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The General: Charles De Gaulle and the France He Saved
No leader of modern times was more unique and more uniquely national than Charles de Gaulle. As founder and first President of the Fifth Republic, General de Gaulle saw himself 'carrying France on my shoulders'. When he first emerged on to the world stage in 1940, his insistence that he spoke for his nation might well have appeared impossibly arrogant for a recently promoted junior general who had never been elected to anything. But he personified many of the traits of his country which fascinate the rest of the world - its pride in itself, its intransigence, its historical and cultural heritage and its quasi-religious belief in the state. Le General, as he became known from 1940 on, appeared as if carved from a single monumental block, but was, in fact, extremely complex, a man with deep personal feelings and recurrent mood swings, devoted to his family and often seeking reassurance from those around him. Though insisting on discipline and loyalty from others, he was a great rebel. A grand visionary with a vast geo-political grasp and elephantine memory, he was also a supreme tactician with a taste for secrecy and the ability to out-flank opponents. This is a magisterial, sweeping biography of one of the great leaders of the twentieth century and of the country with which he so identified himself. Written with terrific verve and narrative skill, and yet rigorous and detailed, it brings alive as never before the private man as well as the public leader through exhaustive research and astute analysis.
720 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2010
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About the author
Jonathan Fenby
42 books53 followersJonathan Fenby, CBE, has been the editor of The Observer and the South China Morning Post. He is currently China Director at the research service Trusted Sources.
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February 4, 2018
This is a magnificent biography of Charles De Gaulle. There are many aspects that stand out about this man.
First and foremost is that when De Gaulle stepped off the plane in England in June, 1940 he was 49 years old. If he would have died then and there he would have been a minor footnote in French history. As it is, he played a compelling role in 20th century history for the next 30 years.
De Gaulle single-handedly took charge of French resistance and started the planning of a new French government. He rejected the Petain government in France as entirely non-representative. France was to be France, certainly not France allied with Nazi Germany, and in the future not France allied with Britain or the U.S. – and certainly not allied with the Soviet Union.
To say that De Gaulle irritated those around him is a severe understatement. During the war years some had to remind him that the real enemy was Germany (Hitler), not Britain (Churchill) or the U.S. (Roosevelt). The word “caustic” is used in this book at one point to describe De Gaulle’s mannerisms. This is truly appropriate.
Page 132 (my book) Churchill
He [De Gaulle] had to be rude to the British to prove to French eyes that he was not a British puppet. He certainly carried out this policy with perseverance.”
De Gaulle must have been a tremendous time-sucker to Churchill and company. He was constantly raising issues, perceived insults, and French interests in far off lands like Syria, Madagascar... that paled beside the critical war being waged on the European continent.
But in private De Gaulle could be grateful. He wrote truly appreciative letters to Churchill, King George VI and Roosevelt to thank them for their generosity (by contrast, Stalin, never did this).
De Gaulle felt, or knew, that he was France incarnate.
Page 134
That he emerged triumphant from the war years was a tribute to his strategic vision, tactical skill, sheer pig-headedness and ability to channel his strong emotions in constructive directions for both himself and his cause. It was a performance which catapulted him on to the world stage and ensured that for most of the next three decades between the flight to London [June 1940] and his death, he would be a unique global player.
De Gaulle knew how to manipulate and some of his public statements could be obtuse. When he went to Algeria to speak to the two million French who lived there he said “I understand you” (Je vous comprends). But in only a few years he set in motion the independence of Algeria. There followed, after this, several attempts on De Gaulle’s life. Algerian independence, like the war years, causes strife and soul-searching in France to this day.
I had not realized how anarchic the conditions were in France during parts of the 1960’s. The author mentions that at certain times there were over ten million workers on strike. This was in addition to student demonstrations and riots!
There is one reviewer on the cover of the book who described this as a “magisterial” work covering the story of a great man. You have to admire De Gaulle – he was truly an individualist – and this is much evidenced in this book. Perhaps, at times, there is too much name dropping that detracts from the flow. But De Gaulle makes history exciting.
First and foremost is that when De Gaulle stepped off the plane in England in June, 1940 he was 49 years old. If he would have died then and there he would have been a minor footnote in French history. As it is, he played a compelling role in 20th century history for the next 30 years.
De Gaulle single-handedly took charge of French resistance and started the planning of a new French government. He rejected the Petain government in France as entirely non-representative. France was to be France, certainly not France allied with Nazi Germany, and in the future not France allied with Britain or the U.S. – and certainly not allied with the Soviet Union.
To say that De Gaulle irritated those around him is a severe understatement. During the war years some had to remind him that the real enemy was Germany (Hitler), not Britain (Churchill) or the U.S. (Roosevelt). The word “caustic” is used in this book at one point to describe De Gaulle’s mannerisms. This is truly appropriate.
Page 132 (my book) Churchill
He [De Gaulle] had to be rude to the British to prove to French eyes that he was not a British puppet. He certainly carried out this policy with perseverance.”
De Gaulle must have been a tremendous time-sucker to Churchill and company. He was constantly raising issues, perceived insults, and French interests in far off lands like Syria, Madagascar... that paled beside the critical war being waged on the European continent.
But in private De Gaulle could be grateful. He wrote truly appreciative letters to Churchill, King George VI and Roosevelt to thank them for their generosity (by contrast, Stalin, never did this).
De Gaulle felt, or knew, that he was France incarnate.
Page 134
That he emerged triumphant from the war years was a tribute to his strategic vision, tactical skill, sheer pig-headedness and ability to channel his strong emotions in constructive directions for both himself and his cause. It was a performance which catapulted him on to the world stage and ensured that for most of the next three decades between the flight to London [June 1940] and his death, he would be a unique global player.
De Gaulle knew how to manipulate and some of his public statements could be obtuse. When he went to Algeria to speak to the two million French who lived there he said “I understand you” (Je vous comprends). But in only a few years he set in motion the independence of Algeria. There followed, after this, several attempts on De Gaulle’s life. Algerian independence, like the war years, causes strife and soul-searching in France to this day.
I had not realized how anarchic the conditions were in France during parts of the 1960’s. The author mentions that at certain times there were over ten million workers on strike. This was in addition to student demonstrations and riots!
There is one reviewer on the cover of the book who described this as a “magisterial” work covering the story of a great man. You have to admire De Gaulle – he was truly an individualist – and this is much evidenced in this book. Perhaps, at times, there is too much name dropping that detracts from the flow. But De Gaulle makes history exciting.
August 2, 2018
This book seems to be the closest thing to a good biography of DeGaulle that exists in English, but that's really not saying much. I believe the definitive biography of De Gaulle in English has not been written, because the translation of Jean Lacouture's French language version has many flaws, chief among them that Lacouture was writing for a French audience, so he assumed on the part of his readers a lot of knowledge of French politics and recent events. A reasonable assumption for educated Francaises et Francais, but not for Americans. Fenby's book, on the other hand is far too facile and lacks depth. DeGaulle was a fascinating and polarizing figure, but for all his faults it is not an exaggeration to say he saved France. My father lived in France when DeGaulle was president, and he understood (and spoke a little) French, so he would listen to DeGaulle's addresses to the nation, and my dad had a finely tuned appreciation for obscure humor, so he enjoyed DeGaulle's speeches. Sadly, DeGaulle has been demonized in America, simply for insisting on France being a truly sovereign nation, but he accomplished so much: he set France on the path to energy independence, he dealt with decolonialization fairly and with respect for both the countries that left and the colonies that chose to stay with France (despite the Algerian quagmire), he re-wrote the constitution and gave France, finally, stable government. And much more.
DeGaulle saw far, and so clearly. He knew that France needed to match Germany's build-up of tank divisions and fighter aircraft in the late '30's, but the government did not listen. He saw that France could maintain her honor and stay fully in the war in 1940 by evacuating the French Army and Air Force to Algeria using France's formidable Navy, but the government did not listen. And he saw and spoke of in the Appel of Juin 1940, that it was a matter of time before the Nazis would be defeated by the industrial might of the United States. He gave hope to occupied France when many, including Roosevelt, had written her off. He was great in ways we do not see in world leaders today.
He is a man much misunderstood in the U.S., and he deserves a fairer evaluation. I wish this biography offered that in a full-throated and eloquent way.
DeGaulle saw far, and so clearly. He knew that France needed to match Germany's build-up of tank divisions and fighter aircraft in the late '30's, but the government did not listen. He saw that France could maintain her honor and stay fully in the war in 1940 by evacuating the French Army and Air Force to Algeria using France's formidable Navy, but the government did not listen. And he saw and spoke of in the Appel of Juin 1940, that it was a matter of time before the Nazis would be defeated by the industrial might of the United States. He gave hope to occupied France when many, including Roosevelt, had written her off. He was great in ways we do not see in world leaders today.
He is a man much misunderstood in the U.S., and he deserves a fairer evaluation. I wish this biography offered that in a full-throated and eloquent way.
March 2, 2019
“The General: Charles de Gaulle and the France He Saved” by Jonathan Fenby is a 2012 biography of de Gaulle. It was entertaining, in-depth, well-researched, and flashed a not-always-kind light on The General. Now whether one thinks highly or poorly of de Gaulle is another matter. Reading this biography portrays many of the stereotypes associated with de Gaulle. He was pompous, larger-than-life, heroic, aristocratic, aloof, controlling, messianic, and autocratic. Yet no one can claim he didn’t put France first.
In some ways France has long had an inferiority complex, especially during and after World War II when it lost its moral authority and was marginalized for giving up Paris without a fight and for the resulting Vichy government. In the end France wasn’t included in much of the fighting in or liberation of Europe. If the big three were Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill … de Gaulle would be lucky to rank as a distant fourth. This rankled de Gaulle and colored most everything he did from 1940 on. De Gaulle had a constant suspicion of the United States and Great Britain, and much of what he did politically can be evaluated through that lens. While de Gaulle strived for a strong independent France - hopefully brokering the distance between the competing interests of the East and the West - it was shaping up as a world passing it by.
The first 120 or so pages take the reader through de Gaulle’s early life and the first world war. The next 510 pages cover the last 30 years through his death in 1970. I thought the book hit its stride in this second section. The details of his political movements – his thoughts and positioning to return to power – are fleshed out wonderfully. One can almost feel how his vision of France slowly departed from reality as time marched on. De Gaulle was not one to change with the times, and as such became a bit of an anachronism in his later years. His efforts to shore up France’s colonies is laid out very nicely, especially the problems in Algiers … Dien Bien Phu wasn’t on his watch, but Algiers was.
If you are looking for details on this period in world history, this is good reading.
In some ways France has long had an inferiority complex, especially during and after World War II when it lost its moral authority and was marginalized for giving up Paris without a fight and for the resulting Vichy government. In the end France wasn’t included in much of the fighting in or liberation of Europe. If the big three were Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill … de Gaulle would be lucky to rank as a distant fourth. This rankled de Gaulle and colored most everything he did from 1940 on. De Gaulle had a constant suspicion of the United States and Great Britain, and much of what he did politically can be evaluated through that lens. While de Gaulle strived for a strong independent France - hopefully brokering the distance between the competing interests of the East and the West - it was shaping up as a world passing it by.
The first 120 or so pages take the reader through de Gaulle’s early life and the first world war. The next 510 pages cover the last 30 years through his death in 1970. I thought the book hit its stride in this second section. The details of his political movements – his thoughts and positioning to return to power – are fleshed out wonderfully. One can almost feel how his vision of France slowly departed from reality as time marched on. De Gaulle was not one to change with the times, and as such became a bit of an anachronism in his later years. His efforts to shore up France’s colonies is laid out very nicely, especially the problems in Algiers … Dien Bien Phu wasn’t on his watch, but Algiers was.
If you are looking for details on this period in world history, this is good reading.
June 22, 2016
What a man, what a book. Perhaps lexicon or Some list of his recurring ministers would be handy
March 6, 2020
De Gaulle was out of touch in 1968 when protests swept his country in a terrible blow to his prestige, but as Jonathan Fenby's biography shows, de Gaulle was essentially out of touch for his entire life. He had a vision of the greatness of France, and of his own importance, that was frequently at odds with reality. For example, he believe France to be an equal partner with the US, Great Britain, and Russia in WWII, and this belief was patently absurd. He also believed in his own legitimacy as the leader of France during that time period, and this was at least highly questionable. His high opinion of himself and of his country frequently led him into behavior that was petty, authoritarian, absurd, and highly irritating to everyone around him. But until 1968, being out of touch with reality served him well. He bullied and bluffed his way to success.
As an American, I can't read about de Gaulle, even today, without rolling my eyes and clucking, but I have to admit that he was indisputably one of the great world leaders of the 20th century. He salvaged France's honor in WWII, brought order to chaos in 1958, ended the awful war in Algeria, and put France on the path back to greatness. Fenby's book does a solid job of telling his story.
As an American, I can't read about de Gaulle, even today, without rolling my eyes and clucking, but I have to admit that he was indisputably one of the great world leaders of the 20th century. He salvaged France's honor in WWII, brought order to chaos in 1958, ended the awful war in Algeria, and put France on the path back to greatness. Fenby's book does a solid job of telling his story.
November 1, 2014
This is a perfectly adequate and workman like biography of De Gaulle. While comprehensive, I never really got a good sense of either him or "the France he saved". Why exactly is he to be regarded as a Great Man, again? While he had some considerable political skill and luck, it was never really made clear the real impact of his presidency or how his leadership saved or shaped his country in any meaningful way. The author did describe various initiatives to enhance France's role as a major player on the world stage, independent of the U.S., but these seemed to only to illustrate just how little real influence France had, other than to irritate Western allies (particularly America).
While not a particularly engaging read, I would suggest it for anyone requiring a biography for college or perhaps high school research.
While not a particularly engaging read, I would suggest it for anyone requiring a biography for college or perhaps high school research.
June 24, 2022
A decent but flawed biography. Largely forgotten now (at least in the U.S.) Charles De Gaulle was 'the face of France" for most of the mid 20th Century. He almost single-handedly resurrected and created modern France after its humiliating defeat in WW II. Like Churchill, he possessed a messianic self-assurance and was convinced he was destined for greatness. Also, like Churchill, he ended up being correct.
He was pompous, arrogant and aloof; almost no one liked him. How then was he able to rise to such heights? Unfortunately that is not addressed by the author. The book is long on detail (attendees of cabinet meetings are listed) but short on analysis. For instance, how did De Gaulle transform himself from an obscure colonel in the French Army to the leader of the Free French; seemingly overnight? In the book a chapter ends with De Gaulle as a tank commander in Western France during the German's initial assault and the next chapter begins with him in London addressing the French through speeches on the BBC. How did he get out of France? Why did he imagine he could now be the leader of the French resistance and most importantly how did he accomplish this? The author is silent. There is also almost nothing about how France was governed after its defeat. Why did the German's only occupy half of France? Why and how was the Vichy government set up? Again silence.
That being said, the descriptions of De Gaulle the man are excellent. Through shear willpower he somehow convinced the Allies to set him up as the leader of France after the Nazi's were defeated then obtained a French sphere of control in occupied Germany as well as a permanent seat on the UN Security Council . He acomplished this even though he treated the British and Americans with disdain and was often uncooperative, if not obstructionist. At least some of De Gaulle's obstructionism was meant to reassure his fellow Frenchman that he was not just a stooge for the US/UK. In other words to show that France had not just swapped one master (the Germans) for another (the British/Americans). But the author does not delve into this.
In spite of his arrogance and pomposity De Gaulle seems to have been a true patriot. His goal was to make France great again. But unlike others who espouse similar goals he seems to have made no attempt to enrich himself in the process and lived simply and frugally.
He was pompous, arrogant and aloof; almost no one liked him. How then was he able to rise to such heights? Unfortunately that is not addressed by the author. The book is long on detail (attendees of cabinet meetings are listed) but short on analysis. For instance, how did De Gaulle transform himself from an obscure colonel in the French Army to the leader of the Free French; seemingly overnight? In the book a chapter ends with De Gaulle as a tank commander in Western France during the German's initial assault and the next chapter begins with him in London addressing the French through speeches on the BBC. How did he get out of France? Why did he imagine he could now be the leader of the French resistance and most importantly how did he accomplish this? The author is silent. There is also almost nothing about how France was governed after its defeat. Why did the German's only occupy half of France? Why and how was the Vichy government set up? Again silence.
That being said, the descriptions of De Gaulle the man are excellent. Through shear willpower he somehow convinced the Allies to set him up as the leader of France after the Nazi's were defeated then obtained a French sphere of control in occupied Germany as well as a permanent seat on the UN Security Council . He acomplished this even though he treated the British and Americans with disdain and was often uncooperative, if not obstructionist. At least some of De Gaulle's obstructionism was meant to reassure his fellow Frenchman that he was not just a stooge for the US/UK. In other words to show that France had not just swapped one master (the Germans) for another (the British/Americans). But the author does not delve into this.
In spite of his arrogance and pomposity De Gaulle seems to have been a true patriot. His goal was to make France great again. But unlike others who espouse similar goals he seems to have made no attempt to enrich himself in the process and lived simply and frugally.
April 30, 2016
Quel homme!
- De Gaulle à Auschwitz: "Quelle tristesse, quel dégoût et malgré tout quelle espérance humaine!"
- De Gaulle à Auschwitz: "Quelle tristesse, quel dégoût et malgré tout quelle espérance humaine!"
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November 18, 2016Excellent biography of a man who loved France. I was reminded of the tumultuous politics of France in the 1960s and 1970s.
March 29, 2024
This biography of Charles DeGaulle examines a man who was a brave, politically savvy animal: a genuine leader who played a leading role not once but twice when France was in crisis. His leadership of the Free French during World War II was one instance. He also became "the Man of Destiny" in the late Fifties when he assumed the Presidency of the new Fifth Republic. He was directly elected President again in 1965 and served four more years. There is no way to understand France in the mid-20th Century without a grasp of "Mon General".
DeGaulle was a unique figure; he was also an arrogant ultra-nationalist who saw France as an independent force that shunned her natural allies, Britain and the United States, in a drive to be not just a force in Europe but THE FORCE in Europe, a super-nation that would stand as a separate entity from NATO, dealing directly with the USSR. It was a bold gambit and it was generally popular with French voters and exasperating to other leaders like Churchill, MacMillian, FDR, Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy
Jonathan Fenby's biography is well-written and concise, taking us through his personal, military, and personal life. In my opinion, DeGaulle's greatest leadership feat came during the crisis over the French occupation of Algeria. As much of an often unbending nationalist as he was, DeGaulle guided a course that brought a needed withdrawal of the French military and civilians from the bloody and ruthless FLN revolutionaries. At the same time, many activist French/Algerian settlers (the pied-noirs) and high-ranking French military renegades set out to stop him with counter-revolutions, including a broad range of terrorist attacks and a long period of calculated assassinations, with several attacks against DeGaulle and his family.
DeGaulle's short-sightedness came with his refusal to bring the United Kingdom into the Common Market and cooperate with the mutual defense of Europe through NATO. His image of France as a pillar of total independence, even in the face of the Soviet menace, seems quixotic.
DeGaulle had many achievements in his long public life. To put it mildly, he would have been a hard man to work for. But he was always decisive when needed and ready to accept the mantle of leadership in hard times. There is much to be admired in a person like that, even when he brings a lot of unbending stubbornness into the international mix.
DeGaulle was a unique figure; he was also an arrogant ultra-nationalist who saw France as an independent force that shunned her natural allies, Britain and the United States, in a drive to be not just a force in Europe but THE FORCE in Europe, a super-nation that would stand as a separate entity from NATO, dealing directly with the USSR. It was a bold gambit and it was generally popular with French voters and exasperating to other leaders like Churchill, MacMillian, FDR, Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy
Jonathan Fenby's biography is well-written and concise, taking us through his personal, military, and personal life. In my opinion, DeGaulle's greatest leadership feat came during the crisis over the French occupation of Algeria. As much of an often unbending nationalist as he was, DeGaulle guided a course that brought a needed withdrawal of the French military and civilians from the bloody and ruthless FLN revolutionaries. At the same time, many activist French/Algerian settlers (the pied-noirs) and high-ranking French military renegades set out to stop him with counter-revolutions, including a broad range of terrorist attacks and a long period of calculated assassinations, with several attacks against DeGaulle and his family.
DeGaulle's short-sightedness came with his refusal to bring the United Kingdom into the Common Market and cooperate with the mutual defense of Europe through NATO. His image of France as a pillar of total independence, even in the face of the Soviet menace, seems quixotic.
DeGaulle had many achievements in his long public life. To put it mildly, he would have been a hard man to work for. But he was always decisive when needed and ready to accept the mantle of leadership in hard times. There is much to be admired in a person like that, even when he brings a lot of unbending stubbornness into the international mix.
March 29, 2020
Charles De Gaulle is probably one of the greatest Frenchmen in history. As president of France, he was obsessed in maintaining France position as one of world’s great powers even if it led him to clash with other superpowers. Even I am interested in reading about him. This book covers much everything about De Gaulle’s life. From his time during World War I as an infantryman, became a proponent of tank warfare and being marginalized by the whole military command who were more defensive and outdated in their thinking, his protege-rivalry with his mentor, Marechal Petain, his time as leader of Free (later Fighting) France, clashing with collaborationist Vichy France, Churchill, Roosevelt, and rivals within his faction, his first retirement, his days in opposition, his comeback and the formation of Fifth Republic, and his presidency, dealing with Algeria Crisis in the beginning, which brought down partially by nationwide protests, and his losing referendum proposal, motivated him to finally retire for good.
Throughout the book, I can see why he was so great. Like other great people throughout history, he possessed a unique personality. Cold and aloof, he earned more enemies than friends. However they cannot deny De Gaulle’s greatness, and he was the right man for the job. There are so many interesting things that I got from this book and I highly recommend this book to anyone who wishes to know more about De Gaulle and to some extension, the history of modern france itself, for without De Gaulle, France will never be this way.
Throughout the book, I can see why he was so great. Like other great people throughout history, he possessed a unique personality. Cold and aloof, he earned more enemies than friends. However they cannot deny De Gaulle’s greatness, and he was the right man for the job. There are so many interesting things that I got from this book and I highly recommend this book to anyone who wishes to know more about De Gaulle and to some extension, the history of modern france itself, for without De Gaulle, France will never be this way.
November 21, 2018
So much to say about this book. I’ve given it a few days and I’m not sure that I feel like I will do a good job speaking about the subject of De Gaulle. Truly, one of the more interesting figures in the twentieth century. One could, and I’m sure many have run out of adjectives to describe him. Patriotic, Nationalistic, Religious, Demagogic, Narcissistic, Stubborn, Honorable, Moralistic. What becomes clear in looking at this is that not all of these adjectives go together. This, in a nutshell, provides a glimpse of the problem of Charles De Gaulle.
The author Jonathan Fenby does a very good job in his work here. I am sure there are countless biographies of him, including one that has just been released and blurbed in the last month, but I think this certainly gives anyone interested a good initial look at , as he liked to be called, The General.
De Gaulle is correctly known to people outside France as, first and foremost, the leader of the Free French during World War Two. But even that epitomization is not as simple when one looks into the history of it. In short, De Gaulle was a pain in the ass. He would have been a superb poker player as he would bluff and or act like he had all the cards when, in most cases, he had none.
His constant refrain in life was to gain respect for France. To have France at the seat of the World Powers after the war. What was most interesting with him, however, was that even during World War Two, after France had capitulated, he still insisted at every turn that the French, the free forces, in the shape of he himself, be consulted and included in all decisions. Churchill, however, ever mindful of how dependent on the United States England was, deferred when he needed to to FDR a d the Americans. FDR had little to no use for De Gaulle and his antics. Churchill who hosted him veered from admiration to exasperation but with De Gaulle one never was far from a blowup of some sort. His ego, his self perception of him and his country, his savior complex , was just too large to allow for any permanent congenial relations.
After the war it was this European dependence on the United States that he consistently fought against. As Russia and the United States turned Europe into a dual of their superiority he wished to make France the third party, but as an equal, to become one of a tripartite power in Europe. In this he never succeeded.
De Gaulle is interesting in how he insisted on staying inside the lines of being democratically elected but, once he did so, he had no use for the constraints put on a Democratic leader. From 1958 until he left the government, well over ten years, he acted as an almost supreme leader in his country. He held all the cards. That said, in any situation where he might lose power, or majorities, he always threatened to leave the government if the voters did not totally endorse him. And, in fairness to him, once he lost the referendum he asked for to keep his powers , he immediately stepped down.
He was and always will be an enigma. I have over a hundred highlights in this book so I am going to review them in real time and comment where I think it makes sense to.
At the beginning of World War Two France had, at least, a thirty percent superiority in both tanks and airplanes. Historians still, and will always argue about this, but I tend to agree that the French people, the soldiers, even the Generals just had a defeatist attitude. The suffering of World War One was not forgotten, the government was consistently, brutally, unstable in the thirties while Germany was under a complete militaristic rearmament.
The agreement by Reynaud to a separate peace with the Germans has been, and could be blamed on the misinterpretation of the phrase “ understood “ in a conversation with Churchill.
At the end of World War I De Gaulle recognized The Treaty of Versailles as a failed document. He called the German signature a joke and expected them to grow more bitter and militaristic while the French would suffer from demobilization. In this he was completely accurate. The demographics of World War One were devastating. Of the 7.5 million, 60 percent of the total population of men before 190, 1.5 million died. Half of the six million survivors were wounded, shell shocked, amputees, or otherwise affected. Population growth stalled. Without the two million citizens added with the gain of Alsace Lorraine and the 1.5 million immigrants since 1914 the population in the thirties would have been even more precipitously lower. Deaths outnumber births, ten percent of the people have syphilis, a quarter of the population is over sixty, and perhaps the best illustration of unpreparedness of the government is France had forty-two different formed governments between the wars. Forty two, how COULD they have been prepared.
When one wants to lose all patience with him they should consider his relationship with his daughter Anne. Heavily afflicted with Down Syndrome both he and his wife insisted in her total integration into the family and Charles loved and doted on her like no one else. His love was endless for her until she passed away. When she died in 1948, he when leaving the funeral, touched his wife’s arm and said “ She’s like others now.”
De Gaulle in the thirties advocated heavily for the building up, improvement, and utilization of tanks as a separate offensive force. It was not appreciated. Interestingly in 1945 a copy of his 1936 book about tank warfare was found in German headquarters annotated approvingly by Hitler.
After the popular front government took power in 1936 led by the Communist Blum there was a wide array of Conservative thought in France that believed better Fascist than Communist. When one considers the America First movement of the same time and the English and American attitude toward Franco in the Spanish Civil War this is not surprising. To the Generals credit he never supported the fascists or their tendencies to want to take by force what they lost in popular elections.
After the capitulation much of French business embraced the Vichy government expecting to have any vestiges of the limitations placed on them by the popular front government and high profit making return. We, as Americans, should not think ourselves too much above this, anyone who thinks our businesses would not embrace profit over politics is not really paying attention.
What’s interesting is once America entered the war everyone, including Churchill, De Gaulle, and FDR assumed the end result of the war was known, it was just a matter of when. De Gaulle was quite prescient when America was bombed and entered, that England as well as France would be less important and that after the war it would all be about the USSR Nd the US
Churchill was amazed at De Gaulle’s stubbornness. Churchill wrote after one long verbal battle “ His country has given up fighting, he himself is a refugee, and if we turn him down he’s finished. But look at him! Look at him! He might be Stalin, with 200 division is behind his words, perhaps the last survivor of a warrior race.”
The loss of Algeria is well known, it was a terrible revolution. De Gaulle was resigned that French Africa would leave, though he felt it as a huge diminishment of his countries prestige. Besides Algeria a great deal of Eastern Africa had been French. In the early sixties they lost it all.
An interesting anecdote told is of the failed Paris conference between Khrushchev and De Gaulle. This was after the u2 incident and Khrushchev was livid. De Gaulle was at his best. After the Chairman has ranted and yelled for forty five minutes De Gaulle said “ we can all hear ( Khrushchev) there is no reason for him to raise his voice. Quotation mark. When the Soviet interpreter went pale and stumbled over his words, De Gaulle told his own interpreter to do the job. Kruschev stopped, cast an angry look at the Frenchman over the top of his spectacles and continued in a quieter tone. Later De Gaulle said that he too had been spied on from the sky. Kruschev asked, “ by your American Allies and the general replied “no, by you. “. After further posturing Eisenhower was impressed, later in his car, to an aide, he said, “ that De Gaulle, he is someone.”
Near the end of his reign De Gaulle suffered from a belief in his oneness with the state. State television was heavily censored, French forces were pulled from NATO command, made several statements that were, or could be considered AntoSemetic, and then with the student and worker protest of 1968 the end was near.
To give De Gaulle credit, he did not take extraordinary measures to stay in power, once the people clearly rejected his desires he left willingly If sadly.
My conclusion is odd. Over a d over as I read this book and watched his behaviors and temperament and tendencies to autocratic behavior I was reminded of Trump. The bluster, The I’ll take my ball and go home, the knee jerk defense of the military and any rule by force as well as the almost automatic rejection of the presumed status quo with noted allies.
Of course this falls apart as soon as one examines De Gaulle in full. He was intelligent, he had fierce ethics, he had morals. He was, in actuality, the opposite of Trump in his appetites and loyalty to the state above people. Still the behaviors of similarity do pop up.
De Gaulle provided a stability that France needed and allowed them the window to become one of the leaders of Europe. After World War 2, in his twelve years out of power the country again ran through governments in an extreme fashion. It seemed they were ungovernable. The General did change that.
His importance to France in the twentieth century cannot be underestimated. He was everything.
The author Jonathan Fenby does a very good job in his work here. I am sure there are countless biographies of him, including one that has just been released and blurbed in the last month, but I think this certainly gives anyone interested a good initial look at , as he liked to be called, The General.
De Gaulle is correctly known to people outside France as, first and foremost, the leader of the Free French during World War Two. But even that epitomization is not as simple when one looks into the history of it. In short, De Gaulle was a pain in the ass. He would have been a superb poker player as he would bluff and or act like he had all the cards when, in most cases, he had none.
His constant refrain in life was to gain respect for France. To have France at the seat of the World Powers after the war. What was most interesting with him, however, was that even during World War Two, after France had capitulated, he still insisted at every turn that the French, the free forces, in the shape of he himself, be consulted and included in all decisions. Churchill, however, ever mindful of how dependent on the United States England was, deferred when he needed to to FDR a d the Americans. FDR had little to no use for De Gaulle and his antics. Churchill who hosted him veered from admiration to exasperation but with De Gaulle one never was far from a blowup of some sort. His ego, his self perception of him and his country, his savior complex , was just too large to allow for any permanent congenial relations.
After the war it was this European dependence on the United States that he consistently fought against. As Russia and the United States turned Europe into a dual of their superiority he wished to make France the third party, but as an equal, to become one of a tripartite power in Europe. In this he never succeeded.
De Gaulle is interesting in how he insisted on staying inside the lines of being democratically elected but, once he did so, he had no use for the constraints put on a Democratic leader. From 1958 until he left the government, well over ten years, he acted as an almost supreme leader in his country. He held all the cards. That said, in any situation where he might lose power, or majorities, he always threatened to leave the government if the voters did not totally endorse him. And, in fairness to him, once he lost the referendum he asked for to keep his powers , he immediately stepped down.
He was and always will be an enigma. I have over a hundred highlights in this book so I am going to review them in real time and comment where I think it makes sense to.
At the beginning of World War Two France had, at least, a thirty percent superiority in both tanks and airplanes. Historians still, and will always argue about this, but I tend to agree that the French people, the soldiers, even the Generals just had a defeatist attitude. The suffering of World War One was not forgotten, the government was consistently, brutally, unstable in the thirties while Germany was under a complete militaristic rearmament.
The agreement by Reynaud to a separate peace with the Germans has been, and could be blamed on the misinterpretation of the phrase “ understood “ in a conversation with Churchill.
At the end of World War I De Gaulle recognized The Treaty of Versailles as a failed document. He called the German signature a joke and expected them to grow more bitter and militaristic while the French would suffer from demobilization. In this he was completely accurate. The demographics of World War One were devastating. Of the 7.5 million, 60 percent of the total population of men before 190, 1.5 million died. Half of the six million survivors were wounded, shell shocked, amputees, or otherwise affected. Population growth stalled. Without the two million citizens added with the gain of Alsace Lorraine and the 1.5 million immigrants since 1914 the population in the thirties would have been even more precipitously lower. Deaths outnumber births, ten percent of the people have syphilis, a quarter of the population is over sixty, and perhaps the best illustration of unpreparedness of the government is France had forty-two different formed governments between the wars. Forty two, how COULD they have been prepared.
When one wants to lose all patience with him they should consider his relationship with his daughter Anne. Heavily afflicted with Down Syndrome both he and his wife insisted in her total integration into the family and Charles loved and doted on her like no one else. His love was endless for her until she passed away. When she died in 1948, he when leaving the funeral, touched his wife’s arm and said “ She’s like others now.”
De Gaulle in the thirties advocated heavily for the building up, improvement, and utilization of tanks as a separate offensive force. It was not appreciated. Interestingly in 1945 a copy of his 1936 book about tank warfare was found in German headquarters annotated approvingly by Hitler.
After the popular front government took power in 1936 led by the Communist Blum there was a wide array of Conservative thought in France that believed better Fascist than Communist. When one considers the America First movement of the same time and the English and American attitude toward Franco in the Spanish Civil War this is not surprising. To the Generals credit he never supported the fascists or their tendencies to want to take by force what they lost in popular elections.
After the capitulation much of French business embraced the Vichy government expecting to have any vestiges of the limitations placed on them by the popular front government and high profit making return. We, as Americans, should not think ourselves too much above this, anyone who thinks our businesses would not embrace profit over politics is not really paying attention.
What’s interesting is once America entered the war everyone, including Churchill, De Gaulle, and FDR assumed the end result of the war was known, it was just a matter of when. De Gaulle was quite prescient when America was bombed and entered, that England as well as France would be less important and that after the war it would all be about the USSR Nd the US
Churchill was amazed at De Gaulle’s stubbornness. Churchill wrote after one long verbal battle “ His country has given up fighting, he himself is a refugee, and if we turn him down he’s finished. But look at him! Look at him! He might be Stalin, with 200 division is behind his words, perhaps the last survivor of a warrior race.”
The loss of Algeria is well known, it was a terrible revolution. De Gaulle was resigned that French Africa would leave, though he felt it as a huge diminishment of his countries prestige. Besides Algeria a great deal of Eastern Africa had been French. In the early sixties they lost it all.
An interesting anecdote told is of the failed Paris conference between Khrushchev and De Gaulle. This was after the u2 incident and Khrushchev was livid. De Gaulle was at his best. After the Chairman has ranted and yelled for forty five minutes De Gaulle said “ we can all hear ( Khrushchev) there is no reason for him to raise his voice. Quotation mark. When the Soviet interpreter went pale and stumbled over his words, De Gaulle told his own interpreter to do the job. Kruschev stopped, cast an angry look at the Frenchman over the top of his spectacles and continued in a quieter tone. Later De Gaulle said that he too had been spied on from the sky. Kruschev asked, “ by your American Allies and the general replied “no, by you. “. After further posturing Eisenhower was impressed, later in his car, to an aide, he said, “ that De Gaulle, he is someone.”
Near the end of his reign De Gaulle suffered from a belief in his oneness with the state. State television was heavily censored, French forces were pulled from NATO command, made several statements that were, or could be considered AntoSemetic, and then with the student and worker protest of 1968 the end was near.
To give De Gaulle credit, he did not take extraordinary measures to stay in power, once the people clearly rejected his desires he left willingly If sadly.
My conclusion is odd. Over a d over as I read this book and watched his behaviors and temperament and tendencies to autocratic behavior I was reminded of Trump. The bluster, The I’ll take my ball and go home, the knee jerk defense of the military and any rule by force as well as the almost automatic rejection of the presumed status quo with noted allies.
Of course this falls apart as soon as one examines De Gaulle in full. He was intelligent, he had fierce ethics, he had morals. He was, in actuality, the opposite of Trump in his appetites and loyalty to the state above people. Still the behaviors of similarity do pop up.
De Gaulle provided a stability that France needed and allowed them the window to become one of the leaders of Europe. After World War 2, in his twelve years out of power the country again ran through governments in an extreme fashion. It seemed they were ungovernable. The General did change that.
His importance to France in the twentieth century cannot be underestimated. He was everything.
June 30, 2018
I have long wanted to learn more about Charles De Gaulle and this excellent biography has proved ideal for this purpose. Clearly and lucidly written, it projects the majesty and significance of its subject without ever becoming too difficult to read. Recommended as both a stand-alone work and as a basis for further reading and study.
October 13, 2012
This is a long, informative, and rather sympathetic biography of Charles De Gaulle written by a noted British journalist who worked for many years in France. The book provides a comprehensive view of de Gaulle's life and is especially strong in its coverage of his early life and role as the leader of the Free French(a role de Gaulle essentially assumed by his own force of personality). Unfortunately, the book is very uneven in its treatment of events after the war, especially when it comes to the period spanning 1946-58, when de Gaulle was out of office. The book regains its footing once de Gaulle returns to power. Overall, I liked the book, but I don't know if I would recommend it. On the positive side, the author does portray de Gaulle as "a highly human, and humanist, figure" who cared deeply about his country and felt that it had a special role to play in postwar world affairs (which likely accounts for his problems with American leaders). On the other hand, the book becomes too enmeshed in details at points and periodically abandons a narrative structure in favor of long, bullet-point lists, as happens with the coverage of the 1968 demonstrations. Also, the very poor quality of the e-book edition (many formatting errors)is disappointing in light of the the book's price.
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January 22, 2017Closer to Churchill and Roosevelt than Petian and Chamberlain, although the former two detested him (and he reciprocated). What's most remarkable besides his leading the resistance to Vichy during WWII was his overseeing the modernization of France—its industry, infrastructure, university system, self-determination, government. Dude had an ego, though. Saw himself as France and France as him. But without him, France might not be the major power it is today. Tried to school Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson on Vietnam; too bad they didn't learn until too late for the 57,000+ brothers & sisters of my generation who died in the invasion. Jonathan Fenby did an admirable job of reporting if not story telling.
April 9, 2018
I read this having always had oddly little sense of even the basics of de Gaulle’s life and how he impacted French and European politics. It’s a very comprehensive read which places him in context, while also letting his personality and actions speak for themselves. Where it falls down slightly is at key junctures of his life - in 1940, 1958 and 1968- when it turns consciously into a day-by-day chronology which misses the broad sweep of events. It’s not for people who just want a sense of the man (it’s too hefty for that), but it strikes a good balance between narrative and letting you draw your own conclusions as to how lasting, and in what areas, his legacy was.
July 4, 2017
The best biographers develop a deep empathy for their subjects that allow the writer to judiciously illuminate the best and worst of their characters. The result is a work that allows us to understand deeply what animates a person's ideas and motivates their actions. Fenby does not manage to accomplish this in his somewhat mean portrayal of Charles DeGaulle. In Fenby's defense, DeGaulle is not a very sympathetic character. He conflates France's glory with his own. On the other hand, he is arguably the most important political figure in modern French history.
January 22, 2013
Others have described this book, so I won't repeat what they wrote. I found it informative but boring and had trouble keeping track of the many cast of characters. To be sure this was a historical book, but there are histories and there are histories. Some historians, like Timothy Snyder, make history come to life. Some do not. Fenby does not.
February 21, 2015
De Gaulle must have been one of the mots extraordinary men who has ever lived. His conviction that he was France. like a medieval king, could have seemed pathological but allowed him to "save" France not once but twice. His love of France was the defining passion of his life, yet he was repeatedly disappointed by the French.
August 19, 2023
Eloquently written biography that besides the political developments on occasion also lifts the veil on De Gaulle's family life and his foibles as a father and husband. To do real justice to the man and his times De Gaulle would merit a two or perhaps even three part biography along the lines of the Manchester tomes on Churchill. As things are, this is a very readable bio.
February 22, 2018
Magnificent biography of the man who reminded us that history is shaped in part by great men. I've now finished it for the third time and will read it again -- there are always new insights to be found
February 13, 2017
Great book. Not a particularly likeable personality to portray.
October 28, 2017
Dense and detailed but a still readable biography. Explains how De Gaulle's dictatorial tendencies were mitigated by his strong sense that he served France and not the other way around.
January 26, 2018
An intimate portrait of a towering figure. The book makes a fantastic case that those who discount the "great man" theory of history should consider 20th century France without Charles de Gaulle.
April 2, 2022
I came away from this book none the wiser as to why De Gaulle holds such an iconic position in French history. His power verged on authoritarianism, his egotism was off the charts, and he seems to have been loathed by almost everyone he met, French and foreign alike.
Stalin looked down on him, Khrushchev dismissed him by noting 'If France had a hundred thermo-nuclear bombs, we would not be worried. But if Germany had just one, that would change the world situation” [455] and Brezhnev ‘summed up the Russian view: […]while he was “an enemy’, his policy had the advantage of weakening US positions in Europe. So he would be humoured. But when it came to Great Power politics, the reality was that he was not much further forward with the Soviets than he had been with Stalin.’ [546]
Charles Bohlen, the US ambassador to Paris, described him as “one of the biggest sons of bitches who ever straddled a pot”. [499]
Roosevelt felt that ‘De Gaulle was determined to establish a dictatorship in France. “There is no man in whom I have less confidence.”’ [198]
Eisenhower noted: “It was all or nothing with him. He wanted it at the top, like Caesar. [But] he didn’t have any means of exercising real world power.” [542]
‘“I don’t like the son of a bitch’, Truman told his staff.’ [282]
‘Kennedy thought that De Gaulle cared only for the 'selfish' interests of France and, echoing Churchill's wartime feelings, concluded that he seemed to prefer tension instead of intimacy in his relations with the United States as a matter of pride and independence'. 'Rather quickly, the Kennedy administration reached a point where we simply did not care what de Gaulle thought except on those matters over which he had a veto," the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, recalled. 'We learned to proceed without him." When he again visited Europe in 1963, Kennedy did not go to France.’ [472]
‘For all his lofty admonitions, and the domestic appeal of the vision of a France reborn, the
General could all too easily seem like a bad-tempered dog yapping at the heels of Washington.’ [522]
Even his own supporters didn’t care for him:
His supporter in Algiers, Louis Joxe, wrote of him at this time as 'proud, haughty, vain, arrogant... Reserved, suspicious, grudge-bearing, indeed hard, wounding, and sometimes vindictive... often indifferent and remote’. [201]
Inevitably, his relations with the British form a significant part of the narrative, with Churchill coming off as a man with almost limitless patience, enduring the endless petty nonsense that De Gaulle was prone to.
‘While Roosevelt would dismiss the General as an unbalanced crypto dictator who took himself for Joan of Arc, Churchill swung between extremes, admiring his 'massive strength' and hailing him as 'perhaps the last survivor of a warrior race', but then threatening to have him clapped in chains. In 1942, when the writer and politician Harold Nicolson said that, for all the problems he caused, the General was a great man, the Prime Minister responded: 'A great man? Why, he's selfish, he's arrogant, he thinks he's the centre of the universe.’ [133]
De Gaulle ‘depended on the help of the British and, to a lesser degree, the Americans. But he
had to ensure that this assistance did not reduce his status: 'I am too poor to be able to bow,’ he told Churchill. The result was a series of monumental clashes, in which the General repeatedly went to the brink. Meeting him in September 1940, the diplomat Hervé Alphand detected 'no desire to please, no concern for nuances, no spirit of negotiation. The only manoeuvre he seemed to know and use was that of the tank that forges ahead.' De Gaulle himself told his spokesman, Maurice Schumann, that intransigence was the one weapon he had, and one which served his campaign to establish leadership of the French. 'He had to be rude to the British to prove to French eyes that he was not a British puppet,' Churchill observed. He certainly carried out this policy with perseverance.”
Observing how well-brought-up British officials shrank from a row, he decided to attack as if leading a military charge. Initially, his offensive approach brought a cold shoulder from his hosts, he noted: 'No meetings, no correspondence, no visit nor lunches. The telephone did not ring. Those British whom we met by chance were sombre and impenetrable.' Then a formal discussion would be organised, followed by détente, with favourable mentions in the press and a result that was 'very much what we had proposed in the first place'. As for his relationship with the Prime Minister, he observed: 'When I am right, I get angry. Churchill gets angry when he is wrong. We are angry at each other much of the time.’ [132]
In the days before D-Day, ‘Roosevelt decreed that Eisenhower should have the freedom to deal with groups in France other than a provisional government Washington did not recognise. A text to be read out on the radio and distributed in leaflets named Eisenhower as ultimate authority for France and omitted any mention of Fighting France, the Resistance or de Gaulle. Shown this, de Gaulle exploded. Eisenhower said the leaflets might be modified - a diplomatic lie since they had already been printed. [239]
Three hours before the invasion was to commence, De Gaulle’s representative ‘confirmed that there would be no liaison help for 'an occupation' of France. Going on to the Connaught [Hotel], Vienot was treated to a tirade from De Gaulle, who described Churchill as a gangster.’ Churchill ‘accused de Gaulle of 'treason at the height of battle' and of putting no value on the lives of British and American soldiers [and] dictated an instruction that De Gaulle was to be flown to Algiers 'in chains if necessary' and a letter to the General ordering him out of Britain’.
‘He did not ask De Gaulle to accompany him when he visited Normandy on 12 June. […] Nor did the Prime Minister attend a dinner Eden gave for De Gaulle. He also raised last-minute objections, without success, about De Gaulle's intention to visit France. In Washington, the War Secretary, Henry Stimson, added to the anti-De Gaulle sentiment when he compared the General's opposition to the issuing of special franc notes by the US forces to a stab in the back. The more he considered the situation, the more convinced he was of the danger the Frenchman represented, he told Roosevelt'. [240/1]
‘Fresh trouble broke out with the British after they launched an operation against the French territory of Madagascar in May 1942, without informing De Gaulle. He ordered the Foreign Affairs Commissioner, Maurice Dejean, to have nothing to do with the Foreign Office, and refused a request from Eden to meet. After two days, however, he considered that he had put up enough of a show and condescended to talk to the Prime Minister. Everything was settled. 'After all,' the General remarked, it's better to see those English pigs in Diego Suarez than those pigs of Germans.’ [184]
Before leaving London on 30 May 1943, De Gaulle had a meeting with Eden at which the Foreign Secretary asked him what he thought of the British. Nobody's more friendly than your people,' the General replied. I do not always think the same of your policy.’
‘Do you know that, of all the European allies, you have caused us the most difficulties?' Eden asked in a friendly tone. 'I don't doubt that,' de Gaulle replied with a smile. "France is a great power.’ [221]
Reading this book, it’s not Napoleon who springs to mind, but Trump. Like The Donald, he had complete faith in his own ability:
‘[…] the General’s authority extended to any field or subject in which he chose to interest himself. As he made clear, ministers were there to implement his instructions. The government emanated from him. Decisions were not taken ‘by’ cabinet sessions, he stated in a note, but ‘in’ them.’ [428]
He was distant:
‘Those who called on the General in June 1940 found him inexpressibly remote, intensely reserved, apparently lacking in humour or concern for others, a man from another era who belonged in a suit of armour and helmet.’ [134]
He was pompous:
‘The General's estimation of his own status was certainly high. When his secretary raised the prospect of him becoming a member of the Académie-Française, he replied: "The King of France does not belong to the Academy, nor does Napoléon”.' [318]
He was petty:
‘His prickliness towards the British led to a particularly unpleasant, if characteristic, incident during victory celebrations on the Champs Élysées when the Free French ambulance unit which Lady Spears had helped to run passed the reviewing stand. The vehicles bore British and French flags, and as they passed a group of wounded French soldiers, a cry went up "Voilà Spears. Vive Spears!" ("There's Spears! Long live Spears!') De Gaulle turned to General Koenig and ordered that the ambulance unit was to be disbanded forthwith and its British member sent home. In protest, French officers being treated by the unit returned their medals to the War Ministry in Paris. As Lady Spears wrote, it was "a pitiable business when a great man suddenly becomes small."' [287/8]
He demanded loyalty but didn’t give it in return:
Georges Pompidou seems to have been one of the very few people the General liked, but when he becomes too popular de Gaulle doesn’t hesitate to replace him: “Something in me was shaken, Pompidou recalled. He felt ‘as if I had ashes in my mouth’ [610] and spoke of the bitterness felt by loyal deputies at the way in which he had abandoned them. […] ‘While demanding the unswerving loyalty of others, the General never hesitated to close the door on them when it suited him.’ [353]
He had strong authoritarian tendencies:
He maintained tight control over the press, with Gaullists heading the Agency France Presse and the Paris bureau of Reuters, and ‘he would not allowing politicians, authors or critics to speak about him without his prior approval on the state broadcasting network. […] He inveighed against its news programmes as superficial, pessimistic and inclined to run reports that reflected badly on the authorities, instead of “what is approved, official and national.”’ [512]
‘From the relatively restrained version of the constitution approved at the referendum of 1958, France had moved towards a system which, at least in the eyes of its ruler, equated to the assertion by Louis XV in 1766 that the sovereign authority rested in his person or, as Louis XIV had put it, 'L'état, c'est moi' ('I am the state'). The constitution as it now stood, de Gaulle said, meant that the supreme power emanated from the people, not from parliamentary 'partisans'. The head of state held this power thanks to his election by the nation; he alone delegated the indivisible authority of the state' in the ministerial civilian, military and judicial spheres.' [525]
During the student protests in May 1968 he said “We are dealing with an armed organisation whose object is subversion. When the child gets angry, the best way of calming him down is sometimes to give him a clout. […] This is a minor matter that must be settled with firmness… Neither truncheons nor tear gas should be spared.”’ [574/5]
His views on women were outdated:
“The pill/ Never! One cannot reduce women to a machine to make love! You would be going against nature what inmost precious to a woman, fertility. She is made to have children!”’ [534]
I guess reducing women to a machine to make babies was ok, but not a machine to make love.
‘It was a very masculine world. De Gaulle did not consider women to be cut out for political positions, and feared that their presence would interfere with the smooth working of his administrative machine. Nor did he set much store by their opinions. After the wife of his Minister of State, Louis Jacquinot, joined the conversation at some length during a lunch, the General remarked to him: 'My dear friend, we agree: men should remain bachelors. On a rare occasion when Yvonne de Gaulle ventured a political opinion, he told her 'get back to your saucepans.’ [422] [Probably for the best: this was the woman who wanted her husband to ban mini-skirts in the 1960’s.]
But above all, De Gaulle was massively, ridiculously egotistical:
‘In a broadcast to the nation on 28 December 1958, de Gaulle referred to himself as 'the Guide of France and Head of the Republican State'. Despite his dozen years out of power, he spoke of enjoying a legitimacy stretching back to 1940. ‘Basically, the Republic is me.”’ [417]
[In 1965] ‘He still had plenty of unfinished business to deal with, and linked himself to the survival of the Fifth republic. If he did not get the overwhelming backing of the people […], “nobody can doubt that everything will collapse.”’
Ultimately, how to quantify his achievements?
‘The French regarded the building of a strong state, France’s international status and the resolution of the Algerian crisis as the main achievements of the General’s seven years in power’. [539]
‘If all successful leaders are, to varying degrees, magicians and actors, the three who led the Western resistance to Nazi Germany were in a special class as star performers, employing spoken words as a major weapon - Churchill in his great wartime speeches, Franklin Roosevelt in addresses to the nation and his radio fireside chats, Charles de Gaulle in his use of an extreme command of the French language to set out a grand vision that would have been hyperbole coming from anybody else. It was the Frenchman who kept his magic going the longest and conjured most from least.’ [131]
‘He liked to call himself the only true revolutionary among France's leaders. His conduct after the Liberation hardly bore out that claim. He knew what he wanted-to restore his country's great ness- and what he did not want a return to the pre-war system of parties, intrigues, combinations. On the first count, he achieved only partial success. On the second, his record was remarkably cautious and ended in failure.' [261]
Perhaps the most jarring thing is the way he speaks about his former allies. In 1956, at the time of the Suez crisis, he said, “You have to be a socialist to believe in the military virtues of the British.” [370]
‘Summoning Duff Cooper, De Gaulle told him […] “I recognise that we are not in a position to wage war against you. But you have outraged France and betrayed the West. That cannot be forgotten.”’ [288]
The irony of his selective amnesia is both amusing and depressing.
On August 25th, 1944 Paris was liberated, pretty much solely by French people, at least if you were to believe what De Gaulle said in his speech at the Hotel de Ville the following day:
‘“Paris that stood up to liberate itself and that knew how to do this with its own hands. […] Liberated by itself, liberated by its people with the help of the French armies, with the support and help of all France.”’ [254]
In June of 1964 he chose not to attend the 20th Anniversary of Operation Overlord:
‘participation would have been a painful acceptance that the Liberation had been the work of non-French forces.’ [518]
Quick history lesson: ‘The Allies landed more than 160,000 troops at Normandy, of which 73,000 were American and 83,115 British and Canadian. Allied casualties on June 6 have been estimated at 10,000 killed, wounded, and missing in action. From D-day through August 21, the Allies landed more than two million men in northern France and suffered more than 226,386 casualties: 72,911 killed/missing and 153,475 wounded.’
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/... Despite Ireland being neutral, there were more Irishmen (70,000 enlisted in the British Army) than Frenchmen (177) on the beaches of Normandy on D-Day.
But yes, of course, France was “liberated by itself”.
Charles De Gaulle was ‘viewed by many as a man lacking in humanity, an arrogant autocrat in a world of his own. That he emerged triumphant from the war years was a tribute to his strategic vision, tactical skill, sheer pig-headedness and ability to channel his strong emotions in constructive directions for both himself and his cause.' [134]
‘In 1956 De Gaulle said, “Great circumstances bring forth great men. Only during crises do nations throw up giants.’ As for himself, he remarked, “I will be better understood in fifty years.” [374]
Well it’s been more than fifty years, and after reading this book I can’t say I understand De Gaulle's popularity or his success, and I certainly can't understand the attraction of the man. He was by turns haughty, proud, vain, monomaniacal, pompous, reactionary and overbearing, frequently all at once. But he was in the right place at the right time, made a wise decision to reject Petain, and from that one choice all his later success seemed to flow.
France’s greatest leader famously said "Ability is of little value without opportunity, I had rather my generals be lucky than able”. The General was the living embodiment of this.
Stalin looked down on him, Khrushchev dismissed him by noting 'If France had a hundred thermo-nuclear bombs, we would not be worried. But if Germany had just one, that would change the world situation” [455] and Brezhnev ‘summed up the Russian view: […]while he was “an enemy’, his policy had the advantage of weakening US positions in Europe. So he would be humoured. But when it came to Great Power politics, the reality was that he was not much further forward with the Soviets than he had been with Stalin.’ [546]
Charles Bohlen, the US ambassador to Paris, described him as “one of the biggest sons of bitches who ever straddled a pot”. [499]
Roosevelt felt that ‘De Gaulle was determined to establish a dictatorship in France. “There is no man in whom I have less confidence.”’ [198]
Eisenhower noted: “It was all or nothing with him. He wanted it at the top, like Caesar. [But] he didn’t have any means of exercising real world power.” [542]
‘“I don’t like the son of a bitch’, Truman told his staff.’ [282]
‘Kennedy thought that De Gaulle cared only for the 'selfish' interests of France and, echoing Churchill's wartime feelings, concluded that he seemed to prefer tension instead of intimacy in his relations with the United States as a matter of pride and independence'. 'Rather quickly, the Kennedy administration reached a point where we simply did not care what de Gaulle thought except on those matters over which he had a veto," the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, recalled. 'We learned to proceed without him." When he again visited Europe in 1963, Kennedy did not go to France.’ [472]
‘For all his lofty admonitions, and the domestic appeal of the vision of a France reborn, the
General could all too easily seem like a bad-tempered dog yapping at the heels of Washington.’ [522]
Even his own supporters didn’t care for him:
His supporter in Algiers, Louis Joxe, wrote of him at this time as 'proud, haughty, vain, arrogant... Reserved, suspicious, grudge-bearing, indeed hard, wounding, and sometimes vindictive... often indifferent and remote’. [201]
Inevitably, his relations with the British form a significant part of the narrative, with Churchill coming off as a man with almost limitless patience, enduring the endless petty nonsense that De Gaulle was prone to.
‘While Roosevelt would dismiss the General as an unbalanced crypto dictator who took himself for Joan of Arc, Churchill swung between extremes, admiring his 'massive strength' and hailing him as 'perhaps the last survivor of a warrior race', but then threatening to have him clapped in chains. In 1942, when the writer and politician Harold Nicolson said that, for all the problems he caused, the General was a great man, the Prime Minister responded: 'A great man? Why, he's selfish, he's arrogant, he thinks he's the centre of the universe.’ [133]
De Gaulle ‘depended on the help of the British and, to a lesser degree, the Americans. But he
had to ensure that this assistance did not reduce his status: 'I am too poor to be able to bow,’ he told Churchill. The result was a series of monumental clashes, in which the General repeatedly went to the brink. Meeting him in September 1940, the diplomat Hervé Alphand detected 'no desire to please, no concern for nuances, no spirit of negotiation. The only manoeuvre he seemed to know and use was that of the tank that forges ahead.' De Gaulle himself told his spokesman, Maurice Schumann, that intransigence was the one weapon he had, and one which served his campaign to establish leadership of the French. 'He had to be rude to the British to prove to French eyes that he was not a British puppet,' Churchill observed. He certainly carried out this policy with perseverance.”
Observing how well-brought-up British officials shrank from a row, he decided to attack as if leading a military charge. Initially, his offensive approach brought a cold shoulder from his hosts, he noted: 'No meetings, no correspondence, no visit nor lunches. The telephone did not ring. Those British whom we met by chance were sombre and impenetrable.' Then a formal discussion would be organised, followed by détente, with favourable mentions in the press and a result that was 'very much what we had proposed in the first place'. As for his relationship with the Prime Minister, he observed: 'When I am right, I get angry. Churchill gets angry when he is wrong. We are angry at each other much of the time.’ [132]
In the days before D-Day, ‘Roosevelt decreed that Eisenhower should have the freedom to deal with groups in France other than a provisional government Washington did not recognise. A text to be read out on the radio and distributed in leaflets named Eisenhower as ultimate authority for France and omitted any mention of Fighting France, the Resistance or de Gaulle. Shown this, de Gaulle exploded. Eisenhower said the leaflets might be modified - a diplomatic lie since they had already been printed. [239]
Three hours before the invasion was to commence, De Gaulle’s representative ‘confirmed that there would be no liaison help for 'an occupation' of France. Going on to the Connaught [Hotel], Vienot was treated to a tirade from De Gaulle, who described Churchill as a gangster.’ Churchill ‘accused de Gaulle of 'treason at the height of battle' and of putting no value on the lives of British and American soldiers [and] dictated an instruction that De Gaulle was to be flown to Algiers 'in chains if necessary' and a letter to the General ordering him out of Britain’.
‘He did not ask De Gaulle to accompany him when he visited Normandy on 12 June. […] Nor did the Prime Minister attend a dinner Eden gave for De Gaulle. He also raised last-minute objections, without success, about De Gaulle's intention to visit France. In Washington, the War Secretary, Henry Stimson, added to the anti-De Gaulle sentiment when he compared the General's opposition to the issuing of special franc notes by the US forces to a stab in the back. The more he considered the situation, the more convinced he was of the danger the Frenchman represented, he told Roosevelt'. [240/1]
‘Fresh trouble broke out with the British after they launched an operation against the French territory of Madagascar in May 1942, without informing De Gaulle. He ordered the Foreign Affairs Commissioner, Maurice Dejean, to have nothing to do with the Foreign Office, and refused a request from Eden to meet. After two days, however, he considered that he had put up enough of a show and condescended to talk to the Prime Minister. Everything was settled. 'After all,' the General remarked, it's better to see those English pigs in Diego Suarez than those pigs of Germans.’ [184]
Before leaving London on 30 May 1943, De Gaulle had a meeting with Eden at which the Foreign Secretary asked him what he thought of the British. Nobody's more friendly than your people,' the General replied. I do not always think the same of your policy.’
‘Do you know that, of all the European allies, you have caused us the most difficulties?' Eden asked in a friendly tone. 'I don't doubt that,' de Gaulle replied with a smile. "France is a great power.’ [221]
Reading this book, it’s not Napoleon who springs to mind, but Trump. Like The Donald, he had complete faith in his own ability:
‘[…] the General’s authority extended to any field or subject in which he chose to interest himself. As he made clear, ministers were there to implement his instructions. The government emanated from him. Decisions were not taken ‘by’ cabinet sessions, he stated in a note, but ‘in’ them.’ [428]
He was distant:
‘Those who called on the General in June 1940 found him inexpressibly remote, intensely reserved, apparently lacking in humour or concern for others, a man from another era who belonged in a suit of armour and helmet.’ [134]
He was pompous:
‘The General's estimation of his own status was certainly high. When his secretary raised the prospect of him becoming a member of the Académie-Française, he replied: "The King of France does not belong to the Academy, nor does Napoléon”.' [318]
He was petty:
‘His prickliness towards the British led to a particularly unpleasant, if characteristic, incident during victory celebrations on the Champs Élysées when the Free French ambulance unit which Lady Spears had helped to run passed the reviewing stand. The vehicles bore British and French flags, and as they passed a group of wounded French soldiers, a cry went up "Voilà Spears. Vive Spears!" ("There's Spears! Long live Spears!') De Gaulle turned to General Koenig and ordered that the ambulance unit was to be disbanded forthwith and its British member sent home. In protest, French officers being treated by the unit returned their medals to the War Ministry in Paris. As Lady Spears wrote, it was "a pitiable business when a great man suddenly becomes small."' [287/8]
He demanded loyalty but didn’t give it in return:
Georges Pompidou seems to have been one of the very few people the General liked, but when he becomes too popular de Gaulle doesn’t hesitate to replace him: “Something in me was shaken, Pompidou recalled. He felt ‘as if I had ashes in my mouth’ [610] and spoke of the bitterness felt by loyal deputies at the way in which he had abandoned them. […] ‘While demanding the unswerving loyalty of others, the General never hesitated to close the door on them when it suited him.’ [353]
He had strong authoritarian tendencies:
He maintained tight control over the press, with Gaullists heading the Agency France Presse and the Paris bureau of Reuters, and ‘he would not allowing politicians, authors or critics to speak about him without his prior approval on the state broadcasting network. […] He inveighed against its news programmes as superficial, pessimistic and inclined to run reports that reflected badly on the authorities, instead of “what is approved, official and national.”’ [512]
‘From the relatively restrained version of the constitution approved at the referendum of 1958, France had moved towards a system which, at least in the eyes of its ruler, equated to the assertion by Louis XV in 1766 that the sovereign authority rested in his person or, as Louis XIV had put it, 'L'état, c'est moi' ('I am the state'). The constitution as it now stood, de Gaulle said, meant that the supreme power emanated from the people, not from parliamentary 'partisans'. The head of state held this power thanks to his election by the nation; he alone delegated the indivisible authority of the state' in the ministerial civilian, military and judicial spheres.' [525]
During the student protests in May 1968 he said “We are dealing with an armed organisation whose object is subversion. When the child gets angry, the best way of calming him down is sometimes to give him a clout. […] This is a minor matter that must be settled with firmness… Neither truncheons nor tear gas should be spared.”’ [574/5]
His views on women were outdated:
“The pill/ Never! One cannot reduce women to a machine to make love! You would be going against nature what inmost precious to a woman, fertility. She is made to have children!”’ [534]
I guess reducing women to a machine to make babies was ok, but not a machine to make love.
‘It was a very masculine world. De Gaulle did not consider women to be cut out for political positions, and feared that their presence would interfere with the smooth working of his administrative machine. Nor did he set much store by their opinions. After the wife of his Minister of State, Louis Jacquinot, joined the conversation at some length during a lunch, the General remarked to him: 'My dear friend, we agree: men should remain bachelors. On a rare occasion when Yvonne de Gaulle ventured a political opinion, he told her 'get back to your saucepans.’ [422] [Probably for the best: this was the woman who wanted her husband to ban mini-skirts in the 1960’s.]
But above all, De Gaulle was massively, ridiculously egotistical:
‘In a broadcast to the nation on 28 December 1958, de Gaulle referred to himself as 'the Guide of France and Head of the Republican State'. Despite his dozen years out of power, he spoke of enjoying a legitimacy stretching back to 1940. ‘Basically, the Republic is me.”’ [417]
[In 1965] ‘He still had plenty of unfinished business to deal with, and linked himself to the survival of the Fifth republic. If he did not get the overwhelming backing of the people […], “nobody can doubt that everything will collapse.”’
Ultimately, how to quantify his achievements?
‘The French regarded the building of a strong state, France’s international status and the resolution of the Algerian crisis as the main achievements of the General’s seven years in power’. [539]
‘If all successful leaders are, to varying degrees, magicians and actors, the three who led the Western resistance to Nazi Germany were in a special class as star performers, employing spoken words as a major weapon - Churchill in his great wartime speeches, Franklin Roosevelt in addresses to the nation and his radio fireside chats, Charles de Gaulle in his use of an extreme command of the French language to set out a grand vision that would have been hyperbole coming from anybody else. It was the Frenchman who kept his magic going the longest and conjured most from least.’ [131]
‘He liked to call himself the only true revolutionary among France's leaders. His conduct after the Liberation hardly bore out that claim. He knew what he wanted-to restore his country's great ness- and what he did not want a return to the pre-war system of parties, intrigues, combinations. On the first count, he achieved only partial success. On the second, his record was remarkably cautious and ended in failure.' [261]
Perhaps the most jarring thing is the way he speaks about his former allies. In 1956, at the time of the Suez crisis, he said, “You have to be a socialist to believe in the military virtues of the British.” [370]
‘Summoning Duff Cooper, De Gaulle told him […] “I recognise that we are not in a position to wage war against you. But you have outraged France and betrayed the West. That cannot be forgotten.”’ [288]
The irony of his selective amnesia is both amusing and depressing.
On August 25th, 1944 Paris was liberated, pretty much solely by French people, at least if you were to believe what De Gaulle said in his speech at the Hotel de Ville the following day:
‘“Paris that stood up to liberate itself and that knew how to do this with its own hands. […] Liberated by itself, liberated by its people with the help of the French armies, with the support and help of all France.”’ [254]
In June of 1964 he chose not to attend the 20th Anniversary of Operation Overlord:
‘participation would have been a painful acceptance that the Liberation had been the work of non-French forces.’ [518]
Quick history lesson: ‘The Allies landed more than 160,000 troops at Normandy, of which 73,000 were American and 83,115 British and Canadian. Allied casualties on June 6 have been estimated at 10,000 killed, wounded, and missing in action. From D-day through August 21, the Allies landed more than two million men in northern France and suffered more than 226,386 casualties: 72,911 killed/missing and 153,475 wounded.’
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/... Despite Ireland being neutral, there were more Irishmen (70,000 enlisted in the British Army) than Frenchmen (177) on the beaches of Normandy on D-Day.
But yes, of course, France was “liberated by itself”.
Charles De Gaulle was ‘viewed by many as a man lacking in humanity, an arrogant autocrat in a world of his own. That he emerged triumphant from the war years was a tribute to his strategic vision, tactical skill, sheer pig-headedness and ability to channel his strong emotions in constructive directions for both himself and his cause.' [134]
‘In 1956 De Gaulle said, “Great circumstances bring forth great men. Only during crises do nations throw up giants.’ As for himself, he remarked, “I will be better understood in fifty years.” [374]
Well it’s been more than fifty years, and after reading this book I can’t say I understand De Gaulle's popularity or his success, and I certainly can't understand the attraction of the man. He was by turns haughty, proud, vain, monomaniacal, pompous, reactionary and overbearing, frequently all at once. But he was in the right place at the right time, made a wise decision to reject Petain, and from that one choice all his later success seemed to flow.
France’s greatest leader famously said "Ability is of little value without opportunity, I had rather my generals be lucky than able”. The General was the living embodiment of this.
December 8, 2018
I can’t ever recall reading a book that started out so promising, so enrapturing, and yet by the midway point, turned into a disappointing thud of a clunker. It might be a tad unfair to blame this sudden reversal of fortune on the author. Instead, one might concede that the life of the subject matter just became uninteresting as did the events that surrounded him at a certain point. Still, one wishes that the author may have realized this as well, and therefore had handled the latter half of the man’s life in not so quite of a meticulous fashion.
As the title implies, yes, Charles De Gaulle did save France, and he “saved” it on more than one occasion. For me, the story that was the most engrossing was the role De Gaulle played in World War II. At the conclusion of World War II, the story then shifts to De Gaulle’s political life. Sadly, this is where the book became about as interesting as picking out a pair of socks to wear for the day.
The author treats his subject matter in a fairly balanced way. He comes across in the author’s view as a positive figure (after all, he ‘saved’ France), yet it makes your head spin how many of De Gaulle’s contemporaries loathed him. Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Khrushchev, Truman….none of them had kind words for the man. As we see, however, this is mainly due to his hard, uncompromising arrogance and such a trait is necessary because of the circumstances.
De Gaulle’s early life is quickly glossed over – a bit more attention is focused on his comings and goings during the first world war. He was quickly made a commander, quickly became one of the first of the wounded, quickly resumed command and was quickly captured by the enemy and made prisoner. He then attempted an escape no less than five times. This stuff is exciting to read about.
Even better is the transition to World War II. France, the ultimate victor of World War I is basically so exhausted and fatigued, that they ignore Hitler and rival Germany as they slowly grow to become the most fearsome army in modern civilization. With revenge on Hitler’s mind, France is quickly added to his list of conquests. France capitulates – mainly because they simply don’t have it in them to fight anymore. The battle scars from 25 years ago are still fresh. Except De Gaulle. He remains the only key player that refuses any part of the puppet Vichy government and quickly sets up base in the French North Africa. Although the allies ultimately prevail, the hawk De Gaulle isn’t allowed to be a major player, and is rather upset when the U.S. and England basically leave him as a spectator on the sidelines. This is the case even during the Battle of Normandy (D-Day). De Gaulle simply can’t fathom this. It is after all, HIS ‘country’. So one begins to see why the other leaders consider him a burr in the butt. Again, exciting stuff.
I wish the book would have wound down at this point. After World War II, the book turns into a giant Wikipedia article with mostly the everyday comings and goings of the French government. There are brief bits of interesting material – such as the failures in Algiers and Indochina, but the book focuses too much on the minutia of the fall of the Fourth Republic, the rise of the Fifth Republic, etc. Yes, De Gaulle was a major player, but all of this is simply not exciting stuff. I confess that there were times where I became so bored, I would basically scan a 50-page chapter in about five minutes. At least it helped me fall asleep some nights.
Another minor irritant is that the author simply won’t refer to his subject as “De Gaulle”. He is always referring to him by his rank, title, or some other euphemism. It became confusing when he’s referred to as “The Colonel”, “The General”, and “The Free French Leader” all in a span of about 50 pages. On a positive note, a fair amount of time is spent with his immediate family, and De Gaulle does come across as quite the loving husband and father – especially with his daughter who suffered from Down’s Syndrome.
Perhaps a reader with a more thorough understanding of the ins and outs of the French government and its personalities will enjoy the latter half of the book more than I did. I still would recommend it, just be prepared to be bogged down rather heavily during the latter portions.
As the title implies, yes, Charles De Gaulle did save France, and he “saved” it on more than one occasion. For me, the story that was the most engrossing was the role De Gaulle played in World War II. At the conclusion of World War II, the story then shifts to De Gaulle’s political life. Sadly, this is where the book became about as interesting as picking out a pair of socks to wear for the day.
The author treats his subject matter in a fairly balanced way. He comes across in the author’s view as a positive figure (after all, he ‘saved’ France), yet it makes your head spin how many of De Gaulle’s contemporaries loathed him. Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Khrushchev, Truman….none of them had kind words for the man. As we see, however, this is mainly due to his hard, uncompromising arrogance and such a trait is necessary because of the circumstances.
De Gaulle’s early life is quickly glossed over – a bit more attention is focused on his comings and goings during the first world war. He was quickly made a commander, quickly became one of the first of the wounded, quickly resumed command and was quickly captured by the enemy and made prisoner. He then attempted an escape no less than five times. This stuff is exciting to read about.
Even better is the transition to World War II. France, the ultimate victor of World War I is basically so exhausted and fatigued, that they ignore Hitler and rival Germany as they slowly grow to become the most fearsome army in modern civilization. With revenge on Hitler’s mind, France is quickly added to his list of conquests. France capitulates – mainly because they simply don’t have it in them to fight anymore. The battle scars from 25 years ago are still fresh. Except De Gaulle. He remains the only key player that refuses any part of the puppet Vichy government and quickly sets up base in the French North Africa. Although the allies ultimately prevail, the hawk De Gaulle isn’t allowed to be a major player, and is rather upset when the U.S. and England basically leave him as a spectator on the sidelines. This is the case even during the Battle of Normandy (D-Day). De Gaulle simply can’t fathom this. It is after all, HIS ‘country’. So one begins to see why the other leaders consider him a burr in the butt. Again, exciting stuff.
I wish the book would have wound down at this point. After World War II, the book turns into a giant Wikipedia article with mostly the everyday comings and goings of the French government. There are brief bits of interesting material – such as the failures in Algiers and Indochina, but the book focuses too much on the minutia of the fall of the Fourth Republic, the rise of the Fifth Republic, etc. Yes, De Gaulle was a major player, but all of this is simply not exciting stuff. I confess that there were times where I became so bored, I would basically scan a 50-page chapter in about five minutes. At least it helped me fall asleep some nights.
Another minor irritant is that the author simply won’t refer to his subject as “De Gaulle”. He is always referring to him by his rank, title, or some other euphemism. It became confusing when he’s referred to as “The Colonel”, “The General”, and “The Free French Leader” all in a span of about 50 pages. On a positive note, a fair amount of time is spent with his immediate family, and De Gaulle does come across as quite the loving husband and father – especially with his daughter who suffered from Down’s Syndrome.
Perhaps a reader with a more thorough understanding of the ins and outs of the French government and its personalities will enjoy the latter half of the book more than I did. I still would recommend it, just be prepared to be bogged down rather heavily during the latter portions.
February 23, 2020
Let me be the first to say, before this book, I never really liked Charles DeGaulle. I thought him as an arrogant pompous man.
BUT...
one picture changed that. I came across a picture of "The General" with his daughter Anne at the beach. This was a side of him I did not know. This led me to this book and completely changed my outlook on this man. Yes, one picture.
Now my wife and I had a young daughter with significant special needs pass away on us when she was 15. But the love General De Gaulle had for his daughter was so close to my heart and I so related to him.
I believe his daughter Anne helped to define who he was.
Fenby's chapter 5 part VI was beautifully written, it captured a part of this man whom I never knew
His and his wife's devotion to raising her in their home, creating a home/charity in honor/memory of Anne (which is still around today) is a side that is not well known. They did not seek to hide her, General DeGaulle simply loved her for who she was. He was a devoted loving father who would go out of his way to put her to bed each night. This chapter ends with "For a Father, Believe me, it is a very great trial. But for me, this child is also a blessing, she is my joy, she has helped me to rise above all setback and honors, and always to aim higher"
Amen General
Amen, Mr. Fenby. I know admire this man as much as I admire Churchill, Eisenhower, and Lincoln (all of who lost children). I understand his passion for both the French honor but who this man was to both France and the world.
My only issue with this book was that there were no pictures. I kept waiting for the pictorial insert.
That though does not take away from the greatness of this man I have now come to admire and appreciate his contribution to history.
Similar to biographies on Grant, Bush Sr, and Churchill, even though I know that passed on, I was sad that they died in the end. I felt like I really got to know these men. I found myself choking up at the end when he died. I came at the end of this book to really love this man.
Thank you Mr. Fenby.
BUT...
one picture changed that. I came across a picture of "The General" with his daughter Anne at the beach. This was a side of him I did not know. This led me to this book and completely changed my outlook on this man. Yes, one picture.
Now my wife and I had a young daughter with significant special needs pass away on us when she was 15. But the love General De Gaulle had for his daughter was so close to my heart and I so related to him.
I believe his daughter Anne helped to define who he was.
Fenby's chapter 5 part VI was beautifully written, it captured a part of this man whom I never knew
His and his wife's devotion to raising her in their home, creating a home/charity in honor/memory of Anne (which is still around today) is a side that is not well known. They did not seek to hide her, General DeGaulle simply loved her for who she was. He was a devoted loving father who would go out of his way to put her to bed each night. This chapter ends with "For a Father, Believe me, it is a very great trial. But for me, this child is also a blessing, she is my joy, she has helped me to rise above all setback and honors, and always to aim higher"
Amen General
Amen, Mr. Fenby. I know admire this man as much as I admire Churchill, Eisenhower, and Lincoln (all of who lost children). I understand his passion for both the French honor but who this man was to both France and the world.
My only issue with this book was that there were no pictures. I kept waiting for the pictorial insert.
That though does not take away from the greatness of this man I have now come to admire and appreciate his contribution to history.
Similar to biographies on Grant, Bush Sr, and Churchill, even though I know that passed on, I was sad that they died in the end. I felt like I really got to know these men. I found myself choking up at the end when he died. I came at the end of this book to really love this man.
Thank you Mr. Fenby.
December 30, 2022
"'Do you know that, of all European allies, you have caused us the most difficulties?' Eden asked in a friendly tone.
'I don't doubt that,' de Gaulle replied with a smile. 'France is a great power.'"
De Gaulle is a man of contradictions. Extremely arrogant and intransigent, he also fell prey to constant bouts of self-pity and doubt. A military man who ruled in an autocratic manner, he insisted on the preservation of democracy and the use of electoral victories to shore up his administration. A noted colonialist and romantic of imperialism, he was the man that allowed for Algerian independence despite the threats to his life that resulted from that decision. While he made constant attacks on the United States and the United Kingdom, he would not have achieved power without their help in the 1940s. A noted pessimist who always believed the worst was about to happen, he had an unshakeable belief in the eternal nature of France and his role within it. Perhaps that, his belief in his role within French history, was the only consistent thing about him. As the author writes of De Gaulle, he was not always right but he was always certain.
These contradictions, the events he oversaw during his time as the "sword of destiny" for France, and his character make De Gaulle one of the most interesting people in modern world history. This biography by Fenby does a good job showing and explaining all aspects of this complicated man, though at times it presumes a greater knowledge of French politics than one should expect. Furthermore, the author has a tendency to just start listing facts without much explanation, perhaps stemming from his journalistic background. But overall, the character of De Gaulle nonetheless shines through and we are able to follow the ups and downs of his career with great interest.
'I don't doubt that,' de Gaulle replied with a smile. 'France is a great power.'"
De Gaulle is a man of contradictions. Extremely arrogant and intransigent, he also fell prey to constant bouts of self-pity and doubt. A military man who ruled in an autocratic manner, he insisted on the preservation of democracy and the use of electoral victories to shore up his administration. A noted colonialist and romantic of imperialism, he was the man that allowed for Algerian independence despite the threats to his life that resulted from that decision. While he made constant attacks on the United States and the United Kingdom, he would not have achieved power without their help in the 1940s. A noted pessimist who always believed the worst was about to happen, he had an unshakeable belief in the eternal nature of France and his role within it. Perhaps that, his belief in his role within French history, was the only consistent thing about him. As the author writes of De Gaulle, he was not always right but he was always certain.
These contradictions, the events he oversaw during his time as the "sword of destiny" for France, and his character make De Gaulle one of the most interesting people in modern world history. This biography by Fenby does a good job showing and explaining all aspects of this complicated man, though at times it presumes a greater knowledge of French politics than one should expect. Furthermore, the author has a tendency to just start listing facts without much explanation, perhaps stemming from his journalistic background. But overall, the character of De Gaulle nonetheless shines through and we are able to follow the ups and downs of his career with great interest.
April 26, 2019
I have for years been interested in reading a biography of the general. This work greatly diminishes whatever respect I had for the general. De Gaulle had an excellent Catholic upbringing. To his credit he practiced his faith for the duration of his life and was an excellent father. He had a daughter who was mentally retarded and he was very kind to her.
I consider myself a Francophile, however De Gaulle simply went way over the top with a type of Gallicanism. In a word, De Gaulle in matters French, was arrogant beyond words.
I recently read a work about two English brothers who assisted the French underground. One of them was captured, the other survived until the end. Needless to say, these two men underwent extreme danger and deprivation in their desire to assist France. When the war ended the surviving brother received a telegram from De Gaulle ordering him to leave France within 48 hours. His fellow French underground members were horrified. De Gaulle wanted all credit to go to France and did not want too much recognition to go to allies who freed them.
De Gaulle's arrogance was so great he consistently violated protocol by placing himself in places where he did not belong, or where he was not even assigned.
De Gaulle's greatest disgrace was abandoning the Algerians who were loyal to France after he gave Algeria up. Tens of thousands along with their families were tortured and slaughtered.
De Gaulle a declared anti-communist, played nice with the Soviet Union and Ho Chi Minh in order to increase the prestige of France.
He opposed NATO which was for France's protection as well as the rest of Europe.
The book was well written. If anyone can recommend a book on De Gaulle that might show another side please let me know.
I consider myself a Francophile, however De Gaulle simply went way over the top with a type of Gallicanism. In a word, De Gaulle in matters French, was arrogant beyond words.
I recently read a work about two English brothers who assisted the French underground. One of them was captured, the other survived until the end. Needless to say, these two men underwent extreme danger and deprivation in their desire to assist France. When the war ended the surviving brother received a telegram from De Gaulle ordering him to leave France within 48 hours. His fellow French underground members were horrified. De Gaulle wanted all credit to go to France and did not want too much recognition to go to allies who freed them.
De Gaulle's arrogance was so great he consistently violated protocol by placing himself in places where he did not belong, or where he was not even assigned.
De Gaulle's greatest disgrace was abandoning the Algerians who were loyal to France after he gave Algeria up. Tens of thousands along with their families were tortured and slaughtered.
De Gaulle a declared anti-communist, played nice with the Soviet Union and Ho Chi Minh in order to increase the prestige of France.
He opposed NATO which was for France's protection as well as the rest of Europe.
The book was well written. If anyone can recommend a book on De Gaulle that might show another side please let me know.
September 12, 2021
A great book, providing a detailed biography of French statesman Charles De Gaulle, along with a history of France through his lifetime. The author, British journalist and historian Jonathan Fenby, skips nothing, covering all the stages of De Gaulle’s life in detail. This provides the thorough background needed to fully understand De Gaulle’s actions and demeanor in his penultimate years as President of the Fifth Republic. Alongside the biography is a running history of France, allowing the reader full immersion into the world De Gaulle experienced. Given the wide expanse of people and events covered, I found myself hard pressed at times to keep track of all the characters. Fenby uses his background as a journalist to provide flavor to the book, recounting personal experiences and using trusted sources to better explain events. I definitely appreciate Gaullism and the role of Western Europe in the early Cold War thanks to this book. A great book for any student of 20th century history. Highly recommended for all seeking a better understanding of how a nation can recover from traumatic wartime defeat.
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