crucial for the success of all the townships. In addition, part ownership will also attract agricultural and other manual labors who could gain access to property (shares in the industries) and the corresponding stake in the enterprise. Otherwise, development might not be absorbed as an individual interest. The facilitation of different levels of trades at micro– and macro-levels, and the allocation of credit to those who would want to establish enterprises in association with the economic units, would increase the buying power of the population and would enhance the capacity of an otherwise limited domestic economy. The governmental presence as part owner of the economic units will help minimize externalities, e.g., set guidelines addressing different matters, at different levels. The national economy would be represented by the government, which would need to reach certain policy arrangements with local units to obtain revenue, at maturation, part taxation and part the share of government in the units. 16.7 The Application of the Proposed Method of Social Change to the Preliminary Proposal for Socioeconomic Development The relationship of this socioeconomic development proposal to the proposed methodology of social change is as follows. Each economic unit would be an Outer Link to its respective surrounding, and the reaction of each of the surrounding peripheral layers in terms of identification and association with each township would form the Inner Link. The involvement of the population of the surrounding peripheral layers would eliminate or mitigate any negative reaction from the respective Inner Links. Moreover, a positive relationship in terms of dependency between town and countryside would follow the mechanism of the societal emulation process, i.e., change will occur in accordance with the societal traits of the population. The involvement of the population around each township will make the change compatible to the societal traits of the surrounding population. The stages of the societal emulation process could serve as guidelines for a stage by stage or incremental introduction of social change to the surrounding population of each economic unit. When economic units are accompanied by the societal traits of the people of each respective region, thereafter, each measure introduced by the townships would create societal traits expectations. In other words, when the townships comply with the values of the people living around them, any subsequent measure emerging from the economic units, could be viewed with the established expectation that the measure in question is compatible to their values. Hence, the economic units would create the expectation on the part of the population that the township would be following their societal traits, (second stage of the societal emulation). Once townships attracted the attention of the population of the surrounding villages, the economic units would begin the process of tentative acceptance, namely the stage of societal expected legitimacy. The continuous interaction of each township with its surrounding population, would enhance the legitimacy of the project, namely the population attributes legitimacy to the townships. Finally, when a positive dependency emerges between economic units and their surrounding population, the population would attribute significance to this type of relationship, and accept the societal change fully, (the last stage of the societal emulation process). The preliminary proposal for socioeconomic development, as the proposed method of social change, is initiated at the micro-level (economic units) and gets elevated to the macro-level (economy). In the societal model, I held that society consisted of individuals, whose macro-individual traits give way to societal traits, which in turn solidify into societal trait cores. By the same token the industrialized townships are the micro-units of the economy contributing to different levels of the economy as the macro-entity. Furthermore, individuals as the inhabitants of different economic units or townships would adopt development in their macro-individual traits in order to establish compatibility between the new phenomenon, industrialization, a market economy, and the traditional way of life, which is status quo in the proposed method of societal change. In the integration of the new changes to the macroindividual traits, the social emulation process would be mediating in order to make the new changes stick to the macro-components of the individual traits, because the social emulation process is based on the utilization of the societal and individual traits. This, in turn, would lessen the shocks associated with the onset of the industrialized townships. Furthermore, trade between the peripheral layers by local merchants of each township would lessen the sudden exposure to the urban medium and reduce the ailment of the urban phenomenon. Moreover, each economic unit would represent a societal threshold, because each, in principle, is an independent socioeconomic unit. The existence of each socioeconomic unit represents an Outer Link to the other socioeconomic units. The needs of each unit, including its population, constitute the Inner Link. Since all the socioeconomic units would be partners as members of the same nation state and as shareholders, hence, conflict would be reduced between the Inner Link and the Outer Link (that is modern towns and towns’ people and their needs), enhancing their prosperity. The reason for the economic prosperity would be the consumption of each other’s commodities. Furthermore, human beings are self-partial. If they were allowed to function in a free market framework, the result would be the imposition of externalities on others. The most recent cases are the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, where the introduction of a free market created social disasters. Hence, if development is based on the macro-individual traits, development could occur without its negative externalities, because macro-individual traits also serve as a control mechanism that keeps people’s self-partiality in check. Thus, if development holds the macroindividual trait as the unit of analysis, human self-partiality and social responsibility would go “hand in hand”. Therefore, individual utility can be replaced by “gross selfsatisfaction”, which occurs when individual self-interest is reinforced with social justice and social responsibility. The significance of such unit of analysis can be appreciated when a bridge between self-partiality and social responsibility is established. The mechanism of this type of “bridge” between self-interest and social factors could be envisaged in the following manner: the individual self-interest contained in micro-individual traits and the social responsibility are confined within the societal traits. The macro-individual traits as precursors to societal traits, also sharing the psychological factor with the micro-individual traits, would provide the bridge between the self and the social. The reason why macro-individual traits would provide a better measure of effectiveness is this: the individual gets the legitimacy of his action from societal traits. In other words, since societal traits consist of macro-individual traits, thus, individuals’ contentions emanate from the satisfaction of their macro-individual traits. As the micro-individual traits pertain to genetic and psychological factors of an individual, and the macro-individual traits as the psychological, normative, and cultural aspects of individuals, therefore, by satisfying the macro-individual traits, we may satisfy microindividual traits. The reason for this is that micro- and macro-individual traits share the psychological state that bridge them together. The micro-individual traits include the heredity and psychological state of mind resulting from family upbringing, which are influenced by the family environment during childhood and by macro-individual traits as the environmental factors, everything in the environment that the child comes in contact with. Hence, the commonality (psychological factors such as family upbringing in the case of micro- and environmental learning in the case of macroindividual traits) between the micro- and macro-individual traits becomes the bridge between the micro-individual and macro-individual traits. By the same token macroindividual traits are the precursors to the societal traits (extent of agreement on normative issues); thus, the social factors that derive from macro-individual traits would fuse with self-factors derive from the micro-individual traits. This would result in the synthesis of the self and social and would prove fruitful, and consequently individuals’ thresholds would sustain the societal threshold. If the prescription of the proposed societal emulation process were followed, the possibility of return to the status quo would be minimized. Consuming the right amount of diverse commodities, on the one hand, and the interdependence among all the units on the other hand would also serve to slow down the tendency toward the middle, rather keeping consumption above the middle (above the minimum threshold). The provision of jobs in each township would serve as instruments, whereby the idea of industrialized township or change, according to the societal model, would get integrated into their macro- and micro-individual traits. What that means is that the introduction of development would not be an imposition, rather an incorporation in their values or societal trait cores. Therefore, with such careful introduction of development, the people, who might otherwise abandon change completely after being affected by the negative effects of change, could not react by abandoning change completely; instead, they would go to the middle. The reason that they would choose to stay in the middle is based on at least four factors: people’s propensity to end up at their threshold; preference for convenience; resistance from dependents, friends and peers; and the fact that victimization has been minimized by the efforts to make social change compatible with peoples’ values. 16.8 Discussion of the Preliminary Proposal for Socioeconomic Development The development scheme that I am proposing is somewhat unorthodox. I am proposing a scenario that would fit in Muslim countries because in most Muslim countries Islam and state are not separated as in the non-Muslim countries. However, a modification of this framework can be applied in other UDCs as well, e.g., in Africa. My assumptions for this preliminary proposal for socioeconomic development are based on the premise of economic disparity brought about by war conditions---in the case of Afghanistan. However, the assumptions are not necessarily confined to war and destruction. I am talking about such assumption as: the country in question does not have revenue sources; it has high levels of inflation, and lacks growth and resources to initiate a sustained development path. Meanwhile, the presence of significant natural resources could make the situation much easier. It is worth mentioning that in most Third World Countries rural inhabitants are suspicious of outsiders from cities, because different experiences in life, directly or indirectly, have created the image that city-dwellers are extracting whatever they can from rural areas. At other times, conservative religious beliefs of the rural population, as in Afghanistan, are offended by the Westernization brought about under the umbrella of development. Since the socioeconomic units would depend on the association of the peripheral rural population to maintain their micro-economies, therefore, the atmosphere in each socioeconomic unit needs to be compatible with the characteristics of the rural populations; otherwise, this economic development scheme would not succeed. The selection of the area for development would be based in part on the economic and prevalent social conditions of the area. Another criterion is a consistent homogenous and balanced geographic development, dispersing the economic development projects (economic units or townships) all over the country. The inclusion of industry in economic units would be based on the availability of raw materials-agricultural products, husbandry, minerals and proximity to transportation routs. The location for each economic unit would be chosen in accordance with the theoretical formulation, namely, that each township’s distant peripheral layers come in contact with the distant layers of the other township. The significance of this formulation rests in the fluidity of trade at all levels. In other words, there would be trade between all the economic units; between each economic unit and its peripheral layers; and between the peripheral layers of different economic units. The specialization of each economic unit would be based on the notion of interdependence; therefore, each unit’s dependence on all the other for the needed commodity becomes the impetus for prosperity. Theoretically, if all the units functioned simultaneously and exchange continued, the economy would be at least stable. In case of economic crises, workers in the economic units who are shareholders in the industries would share the burden of the economic situation as part owners of the industries. Furthermore, when the productivity of these economic units covered the needs of the domestic economy, the surplus could be earmarked for export. Contrary to conventional government-led ISI projects, the quality of the products produced by, and the efficiency in the industries of the townships or economic units would be kept high because workers are part owners. Price in each economic unit would be determined according to the attributed significance of the commodity by the distant region and vice versa as well as the cost of production including wages, maintenance and savings. To the extent possible, the funding for the different development projects would be obtained from institutions such as the Islamic Development Bank or other prosperous Muslim financial institution or countries.72 The type of loans that created 72 The solicitation or application for funding - be it interest free loans or grants-- could be carried out by a non-for profit organization formed with the aim of bringing about such economic recovery. The non-forprofit organization would not be a governmental organization, rather an organization that is made of the the Third World debt crisis would certainly not help as they may become serious drains in the local earnings and prevent local self-determination through mechanism such as SAPS. An alternative institution formed between and controlled by the Third World countries would be ideal. Groups of countries of the same region could initiate and control them. Special efforts should also go into the development of mechanisms to transfer technology from the industrialized to the underdeveloped countries. Formation of regional markets and negotiation of mutual trade agreements on access could be explored as part of this. 16.9 Overcoming Conflicts in Development The various theoretical issues discussed above attempts to overcome conflicts discussed throughout the dissertation. For the most part, the proposed method for social change assumes that in order for any social change to occur, there needs to be compatibility of the ensuing change to the value system of the society, affected by the change. Policy makers would use this approach to formulate policies pertaining to socioeconomic development. Moreover, policy makers could rely on its dynamics to minimize undesirable outcomes. The proposed method could be further developed to provide the road map for policy makers to help them to make choices suitable for the successful outcome of a socioeconomic development policy. The application of the proposed method of social change would enable policy makers to design specific strategies for the introduction and implementation of concerned leaders of the Muslim World, whose aim would be economic development for Underdeveloped Muslim Countries (UMC), such as Afghanistan. developmental policies targeting different segments of the population that may also be geographically distinct from one to another. For example, in Afghanistan, for the most part, distance and/or physical barriers, such as mountains, of different segments of population from large metropolitan centers such as Kabul serve as indicators of the magnitude of their conservatism. The farther a segment of the population lives from Kabul the more likely it is to be conservative; conversely, the closer a segment of people is to Kabul the more likely it is to be moderate to liberal. The significance of Kabul has been its status as the modernization nucleus for the rest of the country. Thus, people living near Kabul, are likely to be exposed to modernity more than those living far from Kabul. Hence, the proximity and distance of different parts of Afghanistan to and from Kabul and to three other major cities seems to determine the rigidity and openness to change of different segments of the population. Another factor that makes segments of the population less receptive to change has been their social organization---e. g., tribal arrangements. Power relations within segment(s) of the population constitute another barrier to social change. Furthermore, the influence of conservative religious icons in some parts of the country and the population’s conformity to his wishes and demands have influenced and shaped peoples’ rigidity and reception to social change. These are various situations for which the application of the proposed method of social change could be effective. 16.91 Example One From my research, experience and exchanges with people knowledgeable of Afghanistan people from Maidan, a province 20 km west of Kabul, were more receptive to change than those from Ghazni province, 100 km west of Kabul. According to the proposed method of social change, if pertinent officials implemented a socioeconomic policy in Maidan, they, would not need to be as careful in conveying the corrective prescriptions demanded by the policy as they would need to be in Ghazni province. People in Maidan had not developed rigid societal traits and their consequent societal threshold was not as rigid as that of the people from Ghazni. The societal threshold of Maidan province evolved from the individual experiences of its inhabitants. People from Maidan who worked in Kabul, either in the government bureaucracy or in a private capacity, encountered daily cultural symbols of modernity. The Maidanese became accustomed to these symbols and disseminated their experiences after they returned to Maidan. The result has been two-fold. First, the macro-individual traits of people of Maidan who worked in Kabul compromised between Maidan and Kabul. Since macroindividual traits are acquired in the environment, they change, depending on the duration of stay somewhere, in response to new experiences. In the case of Maidan workers’ macro-individual traits, although initially formed in Maidan, they incorporated new general understandings from the environment in Kabul into their macro-individual traits. Second, after they returned to Maidan, these workers disseminated the substance of their experiences throughout local villages, and this influenced the macro-individual traits of some of the population of Maidan. Since macro-individual traits are also the micro-societal traits, they (macro-individual traits) influenced the societal traits of the people of Maidan. Consequently, they lowered their guards, as it were, to some of the issues of modernity. Hence, upon introducing socioeconomic policies, the people in Maidan would not respond totally in negative terms to the Outer Link, which could be the government’s policy prescriptions. Instead, they would go through their societal emulation process from status quo to change without the type of hesitance, characteristic of the segments of populations living farther from Kabul. However, this would not affect the societal trait cores, which are the definite or long established values of Maidan’s people. By referring to the various figures, they should make this scenario clear. Conversely, Tajiks from Chahar-Deh, situated four km from Kabul, would be much more receptive to change, than people from Maidan, who are Pashtun. Pashtuns are in general much more conservative than Tajiks. Tajiks are not organized by tribe; instead, they are recognized by reference to their villages. Unlike Pashtuns, who have a strong loyalty to their tribes, Tajiks do not have such loyalty to the village. Furthermore, Pashtuns resistance to change stems from their determination to perpetuate their identity and the upholding of rivalry among each other as imbedded in their Pashtunwali code. For a Pashtun to fall behind another member of the tribe in observing Pashtunwali is a disgrace. Therefore, this competition between members of the same tribe makes deviance from the norms a disgrace. Hence, based on the propositions of the model, policy makers could formulate policies to establish links between developmental policies to tribal identity, perhaps by involving the tribes in development schemes. Such an approach would reduce past developmental shortcomings. 16.9.2 Example Two The proposed model could also penetrate segments of the population separated by both distance and mountain barriers and who have a distinct social organization which is the basis of their sustenance and existence. For example, the Khost district of Gakaiz province in southern Afghanistan satisfies some of these criteria making them different from the people of Maidan. Khost is about 200 km south of Kabul; it sits within the confines of the Matuun hills and the Tora-Ghara Mountains. Due to its distance, isolation and rugged environment, its tribal mode of organization, and power relations are much dominant than they are in Maidan. Again Maidan’s proximity to Kabul and continuous contact made tribal loyalties of the Maidanese people weaker than in Khost. Furthermore, tribes in southern Afghanistan are rivals and at times have engaged in armed conflict. Therefore, the loyalty of tribal members in Khost (as in other southern enclaves) to the tribe becomes a necessity. In addition, the dominance of a rigid tribal mode of organization, dictated by the code of Pashtunwali, sets loyalties of the members of the tribe to the tribe and their khans. Tribal khans rely on mullahs for interpretation in case of the conflict between the Pashtunwali code and Shariah or Islamic Law. Such power relations between khans and mullahs strengthen and justify the power of khans. Hence, policy makers and implementers could use the proposed method of social change as a road map in dealing with people in such areas as well. From the two examples it appears that distance and rigidity have positive linear relationships. The application of the proposed method could reduce the rigidity of reaction to the onset of social change. For example, the proposed method suggests that before the onset of a policy prescribing some sort of social change, the intended social change has to conform to the societal traits of the people affected by the change. In Khost, it is evident from past conflicts that people were not receptive to any government policy bringing in social change; thus, policy makers as well as implementers would have to concentrate on the societal emulation process. Through the social emulation process and the design of some instrument, policy makers and implementers would have to establish the compatibility of the change with the population’s societal traits, i.e. Pashtunwali, Islam and tribal organization. Based on the proposed model, policy makers would rely on the societal friction, the standard of acceptable behavior and, accordingly, the societal threshold or the endurance points, which have already been established by incompatible events in the past. Thus, policy makers would need to design effective outer link(s), which, when utilized through the societal emulation process, could persuade the population of Khost to receive a developmental scheme without resorting to coercive means. The Outer Links would have to address issues of distance, tribal mode of organization and the perpetuation of tribal identity. Furthermore, the policy instruments would have to incorporate the societal traits of the targeted area, their associated societal friction and threshold in order for development to succeed. An economic development proposal would embody all of the conceptual issues, on the one hand; on the other hand, towns or economic units in the proposal would constitute the effective outer links to different regions. The economic development proposal would address the socioeconomic development aspect of social change. Based on the principles of the proposed method of social change, the economic development proposal would minimize potential conflict. The various townships would resolve issues of distance from major metropolitan centers, tribal modes of organization and the corresponding sustenance associated with them, and with the dissemination of power. The establishment of a development policy from Kabul would not undermine their societal values because the people near each township would be associated with their respective town or economic unit. Unlike in the past, when development was the domain of Kabul and intrusion into different parts of the country entailed the violation of the population’s societal traits, this proposal would bypass administrators as well as policy makers in Kabul. Instead, socioeconomic development would become a phenomenon that everyone in society could contribute to and identify with. 16.10 Concluding Remarks Certain qualifications need to be addressed as the concluding remarks. One of the issues raised as impediment for development in Afghanistan was the ethnic divide. The ethnic groups especially Tajiks had been on the forefront of modernization, especially, since they constitute an overwhelming segment of population of Kabul, they have served in regard to change as the mechanism of introduction for the rest of Afghanistan. Unilke the Tajiks and other minorities, Pashtuns or Afghans have been more rigid in their openness to modernization, partly because modernization has been envisaged to them in cultural terms. That is why they have reserved themselves from being as active participants in modernity. However, if development were introduced in such manner that it would be compatible with their societal traits or value systems, then, the possibility for openness would emerge. This point has validity based on the findings of the historical analysis, namely, Kabul being the center of development. Hence, the centralization of development in Kabul couppled with the contradictory measures of the development efforts alienated mostly Pashtuns. Moreover, if there is a government that is based on the societal traits of the Afghan society, then, its measures of development would also carry legitimacy. Hence, there would be fewer reasons for conflict between development and the conservative population. Therefore, if the Taleban continues its liberalizing measures especially toward women, it might provide the needed circumstances for the implementation of this proposal. Afghanistan is unique in having a different social structure than does any other Muslim country. Therefore, development has to be made compatible to the social structure of society if it is to succeed. Finally, I hope that I could implement this proposal in Afghanistan and eradicate the misery of my gallant and wonderful people. References and Relevant Readings Ahmad, M. A.: The Survival of Afghanistan 1747- 1979, Lahore, Pakistan: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1990. Alexander, Jeffrey C. Neo-Functionalism: Key Issues in Sociological Theory. London, Beverly Hills, & New Delhi: Sage Publications 1985. Alexander, Jeffrey C. Neo-functionalism and After. Blackwell Publishers, 1998. Alexander, J. C., Giesen, M., Muench, R., & Smelser, N (ed.), The Micro-Macro Link. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987. Amin, Saikal The Rabbani Government, 1992-1996 in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, edited by William Maley. New York: New York University Press, 1998. Amin, Samir Delinking: towards a polycentric world. London: Zed Books Ltd. 1990. Appelbaum, Richard P Theories of Social Change Chicago: Markham publishing company, 1970. Bailey, Kenneth D Social Entropy Theory New York: State University of New York Press, 1990. Booth, D. Marxism and Development Society: interpreting the impasse. World Development, 13(7), 761-87, 1985 Blau, Peter M Structural Effects American Sociological Review. 25: 179-93, 1960 Brant, Marvin Recent Economic Development in Afghanistan in the 1970s New York, Washington, & London: Praeger Publishers, 1974, Dupree, Louis & Albert, Linette (edit). Cornwall, John. Economic Breakdown and Recovery: theory and policy. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994. Davis, Anthony How the Taliban Became a Military Force in Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban, edited by William Maley. New York: New York University Press, 1998. Dupree, Louis Afghanistan Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973 Dupree, Louis & Albert, Linette (edit) Afghanistan in the 1970s New York, Washington, & London: Praeger Publishers, 1974. Dupree, Nancy Hatch Afghan Women Under the Taliban in Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban, edited by William Maley. New York: New York University Press, 1998. Etzioni, Amitai, and Etzioni-Halvey, Eva, Social Change: Sources, Patterns and Consequences New York: Basic Books inc. Publishers, 1973. Eisenstadt, S. N. Comparative Perspective on Social Change Boston: Little, Brown and company 1968. Foster, John. Evolutionary Macroeconomics London, Allen & Unwin 1987 Fraser-Tyler, W. K. Afghanistan: A Study of Political Development in Central and Southern Asia. 3rd ed., rev. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Fry, Maxwell J. The Afghan Economy Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1974. Gankovsky, Yu. V. A History of Afghanistan translated from Russian to Englishby Vitaly Baskakov by Progress Publishers in 1985. Ghubar, Mir Gholam Mohammed Afghanistan dar Masir-e-Tarikh Kabul: Government Press, 1967. Gregorian, Vartan The Emergence of Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1969 Guessou, Mohammed, A General Critique of Equilibrium Theory of Parons in Readings on Social Change by Wilbert E. Moore and Robert M. Cook Hardiman, Margaret & Midgley, James The Social Dimension of Development. London, Gower and London School of Economics and Political Science, 1989. Harrison, David The Sociology of Modernization and Development. London, Boston, & Sydney, 1988. Hedebro, Goeran, Communication and Social Change in Developing Nations: A Critical View. Iowa, the Iowa State University Press/ Ames. Homans, George C. The Human Group. New York, Chicago, San Francisco, & Atlanta: Harcourt, Bruce, and World inc 1950. Hulme, David, & Turner, Mark M., Sociology and Development: Theories, Policies and Practices. NY, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990b. Hyman, Anthony Russia, Central Asia and the Taliban in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban edited by William Maley. New York: New York University Press, 1998. Jaffee, David Levels of Socio-economic Development Theory Kuhn, Thomas S The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Chicago: University of Chicago press 1962. Laing, Gordon J. Building Scientific Models. London, London School of Economics 1986 MacMunn, George Afghanistan from Darius to Amanullah London: G. Bell & Son, 1929. Maley, William Introduction: Interpreting the Taliban in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, edited by William Maley. New York: New York University Press, 1998. Mead, George Herbert On Social Psychology Chicago: University of Chicago press 1962. Muench, Richard, Theory of Action: Towards a New Synthesis Going Beyond Parsons. London & New York: Routledge and Kegan, 1987. Newell, Richard S. The Politics of Afghanistan Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press Oman, Charles P. and Wignaraja, Ganeshan The Postwar Evolution of Development Thinking. St. Martin Press, 1991 Parsons, Tallcots and Shils, Edward, Toward a General Theory of Action p. 105-107; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University press 1952. Poullada, Leon B. Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929 Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1973. Preston, P. W. Theories of Development London, & Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. Radcliffe-Brown, A. R., On the Concepts of Function in Social Science, in Donald Mcquarie’s Readings in Sociological Theory, New Jersey: Prentice Hall 1995. Rishtya, Syed Qsim. A History of Afghanistan in the 19th Century. Kabul: Education Press, 1949. Seers, D. Dependency Theory: a Critical Assessment. London, Frances Printer, 1981. Rubin, Barnett R. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1995. Sztompka, Piotr 1994, The Sociology of Social Change Oxford, UK, Cambridge & USA: Blackwell publishing Spybey, Tony Social Change, Development and Dependency. Polity Press, 1992. Varma, Baidya Nath, The Sociology and Politics of Development: A Theoretical Study. London, Boston, and Henley, 1980. Waters, Malcolm, Modern Sociological Theory. London, Thousand Oaks, & New Dehli, Sage Publications, 1994. Weber, Maxwell's Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by Henderson and Parsons, 1947 pp. 111-115, 118-120. Wilber, Donald Afghanistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1962. Wilber, Charles K. The Political Economy of development and Underdevelopment. Random House inc., 1988. Ysander, Bengt-Christer. Two Models of an Open Economy. Sweden: Almqvist and Wiksell international 1986. Zollschan, George K. and Hirsch, Walter, Explorations in Social Change. Boston, New York, & IL: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964. In addition, I hope that I would use my knowledge and utilize it in the development of Afghanistan. .