Big-Power Games in the Indian Ocean > Articles

IN OCTOBER last year, the decades-long sovereignty dispute over the Chagos Archipelago seemed to have been solved. The United Kingdom had agreed to return the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), as it is officially called, to Mauritius, to which it belonged before 1965, when that island was still a British colony. Details about the transfer of power over the Chagos Archipelago, a string of islands around 500 kilometers southwest of the Maldives, have yet to be determined — but it is about much more than to whom the mere 56 square kilometers of land and 545,000 square kilometers of ocean around them should belong. The archipelago has at present no native, or permanent, population, but its largest island, Diego Garcia, is where the United States has one of its most important air and naval bases in the Indo-Pacific region. According to the tentative agreement between the UK and Mauritius, the US military will be able to remain there for what has been termed “an initial period” of 99 years.

But those on-the-ground realities, and the uncertain nature of the treaty that the UK and Mauritius are expected to finalize later this year, is already causing concern in Washington. Although the UK has pledged to provide Mauritius with support to develop the islands and needed infrastructure, the fear among US security planners is that China will also step in and take part in transforming the Chagos Archipelago into what lifestyle websites already are calling a tourist paradise like the Maldives. Chinese visitors top tourism arrivals in the Maldives, and China has invested heavily in infrastructure development, the main showpiece being a “friendship bridge” that connects the capital Male with Hulhule Island, where the international airport is located, and Hulhumale, a new, artificial island with residential areas as well as industrial and commercial development zones. 

CHINA’​S INTEREST

Politically, China has become a force to be reckoned with in the Maldives, where pro-Beijing and pro-New Delhi governments regularly succeed one other, reflecting the importance that both China and India place on the Maldives and its strategic location in the middle of the Indian Ocean. Evidently, Beijing’s interests in the region and its island territories go way beyond finding new, attractive destinations for globetrotting Chinese tourists. Or, as Darshana Baruah, a researcher for the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote in April 2023: “Nine of China’s top ten crude oil suppliers transit the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean is also the primary theater of transit for China for engagements with Africa, [the] Middle East, island nations, and littorals across the vast ocean. Going beyond, it is also the main trading route between China and Europe.”

At the same time, Diego Garcia is of utmost importance for America’s operations in the region. At any given time, between 3,000 and 5,000 US military personnel and civilian support staff are based there, and the base provides logistical support to US forces operating in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Ships can dock there, and all kinds of aircraft can land and take off from its runways; its communications systems and signal intelligence capabilities are some of the world’s most advanced. The Diego Garcia base played a crucial role in both Gulf Wars in 1990-91 and 2003 and was also used to support combat missions in Afghanistan.

More controversially, in 2002 the base earned notoriety during then US President George W. Bush’s “war on terror.” It became a “black site” where terrorist suspects who had been captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere were interrogated. Barring a few exceptions, journalists cannot visit Diego Garcia, but much to the embarrassment of the US military and the British authorities who govern the territory, reports of torture of detainees were leaked to the international media.

Seen in that perspective, any change in the status of the Chagos Archipelago could have far-reaching consequences for the security situation and balance of power in the Indian Ocean. If the Chinese would gain a foothold in the archipelago through seemingly innocent investment projects, it would provide them with a key vantage point to monitor US military activities on Diego Garcia.

Politico reported after the announcement was made in October that senior US Republican senators had criticized the British government — formed only three months earlier by the center-left Labour party — for its decision to cede control of the Chagos Archipelago, warning that the move is “a coup for Chinese interests.” Among them were Idaho Senator James Risch, a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Texas Representative Michael McCaul, who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Committee. With Donald Trump in the White House, such concerns are likely to become mainstream politics.

China has what could be argued as a legitimate right to monitor, and, if necessary, defend its economically vital routes across the Indian Ocean. But it is hardly surprising that China’s steadily increasing presence in the Indian Ocean is causing alarm bells to ring in New Delhi. Chinese vessels have not been seen there since the explorer Zheng He’s fleets sailed as far as the Arab peninsula and Africa, and that was in the 15th century. Today’s leaders in Beijing are trying to rewrite history by inventing a “Maritime Silk Road” and claiming that China has always played an important role in regional and even global trade. While a limited number of Chinese seamen may have worked on the ships that sailed across the Indian Ocean in the centuries after Zheng He’s exploits, the actual trade, as author Philip Bowring describes in his book Empire of the Winds: The Global Role of Asia’s Great Archipelago, was carried out by Arabs, Indians and ancestors of today’s Indonesians, Malaysians and Filipinos.

WHO ELSE IS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD?

Reuters reported on Feb. 22, 2024, that “China’s scientific survey fleet of ships is growing, and although the government insists the vessels are for research purposes only, some Asian neighbors, especially India, are concerned that sensitive data they gather might be shared with the Chinese military … China is expanding in both number and size its so-called China Marine Research Vessels, a national survey fleet established in 2012, as President Xi Jinping calls for the building of a ‘strong maritime country.’”

China’s presence in the Indian Ocean also includes submarines, which could hardly be described as maritime research vessels. In August last year, the US Naval Institute wrote on its website: “Within roughly a decade, Chinese-built submarines and the infrastructure to support them have come to stay in the Indian Ocean region. These will undoubtedly become more robust with time.” One such support hub is China’s first-ever overseas military base, which was opened in 2017 in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa and is operated by the People’s Liberation Army Navy.

India has responded by strengthening its navy. In January, India launched a new submarine, a destroyer and a frigate, and that was no doubt linked to the growing rivalry with China in the Indo-Pacific region. As early as 2001, India set up the Andaman and Nicobar Command, its first tri-service command, to safeguard New Delhi’s strategic interests in the waters east of the subcontinent — and, more precisely, to keep a watchful eye on China’s activities in the same maritime region. Headquartered in Port Blair, it co-ordinates the activities in the eastern Indian Ocean of the navy, the army and the air force as well as the coast guard.

Lost on many regional and international observers is that France is another regional power. In fact, France controls more maritime territory in the Indian Ocean than any other country. France’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the Indian Ocean encompasses altogether 2,650,013 square kilometers, which is possible because of all the scattered islands which are under French control. Réunion, with a population of 885,000, is an overseas department of France, and so is the smaller island of Mayotte, northwest of Madagascar, with a population of 320,000. Those overseas departments of France are also regions of the European Union (EU) and part of the eurozone currency union. Regular French troops are stationed on Réunion, and there is a detachment of the French Foreign Legion on Mayotte.

In addition to those inhabited islands, France also controls the Kerguelen Islands, the Crozet archipelago, the St Paul and Amsterdam islands, and a string of smaller islets around and near Madagascar: Juan de Nova, Europa, Bassas da India, Gloriosa and Tromelin. None of those islands have any permanent population, but French scientists, researchers and some military personnel are based there on a rotational basis. More than 100 scientists are based on Kerguelen, the largest and most mountainous of the French-held islands, during the summer and somewhat fewer in winter. Its main settlement, Port-aux-Français, has a satellite tracking station, scientific laboratories, technical installations and, it is rumored, stockpiles of weapons.

And then there is Australia, which has two Indian Ocean territories: Christmas Island and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands. Small and insignificant as they may seem in terms of population and resources — Christmas Island used to have a phosphate mine, but this has been closed since 2017 — those islands give Australia and its allies a strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean. They serve as the outer line of defense for Australia, and in a potential regional conflict with China, the navies of the US and its allies could block Chinese oil supplies from the Middle East. There is at present no military base there, but the Cocos has a long runway lined with huge satellite dishes so, as for now, the importance of that island group lies mainly in its use as a base for electronic surveillance.

US CONCERNS

Washington has been busy building credible alliances to counter China’s rise and ambition to become a dominant power in the Indian Ocean. Beijing, predictably, has responded by saying that those efforts are “doomed to fail,” as government spokesman Zhao Lijian said after a White House summit with then US President Joseph Biden, Australia’s Scott Morrison, Japan’s Yoshihide Suga, and India’s Narendra Modi, in September 2021. Of those, only Modi remains in power, but what is called the QUAD, or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, remains. And then there is the Australia-United Kingdom-United States pact, AUKUS, which is significant because it includes the UK, the departure of which from the EU made it possible for London to collaborate more closely with Washington on the international stage — and that may have been one of the main reasons why it took that step. There is also bilateral co-operation between, for instance, India and France, which have a close military relationship that includes several key defense projects in fields such as submarines and aircraft as well as joint military exercises.

CAN AN AGREEMENT BE TRUSTED?

It remains to be seen what will happen to the Chagos Archipelago after it has been returned to Mauritian rule, and it is not impossible that old grudges may jeopardize the future of the agreement for the Diego Garcia base. Parallels have been drawn with Britain’s agreement with China, where Beijing pledged to uphold the principle of “one country, two systems” for 50 years in Hong Kong after the handover in 1997 and then ignored it by imposing its authoritarian rule on the former freewheeling British colony. Navin Ramgoolam, Mauritian prime minister as of November, has already said that he is not satisfied with the agreement that his predecessor, Pravind Jugnauth, reached with the UK. Without going into detail, Ramgoolam has said it does not benefit Mauritius enough.

Mauritius is not China, and more than half the population of the island republic are descendants of indentured Indian labor that the British brought in during the colonial era to work on the island’s sugar plantations, so relations with India have always been close. But Beijing’s influence is growing, and China sees Mauritius as a gateway to Africa. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Mauritius in 2018, and, in 2019, Mauritius became the first African country to enter into a free-trade agreement with China. There is Chinese investment in finance, real estate, manufacturing and tourism. Mauritius is drawing closer to China, and India is no longer the only major player in its domestic and foreign affairs. 

The Chagos Archipelago was uninhabited when Maldivian and European seafarers visited the islands more than 500 years ago. The French established coconut plantations on the larger islands and brought in slaves from its possessions in the region. The British took over the archipelago in 1815, and it was governed from Mauritius, then also a British colony. Slavery was abolished in 1840, but the workforce and the coconut plantations remained. 

THE DEAL FOR DIEGO GARCIA

Nothing remarkable happened until 1965, when Britain purchased the archipelago from the then self-governing colony of Mauritius. Three years later, Mauritius was granted full independence from Britain, and it has been revealed that independence came at a price. The British had made it clear to the local government of Mauritius that it would not become independent unless it agreed to separate the Chagos Archipelago from its domains. Thus it remained under British control, and it soon became clear why that move was taken. Britain and the US had agreed to turn the main island of Diego Garcia into a formidable military base whereby Britain would remain the governing power, and the US would build a base on Diego Garcia. The choice of Diego Garcia was in line with a US policy at that time called “the Strategic Islands Concept.” Military bases should be built away from populous mainland areas where they could be exposed to anti-Western opposition.

At the same time, the entire population of the archipelago, between 1,000 and 2,000 people, were forcibly evicted and sent to Mauritius and the Seychelles. The original inhabitants, called Chagossians, have for years fought for the right to return home. Those demands were rejected repeatedly by successive British governments, but in 2019, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory stating that the entire British Indian Ocean Territory should be handed back to Mauritius. The Chagossians, now in second and third generations and numbering as many as 10,000, should, in principle, be allowed to settle in the archipelago, but even that is a matter of dispute. Who should be considered a true Chagossian? And to whom should compensation, which also has become an issue, be paid?

But the main question is how the archipelago should be governed and developed once it has become part of Mauritius — and, more important, how the new and future Mauritian governments will balance relations with China and other Indian Ocean powers. Anything could happen, but it would be naïve to believe that China, with its geostrategic interests in the Indian Ocean, would not play an important role in shaping the future of the erstwhile British territory.

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